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ABSTRACT
Internal control evaluation is an area in which IAs and
EAs interface. IAs review internal controls which are
evaluated, and often relied upon, by EAs. It is now
mandatory for UK listed companies to report in their
annual reports whether they are complying with the
Cadbury Code and, if not, why not.
IAs are likely to be involved in the preparation of the
internal control report since they are responsible for
reviewing internal control. EAs have the responsibility
of reviewing the internal control report. So, cooperation
between the two groups of auditors is important. Both
should be interested in any systematic differences which
may exist between their judgement patterns.
This study investigated this similarity assumption.
Specifically, it examined whether IAs made similar
judgements to EAs by means of a mailed questionnaire
using a pre-answered internal control questionnaire (ICQ)
for a payroll internal control system.
This is, to the researcher's knowledge, the first
empirical study to investigate such possible differences
in the UK, and it must be treated as preliminary and
exploratory.
The answers to 8 internal control procedures (ICPs) 
were varied to produce 8 different cases. Each auditor
received 8 cases which comprised: (a) 6 cases which were
similar for all the EAs and IAs and (b) 2 cases which
were similar for a pair of auditors (one EA and one IA).
The 2 cases further contained: (i) 1 case which followed
a 1/4 replicate of 2 8 design and (ii) 1 case which was the
repeat of the case in (1).
The 6 similar cases were able to test for "judgement
consensus" amongst all auditors; that is to find out
whether the auditors gave a similar rating to the 6
cases.
One of the 6 cases had all the 8 ICPs present and this
represented the "ICQ approach" as the case was presented
using an ICQ. In addition to that, the same case was
presented in two other ways to test for similarity of
judgements of auditors using different techniques/
approaches of evaluation.
The first was the "control objectives" (CO) approach
which is a control matrix with the 8 ICPs presented on
the rows and 5 "control objectives" presented as columns.
The auditors were required to match the ability of each
ICP to achieve the 5 control objectives and they were
then required to rate the ability of the overall internal
control system to achieve the control objectives.
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The second presentation was the "control risk" (CR)
approach which also had all the 8 ICPs presented on the
rows and one column for the control risk rating. The
auditors were required to rate the extent of "control
risk" for each ICP. "Control risk" is the ability of each
ICP to prevent or detect material errors from occurring.
The auditors were also required to rate the "control
risk" for the overall internal control system, that is
the ability of the overall internal control system to
prevent or detect "material errors" from occurring.
There were two purposes for the 2 similar cases: (a) the
case which followed the experimental design was to
determine the judgement model of EAs and IAs as a group
and (b) the repeat case was to test for "judgement
consistency" amongst individual auditors, that is to find
out whether the individual auditor gave a similar rating
to the 2 cases.
A judgement model, based on Kempthorne's 1/4 replicate of
28 design was determined for each group of auditors using
64 EAs' and 64 IAs' ratings. In this design, all main
effects and all 28, two-cue interactions were estimable.
Three-cue interactions were not intended to be measured
as previous studies had indicated that they account for
no or negligible interaction. The purpose of this design
was so that the effects of a number of different
variables could be investigated simultaneously. The
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judgement model was analysed by means of analysis of
covariance with the personal profiles of auditors
(experience, educational and position level) as
covariates and the ICPs as the other independent
variables.
Overall, the findings indicate that there was no
significant difference in judgement consensus between and
within each group of EAs and IAs. The two groups were
also consistent in their ratings when given similar cases
to evaluate. Visually, it can be seen that EAs tend to
give higher ratings to all the cases. In other words
there may be a tendency for EAs to place a higher degree
of reliance upon particular controls than would IAs, but
it was found to be not statistically significant.
There was also no significant difference found between
both groups of auditors using different techniques or
approaches of evaluation. They were closest in their
ratings when they used the "ICQ" approach, followed by
the "CO" approach and then the "CR" approach.
The final judgement models of both groups of auditors
were also quite similar. Both groups of auditors
considered the same five ICPs (which consist of two
"accounting" and three "administrative" control
procedures). Consistent with previous studies, the two
separation of duties procedures were found to be
V
important in influencing the auditor's judgement.
Comparing the research findings with the US results
(Bailey, 1981; Landry, 1987 and Moore, 1993), it appears
that there is greater judgement consensus between UK's
IAs and EAs than between US's IAs and EAs. This is likely
to be accounted for by a greater degree of similarity of
professional qualifications and background of UK's IAs
and EAs than may have been the case in the US. However,
this belief deserves further study.
Another implication of the findings is that there is an
even stronger justification for IAs and EAs to rely on
each other's work in the UK than would appear to be the
case in the US. Thus, a directors' internal control
report (the preparation of which IAs have had a
significant input) can be relied upon more confidently by
EAs.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful to Prof Andrew Chambers of the
Department of Accounting and Finance who was my
supervisor. I have received guidance, constructive
criticism and encouragement throughout the course of the
research period. He was always available for
consultation. I sincerely consider myself very lucky to
have a supervisor of such a calibre.
I would also like to thank Dr Eric Gardner of the
Department of Statistics for his expertise and help with
the statistical aspects of the study.
I would also like to thank Mr Allan Reese from the
Computer Department for introducing me to the SPSS
Package, Dr Brenda Porter from Massey University and Mr
David Alexander for their advice during the early stages
of my study.
I am also indebted to the staffs of the Accounting
Department especially to Dr Moyra Kedslie, the Head of
Accounting Department for her concern and generous effort
in making my study a success.
I am also thankful to Universiti Sains Malaysia and the
Dean of the School of Management, Dr Mohamed Sulaiman,
vii
for giving me the opportunity to pursue my higher degree.
I am grateful to Dr Mohammad Jantan from the School of
Management, USM for his initial advice on statistics.
I am also grateful to the auditors who have participated
in my study, either as members of the pilot study or as
participants in the mail survey. Without their help, the
study could not have proceeded. Both the time they gave
to the study and the thoughtful comments many of them
provided are very much appreciated.
Special thanks go to my husband for his support, concern
encouragement, understanding and forbearance throughout
my study period. My children, Intan, Fizah, Khairon and
Sara were also very supportive and were understanding of
the fact that both of their parents were studying. I
would not have been able to complete my study if not for
the warm and happy atmosphere that my family have
provided me during my stay in England.
Last but not least, special thanks go to my friends and
colleagues who have helped me along the way. Thanks to my
family in Malaysia, especially to my mother and sister
who have always given their full support and were always
there when I needed them. MAY ALLAH BE WITH ALL OF US
ALWAYS.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT . . • •
	
1
1.1 Introduction
	
1
1.1.1 Definitions of internal control 	 1
1.1.2 Importance of judgement in
performance of an audit
	 4
1.1.3 Inclusion of internal control report
in the published annual report 	 7
1.1.4 Growth of importance of the internal
audit function	 13
1.1.5 System/ Subsystem structure of
internal Control	 18
1.2 Research question 	 19
1.3 Problem statement	 19
1.4 Significance of the study	 20
1.5 Aim and objectives of the research
project	 21
1.6 Research procedures 	 23
1.6.1 Literature-based study	 23
1.6.2 Conduct of the empirical research	 24
1.7 Examination of the issues	 27
1.7.1 Judgement consistency and judgement
consensus in the area of internal
control evaluation	 27
1.7.2 Techniques/Approaches of internal
control evaluation
	 31
1.7.3 Description of the judgement
formationprocesses(judgementmodel)
utilised by IAs and EAs in the
evaluation of internal control 	 32
ix
1.7.4 Factors that effect judgement
consensus and consistency 	 34
1.7.4.1 Experience, professional
qualifications and position
level in the organisation 	 34
1.7.4.2 Independence of IAs and
size of firms	 35
1.7.5 "Accounting" controls and
"administrative" controls	 36
1.7.6 Completeness, existence and
valuation control
objectives
	
37
1.7.7 Judgement insight	 37
1.8 Outline of the thesis 	 38
1.9 Summary	 40
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO INTERNAL CONTROL . . • •
	
42
2.1 Introduction	 42
2.2 Growth of the auditing profession in the
UK	 43
2.3 Importance of an audit 	 62
2.4 Defining internal control	 67
2.4.1 Official Pronouncements	 67
2.4.2 Auditing Literature
	 87
2.5 Internal control report	 93
2.6 Evaluation of internal control 	 103
2.7 Financial statements audit 	 112
2.8 Common approaches or techniques of
evaluation of internal control
	
115
2.8.1 Internal control questionnaire
(ICQ) technique
	
116
2.8.2 Control objectives (CO) technique 	 117
2.8.3 Audit risk model 	 121
2.8.3.1 Concept of audit risk model	 121
2.8.3.2 Control risk (CR) technique 	 128
2.8.4 Objective internal control
evaluation	 129
2.8.5 Computer-assisted approach
	 130
2.8.6 Mathematical models	 133
2.8.7 Protocol analysis
	 134
2.8.8 Chernoff faces 	 135
2.9 Cooperation between EAs and IAs 	 136
2.10 Factors affecting judgement of EAs
and IAs	 147
2.10.1 Experience, education and
position level	 148
2.10.2 Independence/ objectivity
of IAs	 152
2.11 Increasing importance of the role of IAs 161
2.12 Summary	 165
CHAPTER 3: NATURE OF JUDGEMENT 	 	 167
3.1 Introduction	 167
3.2 Categories of thought processes
	 168
3.2.1	 Preparation	 for	 Intellectual
Activity	 169
3.2.2 Productive thought	 172
3.2.3 Judgement	 173
3.3 Relationship with perception 	 175
3.4 An approach to the representation of
judgement	 177
3.5 The use of "lens model" for the
representation of judgement	 178
3.6 Judgement consensus and consistency 	 184
3.7 Scope of thesis	 186
3.8 Summary	 190
xi
CHAPTER 4: PREVIOUS LITERATURE 	 	 192
4.1 Introduction	 192
4.2 System of internal controls	 192
4.3 Prior research in internal control
evaluation
	
195
4.4 Categories of previous research 	 196
4.4.1 Research involving individual
judgements in the area of internal
control evaluation	 197
4.4.2 Research involving group judgements
in the area of internal control
evaluation	 219
4.4.3 Research comparing EAs and IAs
judgements in the area of internal
control evaluation	 222
4.4.4 Other relevant research in
accounting	 227
4.4.5 Other relevant research not in
accounting	 233
4.4.5.1 Psychology
	 233
4.4.5.2 Organisational Behaviour
	
234
4.4.6 Research on reliance of IAs by EAs 235
4.5 Summary	 239
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY - EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN	 243
5.1 Introduction	 243
5.2 Description of study
	
243
5.3 The experimental task
	
246
5.3.1 Evaluation of a Subsystem 	 246
5.3.1 Selection of the payroll subsystem 247
5.4 Payroll errors and irregularities 	 253
5.5 Steps in payroll verification
	 254
5.6 Internal control of payrolls
	 257
xii
5.7 Internal control procedures selected for
this experiment	 258
5.8 Judgement model	 263
5.9 Research objectives and hypotheses
	 275
5.10 Description of analysis to be done
	
284
5.11 Phases of the research
	 285
5.11.1 "First phase"- pilot study
	 286
5.11.2 "Second phase" -list of auditors
who were willing to participate	 287
5.11.3 "Third phase" -primary
questionnaire	 290
5.11.3.1 Contents of the
questionnaire	 291
5.12 Experimental design	 292
5.13 Order of cases	 297
5.14 Method of choosing the 6 cases
	 299
5.15 Matching process
	 301
5.16 Auditors' response
	 304
5.17 Summary	 308
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS 	 	 309
6.1 Introduction	 309
6.2 Demographic information	 309
6.3 The design of the cases	 320
6.4 Method of analysis	 323
6.5 Discussion of hypotheses	 330
6.5.1 Consensus
	
330
6.5.1.1 Cases
	
332
6.5.1.1.1 Discussion of the
findings on the
ratings of the
similar cases
	 343
6.5.1.2 Techniques of evaluation 	 345
6.5.1.2.1 Discussion of
findings on the
techniques of
evaluation	 353
6.5.1.3 Whether ICPs and internal
control system can achieve
control objectives 	 356
6.5.1.3.1 Discussion of the
findings on ability
of ICPs and internal
control system to
achieve control
objectives	 376
6.5.1.4 Level of control risk
of ICPs and internal
control system	 379
6.5.1.4.1 Discussion of
findings on the
level of control
risk of ICPs and
internal control
system	 386
6.5.1.5 Importance of ICPs 	 389
6.5.1.5.1 Discussion of
findings on the
importance of ICPs
and the overall
internal control
system	 395
6.5.1.6 Types of controls 	 397
6.5.1.6.1 Points allocated to
the 2 controls	 399
6.5.1.6.2 Control objectives
achieved by the 2
controls	 402
6.5.1.6.3 Ratings of the level
of control risk for
accounting and
administrative
controls	 409
6.5.1.6.4 Discussion of
findings on types
of controls	 411
xiv
6.5.2 Consistency	 414
6.5.2.1 Repeat cases 	 415
6.5.2.2 Discussion of findings
on consistency	 423
6.5.3 Effects of various variables on
judgement consensus and consistency 425
6.5.3.1 Discussion of findings of
effect of the 7 variables
on judgement consensus and
consistency	 444
6.6 Summary of findings on hypotheses 	 446
6.7 Descriptive judgement model of auditors 	 454
6.7.1 Experimental design used and
results	 454
6.7.2 Descriptive judgement model for
EAs	 458
6.7.3 Descriptive judgement model for
IAs	 468
6.7.4 Comparison of judgement model and
subjective weightings given by the
auditors	 477
6.8 Comparison with previous research which
involves IAs and EAs 	 481
6.9 General comments from auditors
	 488
6.10 Summary	 489
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS,IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTION
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
	 	
490
7.1 Introduction
	
490
7.2 Summary of problem and research approach 	 490
7.3 Summary of findings
	
492
7.3.1 Consensus
	
493
7.3.2 Judgement models
	
497
7.3.3 Consistency
	
501
XV
7.3.4 Effect of the variables on
judgement "consensus" and
"consistency"	 502
7.3.5 Conclusion of study	 502
7.4 Limitations of this study 	 503
7.5 Implications of this study 	 507
7.6 Suggestions for future research
	
509
7.7 Summary	 512
REFERENCES 	 	 513
xvi
Page
536
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 5a:LIST OF AUDITORS
Appendix 5ai): Cover letter for "list of
auditors who are willing to
participate" from supervisor	 536
Appendix 5aii): Cover letter for "list of EAs
who are willing to participate"
from the researcher	 537
Appendix 5aiii): Cover letter for "list of
IAs who are willing to
participate" from the
researcher	 538
Appendix 5aiv): Example froM a page of list
of auditors who would be
willing to participate	 539
APPENDIX 5b: FOLLOW-UP LETTER FOR "LIST OF
AUDITORS WHO ARE WILLING TO
PARTICIPATE" FROM SUPERVISOR 	 540
APPENDIX 5c: PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE 	 	 541
Appendix 5ci): Cover letter for primary
questionnaire from the
researcher	 541
Appendix 5cii): Primary questionnaire 	 542
APPENDIX 5d: FOLLOW-UP LETTERS FOR PRIMARY
QUESTIONNAIRE 	 	 590
Appendix 5di): First follow-up letter on
primary questionnaire from the
supervisor	 590
Appendix 5dii): Second follow-up letter on
primary questionnaire from the
researcher	 591
xvii
Appendix 5diii): Third follow-up letter on
primary questionnaire from
the supervisor	 592
Appendix 5div): Fourth follow-up letter on
primary questionnaire from the
supervisor	 593
APPENDIX 5e: ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS TO FILL IN
PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE 	 	 594
Appendix 5ei): Cover letter for additional
participants to fill in primary
questionnaire from the
supervisor	 594
Appendix 5eii): Profile list of auditors
attached to questionnaire	 595
APPENDIX 5f: MATCHING UP AND SELECTION OF
AVAILABLE AUDITORS	 597
Appendix 5fi): Matching up and initial
selection of EAs and IAs from
the list of available auditors 597
Appendix 5f ii): Final matching up and
selection of the 64 pairs of
auditors	 604
Appendix 5fiii): Assignment of set numbers to
the 64 matched pairs of
auditors at random	 606
APPENDIX 5g: NON-RESPONSE BIAS 	 609
Appendix 5gi): Results of t-tests - early
versus late reply for
respondents selected at
"random"	 609
Appendix 5gii): Results of t-tests - reply
from "randomly" versus "non-
randomly" selected
respondents	 610
APPENDIX 6: EXAMINATION OF VARIABLES 
	 	 611
Appendix 6ai): Examination of variables to
determine whether they are
normally distributed or
otherwise	 611
xviii
Appendix 6aii): Examination of closeness of
EAs' and IAs' ratings of the
different cases	 614
Appendix 6aiii): Examination of closeness of
EAs' and IAs' ratings of the
different cases by means of
"overlay plots"	 619
Appendix 6aiv): Results t-test matched pairs
(parametric test) and wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank
tests (non-parametric test)
- an example	 623
xix
Page
111
FIGURES
Figure 2.1: The Rain Cloud Analogy
Figure 2.2: Internal control evaluation by means
of "control objectives" approach . . 	 119
Figure 2.3: The relationship between senior management
and EAs and IAs 	  140
Figure 2.4: A model of internal audit independence 159
Figure 3.1: A Simplified Lens Model 	 	 179
Figure 4.1: Categories of prior research .	 • •	 197
Figure 5.1: Case number 1 	 	 260
Figure 5.2: Internal and external auditors'
of internal control evaluation • • •	 265
Figure 6.1: Types of professional qualifications
of EAs and IAs	 	  315
Figure 6.2: Summary of types of consensus examined
in this study 	 	 33L
Figure 6.3: Summary of findings on cases 	 • • •	 332
Figure 6.4: Evaluation of the 6 similar cases by
EAs and IAs 	 	 336
Figure 6.5: Summary of findings on techniques of
evaluation 	 	 345
Figure 6.6: Evaluation of internal control system
using different techniques of
evaluation by EAs and IAs	 355
Figure 6.7: Summary of findings on achievement
of control objectives 	 	 356
Figure 6.8: Evaluation of whether internal control
procedures or the overall internal
control system can meet "internal
control objectives" by EAs and IAs
	
375
Figure 6.9: Summary of findings on "control risk" 	 379
XX
Figure 6.10: Evaluation of whether internal
control procedures can meet "control
risk" by EAs and IAs 	 	 383
Figure 6.11: Summary of findings on the relative
importance of ICPs 	 	 389
Figure 6.12: Points allocated to the importance of
internal control procedures by EAs and
IAs 	 	 394
Figure 6.13: Examination of accounting and
administrative controls 	 	 397
Figure 6.14: Summary of findings on points
allocated to the 2 controls . . . • 	 399
Figure 6.15: Summary of findings on control
objectives achieved by the 2 types of
controls 	 	 402
Figure 6.16: Summary of findings on the ratings of
control risk for accounting and
administrative controls 	 	 409
Figure 6.17: Summary of findings on consistency 	 414
Figure 6.18: Differences in evaluation of case 1
and case 7 between EAs and IAs . . .	 417
Figure 6.19: Plot of case 1 and case 7 for EAs 	 420
Figure 6.20: Plot of difference in ratings of case
1 and case 7 against the mean of the
difference for case 1 and case 7 for
EAs 	
	 420
Figure 6.21: Plot of case 1 and case 7 for IAs 	 422
Figure 6.22: Plot of difference in ratings between
case 1 and case 7 against mean of the
difference for case 1 and case 7 for
IAs 	
	 422
Figure 6.23: Summary of findings of °variables" on
judgement consensus (ICQ) 	 	 427
Figure 6.24: Summary of findings of "variables" on
judgement consistency (ICQ) - - - - 	 428
Figure 6.25: Summary of findings of "variables" on
judgement consensus using 'CR°
approach 
	
	 429
Figure 6.26: Summary of findings of "variables' on
judgement consensus using "CO'
approach 	
	 430
xxi
Figure 6.32:
Figure 6.33:
Figure 6.34:
Figure 6.35:
Figure 6.28: Initial judgement model for EAs with
all terms 	 	 459
Figure 6.29: Initial judgement model for EAs with
no two-factor interactions 	 	 463
Figure 6.30: Initial judgement model of EAs with
no two-factor interactions and no
covariate "havprof" 	 	 465
Figure 6.31: Initial judgement model of EAs with
no two-factor interactions, no
covariate "havprof" and "manager" 467
Final judgement model of EAs . . • •	 468
Initial judgement model of IAs with
all terms 	
	 469
Initial judgement model of IAs with
no two-factor interactions 	 	 472
Initial judgement model of IAs with
no two-factor interactions and no
factor "dutro" 	 	 474
Figure 6.36: Final judgement model of IAs (based on
the evaluation of the cases by means of
ICQ approach) 	 	 475
Figure 7.1: Final judgement model of EAs • • • •
	
498
Figure 7.2: Final judgement model of IAs	 • • •	 499
TABLES
Page
Table 5.1: Summary of hypotheses on judgement
consensus 	 	 279
Table 5.2: Summary of hypotheses on judgement
consistency 	 	 279
Table 5.3: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on "judgement consensus"
(ICO) 	 	 280
Table 5.4: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on "judgement consensus"
(CR)	 281
Table 5.5: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on judgement consensus (CO)
	 282
Table 5.6: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
	
variables on judgement consistency . .
	
283
	
Table 5.7: 64 combinations of the factor levels .
	
294
	
Table 5.8: Three different orders of the 8 "ICPs"	 298
Table 5.9: Three different orders of the 8 "cases" 298
Table 5.10: Combination of the factor levels of
the 6 cases 	 	 299
Table 5.11: Combination of the facto levels of the
8 cases for Set 1 	 	 301
Table 5.12: Arrangement of EAs and IAs in
ascending order 	 	 304
Table 5.13: Assignment of set numbers to three
pairs of auditors 	 	 304
Table 6.1 : Demographic information of EAs and
"names of external audit firms" that
have participated in the study 	 . .	 310
Table 6.2: Demographic information of IAs and
"names of organisation" of IAs that
have participated in the study . . . 	 312
Table 6.3: Position level of the 64 matched pairs
of auditors 
	 	
313
Table 6.4: Experience level of the 64 matched
pairs of auditors 	 	 314
Table 6.5: Professional qualification of the 64
matched pairs of auditors 	 	 315
Table 6.6: Table comparing experience level of EAs
and number of times they have audited
the payroll system	 316
Table 6.7: Number of IAs reporting to the different
level of reporting (starting with the
least independent) 
	 	
317
Table 6.8: Number of EAs with and without prior
internal auditing experience 	 	 318
Table 6.9: Number of IAs with and without prior
external auditing experience 	 	 319
Table 6.10: Comparison of EAs and IAs as to
whether the internal control
procedures are able to
achieve the control objectives • • •	 320
Table 6.11: Comparison of EAs and IAs as to
whether the internal control
procedures are able to
detect or prevent material errors . . 	 320
Table 6.12: Explanation of the 8 ICPS 
	 	 321
Table 6.13: Number of ICPS present in the 8 cases
	 322
Table 6.14: Consensus in ratings of cases by IAs
and EAs 	 	 333
Table 6.15: Comparison of consensus level of IAs
and EAs based on the cases ratings . 	 341
Table 6.16: Summary of judgement consensus in
previous studies 	 	 343
Table 6.17: Coefficient correlation comparing the
three different techniques of
evaluation 	 	 351
Table 6.18a: Achievement of "completeness" control
objectives by the ICPs 	 	 358
Table 6.18b: Achievement of "existence" control
objectives by the ICPs 	 	 360
Table 6.18c: Achievement of "presentation &
disclosure" control objectives by the
ICPs 	 	 361
xxiv
Table 6.18d:Achievement of "rights & obligations"
control objectives by the ICPs . . . 	 363
Table 6.18e:Achievement of "valuation" control
objective by the ICPs 
	 	 364
Table 6.19: Consensus in ratings of overall
internal control system in achieving
the control objectives 	 	 366
Table 6.20: Correlation in ratings of EAs and IAs
on how well the overall internal
control system can achieve the control
objectives.	 367
Table 6.21: Consistency in ratings of EAs on how
well ICP and the overall ICS can
achieve the control objectives . . .
	 368
Table 6.22 : Correlation in ratings of EAs on how
well ICP and the overall internal
control system can achieve the IAs
control objectives	 370
Table 6.23: Consensus in ratings of IAs on how
well ICP and the overall internal
control system can achieve the control
objectives 	 	 371
Table 6.24: Correlation in ratings of IAs on how
well ICP and the overall internal
control system can achieve the
internal control objectives
	 • • • •	 372
Table 6.25: Consensus in ratings of the level of
CR of ICPs by IAs and EAs 	 	 381
Table 6.26: Correlation in mean ratings of ICP and
control risk 	 	 386
Table 6.27: Consensus in weightings of ICPs by IAs
and EAs 	 	 391
Table 6.28: Consensus in ratings of EAs on how
well the control objectives can be
achieved by the 2 types of controls .	 403
Table 6.29: Consensus in ratings of IAs on how
well the control objectives can be
achieved by the 2 types of controls . 	 404
Table 6.30: Consensus in ratings of IAs and EAs on
how well the control objectives can
be achieved by the accounting controls 405
XXV
Table 6.31: Consensus in ratings of IAs and EAs on
how well the control objectives can be
achieved by the administrative
controls 	 	 406
Table 6.32: Comparison of EAs and IAs ratings of
accounting and administrative controls
in achieving the control objectives . 	 407
Table 6.33: Comparison of ratings of control risk
of accounting and administrative
controls between EAs and IAs . . • •
	 411
Table 6.34: Coefficient correlation of case 1 and
case 7 between EAs 	 	 421
Table 6.35: Coefficient correlation of case 1 and
case 7 between IAs 	 	 423
Table 6.36: Summary of judgement consistency in
previous studies 	 	 424
Table 6.37: Comparison of EAs and lAs judgements
according to the different variables
for the cases	 432
Table 6.38: Comparison of EAs and IAs judgement
consensus according to the different
variables using "CR" and "CO" approach . 436
Table 6.39: Relationship of the variables on
"judgement consensus" and "judgement
consistency" by using "ICQ", "CR"
and "CO" approach 	 	 439
Table 6.40: Comparison of findings from the
current study with previous studies
over the 7 variables 	 	 444
Table 6.41: Summary of hypotheses on "judgement
consensus" 
	 	 450
Table 6.42: Summary of hypotheses on "judgement
consistency" 
	 	 450
Table 6.43: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on "judgement consensus"
using ICQ approach 
	
	
451
Table 6.44: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on "judgement consensus"
using CR approach 	 	 452
xxvi
Table 6.45: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on "judgement consensus"
using CO approach 	 	 453
Table 6.46: Summary of hypotheses on effects of
variables on judgement consistency .
	 454
Table 6.47: Comparison of judgement model and
subjective weightings of EAs and IAs
	
477
Table 6.48 :Summary of judgement insight in
previous studies
	 478
Table 6.49: Range of subjective weightings of EAs
and IAs	 479
Table 6.50: Comparison of findings with previous
research 	 	 488
CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to give a broad coverage of t
issues surrounding the study. It examines the definitions
of internal control, requirements of Cadbury's Code of
Best Practice, growth of importance of internal audit
function, official pronouncements relating to internal
control evaluation and the importance of judgement and
perception in the area of internal control evaluation.
Aims and objectives of the research project, issues
examined in this thesis including the research procedures
and instrument are also discussed. It concluded with a
summary of the seven chapters of the thesis. Chapter 2
will examine developments in understanding internal
control in more detail.
1.1.1 Definitions of internal control 
Auditing Practices Committee (1989, T2) defines an
independent audit as:
The independent examination of, and expression of an
opinion on, the financial statements of an
enterprise.
Before external auditors (EAs) 1 can 'express" opinions on
Hereon, will be referred to as EAs.
1
the financial statements, they have to look at the
"input" or the data that actually provides the basis for
preparation of the financial statements. This can be
ascertained by looking at the internal control system in
existence.
Various definitions of internal control can be found to
date. Amongst them are definitions given by
American Institute of Accountants 2 (AIA, 1949)
Internal control comprises the plan of an
organisation and all of the co-ordinate methods and
measures adopted within a business to safeguard its
assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its
accounting data, promote operational efficiency and
encourage adherence to prescribed managerial
policies.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IA, 1989), in its
Standard 300 "Scope of work" states that,
The overall system of control is conceptual in
nature. It is an integrated collection of controlled
systems used by an organization to achieve its
objectives and goals.
(IIA 1989, Standard 300, ¶.06, 31).
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IA) continues to
adhere to their position that internal control exists to
achieve five objectives in contrast to COSO's three
objectives.
The five objectives as stated in Standard 300 (IA, 1989)
are:
1. The reliability and integrity of information
2 AIA, now known as AICPA (American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants).
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2. Compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws
and regulation
3. The safeguarding of assets
4. The economical and efficient use of resources
5. The accomplishment of established objectives and
goals for operations and programmes
(IIA 1989, Standard 300, ¶.05, 29-30 )
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisation of the Treadway
Commission (COSO, 1992a, "Executive Summary", 1) 3 has
defined internal control as the following:
Internal control is a process effected by an
entity's Board of Directors, management and other
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievements of objectives in the
following categories:
• effectiveness and efficiency of operations
• reliability of financial reporting
• compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
To elaborate on the meaning of "internal controls",
Standards on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 29 (AICPA, I972c)
divided internal controls into "accounting" and
"administrative controls".
Accounting controls are concerned mainly with
safeguarding of assets and reliability of financial
records i.e physical control over assets, separation
of duties. Administrative controls are concerned
mainly with operational efficiency and adherence to
managerial policies i.e time and motion studies,
variance reports.
An EA then has to examine the internal control system to
see if the controls in existence are able to detect or
prevent material financial statement errors and
irregularities. After forming an opinion regarding the
quality of the internal control system, an EA would then
3 Called COSO for short, comprise of American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, American Accounting Association,
Institute of Internal Auditors, Institute of Management Accountants
(formerly National Association of Accountants) and Financial
Executives Institute.
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decide to express his or her opinion via audit report.
1.1.2 Importance of -judgement in performance of an
audit 
The internal control system is communicated to the
auditor in the form of sensory stimuli. These (sensory
stimuli) are perceived by the auditor as attributes of
the quality of the internal control system. So, these
perceptions are likely to influence the auditor's overall
evaluation of internal control.
In human behaviour, the process of giving meaning to
stimulus is referred to as perception.
It is a complex process by which people select,
organize, and interpret sensory stimulation into a
meaningful and coherent picture of the world.
(Berelson & Steiner 1964, 33).
The relevance of the concept of perception to auditing
arises from the fact that the quality of the internal
control system has to be perceived by the auditor first.
The auditor's perception will then influence the auditing
procedures to be used to evaluate the internal control
system and finally, the auditor's judgement will be used
to decide on the quality of the internal control system.
Perception of the auditor's initial outlook on the
internal control system may/ may not be the same as the
final judgement that the auditor makes of the quality of
internal control system.
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Almost all of the work of an EA requires the exercise of
"judgement". The end product of a financial statement
audit, for example, requires the auditor to express an
opinion regarding the truth and fairness of the financial
statements. However, before the auditor can perform this
task, he will have to make a series of other judgements.
This normally includes having to "judge" the quality of
the internal control system and to be able to do this, he
would have to "judge" whether the internal control system
would be able to detect "material errors" or
irregularities. Even before he is able to determine
whether the internal control system is able to detect
"material errors or irregularities", he would have to
"judge" the most appropriate audit procedures to be used
to achieve this purpose.
Thus, it can be said that an audit is a process that
involves an ongoing "judgement" and that an EA usually
makes a judgement on the truth and fairness of the
financial statements partly based on his evaluation of
the internal control system.
The determination of "material errors" itself requires
some "judgement" on the part of the EAs.
Hall (1980, 78) states that,
An auditor's sense of materiality lies at the heart
of his professional judgement. An appreciation of
the concept may be innate 	 , but experience
nurtures, refines and sharpens it.
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The Auditing Practices Board, in its paper titled "The
Future Development of Auditing" (APB, 1992) states that,
Materiality cannot be precisely defined: what is
material will be dependent on the context of
financial statements in question ...
In assessing whether a matter is material, it should
be considered in the context of:
• the amount of net assets and profit or loss of the
company
• the amount of the item itself and of the total of
which it forms a part;
• any other relevant circumstances.
(APB 1992, "The Future Development of Auditing", 20-
21)
Realizing the importance of "judgement", the same paper
states the use of it as one of the guiding principles of
audit in its proposal.
Auditors should apply sound professional judgement.
(APB 1992, "The Future Development of Auditing", 20)
The definition of internal control has undergone a heavy
scrutiny over the years. One of the reasons is so that
there would be a common meaning attached to it.
Shelly and Bryan (1964) defined judgement in the
following way:
If we need to limit it (the term "judgement") in
some way beyond its intuitive content, we can say
that roughly a "judgement" refers to any verbal
reaction (or its equivalent) that is the "direct"
product of the individual's processing his sensory
inputs in combination with his memories of "stored
experiences".
(Shelly and Bryan 1964, 9)
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1.1.3 Inclusion of internal control report in the
published annual report 
In the 1990's US (COSO) and UK (Cadbury) 4 has come out
with another definition of internal control. Among the
reasons for the setting up of COSO and Cadbury was so
that a common meaning could be attached to internal
control which could ease management in their reporting of
the internal control system and could ease the
attestation duties that had to be made by EAs. In this
respect, both EAs and internal auditors (IAs) 5 have an
increased role to play; IAs would most probably be asked
by management to help prepare the report on internal
control and EAs would have to attest or evaluate the
contents of the report.
COSO invited Treadway to head a commission of enquiry as
a result of the growing fraudulent activities in
companies and hence the Treadway report was issued in
1987. Treadway recommended that management should include
a report on internal control with their published
financial statements. However, adoption of the report was
deferred pending clarification of the definition of
internal control. To date, it looks as if it is going to
4 Cadbury Report is produced by the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance which was set up in May 1991 by the
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the
accountancy profession to address the financial aspects of corporate
governance. The Cadbury Report incorporating a Code of Best Practice,
was published on 1 December 1992.
5 Hereon, will be referred to as IAs.
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be a voluntary, but frequently followed practice in the
US. To provide for the next task of clarifying the
definition of internal control, COSO funded a further
project, the fieldwork of which was conducted by Coopers
& Lybrand, which led to the publication of the Internal
Control - Integrated Framework by AICPA in September
1992.
Cadbury (UK) made similar recommendations to Treadway,
i.e directors should include in their company's report
and accounts a report "on the effectiveness of the
company's system of internal control" (point 4.5). Again,
similar to the US situation, before the report on the
internal control system is possible, it would require
further clarification as to how EAs can assess the
effectiveness of the report and the form in which the
auditors and the directors should report. The fieldwork
was headed by Rutteman, a partner in Ernst and Young, and
in October 1993 a draft report was issued. Another
revised exposure draft was issued in August 1994 before
the final guideline to directors was issued in December
1994.6
The UK Final Guidance to internal control and financial
6 One difference between Treadway (US) and Cadbury's (UK)
requirement is that US requires management to make the report on
internal control whereas UK requires the directors to produce the
report.
8
reporting (ICAEW, 1994b) 7
 defines internal control as
The whole system of controls, financial and
otherwise, established in order to provide
reasonable assurance of:
1. effective and efficient operations
2. internal financial control
3. compliance with laws and regulations
(ICAEW 1994, Statement of principles, 112)
"Internal financial control" is defined in the UK Final
Guidance as,
The internal controls established in order to
provide reasonable assurance of:
(a) the safeguarding of assets
(b) the maintenance of proper accounting records and
the reliability of financial information used
within the business or for publication
(ICAEW 1994b, Statement of principles, T2)
According to COSO's "Internal Control - Integrated
Framework",
Internal control is a process, effected by an
entity's board of directors, management and other
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of objectives in the
following categories:
• effectiveness and efficiency of operations
• reliability of financial reporting
• compliance with applicable laws and regulations
(COSO 1992b, "Framework", 1)
An entity's internal control structure 8 consists of
the following five components:
• Control environment - The control environment sets
the tone of an organization, influencing the
control consciousness of its people. It is the
foundation for all other components of the
internal control structure, providing discipline
and structure.
• Risk assessment - Risk assessment is the entity's
identification and analysis of relevant risks to
achievement of its objectives, forming a basis for
7 The revised draft in 1994 also defines "internal control" and
"internal financial control" in a similar manner.
8 In the Statement, "internal control" is also referred to as
"internal control structure".
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determining how the risks should be managed.
• Control activities - Control activities are the
policies and procedures that help ensure
management directives are carried out.
• Information and communication - Information and
communication are the identification, capture, and
exchange of information in a form and time frame
that enable people to carry out their
responsibilities.
• Monitoring - Monitoring is a process that assesses
the quality of the internal control structure's
performance over time.
(AICPA 1995, Proposed SAS 55, ¶6 and ¶7).
Although COSO's definition does not state explicitly (as
compared with UK's definition) that internal control can
be divided into "financial and non-financial", it does
however recognise that the objectives of control are
"distinct but overlapping categories which address
different needs and allow a directed focus to meet the
separate needs". Thus, it can be said that UK and US both
agree that internal controls can be divided into two
categories, i.e financial and otherwise 9 (COSO 1992a,
"Executive Summary", 1).
To date both in the US and in the UK the report on
internal control has not been made mandatory", though
the majority of companies are including the reports in
9 Otherwise, taken to mean administrative control as indicated
in 1949 AICPA's definition.
10 In the UK, it is compulsory for listed companies to comply
with the Cadbury Code. This is not to say that listed companies must
necessarily comply with any of the items within the Code but rather,
that they must explain their reasons for non-compliance. In US, there
is still no requirement for listed companies to report on internal
control.
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their published annual report."
As stated in a discussion paper on "Internal Financial
Control Effectiveness" (APB, 1995e),
It is clear from the number of unsuccessful attempts
to legislate public reporting on internal controls
that consensus has not been reached in the United
States as to whether such reports are of benefit to
the users of financial statements. Indeed the
present Chief Accountant of the Securities and
Exchange Commission has publicly expressed
reservations about such public reporting on the
basis of its costs relative to expected benefits.
(APB	 1995e,	 "Internal	 Financial	 Control
Effectiveness", 3)
COSO (1992c) notes in its report that,
...public reporting on internal control is not a
component of or criterion for, effective internal
control. An entity can have an effective internal
control system without making a public statement to
that effect ... in the end internal control
effectiveness is determined by the adequacy of the
system not by what is said about it.
(COSO 1992c, "Reporting to External Parties", 2).
UK Final Guidance (ICAEW, 1994b) require directors only
to state their opinion on the "effectiveness" of the
internal financial control system and their report covers
only internal "financial" control and not the whole
11 M.R.Kintzele, P.L. Kintzele and Kwiatkowski (1993, 9-11)
states that COSO reviews Annual reports for the calendar year 1990
from 226 publicly held corporations found that the overall percentage
of companies that includes the statements was in excess of 90 %.
However, currently most internal control reports are stating that
"management is responsible for establishing, maintaining, and
evaluating its system of internal control, but management fails to
make an assessment of "the effectiveness of its control system" and
state this in its report. For a detailed example of internal control
reports in the UK, please refer to an article written by Chambers
A.D.(1995) titled, " Directors' Report on Internal Financial
Control".
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system of internal control. The Guidance applies to
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 1995.
Directors may state their opinion on the "effectiveness"
of their system of internal financial control and
extend their opinion to the internal control system as a
whole (ICAEW 1994b, 'UK Final Guidance", 48 and 714) if
they so wish.
However, EAs are not required to audit the directors"
opinion on the effectiveness of the internal financial
control until certain issues such as practical
difficulties in reviewing internal control effectiveness
and meaning of "effectiveness" is resolved (APB, 1995d,
"Reporting to Corporate Governance - Revised").
In April 1995, the Auditing Practices Board (APB, 1995e)
issued a discussion paper on "Internal financial control
effectiveness" which among other issues seeks to clarify
the issues associated with EAs' task of evaluating the
directors' opinion on the effectiveness of the internal
financial control system.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS,
1993) has also issued a draft proposal on how to
implement the recommendations made by Cadbury (1992).
The ICAS directors' report on internal control has a very
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broad coverage which includes management information
systems, internal controls and internal control systems,
but which did not state the time period that it covers.
The same applies for ICAS's recommendations on the
auditor's evaluation of the internal control report.
Although both US and UK have agreed to restrict the
internal control report to internal financial controls,
they differ with regards to the timeframe that the
statement covers. Whilst, US (COSO) mentioned that the
effectiveness of internal control system is at the "year
end" (one point in time), UK (Final Guidance) mentioned
that the internal control report should cover "a period
of time".
1.1.4 Growth of importance of the internal audit 
function
With the recommendations placed on management/ directors
to include an internal control report (the basis for
which will often be prepared by IAs) in their annual
reports, as a result of which EAs are required to assess
that internal control report, there is increased reliance
placed on IAs.
As Porter (1994) puts it,
The internal auditors are primarily responsible for
monitoring the system of internal controls
established by the companys' directors to control
corporate activities - that is for corporate
governance. The external auditors have the task of
ensuring that the accountability reports produced by
the directors give a fair reflection of the
companys' activities and its financial affairs.
(Porter 1994, 25)
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Cooperation between IAs and EAs may benefit both parties.
IAs may achieve overall cost savings on the external
audit fee by avoiding duplication of auditing efforts,
and the testing performed for the external audit could
also be used as internal audit evidence of the adequacy
and effectiveness of controls.
However, there is an alternative view that diversion of
IAs from the achievement of internal audit objectives (to
do with efficiency and effectiveness) to acting as an
assistant to the EA is often not the best use of internal
audit time in value for money terms.
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that IAs and EAs
should coordinate their work so as to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
If a management control report is made mandatory, there
would be an increase in responsibility placed on EAs to
review the "internal control report". It would thus be
beneficial if both groups of auditors cooperate with one
another.
In 1991, the Auditing Standards Board issued SAS 65
(AICPA, 1991a). It expanded on SAS 9 by permitting
additional reliance on IAs in performing substantive
tests and by encouraging coordination between the two
audit functions.
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Substitution of EA's work with IA's work is explicitly
prohibited by SAS 9 (11) and SAS 500 (14).
It should be realized that there is likely to be
similarity between the work of an EA and IA in the area
of internal control evaluation. The primary mission of
IAs is to assess controls to ensure that the controls are
operating effectively. EAs on the other hand, are
required to assess controls for the purpose of
ascertaining that the financial statements show a true
and fair view.
Chambers (1980, 273) states that an IA:
a) acts as an arm of management
b) rounds up and perfects the system of internal
control
c) directly participates in the verification of
financial statements.
Since both auditors are given the task of evaluating
internal controls, it has been suggested in the auditing
literature (ICAS, 1993; Cadbury, 1992; COS°, 1992) that
lAs be given the task of evaluating the controls (because
they are employees of the organisation and would
understand how the system works best) and EAs be asked to
evaluate the internal control report prepared by IAs.
A possible strategy when planning audit work would be for
IAs to assist in performing the required tests of
controls and documenting the internal control structure
when EAs have decided to rely on the internal controls.
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External auditors will assess and rely on the work
of the company's internal auditors in the same way,
as, in some audits, they currently rely on the work
of other auditors and/ or experts.
(ICAS, 1993, "Auditing into the Twenty-First
Century", 3)
Auditing Guideline 3.204 (APC, 1980b, 111 )12 requires
auditors to "ascertain and evaluate those controls and
perform compliance tests on their operations, if the
auditor wishes to place reliance on any internal
controls".
Thus, EAs would not be required to evaluate internal
controls if they do not wish to place reliance on them.
As Porter (1994) puts it,
It is acknowledged that in some cases auditors do
not place reliance on a company's internal controls
	
 and where this applies they are not
obliged to study and test the controls in detail.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that, in gaining their
understanding of the client and its affairs, and in
assessing factors of audit risk, both of which are
fundamental to the modern audit process, all 
auditors undertake a general assessment of the
quality of the auditee company's internal controls
and are (or should be) in a position to report
accordingly. It is also observed that, at the
conclusion of an audit, auditors usually routinely
provide a management letter to the directors of the
auditee company informing them, inter alia, of
weaknesses detected in the internal controls and
indicating ways in which these might be rectified.
The detail of the information in the management
letter relating to the company's internal controls
reflects the extent to which they were studied and
tested during the audit.
(Porter 1994, 22)
12 Auditing Guideline 3.204 is superseded by SAS 300 (APB
1995). SAS 300 (1128) states the same concept on the matter.
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There are various techniques that can be used by an
auditor to evaluate the internal control system such as
internal control questionnaires (ICQ), assessment of
control risk or achievement of control objectives.
Arens and Loebbecke (1980) have suggested an approach of
evaluating internal controls quite similar to the
approach being used by many IAs; that is, by means of a
"matrix" to look at whether the internal controls in
existence can help achieve the internal control
objectives. Control matrix links up the control 
procedures established by a client with the control 
objectives that are set up by the company. The control
objectives suggested by Arens and Loebbecke (1980) are
"a) validity; b) authorization; c) classification;
d) completeness and e) valuation". This method of
evaluation has been popular since then.
COSO (1992b, "Framework") identifies these control
objectives or assertions, as they called them, as "a)
existence or occurrence; b) completeness; c) rights and
obligations d) valuation or allocation and e)
presentation and disclosure." For the purpose of this
thesis, COSO's assertions are being made use of.
Studies have also shown that there are a lot of
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similarities" between the two groups of auditors. An
example is a study by Waggoner and Ricketts (1989) who
have conducted a test to address the "competency" of IAs,
compared with EAs, in the performance of an internal
control test. IAs' and EAs' performance was compared in
a test of controls that could be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of certain internal control procedures over
a cash disbursement system. Results showed that IAs had
an overall detection rate of 63.2 percent. EAs had an
overall detection rate of 59 percent. Statistically, this
is not a significant difference. The results of this
comparison of IAs' and EAs' performance suggest that, in
terms of performance, IAs and EAs rank equally on the
task tested.
1.1.5 System/Subsystem structure of Internal Control 
Johnson et al. (1967, 113) suggested that a "system" may
be defined as "... an array of components designed to
accomplish a particular objective according to plan". The
components of the system are often referred to as
"subsystems".
Ackoff (1961, 28), suggested that the principal
characteristics of a system are that it is composed of
interacting subsystems, each of which has interests in
its own right. For example, the internal control
Please refer to Chapter 4 for the studies.
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pertaining to sales, accounts receivable, inventory, and
cash receipts perform important functions when each is
considered by itself; however, these four subsystems
interact when credit * sale is made and the payment
received later.
In line with these lines of thought, financial statement
audit have also followed this approach of dividing the
financial statement into various "transaction cycles"
which is similar to the "subsystem" explained earlier.
Arens and Loebbecke (1991) suggested five transaction
cycles for the financial statement audit and they are (a)
payroll and personnel cycle (b) sales and collection (c)
acquisition of payment cycle (d) inventory and
warehousing (e) capital acquisition and repayment cycle.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION
The purpose of this research is therefore to answer the
following question:
DO EAs AND IAs MAKE SIMILAR JUDGEMENTS?
Reliance on this would be possible if it is found that:
1. EAs and IAs make consistent judgements
2. EAs and IAs can reach consensus in their judgement
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
With the increasing responsibilities for both the IAs and
EAs, it would be beneficial in terms of time and cost for
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EAs to rely on IAs, and vice-versa. The main purpose of
this study is thus to see if "EAs and IAs will arrive at 
the same -judgements about the quality of an internal 
control system that they have to evaluate". The results
from this study would serve as evidence that can help to
support the idea that EAs should or should not rely on
IAs, and vice-versa.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
It would help to determine the extent of reliance that
could be placed by EAs on IAs' reports on internal
control. Where internal control reports are published by
the Board (or by senior management) and are reviewed by
the EAs, the EAs could obtain a degree of reassurance as
to the reliability of those reports if the reports had
been based on the output of audit work conducted by IAs
who are likely to reach similar couclusiorks tc, thc.se. et
EAs. If the judgements of both types of auditors are not
significantly different, then there could be increased
cooperation between them and this could benefit all
parties concerned, namely management, IAs and EAs in
terms of the quality of work that could be achieved in
less time and cost.
The study can also help to identify factors that the
auditor perceived as important in determining the quality
of internal control system which would be useful in the
context of implementing Cadbury's requirement on internal
control reporting.
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The nature of auditing judgement has been the subject of
considerable research in the United States (Ashton, 1985;
Libby and Lewis, 1977 and 1982, etc.) For review, please
refer to Chapter 4). Given the dependence on judgement in
auditing, it would be important to examine judgement of
EAs and IAs in this context.
In fact, Turley and Cooper (1991, 29) has stated that,
Given the overt dependence on judgement to determine
the parameters of the audit and their interpretation
in terms of evidence requirements, as well as the
evaluation of results and formulation of an opinion,
it would be desirable to see this research
replicated and extended in the United Kingdom.
1.5 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
It has been noted that reliance on IA's work seems a
necessity in order to fulfil the new demands required of
both EAs and IAs. One of the principal results of the
research will be:
TO DETERMINE WHETHER EAs CAN RELY ON THE WORK OF IAs, AND
VICE-VERSA.
The research question "Do IAs and EAs make similar
judgements?" can be answered through 4 main objectives
of the study below:
1) whether EAs and IAs reached the same consensus as to
the quality of a given internal control system
2) whether EAs and IAs were consistent in the ratings
of two similar internal control systems
3) the effect of certain factors on judgement consensus
and judgement consistency for both EAs and IAs, and
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4) the judgement model of both groups of auditors
Findings will be discussed according to these four main
issues (i.e consensus, consistency, factors affecting
consensus and consistency and judgement model of
auditors).
Consensus of EAs and IAs which was the main thrust of the
study, was looked at in 6 ways:
1) consensus in the ratings of the 6 similar cases
given to both groups of auditors
2) consensus in the ratings of a case using different
techniques/ approaches of evaluation
3) consensus in the ratings of whether internal control
procedures (ICPs) were able to achieve control
objectives
4) consensus in the ratings of the ability of the ICPs to
detect or correct material errors (control risk)
5) consensus in the weights (i.e relative importance)
given to the ICPs and
6) consensus in the ratings and relative weights given by
the auditors to the "accounting" controls in
comparison with "administrative" controls
To facilitate achievement of these aims, the research had
the following approach:
1) to undertake literature research (through past
research, official pronouncements and auditing
literature) to ascertain:
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a) the nature of internal controls
b) the increase in reliance on 1As
c) importance of judgement to internal control
evaluation
d) techniques of internal control evaluation
e) the position of internal control reports
f) influence of the following factors on judgement
i) experience level
ii) educational level
iii) position level in the organisation
iv) independence of internal audit
v) size of firm
2) to undertake a literature review of past research
related to the study
3) to conduct empirical research to establish the extent
of similarity of IAs and EAs in the area of internal
control evaluation.
1.6 RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
The research has been conducted in two phases:
a) literature-based study
b) empirical research
1.6.1 Literature-based study
For the literature-based study, relevant literature
relating to internal control evaluation and the position
of the internal control report which is a key area in
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which IAs and EAs can cooperate was reviewed. This was
primarily derived from dissertations, reports of various
committees set up by professional bodies, professional
promulgations and journal articles. The literature was
identified mainly from the following sources:
i) online database searches of:
a) dissertation abstracts (CD-Rom and Aslib)
b) article abstracts (ABI information)
ii) footnotes and references cited in the auditing
literature
1.6.2 Conduct of the empirical research
A mail questionnaire using a pre-answered Internal
Control Questionnaire (ICQ) for the payroll internal
control system was used. There were 8 internal control
procedures (ICPs) on each ICQ. The answers to the 8 ICPs
on the ICO were varied to produce 8 different cases. Each
auditor received 8 cases which comprised: (a) 6 cases
which were similar for all EAs and IAs and (b) 2 cases
which were similar for a pair of auditor (one EA and one
IA). The 2 cases were made up of (i) 1 case which
followed Kempthorne's h replicate of 28 design and (ii) 1
case which was the repeat of the case in (1).14
The purpose of the 6 similar cases was to test for
"judgement consensus" amongst all auditors, that is to
114 Please refer to Appendiz 5c11) for the questionnaire,
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find out whether the auditors gave a similar ratin g to
the 6 cases.
One of the 6 cases had all the 8 ICPs present and this
represented the "ICO approach" as the case was presented
using an ICQ. In addition to that, the same case was
presented in two different ways to test for similarity of
judgements of auditors using different techniques/
approaches of evaluation.
The first was by means of a control matrix with the 8
ICPs presented on the rows and 5 "control objectives"
presented as columns. This is referred to as the
"control objectives" (CO) approach in the thesis.
The second presentation also had all the 8 ICPs presented
on the rows and one column for the control risk rating.
This is referred to as the "control risk" (CR) approach
in the thesis. Please refer to Appendix 5cii) for the
approaches.
There were two purposes for the 2 similar cases: (a) the
case which followed the experimental design was to
determine the judgement model of EAs and IAs as a group
and (b) the repeat case was to test for "judgement
consistency" amongst individual auditors, i.e to find out
whether the auditors gave a similar rating to the 2
cases.
versIty
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The judgement model was determined for each group of
auditor using 64 EAs' and 64 IAs' ratings. The judgement
model was based on Kempthorne's h replicate of 2 8 design.
In this design, all main effects and all 28, two cue
interactions were estimable. Three cue interactions were
not intended to be measured as previous studies (Ashton,
1974; Ashton and Brown, 1980 and Ashton and Kramer, 1980)
have indicated that they account for no or negligible
interaction. The purpose of using this design was so that
the effects of a number of different variables could be
investigated simultaneously.
The effect of various variables indicates the degree of
influence each variable has upon the final judgement.
This is also known as the "main effect" of each variable.
In the case of the internal control evaluation, it would
be the effect of the 8 ICPs and the three covariates
(experience, educational and position level) on the final
judgement of auditors.
The effect of interactions among different variables
indicates the effect of a combination of two or more of
the variables upon the final judgement. This is called
"interactions". In the case of the internal control
evaluation, it would be the effect of a combination of
two or more of the independent variables (8 ICPs and the
three covariates) on the dependent variable, i.e the
final rating of the auditors on the "visual analog
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scale". In other words, the importance of each
independent variable depended upon the answer to the
other independent variable.
The judgement model was analyzed by means of analysis of
covariance with personal profiles of auditors
(experience, educational and position level) as
covariates and the ICPs as the "other" independent
variables.
1.7 EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
This section summarizes the variables examined in the
study in more detail than was done in Section 1.6.2.
Judgement consensus and judgement consistency
are also defined. However, further discussion regarding
these terms will be made in Chapter 3.
1.7.1 Judgement consistency and judgement consensus in
the area of internal control evaluation
The financial statement user is entitled to assume
that both the financial statements and the auditor's
opinion on those statements were prepared in a
consistent manner.
(Smith 1971, 1).
The reporting standard under Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (AICPA 1972, SAS 1, AU Section 150, ¶.02)
states that before an unqualified audit report is issued,
the auditor should ascertain that the financial
statements are prepared according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), that the accounting methods
are used in a consistent manner and that appropriate
disclosures have been made.
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There are 4 types of opinion (APB 1993, SAS 600, T32-37)
that can be issued, that is unqualified, qualified,
disclaimer and adverse.
"Unqualified" opinion is issued when the auditor thinks
that the financial statements are prepared according to
GAAP, the accounting methods are used in a consistent
manner and there are adequate disclosures. In other
words, the auditor is adequately confident to say that
the financial statements are true and fair.
"Qualified" opinion is issued when the auditor has some
reservations regarding the financial statements but still
thinks that the financial statements shows a true and
fair view.
"Disclaimer" opinion is issued when the auditor does not
want to issue an opinion on the financial statements.
"Adverse" opinion is issued when the auditor does not
think that the financial statements show a true and fair
view.
If auditors are given the same kind of internal control
system and the same set of financial statements,
different auditors using any approach of evaluation (be
it ICQ, CO or CR) would be likely to come out with the
same type of opinion. It does not matter what approach
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they used as long as at the end of the day their audit
opinions are the same or that they are able to reach a
"consensus" regarding the quality of financial statements
(which is dependent on the quality of internal control
system).
If during the next year, the internal control system has
not changed much and thus the financial statements would
not be much affected, it would be expected that the same
auditor would come out with the same type of opinion. In
other words, the auditor would be "consistent" in his
opinion.
The presentation of consistently-prepared opinions
by independent auditors should be of concern to the
public accounting profession. It is commonly assumed
that financial statement users can distinguish
between different "grades" of opinions.
(Anderson, Glese and Booker 1970, 525).
... a financial statement user, in making his
resource allocation decision, place less reliance on
the financial statements in correspondence to the
degree to which the audit report is qualified.
(Carmichel 1972, 2).
Judgement on the quality of the internal control system
would determine the "different degrees of qualifications"
to be issued. If different auditors could not reach the
same "degree of qualification" (cannot reach a consensus)
on the same type of internal control system or if the
same auditor could not reach the same "degree of
qualification" at two separate times on the same type of
internal control system (is not consistent), the results
would be that financial statement users would make poor
resource allocations.
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According to Ashton (1973),
Consistency of internal control judgements is also
important to the public accounting firm because the
cost and/ or quality of an audit may be in part, a
function of the auditor's judgement of the strength
of the internal control system, regardless of the
controls actually employed or the evidence gathered
to evaluate them. Variations in judgement by the
same auditor at different points in time or by
different auditors at the same point in time will
cause the cost and/ or quality of the audit to
fluctuate... assuming that all other factors are
equal.
Ashton (1973, 25)
One of the ways to test consistency and consensus in
judgement is by means of a controlled experiment because
in practice, all other factors are not equal.
In this empirical research each case would represent an
internal control system. The definitions and the measures
of the two variables, "judgement consensus" and
"judgement consistency", were measured in the following
ways:
"Judgement consensus": agreement amongst auditors on the
evaluation of a particular case i.e, would the auditors
pass the same judgement regarding the internal control
quality of a case given a case of the same nature to
evaluate?
"Judgement consistency": agreement of an auditor with
himself on the evaluation of a particular case i.e, would
an auditor pass the same judgement regarding the internal
control quality of a case given two cases of the same
nature to evaluate.
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Consensus/ consistency will be investigated based on 3
aspects:
1. consensus/consistency amongst IAs
2. consensus/consistency amongst EAs
3. consensus/consistency between IAs and EAs as a group
1.7.2 Techniques/ Approaches of internal control 
evaluation
...several auditors might judge the effectiveness of
a given system of internal control quite
differently....This condition develops primarily
from the use of different methods of appraisal, but
can also arise because auditors place different
emphasis on the relative importance of various
factors of internal control.
(Brown 1962, 50).
Methods of appraisal can lead to different judgement
amongst auditors regarding the quality of a given
internal control system. Thus, this issue was also
investigated.
An attempt was also made to have the EAs and IAs evaluate
the same case using "CO", "CR" and "ICQ" approach.
Under the "CO" approach, the auditors were asked to
evaluate the extent to which each of the internal control
procedures (ICPs) and the overall internal control system
could meet the five control objectives (completeness,
existence, rights and obligations, presentation,
disclosure and valuation).
The purpose was to see if the evaluation of the overall
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internal control system was based on the evaluation made
for each ICP (components of the internal control system).
Under the assessment of control risk, the auditors were
also required to assess each ICP's and the overall
internal control system's ability or potential for
detecting or correcting material errors.
Control risk is the risk that a misstatement could
occur in an account balancepr class of transactions
and that could be material,' either individually or
when aggregated with misstatements in other balances
or classes, would not be prevented, or detected and
corrected on a timely basis, by the accounting and
internal control systems.
(APB 1995a, SAS 300, ¶5).
Again, the purpose was to see if the evaluation of the
overall internal control system was based on the
evaluation made for each ICP (components of the internal
control system).
1.7.3 Description of the judgement formation processes
(judgement model) utilised by IAs and EAs in the
evaluation of internal control 
Auditors might judge the effectiveness of a given quality
of an internal control system differently because
"auditors placed different emphasis on the relative
importance of various factors in internal control" (Brown
1962, 50).
In line with this theory, the purpose of the "judgement
model" was to find out which of the 8 ICPs (indicators of
internal control strength) were used by the two groups of
auditors in evaluating the internal control system. The
information obtained from an examination of judgement
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formation processes should be useful in resolving a
problem (Brown 1962, 50).
If the internal control report is going to be prepared by
management as part of the annual report and EAs would be
given the task of evaluating or assessing the report, it
would be important that the evaluations of IAs and EAs do
not differ.
The 8 ICPs were deliberately selected to comprise 4
"administrative" and 4 "accounting" controls. It was the
intention to find out if the two groups of auditors
placed different emphasis on the two "types" of internal
control. Although (as discussed in chapter 2) there is no
clearcut definition of the two "types" of controls,
auditing literature (Coopers & Lybrand, 1989; Spicer and
Pegler, 1985; Auditing guideline 3.204, 1980b and COSO's
"Framework", 1992b) seem to point out to the following
characteristics of "accounting " and "administrative" 
controls:
1. "Accounting" control. It comprises the plan of
organisation and all methods and procedures that are
concerned mainly with, and relate directly to, the
safeguarding of assets and reliability of financial
records. It achieves the control objectives over
"completeness, accuracy and validity". Examples
include prenumbering of documents, rotation of duties
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and physical security of assets.
2. "Administrative" control. It comprises the plan of
organisation and all methods and procedures that are
concerned mainly with operational efficiency and
adherence to managerial policies and usually relate
indirectly to financial records. Examples includes
having an organisation chart, accounting procedures
and policies adequately documented and variance
reports.
1.7.4 Factors that effect judgement consensus and
consistency
Previous researches have shown mixed results regarding
factors that have an influence on judgement consensus and
consistency. Please refer to Chapter 4 for a discussion
of these factors.
1.7.4.1 Experience, professional qualifications and
position level in the organisation
The three main variables examined in this thesis were:
a) experience level; b) educational level and c) position
level in the organisation. These variables were also
examined in determining the judgement model of EAs and
IAs.
To date there have been varying results regarding the
effect of these three variables on judgement consensus
and consistency of auditors.
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Mautz and Sharaf have emphasized the importance of
"experience" on the judgements of the auditors.
When writers discuss the role of judgement in
auditing, it is frequently stated or implied that
the ability to apply judgement is improved through
experience and/or through association with a fellow
auditor who has had a great deal of auditing
experience.
(Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, 35).
Mautz also stressed the importance of "experience" and
"education" in the development of an "auditing attitude".
What is this auditing attitude without which no man
can attain real success in auditing? It is a
combination of education, experience, and judgement
which provides a frame of mind, a point of view
toward his work, that enables an auditor to appraise
his problems accurately and to attack them
effectively.
(Mautz 1964, 1-2).
Regarding "position levels", Trotman et al. (1983, 291)
have stated that they expected differences to occur
across the various levels (from junior to partner)
because of different weights that each level of
management carries in the decision process. This study
also examined the effect of "position" levels on
judgement consensus and consistency.
1.7.4.2 "Independence" of IAs and "size" of firms 
To date, only one research has examined this issue.
Moore (1993) found no effect of "independence" of IAs on
judgement consensus. In this thesis, this variable was
also explored.
Data on IAs' "independence" was gathered through
questions asking: a) the accountability of head of
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internal audit; b) whether they were involved in
compliance testing; c) whether they made recommendations
for improvement in internal control systems; d) whether
they were involved with developing detailed proposals for
the design of internal controls; e) whether they were
involved with the implementation of control changes and
f) whether they were involved in administering or
operating any internal controls. Please refer to Appendix
5cii) for the questions. The data was analyzed to see if
"independence" of IAs will affect judgement consensus and
consistency.
Data regarding the "size" of firms was gathered through
questions asking: a) firm's turnover; b) number of
employees; c) net assets and d) annual profit. Please
refer to Appendix 5cii) for the questions. Analysis was
then done to determine the effect of "size" of firms on
judgement consensus and consistency, that is to determine
whether auditors working in "bigger" firms would make
more consistent judgements and would agree more
(consensus) with each other compared with auditors
working in "smaller" firms. This is based on the
assumption that "bigger" firms could provide better
training facilities and more advanced modules on how to
evaluate internal control.
1.7.5 "Accounting" and "administrative" controls
An analysis was also done to determine whether the
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auditors showed any preference for "administrative" or
"accounting" controls when making their evaluations.
The analysis was based on: a) the weightings (relative
importance) given to the two "types" of controls; b)
control risk (ability to detect or correct material
errors) that can be achieved by the two "types" of
controls and c) control objectives that can be achieved
by the two "types" of controls.
1.7.6 Completeness, existence and valuation control 
objectives 
It was noted in the auditing literature 15 (COSO, 1992;
Coopers and Lybrand, 1989) that "accounting" controls can
achieve "completeness, existence and valuation" better
than the other two objectives ("rights and obligations"
and "presentation and disclosure"). Thus, this issue was
also investigated in this thesis.
1.7.7 Judgement insight
Insight in this thesis, refers to the "insight that an
auditor has into his own judgement formation processes".
Judgement insight was calculated based on the correlation
between: a) the auditors' allocation of points to each
ICP based on its importance and b) the importance of each
ICP as determined by the judgement model.
15
Please refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.
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According to Ashton (1973),
To the extent that an auditor has a poor
understanding of the way in which he formulates his
judgements he will be ineffective in transferring
his judgement skills to another person-perhaps a
trainee in his firm.
(Ashton 1973, 23)
1.8 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
To achieve the study objectives, the thesis is structured
in the following manner:
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
CHAPTER TWO: PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS AND
RELIANCE ON IAS BY EAS.
Highlights the historical background of auditing,
authoritative bodies in the accounting profession,
controversy in the breadth of definition of internal
control, different techniques of internal control
evaluation, control objectives, why there should be
cooperation between the two groups of auditors, impact of
the internal audit function on the external audit, issues
that are raised by EAs' reliance on internal audit work
and auditing standards and guidelines that have been
issued surrounding the topic.
CHAPTER THREE: NATURE OF JUDGEMENT
Reviews the literature on judgement and approach used on
judgement research in the past. Research approach and the
variables of interest in the current thesis are also
explained.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON INTERNAL CONTROL
EVALUATION AND OTHER AREAS INVOLVING ISSUES OF JUDGEMENT
Mainly reviews the previous work done concerning internal
control evaluation. The literature was classified
according to studies in internal control evaluation,
studies in other types of evaluation in "accounting" and
"non-accounting areas" and studies on reliance on IAs by
EAs. All these studies involved the issue of judgement
and most of them used "experimental design" in their
approach of study.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Deals with methodology of the experiment. It describes
the experimental task and the experimental design. Issues
discussed include choice of the payroll subsystem, ICPs
selected as indicators of internal control strength,
phases of the experiment, sample selection and a
description of the judgement model and research
instrument. Also discussed are issues such as when the
questionnaire was piloted, comments given and changes
that need to be done before launching of the primary
questionnaire, when the primary questionnaire was sent
and the practical difficulties encountered in carrying
out the study.
CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
It describes the results of the findings. Discussion of
findings is made by means of hypotheses and these
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hypotheses are categorised into four main issues:
(a) judgement consensus; (b) judgement consistency;
(c) factors affecting judgement consensus and consistency
and (d) judgement model of EAs and IAs. An attempt is
also made to compare the findings with previous studies.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Provides the study summary, limitations, implications and
suggestion for future research.
1.9 SUMMARY
It has been noted that there has been a growing
importance of the internal audit function during the past
years. A recent influence has been that various bodies
have recommended the inclusion of the internal control
report as part of the financial statements.
Various research studies have been done examining the
similarities of audit judgements. The empirical research
that was used in this study was based on the idea of
Ashton (1973) who examined the judgement formation
process of individual EAs. The present study extended it
further to include the IAs' and EAs' judgement formation
process as a group.
Judgement consensus and judgement consistency are
considered to be the means by which similarity of audit
judgements can be measured. This chapter has outlined the
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issues examined in the thesis, research methodology
employed and has concluded with an overview of this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF INTERNAL CONTROL: IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTIONS BY PROFESSIONAL BODIES, IN THE LITERATURE
AND BY RESEARCHERS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines issues surrounding internal control
including a consideration and criticism of:
• the diverse and evolving definitions of internal
control found in literature;
• the techniques by which internal control may be
evaluated;
. the educational and other requirements that have to
be met to be an auditor;
. the meaning of audit risk in the context of internal
control ("control risk");
• the importance and meaning of independence in
auditing" and
• how EAs and IAs can better cooperate.
16 In this thesis, only the independence of IAs was discussed.
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A deliberate attempt has been made to use only official
pronouncements (especially from professional bodies) and
material from auditing textbooks to discuss these issues
- except where it has also been found necessary to refer
to certain research to support and/or clarify the topic
under discussion. Prior research done in this area is
discussed mainly in Chapter 3.
2.2 GROWTH OF THE AUDITING PROFESSION IN THE UK
The first Companies Act was introduced by Gladstone in
1844 (Attwood & Stein, 12-13). There had developed a
need for an independent examination of accounts to
safeguard shareholders' interests in view of the
separation between the providers of capital for a
business (shareholders) and its management (directors and
executives). The rationale for external audit as a
prerequisite of effective external control was summed up
well by Professor McKenzie in his Foreword to Normanton's
book The Accountability and Audit of Governments:
Without audit - no accountability; without
accountability - no control; and if there is
no control - where is the seat of power?
Under the Act, registered companies were required to
appoint one or more EAs; there was no guidance as to
their qualifications nor with respect to their required
independence. If at the conclusion of the annual meeting
of the company, no EA had been appointed, the Board of
Trade was directed to appoint an auditor - a power which
still persists.
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The 1856 Companies Act, which replaced the 1844 Act,
introduced the provision that the EA need not be a
shareholder, thus encouraging the development of
professional auditors. Today, the rules of the
professional accounting bodies whose members are
authorised to act as company auditors, expressly exclude
an auditor owning or having an interest in shares of the
client company.
In the 19th century, EAs' were concerned with the Balance
Sheet and not the Profit and Loss account. It was the
1929 Companies Act that extended the EA's report to cover
the Profit and Loss account as well; and the 1948 Act
extended to the Profit and Loss disclosure requirements.
The 1985 Companies Act dealt more fully with the
appointment of EAs and lays down their duties. The
current 1989 Companies Act governs the accounting
profession in relation to its work as statutory auditors
of companies in the UK (in the Republic of Ireland, it is
their 1990 Companies Act).
Under the Companies Act the EA is obliged to make a
report to the members stating whether, in the EA's
opinion, the financial statements show a true and fair
view of the company's performance and position.
There are four main professional bodies whose members are
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authorized under the Companies Act to audit the accounts
of companies, which are
ICAS (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland,
established 1854)
ICAEW (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England,
and Wales, 1880)
• ICAI (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland,
1885)
and
• CACA (Chartered Association of Certified Accountant,
1905).
Two other bodies, CIMA (Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants, 1919) and CIPFA (Chartered Institute of
Public Finance and Accountancy, 1885) have their
specialised areas which lie principally outside external
auditing, though CIPFA is seeking approval for its
members to act as EAs of companies.
Woolf (1990) stated,
Members of CIPFA are largely concerned with
accounting and audit work in local government, as
well as in hospitals, schools and other institutions
within the public sector. CIMA members are highly
qualified to act in industry, their natural compass,
in view of their expertise in accounting and costing
systems, budgeting, financial and investment
decision-making, and other skills within the full
management range, not excluding the increasingly
complex area of industrial law and accountability.
The skills of ICA and CACA membership are less
specialized, and provide the full range of
professional work, both in public practice and as
directors and employees in commerce and industry.
(Woolf 1990, 9)
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All the six above bodies form the CCAB (Consultative
Committee of Accountancy Bodies) whose purpose is to
promote cooperation among them.
In the context of this thesis it is a matter of regret
that the Institute of Internal Auditors (IA), which is
the only professional body to cater exclusively for IAs,
is not a member of CCAB: a forum which would have the
potential to promote cooperation and coordination between
IAs and EAs and which would have potential benefit to the
work of both types of audit as well as to their clients.
The overall finding of this thesis is that IAs and EAs
have significant potential to rely on each others work,
conclusions and even opinions relating to internal
control. This is because the study finds that IAs and
EAs come to closely similar judgements when they review
similar systems of internal control. Yet the Auditing
Practices Board (APB) of CCAB, which develops auditing
standards, has no representatives from the IIA even
though it has voting representatives from a number of
"audit user" bodies (see later in this chapter) - and so
there is insufficient opportunity to develop mature
official guidance on coordination between EAs and IAs,
and reliance by EAs upon internal audit (and vice versa).
The findings of this research study would be useful input
into such a process. It is very unusual for the IIA to
be invited to nominate a representative to join even a
working party of the APB: in 1995 this happened for the
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first time in the working party which is developing APB
guidelines for IAs.
CIPFA and the IIA have for years contested for the
leadership of internal auditing in the public sector
within the UK; and many IAs have professional membership
of one or more of the other CCAB bodies and may not have
membership of the IIA as well: it is not unreasonable
that the CCAB's APB should seek to provide general
guidance to its members who are IAs, and also provide
guidance to its EA members on placing reliance upon
internal audit. It is confusing and counter-productive
to effective auditing that both the IIA and the CCAB are
independently active in developing guidance for IAs. It
will not be easy to resolve this problem, but it is
necessary that it should be resolved. Forward looking
members of the profession foresee a time when a larger
part of the statutory audit task will be performed by IAs
with EAs acting as assessors (ICAS, 1993, "Auditing into
the Twenty-First Century"). If this is to happen the
level of coordination between the two audits will need to
be enhanced and in. the UK it is unlikely to be so
enhanced without higher levels of coordination between
the CCAB and the IIA. The challenge is all the greater
because the Standards of the IIA have worldwide
applicability whereas the remit of CCAB extends to the UK
only. Nevertheless, CCAB accounting and auditing
standards and guidelines are coming closer into line with
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international	 ones.	 It	 is	 the policy of	 the	 APB	 to
endeavour to	 be	 consistent with the International
Auditing Guidelines	 issued by the International
Federation of Accountants	 through their International
Auditing Practices Committee.
A higher level of coordination has been achieved in the
US. The IIA was one of the sponsoring bodies of the
Treadway Commission and the subsequent Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework project the latter of which has had
such a profound impact upon the development of our
understanding about the nature of internal control and
internal control review17 . There were four other
professional bodies who belonged to the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) including the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) and the American Accounting
Association. The IIA was not represented on the broadly
equivalent UK committees which produced the so-called
"Cadbury Report" and "Rutteman Report", and so were able
to exert influence only by responding to exposure drafts
and by the influence they had on the US developments
which have been adopted to a significant extent in the
UK.
17The impact has been widely felt throughout the world. For
instance, in the U.K. the "Rutteman Report" on Guidance to Directors 
on Reporting on Internal Control (December 1994) follows closely the
five COSO "components" [COSO] or "criteria" [Rutteman] of internal
control systems.
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Likewise, to illustrate further that the IIA is more
influential at a senior level in the US, IIA. Inc. is one
of three host organizations of the bi-annual World
Congress of Accountants sponsored by the International
Federation of Accountants (the other two being the AICPA
and the US Institute of Management Accountants).
In 1994 the CACA proposed that the IIA together with
other bodies such as the Institute of Taxation should
become associate members of CCAB, but to date that
proposal has not been advanced.
The predecessor body to the APB was the Auditing
Practices Committee (APC), established by CCAB in 1976.
It issued its first Discussion Drafts for Auditing
Standards and Guidelines in 1978. Auditing Standards and
Guidelines issued by the APC covered much of the core of
the subject and are also essential material for auditing
students and practitioners. In the explanatory foreword
of Auditing Standards and Guidelines issued by the APC
(1989),
Auditing Standards prescribes the basic principles
and practices which members of the various
accounting bodies will be expected to follow in the
conduct of any audit.
(APC 1989, Explanatory Foreword, 58)
On the other hand, Auditing Guidelines are not intended
to be definitive and are not intended to form part of the
Auditing Standards.
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Auditing Guidelines have the same status and purpose as
the explanatory notes contained in some Auditing
Standards and they provide guidance on:
(a) procedures by which the Auditing Standards may
be applied
(b) the application of the Auditing Standards to
specific items appearing in the accounts
(c) the application of Auditing Standards to
particular sectors, industries and service
organisations
(d) specific types of reporting engagements other
than financial statements audit
(e) other matters relating to the proper
performance of audit work
(APC 1989, Explanatory Foreword, ¶13)
In terms of their respective relative degrees of
authority, the auditing standards and guidelines
promulgated originally by AFC (and now in their revised
and expanded form by APB) correspond to the standards and
guidelines of the IIA. Members of the latter Institute,
per their Code of Ethics, 
shall adopt suitable means to comply with The
Standards and Members ... in violation of the
... Code  ... shall be subject to forfeiture if
their membership of The Institute.
On the other hand, the IA's Guidelines are "the most
generally accepted" ways of meeting the requirements of
the Standards (IA: "Administrative Directive No. 1,
1991) but are not obligatory. However, in terms of their
relative detail, there is a significant difference
between the APB standards and those of the IIA. The
latter has five general and twenty-five specific
standards - each concisely stated in a single sentence.
They are expressed in such terms as to allow much
discretion as to how they will be observed and to make it
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difficult to fault a member for non-observance. The
APB's standards are in more detail and cover essential
procedures as well as basic principles (APB: "Scope and
authority of APB Pronouncements", May 1993).
One of the six sections of the APB's Statements of
Auditing Standards is devoted to "Accounting systems and
internal control". The APC's "Guidance for Internal
Auditors" (June 1990) is omitted from that section
pending its redevelopment by an APB working party which
is currently meeting: that statement had the status of a
guideline but under consideration is whether it should be
replaced by a Standard which would be obligatory for CCAB
members working as IAs or with overall responsibility for
the direction of internal audit functions. If it emerges
as a Standard there will be a major conflict of
jurisdiction over internal auditing between CCAB and the
IIA. At present the only content of the APB's Statements
of Auditing Standards which directly relates to internal
auditing is their guidance to EAs on "Considering the
work of internal audit". Additional content will be
developed in the section on "Accounting Systems and
Internal Control".
The overlap of CCAB and the IIA in the area of standards
and guidelines has been discussed in some detail as it
impacts upon the cooperation and coordination which may
be achieved between IAs and EAs. EAs are answerable to a
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CCAB body whereas IAs may be answerable to either a CCAB
body or the IIAs, or both. It is desirable that there
should be consistency of content in auditing standards
and guidelines relating to internal audit and internal
control - from whatever quarter they emanate - and
preferable that there should be one set of standards and
guidelines subscribed to by all bodies. Disparity
between them weakens the potential for the cooperation
and coordination which has always been desirable and
which the findings of this thesis indicate inter alia  is
feasible. Furthermore, disparity between the Standards
and Guidelines of different professional bodies
translates itself into different training requirements
and therefore levels and types of attainment which differ
between the members of one professional body and another.
To date, it is probable that the finding of this thesis
that IAs and EAs are likely to come to closely similar
internal control judgements when they evaluate a system,
has in part been a consequence of closely similar
backgrounds, including training, of the two types of
auditor. If their standards and guidelines were to
diverge markedly in the future, the same conclusions
might not be drawn from a research study conducted at a
future date - and an opportunity for harmonious
cooperation between the two audits might have been lost.
So, for these strategic reasons, it is desirable that a
single set, or compatible sets, of standards and
guidelines are developed into the future. This becomes
52
particularly clear if we consider the implications that
EAs in the twenty-first century might become assessors of
work done by IAs, which was touched on earlier in this
chapter. It becomes very desirable that the IIA in the
UK should be a full member of CCAB.
The geographical spread of the auditing standards setting
bodies enhanced the problem but may not be serious as
national standards are brought more into line with each
other - as discussed earlier in this chapter.
The APC of the CCAB published its first three Auditing
Standards in June 1980 which were respectively entitled
"The Operational Standard", "The Audit Report" and
"Qualifications in Audit Reports". The latter two were
revised and combined in a single Standard in 1989 titled
"Audit Report".
The IIA's Statements on Internal Auditing Standards
(SIASs) are issued both to explain changes to the
specific Standards 18 and/or guidelines within the
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing, and also (and more commonly) to elaborate upon
the Guidelines. They can be considered as authoritative
interpretations of the Standards.
"In practice, the five general and twenty-five specific
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors have hardly changed
since they were introduced in 1978.
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On 1 April 1991, a new Auditing Practices Board (APB) was
set up to replace the old APC. The APB makes three
categories of pronouncements:
• Statements of Auditing Standards (SASs)
• Practice Notes
• Bulletins
According to MacLochlain and Punch (1995),
This new board differs from its predecessor in that
the voting membership is evenly divided between
practising EAs and user representatives (including
nominees of the Bank of England, the London Stock
Exchange, the National Audit Office, the Audit
Commission, the Securities and Investments Board,
the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the
Irish Department of Enterprise and Employment).
(MacLochlain and Punch 1995, 3)
SASs contain the basic principles and essential
procedures which are the auditing standards themselves
and with which at present EAs only are required to
comply. Practice Notes are guidance: they assist EAs in
applying Auditing Standards of general application to
particular circumstances and industries. Bulletins are
issued to provide timely guidance on new or emerging
issues. The Auditing Standards and Guidelines determined
by the APC were adopted by the APB until such time as
they were amended or superseded.
UK professional bodies are also members of international
accounting organisations such as:
. IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee,
1973), to issue IAS to promote the world wide
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acceptance and observance of basic standards in the
presentation of audited accounts and financial
statements.
• FEE (Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens)
• IFAC (International Federation of Accountants, 1977)
which issues International Auditing Guidelines (IAG)
on Auditing through IAPC (International Auditing
Practices Committee).
The Accountancy Bodies have agreed to incorporate the
principles on which IAG are based into their own Auditing
Standards and Guidelines when, and to the extent that
they are practicable. IAG are authoritative in the UK
only to the extent that they have been incorporated into
the pronouncements of the CCAB.
Other UK bodies concerned with Auditing and Accounting
are:
• Association of International Accountants (AIA, 1928)
• Society of Company and Commercial Accountants
(SCCA, 1923)
• Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT, 1980)
• Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators
(ICSA, 1891)
Dunn (1991) discuss the educational route to becoming an
auditor as follows:
It takes several years to become a qualified
accountant. While each body has slightly different
rules, in general one has to obtain the minimum
entry requirements (typically a degree in the case
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of ICAEW and ICAS) and then complete a period of
practical training of roughly three years' duration.
Students must pass a series of demanding
examinations during the training period. Thus,
school-leavers seeking a career in accountancy would
have to commit themselves to a course of study and
training which could take six years or more to
complete....
Each of the professional bodies insists that its
members do not provide professional accounting
services unless they are in possession of a
practising certificate. ..In general, one has to
obtain at least two years of appropriate experience
before being granted a practising certificate ...
(Dunn 1991, 10).
It is a matter of some concern with respect to harnessing
the full potential for cooperation and coordination
between internal and external auditing which this thesis
suggests is possible, that members of The IIA are the
exception amongst auditors in that they do not require
their members to have a practice certificate.
Furthermore, many of them joined their Institute without
studying for and passing examinations. Indeed there is
no statutory requirement for most UK enterprises (such as
companies, for instance) to have an internal audit
function although it is frequently recommended (such as
in the Cadbury Report, 1992) and is often mandatory
requirement through statutory instrument or regulation -
for instance in local government, health authorities,
universities, building societies and building
associations.
Companies and many other types of enterprise which do
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have internal audit need not staff the internal audit,
nor head up the function, with a member of staff who is
subject to the discipline of either a CCAB body or of the
IIA. In these respects it could be said that internal
auditing is less developed professionally than is
external auditing, is less likely to be conducted to
uniform standards, and may therefore be the less reliable
partner when external audit seeks to place reliance upon
internal audit, than vice versa.
Internal auditing developed much later than external
auditing. According to Chambers, Selim and Vinten
(1990):
The main impetuses in their growth appear to
have been associated with times of economic
restraint when managements, having less
opportunity to increase profits by increasing
sales, have sought to do so by controlling
costs. It is probable that internal auditing
has been seen as an effective agent for this
purpose.
(Chambers, Selim and Vinten 1990, 4).
Some evidence suggests that the most recent recession may
have been an exception in that internal audit provision
often has been cut back in many businesses during this
recession as part of the general processes of very
significant downsizing and empowerment. To some extent
at least this must have been balanced by the positive
impact upon internal audit of the new emphasis upon
corporate governance and internal control reporting.
Empowerment suggests that line management and staff
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themselves should have a role in assessing the
effectiveness of their own systems of internal control,
and in some companies this has been at least the reason
cutting back or cutting out the internal audit function.
Sawyer (1981) said that:
Internal auditors do what management would do -
if management had the time and knew how.
COSO and Rutteman both identify the monitoring of
internal control as an essential part of the internal
control framework. Management is responsible for
internal control, and management may conduct this
monitoring for themselves. But in the past many
enlightened enterprises have delegated this monitoring to
internal audit who do it on management's behalf.
Internal audit has the time and the expertise to audit.
By delegating the task to lAs, management is endeavouring
to ensure that it is done - and that it is done
professionally. It is also likely to be done more
objectively if done by an internal audit function as line
management and their staff may be too close to their
systems to evaluate them dispassionately.
On the other hand a dedicated internal audit function is
costly to maintain and there is the risk that line
management and staff feel they have not only delegated
the authority to review internal control to internal
audit but have delegated the responsibility for internal
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control to internal audit as well - which is very unsound
and risky.
Control self assessment (CSA) is a response to these
concerns (I1A - UK, 1995). Existing alongside internal
audit, or sometimes as an alternative to it, it empowers
line management and their staff to review their internal
control arrangements themselves in a highly participative
way. It has been found not to work well in highly
autocratic businesses or in parts of businesses which are
highly autocratic. 1As may have misgivings about CSA but
they should hardly discourage its introduction into a
business - in particular because it is healthy that line
management and staff should take "ownership" of internal
control review. CSA has generally been found to need
internal audit to act as its facilitator or champion, but
the risk is that if internal audit "owns" and "manages"
the programme then internal audit assumes executive
authority for it over line management. Internal audit is
also not then well placed to advise senior management and
the audit committee as to whether the CSA programme is
effective and its results reliable. A significant threat
to the medium to long term effectiveness of CSA is that
line management and staff become demotivated to repeat
their internal control evaluation perhaps annually or
somewhat less frequently. They may consider that since
they did the exercise a year or two before, there is less
need to approach it conscientiously the second time
round.
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CSA is sometimes being termed Control Risk Self
Assessment (CRSA) which stresses the importance of risk
evaluation in any internal control framework. Control
should be tailored to risk. Sometimes CSA is called Self
Assessment Programme (SAP) - which broadens its potential
scope beyond the review of internal control to include
quality, environmental and other issues as well.
The non-mandatory role of internal audit in many
enterprises, an internal audit role and scope which
varies between enterprises, the increasingly popular
hiving off of some or all of internal control review to
line management and staff in a control self assessment
process, and the downsizing of many internal audit
functions - all represent challenges to the extent to
which EAs in practice will be able to co-operate with
internal audit in arriving at their view as to the
effectiveness of the internal controls which are
pertinent to their external, statutory audit.
On the other hand, the advent in the Cadbury Report of
EAs reporting on directors' published reports on internal
control does indicate that EAs are likely to have a
broader interest in more aspects of internal control in
the future - more closely corresponding to the broader
scope of internal auditing. In this sense, there will
therefore be more incentive and scope for EAs to rely on
the results of IAs' reviews of internal control than has
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been the case in the past when EAs often have been able
to obtain their audit reassurance while by-passing any
reliance on internal control. In the future they will
not be able to by-pass internal control as they will be
reviewing and reporting upon the directors' published
internal control report. It is possible that the scope
of the directors' report which the EAs will review and
report upon may be much wider than the internal controls
which relate to the reliability of the published
financial statements ("Internal Financial Control
Effectiveness", The APB, 1995e; "Disclosures Relating to
Corporate Governance", The APB, 1995d; Chambers, A.D,
1995b).
Already the scope is to some extent wider as it includes
the internal financial controls which contribute to the
reliability of financial information used within the
business and also the internal controls which contribute
to the safeguarding of assets.
It is useful to take a brief look at the development of
the IIA:
The IIA was established in the United States in 1941
with 24 members. In 1948, a Chapter was started in
London, and five other UK Chapters started shortly
afterwards. By 1965, the Institute had 75 Chapters
worldwide with 6,000 members and currently has over
100 Chapters with 27,000 members, over 2,400 of whom
are in the United Kingdom
(Chambers, Selim and Vinten 1990, 20)
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By 1995, the IIA had over 51,000 members worldwide and
over 3,700 in the UK, a recent decline from over 4,000.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, many IAs possess
the same professional qualifications as EAs, such as
CACA, CIMA and CIPFA. However, IIA offered its first
professional qualification in the United Kingdom and Eire
in 1981, and now many IAs also have this additional
qualification. People passing the examinations have been
awarded the "Member of Institute of Internal Auditors"
(MIIA) and the right to add the letters after their
names. The IIA (UK) qualification scheme is currently in
the process of significant revision: in its revised form
it will be possible for a CCAB-qualified person to more
readily qualify by examination as a member of IIA than
was the case previously - which should assist in
developing common approaches to internal control review
between CCAB-qualified EAs and CCAB-qualified IAs since
an increasing proportion of IAs might hold both a CCAB
and the IIA qualification by examination.
2.3 IMPORTANCE OF AN AUDIT
Auditing Practices Committee (1989, ¶2) defined an
independent audit as:
The independent examination of, and expression of an
opinion on, the financial statements of an
enterprise.
The work of the EA is directed towards the main object of
representations on the financial statement. EAs approach
this task by:
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• proving "completeness, accuracy and validity" of the
financial statements and by testing the accuracy of the
underlying records on which they are based
• examining reliable, relevant and sufficient evidence of
the existence, ownership and valuation of assets and
liabilities.
• reviewing the overall position shown by the financial
statements.
Thus independent auditing can be said to be the review of
the work of others, not the original performance of that
work. In this sense, reliance by EAs upon internal audit
extends the former's review of the work of others - or
adapts it if to some extent their use of internal audit
becomes alternative to the approach they have generally
taken in the past.
EAs collect various forms of evidence on which to base
their opinion. In fact, Mautz and Sharaf (1985, 86)
considered independent auditing to be composed of two
basic functions: the "evidence-gathering" function and
the "evidence-evaluation" function. In order to fulfil
these functions, EAs are frequently encouraged to rely
upon their "professional judgement". Mautz and Sharaf
have stated that the approach of EA includes the
following components:
1. Restriction of interest and inquiry primarily
to matters on which judgement is requested
2. Adoption of a position of impartiality in
formulating and expressing judgements
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3. Basing judgement formation and expression on
such evidence as is reasonably available.
(Mautz and Sharaf 1985, 22)
Although some amount of judgement is required in the
"evidence-gathering" portion of audit work, a review of
basic auditing textbooks indicates that a fairly wide
consensus exists concerning the types of evidence that
should be collected in a given situation and the
techniques for collecting that evidence.
On the other hand, the EA's "evidence-evaluation"
function is more difficult to define precisely than is
the "evidence-gathering" function.
Looking at the area of internal control evaluation for
example, EA is required to gather evidence regarding the
system of internal controls through inquiry, observation,
written documentation, etc and then evaluate the evidence
in order to come out with an opinion as to the
effectiveness of the system of internal controls. The
"evidence-evaluation" function (i.e evaluation of the
effectiveness of the system of internal controls)
requires EAs to exercise their professional judgement.
The examination of the effectiveness of internal controls
may be an important thrust or "backbone" of an audit. If
the internal control system is satisfactory, then one of
the outputs from the system (the financial statements) is
more likely to be reliable in showing a "true and fair
view". An assessment of these controls may be made by EA
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in order to determine the volume of detailed checking
necessary to enable the discharge of the primary external
audit function.
SAS 300 (APB 1995a, 1111) requires that the "auditor
assess the adequacy of the accounting system as a basis
for preparing the financial statements".
It is not a requirement of the auditing standards to have
the EAs evaluate the internal control system, if they
seek to conduct a "non-reliance" audit (not to rely on
the internal controls system of the client). However,
according to Porter (1994, 22), usually EAs are required
to have a general feeling regarding the quality of
internal control system in order to plan their audit work
(and their Standards stipulate this) and also to be able
to produce a management letter" at the end of the audit.
Furthermore, with the requirement noted above that
directors have to report publicly on their system of
internal financial control and EAs are required to review
and report on this directors' internal control report, it
becomes unavoidable that EAs learn about the internal
control system even if they chose not to rely on the
internal control system to any great extent in arriving
19SAS 610 [March 1995] has dropped the term "Management Letter"
in favour of "Reports to directors, including any audit committee, 
or to management, at an appropriate level, of weaknesses in
accounting and internal control systems and other matters",  51.
However, not surprisingly, the term "Management Letter" is still
widely understood.
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at their opinion as to whether the year-end financial
statements are true and fair. If control has been
reviewed by IAs it would be constructive if EAs were able
to place reliance on their work.
As stated in a discussion paper titled "Internal
Financial Control Effectiveness" (APB, 1995e)
Since 1990, in both Canada and the United States,
generally accepted auditing standards have been
revised to require auditors to have some
understanding of internal control systems on all
audits. It is no longer acceptable for auditors, in
those countries, to study and evaluate only those
internal controls on which they expect to be able to
rely (which in essence is the present situation in
the United Kingdom).
(APB	 1995e,	 "Internal	 Financial	 Control
Effectiveness", 5)
SAS 300 (APB 1995a, S28) requires EAs to ascertain and
evaluate internal control system only if they expect to
be able to rely on it.
In the context of the development of control self
assessment, earlier in this chapter was a recognition
that the responsibility rests with management to
determine the nature and extent of the system of internal
control within a business (SAS 300, APB 1995a, S8). To
help management carry out this responsibility, an
internal audit department is often set up in an
organisation.
SAS 500 (APB, 1995c) states that,
"Internal audit" means an appraisal or monitoring
activity established by management and the directors
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for the review of the accounting and internal
control systems as a service to the entity. It
functions by, amongst other things, examining,
evaluating and reporting to management and the
directors on the adequacy and effectiveness of
components of the accounting and internal control
systems.
(APB 1995c, SAS 500, S3)
The CIPFA's definition is as follows:
Internal audit is an independent appraisal function
within an organisation for the review of activities
as a service to all levels of management. It is a
control which measures, evaluates and reports upon
the effectiveness of internal controls, financial
and other, as a contribution to the efficient use of
resources within an organisation.
(CIPFA 1979).
Thus, it can be concluded that an internal audit
department is given the task by management to look at the
effectiveness of an internal control system at least in
part to contribute to the efficient and economical use of
resources.
2.4 DEFINING INTERNAL CONTROL 
Attempts to define internal control satisfactorily have
been made over several decades. In this section, the
definitions of internal control in official
pronouncements and auditing literature are explored.
2.4.1 Official Pronouncements
According to SIAS 1 (IIA, 1983),
"Controls" were defined early in the evolutionary
process of organisational management as mechanisms
or practices used to prevent or detect unauthorised
activity. The purpose of controls was later expanded
to include the concept of getting things done.
Current usage leans toward any effort made to
enhance the probability of accomplishing objectives
(IIA 1983, SIAS 1, 1).
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SIAS 1 came out with guidelines as to the nature of
control and roles played by the participants as follows:
Internal auditors examine and evaluate the planning,
organising, and directing processes to determine
whether reasonable assurance exists that objectives
and goals will be achieved. Thus, all systems,
processes, operations, functions, and activities
within the organisation are subject to internal
auditing's evaluations.
External auditors evaluates "internal accounting
control" within the parameters stated in their
generally accepted auditing standards.
(IIA 1983, SIAS 1, 3).
As can be seen from the definition above, IAs have the
responsibility of reviewing whether the whole system of
internal control is working economically, effectively and
efficiently, whereas EAs may review that the internal
control system in place would lead to the preparation of
financial statements which are "true and fair". Thus the
scope of IAs is much broader than that of EAs.
To date in the US and UK, through the efforts of various
committees, internal control has been defined and
redefined so that there is now more of a common meaning
attached to it.
The main definitions of internal control from as early as
1948 to the final reports on the matter produced recently
by the committees in the US and UK2° are explored in the
following pages. It can be seen from the evolution of
the definitions that since 1958 there has been wide
"In the UK, the definition was finalised in 1994. In the US,
It was finalised in 1992.
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acceptance of the division of internal control into
"accounting" and "administrative" controls - a division
we have made use of in the empirical study of this
thesis.
The division of internal control between "accounting" and
"administrative" control is not without its conceptual
problems. It came about as a reaction by EAs in the US
to the very broad scope of internal control contained
within the 1948 definition. EAs considered there were
large parts of a business's internal control system
which, being operational as distinct from accounting-
oriented, were not important to them in the development
of their opinion as to whether or not the year-end
financial statements were true and fair. They ensured
that this was acknowledged in their professional body's
1958 and subsequent definitions of internal control. As
recently as September 1992 21 the distinction was
authoritatively confirmed not so much in the new
definition of internal control as in the acknowledgement
that the EA's interest in internal control may amount to
a "directed focus" only.
In 1948 the Committee on Auditing Procedure made a
comprehensive study of internal control and published its
results in 1949 as a special report entitled "Internal
21C0S0: Internal Control - Integrated Framework
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Control-Elements of a Coordinated System and its
Importance to Management and the Independent Public
Accountant". In that special report, internal control
was defined as follows:
Internal control comprises the plan of organisation
and all of the coordinate methods and measures
adopted within a business to safeguard its assets,
check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting
data, promote operational efficiency and encourage
adherence to prescribed managerial policies. This
definition possibly is broader than the meaning
sometimes attributed to the term. It recognises that
a system of internal control extends beyond those
matters which relate directly to the function of the
accounting and financial departments. Such a system
might include budgetary control, standard costs,
periodic operating reports, statistical analyses and
the dissemination thereof, a training program
designed to aid personnel in meeting their
responsibilities, and an internal audit staff to
provide additional assurance to management as to the
adequacy of its outlined procedures and the extent
to which they are being effectively carried out.
(AICPA 1949)
Several Statements on Auditing Procedure (SAPs), were
also issued in the United States regarding the matter.
Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 29, "Scope of the
Independent Auditor's Review of Internal Control" issued
in 1958 gave another definition of internal control as
the definition given in 1949 Internal Control report was
not easily interpreted. It was the 1958 definition that
subdivides internal control as comprising of accounting
and administrative controls.
SAP 29 (AICPA, 1958) states that,
Internal control can be divided into 2 types:
a) Accounting controls comprise the plan of
organisation and all methods and procedures that
are concerned mainly with, and relate directly
to, the safeguarding of assets and the
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reliability of financial records. They generally
include such controls as the systems of
authorizations and approval, separation of duties
concerned with record keeping and accounting
reports from those concerned with operations or
asset custody, physical controls over assets, and
internal auditing
b) Administrative controls comprise the plan of
organisation and all methods and procedures that
are concerned mainly with operational efficiency
and adherence to managerial policies and usually
relate only indirectly to the financial records.
They generally include such controls as
statistical analyses, time and motion studies,
performance reports, employee training programs
and quality controls.
(AICPA 1958)
The subdivision of internal control into "accounting
controls" and "administrative controls" was made for the
purpose of clarifying the scope of study contemplated
under generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). The
Committee's conclusions in that respect were incorporated
in SAP 33 in 1963 as follows:
The independent auditor is primarily concerned with
the accounting controls. Accounting controls ...
generally bear directly and importantly on the
reliability of financial records and require
evaluation by the auditor. Administrative controls
... ordinarily relate only indirectly to the
financial records and thus would not require
evaluation. If the independent auditor believes,
however, that certain administrative controls may
have an important bearing on the reliability of the
financial records, he should consider the need for
evaluating such controls. For example, statistical
records maintained by production, sales, or other
operating departments may require evaluation in a
particular instance.
(AICPA 1963)
In this thesis, the two types of subdivision of internal
control is used. SAP 54 (AICPA, 1972) was issued to
clarify the definition of internal control contained in
SAP 33 (AICPA, 1963). It states:
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Administrative control, includes but is not limited
to, the plan of organisation and the procedures and
records that are concerned with the decision
processes leading to management's authorization of
transactions. Such authorization is a management
function directly associated with the responsibility,
for achieving the objectives of the organisation and
is a starting point for establishing accounting
control transactions.
Accounting control comprise the plan of organisation
and the procedures and records that are concerned
with the safeguarding of assets and the reliability
of financial records and consequently are designed
to provide reasonable assurance that:
a) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization
b) transactions are recorded as necessary:
i) to permit preparation of financial
statement in conformity with GAAP or any
other criteria applicable to such
statements and
ii) to maintain accountability for assets
c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's authorization
d) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences.
(AICPA 1972)
In the UK, there is a similar understanding about the
nature of internal control. Until the "Rutteman Report"
[December 1994] the generally accepted UK definition of
internal control had been in accordance with what is now
SAS 300 (APB, 1995a) which continues to define an
internal control system as,
"Internal control system" comprises the control
environment and control procedures. It includes all
the policies and procedures (internal controls)
adopted by the directors and management of an entity
to assist in achieving their objective of ensuring,
as far as practicable, the orderly and efficient
conduct of its business, including adherence to
internal policies, the safeguarding of assets, the
prevention and detection of fraud and error, the
accuracy and completeness of the accounting record,
and the timely preparation of reliable financial
information. Internal controls may be incorporated
within computerised accounting systems. However, the
internal control system extends beyond those matters
which relate directly to the accounting system.
(APB 1995a, SAS 300, 58)
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Other definitions include International Auditing
Guidelines 6 (Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA)
and Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants
(MACPA), 1987)" which states that internal control is:
The plan of organisation and all the methods and
procedures adopted by the management of an entity to
assist in achieving management's objective of
ensuring, as far as practicable, the orderly and
efficient conduct of its business, including
adherence to management policies, the safeguarding
of assets, the prevention and detection of fraud and
error, the accuracy and completeness of the
accounting records, and the timely preparation of
reliable financial information. The system of
internal control extends beyond those matters which
relate directly to the functions of the accounting
system.
(MIA and MACPA 1987)
In summary, there is broad agreement between the
countries (US, UK and Malaysia) that internal control has
four main objectives, i.e (a) safeguarding of assets, (b)
reliability of accounts (c) operational efficiency and
(d) achievement of goals." Also, that there are two
subdivisions of internal control. For example, both SAS
22 International Auditing Guidelines (IAGs) are issued by
the International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) of the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). The Accounting
profession in Malaysia is influenced strongly by MIA and MACPA and
both of the bodies will approved the IAGs for adoption. Where there
are significant differences between the provisions of an IAG and
Malaysian auditing practices, additional guidance will be given on
such differences with a view to achieving harmonisation. MIA also
produces Malaysian Auditing Guidelines (MAGs) which are intended to
cover topics not dealt with in an IAG or topics where particular
features of the Malaysian environment warrant a domestic standard.
23 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.1 the five
objectives of IIA includes all the four objectives with an additional
objective of compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and
regulations.
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300 and IAG 6 both stress that internal controls "extends
beyond those matters which relate directly to the
accounting system".
In the 1990's the US (COSO) and UK (Cadbury) have come
out with another definition of internal control. COSO
invited Treadway to head a commission of enquiry as a
result of the growing concern about fraudulent financial
reporting of companies and hence the Treadway Report was
issued in 1987. Treadway recommended that management
should include a report on internal control with their
published financial statements. However, adoption of this
aspect of the report was deferred pending clarification
of the definition of internal control and how it should
be reported upon. To date, it looks as if compliance is
going to be a voluntary, but frequently followed practice
in the US. To provide for the next task of clarifying the
definition of internal control, COSO funded a further
project, the fieldwork of which was conducted by Coopers
& Lybrand, which led to the publication of the Internal
Control - Integrated Framework by AICPA in September
1992.
Thus in 1992 in the United States, COSO came out with an
elaborate and lengthy treatise on internal control in its
report titled "Internal Control -Integrated Framework". 24
Since then, their definition is proposed to be
24 The report has 4 volumes: a) Volume 1- Executive Summary;
b) Volume 2- Framework; c) Volume 3- Reporting to External Parties
and d) Volume 4- Evaluation Tools.
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incorporated in SAS 55 and other SAS's which involve the
definition of internal control. Proposed SAS 55 25
 defines
internal control as follows:
Internal control is a process, effected by an
entity's board of directors, management and other
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of objectives in the
following categories: (a) reliability of financial
reporting; (b) compliance with applicable laws and
regulations and (c) effectiveness and efficiency of
operations.
An entity's internal control structure" consists of
the following five components:
• Control environment - The control environment sets
the tone of an organization, influencing the
control consciousness of its people. It is the
foundation for all other components of the
internal control structure, providing discipline
and structure.
• Risk assessment - Risk assessment is the entity's
identification and analysis of relevant risks to
achievement of its objectives, forming a basis for
determining how the risks should be managed.
• Control activities - Control activities are the
policies and procedures that help ensure
management directives are carried out.
• Information and communication - Information and
communication are the identification, capture, and
exchange of information in a form and time frame
that enable people to carry out their
responsibilities.
• Monitoring - Monitoring is a process that assesses
the quality of the internal control structure's
performance over time.
(AICPA 1995, Proposed SAS 55, 16 and 7).
"Control environment" is the foundation for all other
components of internal control providing discipline and
structure. It embraces factors such as: integrity and
ethical values; competence of the entity's people; board
of directors or audit committee; management's philosophy
n It is similar to COSO's (1992b, "Internal Control-
Integrated Framework, Framework") definition.
26 In the Statement, "internal control" is also referred to
as "internal control structure".
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and operating style; organisational structure; the way
management assigns authority and responsibility and human
resource policies and practices.
"Risk assessment" refers to risks that come from external
and internal sources. A precondition to risk assessment
is the establishment of objectives linked at different
levels and internally consistent. Risk analysis is the
identification and analysis of relevant risks to
achievement of the objectives, forming a basis for
determination of how the risks should be managed.
"Control activities" are the policies and procedures that
ensure management directives are carried out. They help
ensure that necessary actions are taken to address risks
to achieve the entity's objectives. Control activities
occur throughout the organisation at all levels and in
all functions. They include approvals, authorizations,
verifications, reconciliations, reviews of operating
performance, security of assets and segregation of
duties.
"Information and communication" refers to the fact that
pertinent information must be identified, captured and
communicated in a form and time frame that enables people
to carry out their responsibilities. Information systems
produce reports to run and control business. According to
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the proposed SAS 55), it
... consists of the methods and records established
to identify, assemble, analyse, classify, record and
report entity transactions (as well as events and
conditions) and to maintain accountability for the
related assets and liabilities.
(AICPA 1995, SAS 55 1 511).
"Communication" takes such forms as policy manuals,
accounting and financial information and can be
communicated orally or through management actions.
"Monitoring" is a process of ensuring that all management
policies and procedures are being adhered to in order to
achieve the entity's goals and objectives. It includes
supervision of management.
In summary, COSO (1992b) states that,
The control environment provides an atmosphere in
which people conduct their activities and carry out
their control responsibilities. It serves as the
foundation for the other components. Within this
environment, management assesses risks to the
achievement of specified objectives. Control
activities are implemented to help ensure that
management directives to address the risks are
carried out. Meanwhile relevant information is
captured and communicated through out the
organisation. The entire process is monitored and
modified as the conditions warrant.
(COSO 1992b, "Framework", 13)
Internal control exists to provide management with
reasonable assurance (but not an absolute guarantee) of
achieving a number of objectives. It is perfectly
reasonable to take the view that the reliability of the
financial statements is one objective of internal control
and that operational effectiveness is another objective
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of internal control. It is less obvious that the
controls which exist, or should exist, within the
business can themselves be classified between those which
are "accounting" controls and those which are
"administrative" or operational. Certainly, each of
COSO's five components of internal control makes an
essential contribution to effective "accounting" control.
While COSO suggests that the EAs have a directed focus
when reviewing these five components of internal control,
it is not clear what that directed focus would be. For
instance, a particular control activity such as searching
staff before they leave the building, may contribute to
both operational effectiveness and also to the
reliability of the accounts. The existence of an
appropriate Code of Business Conduct (which would be
classified as part of the control environment) would
similarly potentially contribute to all the objectives of
control. It does not seem that the component parts of an
internal control system are specialised in that they are
targeted only or principally at one of the objectives of
control (operational efficiency and effectiveness,
safeguarding of assets, reliability of information,
compliance with laws and regulations, etc). Since it is
the components (COSO) of internal control which are to be
assessed by directors to enable them to report on their
system of internal control, it does seem inappropriate to
suggest that the directors may restrict their report to
internal financial control alone and that the auditors
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may restrict their review of the directors' report to
internal financial control alone - as is being currently
recommended in both the US and the UK.
According to COSO (1992b, "Framework"),
There is a direct relationship between objectives,
which are what an entity strives to achieve, and
components, which represent what is needed to
achieve the objectives. (For example) "Financial"
and "non-financial" data generated from internal and
external sources, which is part of the information
and communication component, is needed to
effectively manage business operations, develop
reliable financial statements and determine that the
entity is complying with applicable laws.
(COSO 1992b, "Framework", 15)
COSO in its definition of internal control does not
explicitly state that the internal control system can be
divided into "financial and administrative control" but
that the internal control system should be able to
achieve 3 objectives": (a) effectiveness and efficiency
of operations; (b) reliability of financial reporting
and (c) compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Cadbury (UK) made similar recommendations to Treadway,
i.e directors should include in their company's report
and accounts a report "on the effectiveness of the
company's system of internal control" (point 4.5). Again,
similar to the US situation, before the report on
internal control system would be practical, it was
considered that further clarification was needed for
27 According to Chambers (1994a, 7), the three objectives
can be reconciled to the four objectives of control in the 1949
definition because "safeguarding of assets" is regarded by COSO as
part of the "effectiveness and efficiency of operations" objective.
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directors and also for EAs. Clarification for directors
was headed by Rutteman, a partner in Ernst and Young, and
in October 1993 a draft report was issued. Another
revised exposure draft was issued in August 1994 before
the final guideline to directors was issued in December
1994.
The UK Draft on "Internal Control and Financial
Reporting" (ICAEW, 1993) 28 defined "internal control" as
The whole system of controls, financial and
otherwise, established in order to provide
reasonable assurance of:
1. effective and efficient operations
2. reliable financial information and reporting
3. compliance with laws and regulations
(ICAEW 1993, "Internal Control and Financial
Reporting", 10)
It further defined "internal financial controls" as,
internal controls established in order to provide
reasonable assurance of the maintenance of proper
accounting records and the reliability of financial
information used within the business or for
publication.
(ICAEW 1993, "Internal Control and Financial
Reporting", 6)
The UK Final Guidance to "Internal Control and Financial
Reporting" (ICAEW, 1994b)" defines "internal control"
as,
The whole system of controls, financial and
otherwise, established in order to provide
reasonable assurance of:
1. effective and efficient operations
2. internal financial control
28 Hereon, referred to as "UK Draft". The UK Draft on
"Internal Control and Financial Reporting" was issued in October
1993. Then a revised draft was issued in August 1994 (referred to as
"UK Revised Draft" in this thesis) and finally, the final guidance
(referred to "UK Final Guidance" in this thesis) was issued in
December 1994.
29 The revised draft in 1994 also defines internal control
and internal financial control in a similar manner.
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2. internal financial control
3. compliance with laws and regulations
(ICAEW 1994, "Statement of principles", 12)
"Internal financial controls" is defined in the UK Final
Guidance as,
The internal controls established in order to
provide reasonable assurance of:
(a) the safeguarding of assets
(b) the maintenance of proper accounting records
and the reliability of financial information
used within the business or for publication
(ICAEW 1994b, Statement of principles, ¶2)
Although COSO's definition does not state explicitly (as
compared with UK's definition) that internal control can
be divided into "financial and non-financial"
(administrative), it does however recognise that the
objectives of control are "distinct but overlapping
categories which address different needs and allow a
directed focus to meet the separate needs" (COSO, 1992a,
"Executive Summary", 1). Thus, it can be said that UK and
US both agree that internal controls can be divided into
two categories, i.e "financial and otherwise".
The UK Draft (ICAEW, 1993, 12-13) replaced the five
components by which control is achieved by four elements,
taking exception to the word components. However the
final version was in line with COSO in that the fivefold
division was made, although COSO's components became
Rutteman's criteria. The four elements had been (a) the
control environment; (b) the identification of risks,
control priorities and objectives; (c) control activities
and (d) monitoring and corrective action. COSO's
3 0 Otherwise, taken to mean "administrative control" as
indicated in 1949 AICPA's definition.
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"information and communication" component was included in
"the identification of risks, control priorities and
objectives", though it was shown separately in the final
version.
The UK Final Guidance (ICAEW 1994b, 5-6) comes in line
with the US in describing a fivefold division, though the
UK now finds it preferable for "control activities" to be
termed "control procedures". The five criteria are:
(a) control environment; (b) identification of risks and
control objectives; (c) information and communication;
(d) control procedures and (e) monitoring and corrective
action.
According to Chambers (1994a),
Being the mechanisms by which control is achieved it
does seem linguistically more appropriate to refer
to these five sub-divisions as components, component
parts or elements. In contrast, "criteria" are
standards against which the components or elements
should be assessed.
(Chambers 1994a, 10)
The significance of Rutteman's guidance is that directors
should assess the effectiveness of internal control by
examining the quality of what are termed the five
internal control criteria. But they are the means to .
achieve the end of effective internal control. It is
surely	 inadequate	 to	 assess	 internal	 control
effectiveness just in terms of the quality of the system
without reference to whether the objectives of internal
control have been achieved.
	
Chambers (1995b) has
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elsewhere" described this as analogous to assessing
whether trains arrive on time by examining the quality of
the train sets while disregarding the timetable and the
past success of the operator in keeping to time.
Auditing Guideline 3.308 (APC, 1990), distinguishes
between "internal control", "internal control system" and
"control/internal controls" as follows:
Internal control is the regulation of activities in
an organisation through systems designed and
implemented to facilitate the achievement of
management objectives.
Internal control system32 is the whole system of
controls, financial and otherwise, established by
the management in order to carry on the business of
an organisation in an orderly and efficient manner,
ensure adherence to management policies, safeguard
assets and secure as far as possible the
completeness and accuracy of records.
Controls/ internal controls is the individual
components of an internal control system which
ensures that processes work to meet the system's
objectives.
(APC 1990, Auditing Guideline 3.308, Appendix).
The definition given for "internal control system" above,
is similar to the COSO's and UK Final Guidance's
definition of "internal control" .
Guideline 3.308 (160) further states the main objectives
31Chambers, A.D.: "Internal Control Reporting, Chapter in
Financial Reporting, 1995-5,  Chartac Books, December 1995.
32 Final UK Guidance have defined internal control as "the
whole system of controls, financial and otherwise ....", which to the
researcher's mind indicates that "internal control" and "internal
control system" refers to the same thing. Throughout this thesis,
internal control and internal control system is considered to be the
same.
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of the internal control system as follows:
(a) to ensure adherence to management policies and
directives in order to achieve the
organisation's objective
(b) to safeguard assets
(c) to secure the relevance, reliability and
integrity of information, so ensuring as far as
possible the completeness and accuracy of
records and
(d) to ensure compliance with statutory
requirements.
(APC 1990, Auditing Guideline 3.308, 160)
It is similar to the objectives given by UK Final
Guidance. Auditing Guideline 3.204 (APC, 1980b) 33 states
the following types of internal controls on which the
auditor may seek to rely on.
1. Organisation. Enterprises should have a plan of
their organisation, defining and allocating
responsibilities and identifying lines of
reporting for all aspects of the enterprise's
operations, including the controls.
2. Segregation of Duties. One of the prime means of
control is the separation of those
responsibilities or duties which would, if
combined, enable one individual to record and
process a complete transaction.
3. Physical. These are concerned mainly with the
custody of assets and involve procedures and
security measures designed to ensure that access
to assets is limited to authorised personnel.
4. Authorization and approval. All transactions
should require authorization or approval by an
appropriate responsible person. The limits for
these authorizations should be specified.
5. Arithmetical and accounting. These are the
controls within the recording function which
check that the transactions to be recorded and
processed have been authorised, that they are
all included and that they are correctly
recorded and accurately processed.
6. Personnel. There should be procedures to ensure
that personnel have capabilities commensurate
with their responsibilities. Inevitably, the
3 3 Even though superseded by SAS 300, the researcher feels
that the elements mentioned is actually the same as the new
definition in SAS 300. Thus, it is still discussed in this thesis.
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proper functioning of any system depends on the
competence and integrity of those operating it.
The qualifications, selection and training as
well as the innate personal characteristics of
the personnel involved are important features to
be considered in setting up any control system.
7. Supervision. Any system of internal control
should include the supervision by responsible
officials of day-to-day transactions and the
recording thereof.
8. Management. These are the controls exercised by
management outside the day to day routine of the
system. They include the overall supervisory
controls exercised by management, the review of
management accounts and comparison thereof with
budgets, the internal audit function and any
other special review procedures.
(APC 1980, Auditing Guideline 3.204, Appendix).
The above list in the Auditing Guideline 3.204 can be
treated as criteria that auditors should look for in
order to reach reliance upon an internal control system.
If an attempt is made to match Auditing Guideline 3.204
to COSO and the UK Final Guidance, "Organisation" and
"Personnel" of Guideline 3.204 can be considered to be
the same as the criterion "Control environment";
"Segregation of duties", Physical, Authorization and
approval and Arithmetical and accounting" of Guideline
3.204 can be considered to be the same as "Control .
procedures";	 and "Supervision" and "Management" of
Guideline 3.204 can be considered to be the same as
"Monitoring and corrective action". "Organisation" of
Guideline 3.204 also relates to the criterion of
"Information and communication."'
34 Organisation" per Guideline 3.204 touches on "Information"
when it addresses the subject of reporting; but in other respects
"Organisation" per Guideline 3.204 relates to COSO's "Control
environment".
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There are no criteria stated in the Guideline that relate
directly to COSO's and the UK Final Guidance criterion of
"Identification of risks and control objectives". Except
for this criterion, it can be said that the difference
between Guideline 3.204 and COSO's and UK's Final
Guidance is in form but not in fact.
According to SIAS 1 (IIA 1983),
The variant "internal control" came into general use
to distinguish controls within an organisation from
those existing externally to the organisation (such
as laws)... ... from the organisation's viewpoint,
internal controls are all activities which attempt
to ensure the accomplishment of the organisation's
objectives and goals.
(IIA 1983, Auditing Guideline 300.6, SIAS 1, 1.3)
Standard 300, "Scope of Work" (IA, 1989) states that,
The overall system of control is conceptual in
nature. It is an integrated collection of controlled
systems used by an organization to achieve its
objectives and goals.
(IIA 1989, Standard 300, 11.06,)
IIA identifies five objectives' of control in contrast
to the four explicit in the AICPA pronouncements and the
three objectives in COSO and UK's final guidance.
According. to Chambers (1994a, 6) IIA continues to adhere
to their position that internal control exists to achieve
these five objectives, notwithstanding that the IIA was
one of the five COSO bodies. As evidence, Chambers
(1994a, 6) quoted that the five objectives were agreed at
the mid-year meeting of the Internal Auditing Standards
Board of IIA Inc (December 1993) and are being applied,
35 Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.1.1.
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for instance, in the exposure draft of a new SIAS on
"Summary Reporting on Internal Control".
2.4.2 Auditing Literature 
Auditing literature has also indicated that "internal
controls" or the "internal control system" in general can
be divided into "financial and non-financial controls"
though they are sometimes referred to under different
names.
Coopers & Lybrand (1989, 78-83), for example suggested
that internal control can be divided into 2 categories
which are: (a) internal accounting controls and
(b) operational controls.
"Internal accounting controls" are those controls that
are relevant to the expression of an audit opinion on
financial accounts. They comprise 2 types of controls:
(a) basic controls, which are those controls necessary
for the completeness, accuracy, validity and proper
authorization of the accounting records. Example:
prenumbering of documents can help achieve the
"completeness" objective, i.e ensure that all
transactions are accounted for, and
(b) disciplines over basic controls, which are designed
to ensure the continued and proper operations of basic
controls to safeguard assets. Example: rotation of duties
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of staff so that no one person deals with one aspect of
the company's accounting procedure on a continuous basis,
and custodial controls such as locked cabinets.
"Operational controls" are controls which are not
directly relevant to the expression of an audit opinion
on financial accounts but are important to provide
conditions for the task to be carried out. Example:
having a clearly defined organisational chart, having
competent staff and proper documentation of accounting
procedures and policies.
Coopers and Lybrand's definition of "internal accounting
controls" is the same as "financial controls" and
"operational controls" is the same as "non-financial
controls" 36
Spicer and Pegler's "Practical Auditing" (1985), also
suggested that there are two types of internal control:
(a) application controls and (b) general controls.
Application controls are the basic controls over
"completeness, accuracy and validity" control
objectives. They are so called because they are
specific to particular accounting applications,
example the processing of sales invoices or the
preparation of payrolls. Their essential feature is
that they contain a procedure which either prevents
or detects and corrects a particular type of
accounting error.
The types of controls are as follows:
36 In this thesis, "financial controls" is considered as
"accounting controls" and "non-financial controls" is considered as
"administrative controls".
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• physical which are concerned mainly with the
custody of assets and involve procedures and
security measures designed to ensure that access
to assets is limited to authorized personnel
• authorization and approval which requires that all
transactions should be authorized or approved by
an appropriate responsible person. The limits for
these authorizations should be specified.
• arithmetical and accounting which are the controls
within the recording function which ensure that
the transactions to be recorded and processed have
been authorized, that they are all included and
that they are correctly recorded and accurately
processed. For example, checking the arithmetical
accuracy of the records, the maintenance and
checking of totals, reconciliations, control
accounts and trial balances.
General controls are those controls that determine
the environment in which the application controls
operate. It includes the following types of
controls:
• organization which means that enterprises should
have a plan of their organization, defining and
allocating responsibilities and identifying lines
of reporting for all aspects of the enterprise's
operations, including the controls. The delegation
of authority and responsibility should be clearly
specified.
• segregation of duties which is one of the prime
means of control. Segregation of duties does not
enable one individual to record and process a
complete transaction thus reducing the risk of
intentional manipulation or error and increases
the element of checking. Functions which should be
separated include those of authorization,
execution, custody, and in, the case of a
computer-base accounting system, systems
development and daily operations.
• personnel which means that there should be
procedure to ensure that personnel have
capabilities that can match up with their
responsibilities. Inevitably, the proper
functioning of any system depends on the
competence and integrity of those operating it.
Qualifications, selection and training as well as
the innate personal characteristics of the
personnel involved are important features to be
considered in setting up any control system.
• supervision which means that day-to-day
transactions and recordings thereof should be
properly supervised by responsible officials.
• management which are the controls exercised by
management outside the day-to-day routine of the
system. They include the overall supervisory
controls exercised by management, the review of
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management accounts and comparison thereof with
budgets and other special review procedures.
(Spicer and Pegler 1985, 87)
Again, according to Spicer and Pegler, the internal
control system can be divided into "financial"
(application) and "non-financial" (general) controls.
As can be observed from the above definitions, the
objective of "financial controls" is to achieve
"completeness, accuracy and validity" objective. The
types of control mentioned in the definitions follows
closely the ones mentioned in Auditing Guideline 3.204,
(ICAEW 1980,Appendix)."
In this thesis, "completeness, accuracy and validity" is
considered by the researcher to be the same as the
"completeness, existence and valuation" objective.
In summary, the purposes of internal control discussed in
the auditing literature" are to:
• safeguard the assets of an organization
• check the accuracy and reliability of accounting data
• promote operational efficiency, and
• encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies.
The first two purposes, that is safeguarding of assets
and reliability of accounting data can be achieved
3 7 However, this guideline is superseded by SAS 400 (APB,
1995).
38 SAP 29 (AICPA, 1949), Auditing Guideline 3.204, (ICAEW,
1980) and " A framework for internal control (CIMA,1992) to name a
few.
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through "financial controls" and the latter two purposes
can be achieved through "non-financial controls". This
claim is made based on the UK Final Guidance's definition
of internal financial controls.
In this thesis, the internal control system has eight
ICPs which consist of an equal number of "accounting" 
(financial)	 and	 "administrative"	 (non-financial)
controls. The division of the 8 internal control
procedures is based on the auditing literature's
definition of the two types of controls.
The purpose of doing this is to find out whether: (a) EAS
and IAs perceive the internal control system as having
these two distinct categories; (b) the two groups of
auditors place different amounts of emphasis on the two
distinct categories" and (c) the accounting controls are
able to achieve the "completeness, existence and
valuation" objective.
The existence of satisfactory internal control improves
the likelihood that the organisation's goals will be
achieved. It does this in part by increasing the
3 9 IAs are assumed to place more emphasis on the
"administrative controls" since their objective is more towards
ensuring that the internal control system in place can achieve
management's objective and are efficient in doing it. EAs are assumed
to place more emphasis on the "accounting controls" as their emphasis
is ensuring whether the financial statements show a true and fair
view.
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probability that errors, fraud and other irregularities
will be eliminated or detected early.
Satisfactory internal control will tend to limit
irregularities to those that require collusion between
two or more persons or those whose consequences are
material.
Schiff, Miller and May (1989) suggested that the primary
purpose of the auditor's study and evaluation of internal
controls is to determine whether the system can be
"relied on" to produce reliable financial information.
According to "Due Care in the Performance of Work" issued
by Auditing Standards Board (ASB) in 1972, in order to
rely on an internal control system, auditors seek
reasonable assurance that:
• transactions are executed in accordance with
management's authorization
• transactions are recorded so that financial
statements will be in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and
accountability over assets will be maintained
• access to assets is controlled
• assets are periodically compared to recorded
accountability
(ASB 1972, "Due Care in the Performance of Work")
Schiff, Miller and May view internal control as
comprising a "three-legged stool" which illustrates that
internal control is a broad function that is supported by
three independent elements-accounting controls,
managerial or administrative controls, and operational
controls.
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If this stool was missing a leg, or if one of the
legs were to break, it would not be properly
supported and would topple over. Similarly, if a
company has weak or nonexisting accounting,
managerial or operational controls, internal control
may not be supported properly, and the company may
be vulnerable to problems.
(Schiff, May and Miller 1989, 6)
2.5 INTERNAL CONTROL REPORT
As stated earlier in this chapter, one of the reasons for
the 1990's effort to redefine and clarify the definition
of internal control has been so that there can be a
common meaning attached to it. Amongst the reasons for
this is to ease the task of preparing the internal
control report by managers (as referred to in COSO) or
directors (as referred in the UK final guidance) and
review of that report by EAs are required to do in the
UK.
To date both in the US and in the UK the report on
internal control has not been made mandatory, though
majority of companies are including the reports in their
published annual report. In the US it is optional. In
the UK it is a "requirement" of the Cadbury Code of Best 
Practice but a listed company need only draw attention to
the parts of the Code it is not complying with, giving
reasons. Strictly, it is not a Stock Exchange
requirement to comply with every item in the Cadbury Code
though most listed companies are intending to do so.
As stated in a discussion paper on "Internal Financial
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Control Effectiveness" (APB, 1995e),
It is clear from the number of unsuccessful attempts
to legislate public reporting on internal controls
that consensus has not been reached in the United
States as to whether such reports are of benefit to
the users of financial statements. Indeed the
present Chief Accountant of the Securities and
Exchange Commission has publicly expressed
reservations about such public reporting on the
basis of its costs relative to expected benefits.
(APB	 1995e,	 "Internal	 Financial	 Control
Effectiveness", 4)
COSO (1992c) notes in its report that,
...public reporting on internal control is not a
component of or criterion for, effective internal
control. An entity can have an effective internal
control system without making a public statement to
that effect ... in the end internal control
effectiveness is determined by the adequacy of the
system not by what is said about it.
(COSO 1992c,"Reporting to External Parties", 2).
In UK, the concept of internal control reporting has also
been facing increasing opposition from auditors, finance
directors and others in business. According to The
Guardian (1994),
Finance directors have criticized the proposals as
being too long and too costly. Auditors are
reluctant to report on the directors' comments for
fear of litigation if internal systems subsequently
turn out to have been flawed.
(The Guardian, 21 Feb 1994, 10).
FRAG (Financial Reporting Auditing Group), the
English Institute of Chartered Accountants opposes
the plan to make companies report publicly on their
controls. It says that smaller public companies
would find it difficult to comply with the necessary
requirements, and that public reports on internal
controls could be misunderstood by the public. Also,
directors and auditors would expose themselves to
further liability if negligence claims arose, at a
time when liability is already causing problems.(The
Guardian, 9 Mar 1994, 17).
UK Final Guidance (ICAEW, 1994b) does not require
directors to arrive at an opinion on the effectiveness of
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internal control or even of just internal "financial"
control, and they are certainly not required to publish
any opinion that they do reach - though they may do so if
they choose to.
The requirement covers only internal "financial" control
and not the whole system of internal control. The
Guidance applies to accounting periods beginning on or
after 1 January 1995.
It also states that the directors' statement should
contain as a minimum:
(a) acknowledgement by the directors so that they
are responsible for the company's system of
internal financial control;
(b) explanation that such a system can provide only
reasonable and not absolute assurance against
material misstatement or loss;
(c) description of the key procedures that the
directors have established and which are
designed to provide effective internal
financial control;
(d) confirmation that the directors (or a board
committee) have reviewed the effectiveness of
the system of internal financial control.
(ICAEW 1994b, UK Final Guidance, ¶8)
The "last" minimum requirement is found in "Disclosure
Relating to Corporate Governance (Revised)" as issued by
APB in February 1995. It is as follows:
(e) information about those weaknesses in internal
financial control that have resulted in
material losses, contingencies, or
uncertainties which require disclosure in the
financial statements or the auditors' report on
the financial statements
(APB 1995d," Disclosure Relating to Corporate
Governance (Revised)", ¶9)
As can be seen from the requirements, the Directors are
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In addition to our audit of the financial
have the directors'statements, we reviewed
statement(s) on page(s)...on the company's
not required to state their opinion as to the
"effectiveness" of the internal control system (unlike in
the US). They may however, state their opinion on the
"effectiveness" of their system of internal "financial"
control and may extend their opinion to the internal
control system as a whole (UK Final Guidance, 118 and 14)
if they so wish.
However, EAs are not required to audit the directors
opinion on the effectiveness of the internal "financial"
control until certain issues such as practical
difficulties in reviewing internal control effectiveness,
and the meaning of effective is resolved (APB, 1995d).
The UK Revised Draft (ICAEW, 1994a) and UK Final Guidance
(ICAEW, 1994b) has not included an example of what the
directors statement should look like but the UK Draft
(ICAEW, 1993) recommends the following format,
The company maintains a system of internal financial
controls, including suitable monitoring procedures,
in order to provide reasonable but not absolute
assurance of the maintenance of proper accounting
records and the reliability of the financial
information used within the business or for
publication. The directors are satisfied that these
controls operated effectively during the period
covered by the financial statements.
(ICAEW 1993, UK Draft, 36)
Example of EA's report on the directors' internal control
statement as suggested by the APB in its report titled
"Disclosures Relating to Corporate Governance (Revised)"
(APB, 1995d)is as follows:
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compliance with the paragraphs of the Code of Best
Practice specified for our review by the London
Stock Exchange. The objective of our review is to
draw attention to non-compliance with those
paragraphs of the Code which is not disclosed.
We carried out our review in accordance with
Bulletin 1995/1 'Disclosures Relating to Corporate
Governance' issued by the Auditing Practices Board.
The Bulletin does not require us to perform the
additional work necessary to, and we do not, express
any opinion on the effectiveness of either the
company's system of internal financial control or
its corporate governance procedures nor on the
ability of the company to continue in operational
existence.
Opinion
With respect to the directors' statements on
internal (financial) control on page ..., in our
opinion the directors have provided the disclosures
required by paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 of the Code (as
supplemented by the related guidance for directors)
and such statements are not inconsistent with the
information of which we are aware from our audit
work on the financial statements.
Based on enquiry of certain directors and officers
of the company, and examination of relevant
documents, in our opinion the directors' statement
on page ... appropriately reflects the company's
compliance with the other paragraphs of the code
specified for our review.
(APB 1995d, "Disclosure Relating to Corporate
Governance", Appendix 3).
As can be seen from the example above, there is no
responsibility of EAs to express their opinion on whether
the internal controls are operating effectively, even if
the directors do express their opinion on the
effectiveness of the controls. In April 1995, the APB
issued a discussion paper on "Internal Financial Control
Effectiveness" which among other issues seeks to clarify
the issues associated with EAs j task of evaluating the
directors opinion on the effectiveness of the internal
financial control system.
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Example of a report from the directors on the
"effectiveness" of internal financial control system as
recommended by the discussion paper is as follows:
The directors are responsible for the company's
system of internal financial control, which is
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding;
(a) the safeguarding of assets against unauthorised
use or disposition; and
(b) the maintenance of proper accounting records and
the reliability of financial information used
within the business or for publication.
Such a system can provide only reasonable and not
absolute assurance against material misstatements or
loss.
{Description of the key procedures that the
directors have established and which are designed to
provide effective internal financial control)
The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors has
reviewed the effectiveness of the company's internal
financial control system for the period from [date
of commencement of financial statements] to [date of
approval of financial statements] in relation to the
'Criteria for assessing effectiveness described' in
'Internal control and financial reporting' issued by
the Cadbury Internal Control Working Group. Based on
this review the directors believe that for the
period from ...to ...the system of internal
financial control met those criteria [and was
operating effectively].
(APB 1995e, "Internal Financial Control
Effectiveness", 15)
An example of an EA's evaluation report on director's
report on internal control, in the same paper, is as
follows:
We have examined the director's statement that XYZ's
system of internal financial control over financial
reporting for the period from ...to ...included in
the accompanying Report on Effectiveness of Internal
Financial Internal Control System met the criteria
for effectiveness described in 'Internal control and
financial reporting' issued by the Internal Control
Working Group [and was operating effectively].
Our examination was made in accordance with
standards established by the Auditing Practices
Board and, accordingly, included obtaining an
understanding of the system of internal financial
control, testing, and evaluating the design and
operating effectiveness of the internal financial
control system, and such other procedures as we
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considered necessary in the circumstances. we
believe that our examination provides a reasonable
basis for our opinion.
Because, of inherent limitations in any system of
internal financial control, errors or irregularities
may occur and not be detected. Also, projections of
any evaluation of the internal control system to
future periods are subject to the risk that the
internal financial control system to future periods
are subject to the risk that the internal financial
control system may become inadequate because of
changes in conditions or that the degree of
compliance with the policies may deteriorate.
In our opinion, the directors' statement that XYZ
Company's system of internal financial control for
the period from ... to ... met the criteria for
effectiveness described in 'Internal control and
financial reporting' issued by the Internal Control
Working Group [and was operating effectively] is
fairly stated in all material respects.
(APB	 1995e,	 "Internal	 Financial	 Control
Effectiveness", 16)
An internal control system is "effective" if the five
components are present and functioning effectively (COSO,
1992b, "Framework", 16). However, determination of
whether they are present and functioning effectively
involves a subjective assessment.
"Disclosures Relating to Corporate Governance (Revised)"
(APB, 1995d) requires EAs to carry out a significant
number of additional procedures if they are to report on
the directors' opinion on the effectiveness of the
internal financial control system. This is because,
... the process of determining whether internal
financial control is 'effective' is more complex and
subjective than the consideration of whether to rely
on an assessment of control risk in the context of
the auditors' opinion on the financial statements.
... the definition of internal financial control
encompasses controls over the management accounts of
an entity; these are not required to be, and
therefore may not be, considered by the auditors
when carrying out a financial statement audit.
(APB 1995d, "Disclosure Relating to Corporate
Governance (Revised), 115)
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The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS,
1993) has also issued a draft proposal on how to
implement the recommendations made by Cadbury (CFACG,
1992).
The ICAS directors report on internal control has a very
broad coverage which includes management information
systems, internal controls and internal control systems
but does not state the time period that it covers. The
same applies to ICAS's recommendations on the auditor's
evaluation of the internal control report.
In the US, COSO (1992c, "Reporting to External Parties"),
lists down the following reporting guidelines that are
required to be present in the internal control report,
• The category of controls being addressed (controls
over the preparation of the entity's published
financial statements)
• A statement about the inherent limitations of
internal control systems statement about the
existence of mechanisms for system monitoring
and responding to identified control deficiencies
• A frame of reference for reporting - that is,
identification of the criteria against which the
internal control system is measured
A conclusion on the effectiveness of the internal
control system. If one or more material weaknesses
exist, which would preclude a statement that the
criteria for system effectiveness are met, a
description of the material weaknesses should be
included
• The date as of which (or the period for which)
the conclusion is made
• The names of the report signers
(COSO 1992c, "Reporting to External Parties",
14)
Comparison with UK requirements, shows that the US
requirements are more general in nature, whereby US
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requires, date of the report and the names of report
signers to be included in the report. Also, US requires
management to state their opinion on the effectiveness of
internal control system. COSO has come out with the
following recommendations for the internal control report 
by management,
XYZ Company maintains a system of internal control
over financial reporting, which is designed to
provide reasonable assurance to the Company's
management and board of directors regarding the
preparation of reliable published financial
statements. The system contains self-monitoring
mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct
deficiencies as they are identified. Even an
effective internal control system, no matter how
well designed, has inherent limitations - including
the possibility of the circumvention or overriding
of controls - and therefore can provide only
reasonable assurance with respect to financial
statement preparation. Further, because of changes
in conditions, internal control system effectiveness
may vary over time.
The company assessed its internal control system as
of December 31,19XX in relation to criteria for
effective internal control over financial reporting
described in "Internal Control - Integrated
Framework" issued by the committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Based on
this assessment, the Company believes that ,as of
December 31, 19XX, its system of internal control
over financial reporting met those criteria.
(COSO 1992c, "Reporting to External Parties", 15)
Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements 2
(AICPA, 1993, SSAE 2) recommended the following format
for EAs evaluation of the internal control report.
We have examined management's assertion [identify
management's assertion, for example, that W company
maintained an effective internal control structure
over financial reporting as of December 31, 19xx]
included in the accompanying [title of management
report].
Our examination was made in accordance with
standards established by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly,
included obtaining an understanding of the internal
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control structure over financial reporting, testing,
and evaluating the design and operating
effectiveness of the internal control structure, and
such other procedures as we considered necessary in
the circumstances. We believe that our examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
Because of inherent limitations in any internal
control structure, errors or irregularities may
occur and not be detected. Also, projections of any
evaluation of the internal control structure over
financial reporting to future periods are subject to
the risk that the internal control structure may
become inadequate because of changes in conditions,
or that the degree of compliance with the policies
or procedures may deteriorate.
In our opinion, management's assertion [identify
management's assertion, for example, that W Company
maintained an effective internal control structure
over financial reporting as of December 31,19XX] is
fairly stated in all material respects, based upon
[identify stated or established criteria].
(AICPA 1993, SSAE 2, 1.51)
Although both US and UK restrict the internal control
report to internal financial controls, they differ with
regard to the timeframe that the statement covers.
Whilst, US (COSO) mentioned that the effectiveness of the
internal control system is at the year end (one point in
time), the UK (Final Guidance) mentioned that the
internal control report should cover a period of time. In
addition, US's internal control report by management 
should state whether the internal control is "effective"
but in the UK, the internal control report by directors 
need not state this in their report.
SSAE 2 differentiates the purpose of evaluation of
internal control report by EA and evaluation of internal
control in financial statement audit.
SSAE 2 has stated that,
The purpose of a practitioner's examination of
102
management's assertion about the effectiveness of an
entity's internal control structure is to express an
opinion about whether management's assertion that
the entity maintained an effective internal control
structure as of a point in time is fairly stated in
all material respects, based on the control
criteria. In contrast, the purpose of an auditor's
consideration of the internal control structure in
an audit of financial statements conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards is to enable the auditor to plan the audit
and determine the nature, timing, and extent of
tests to be performed.
(AICPA 1993, SSAE 2, 11.84)
SSAE 2 (11.86) also states that even though an auditor's
(EA's) consideration of the internal control structure in
a financial statement audit is more limited than
examining management's assertion about the effectiveness
of the internal control structure, knowledge the auditor
(EA) obtains about the entity's internal control
structure as part of the examination of management's
assertion may serve as the basis for his or her
understanding of the internal control structure in an
audit of the entity's financial statements.
2.6 EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
External audit evaluation of internal control as part of
the audit of the financial statements is only required to
be done if the EA intends to rely on it.
Auditing Guideline 3.204 (APC 1980b), states:
If the auditor wishes to place reliance on any
internal controls, he should ascertain and evaluate
those controls and perform compliance tests on their
operations.
(APC 1980b, Auditing Guideline 3.204, 111)
The EA should gain an understanding of the accounting
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system and related internal controls and should study and
evaluate the operation of those internal controls upon
which he or she wishes to rely in determining the nature,
timing and extent of other audit procedures (APC 1980b,
Auditing Guideline 3.204, 57, AICPA, 1972a, GAAS, AU
Section 150, 5.02). Where the EA concludes that he or she
can rely on certain internal controls, the substantive
procedures would normally be less extensive than would
otherwise be required and may also differ as to their
nature and timing.
However, EAs are encouraged to evaluate the internal
control system even if they seek not to rely on the
internal controls. This is because EAs actually prepare
a letter of weakness (management letter) at the end of an
audit.
Auditing Guideline 3.204 states that"
At the end of an audit, the auditors (EAs) are
required to report as soon a practicable,
significant weaknesses in internal controls which
come to the attention during the course of an audit
to an appropriately senior level of the management
of the enterprise.
(APC 1980b, Auditing Guideline 3.204, 521)
Evaluation of internal control system eventhough EAs seek
non-reliance approach is made even more important with
the new developments in the US and UK relating to
"disclosures in corporate governance".
4 0 In the US, the same requirement is warranted through its
SAS 60, "Communication of Internal Control Structure Related Matters
Noted in an Audit" (AICPA 1980).
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According to Mautz and Sharaf (1985, 142), there are two
purposes of evaluation of internal control: (a) making
constuctive suggestions about improvement of the system
and (b) as a basis of planning his audit work.
Mautz (1964) also states the procedure by means of which
an auditor arrives at a judgement with respect to the
financial statement or other representations which may
include the following steps:
1. identification of the assertions to be examined
2. evaluation of the assertions as to relative
importance
3. collection of the necessary information or
evidence about the assertions to qualify him to
give an informed opinion
4. evaluation of the evidence as valid or not
valid, pertinent or not pertinent, sufficient or
not sufficient
5. formulation of judgement as to the fairness of
the assertions at issue.
(Mautz 1964, 55)
The steps outlined by Mautz resembles the "CO" approach
whereby the auditors are required to determine whether
the ICPs meet these assertions (control objectives) and
then come to a conclusion on the quality of the internal
control system. Control objectives used in this thesis
was based on SAS 31 and COSO's definition (1992b,
"Framework", 32).
EAs have to reason from the "universal" accounting
principles to the specific situation. Likewise,
evaluation of internal control must take into account
certain basic notions of what constitute internal control
and reason from these the strengths and weaknesses of the
system under study.
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SAS 31 (AICPA, 1980) identifies these assertions as
"existence or occurrence, completeness, rights and
obligations, valuation or allocation and presentation and
disclosure" and these five assertions are defined as
follows:
Assertions about "existence or occurrence" deal with
whether assets or liabilities of the entity exist at
a given date and whether recorded transactions have
occurred during a given period.
Assertions about "completeness" deal with whether
all transactions and accounts that should be
presented in the financial statements are so
included.
Assertions about "valuation or allocation" deal with
whether asset, liability ,revenue, and expense
components have been included in the financial
statements at appropriate amounts.
Assertions about "rights and obligations" deal with
whether assets are the rights of the entity and
liabilities are the obligations of the entity at a
given date.
Assertions about "presentation and disclosure" deal
with whether particular components of the financial
statements are properly classified, described, and
disclosed.
(AICPA 1980, SAS 31, ¶.04-.08).
In the UK, Auditing Guideline 3.203 is being superseded
by SAS 400 (APB, 1995b). There is no mention of
assertions in the guideline, but in SAS 400, besides the
five assertions mentioned in SAS 31, there are two
additional assertions, i.e "occurrence and measurement".
However, for the purpose of this thesis, the five
assertions used in SAS 31 (AICPA, 1980) were thought to
be more appropriate.
SAS 65 (AICPA, 1991a, 11.21-.22) specifically notes that
the "existence" assertion generally requires more
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objective evidence and has a low risk of material
misstatement while the "valuation and disclosure"
assertions require more subjective evidence and have a
high risk of material misstatement.
For the purpose of this thesis, the assertions are
considered as control objectives which management has to
achieve in order for the internal control system to
operate effectively.
COSO (1992b, "Framework", 16) suggested that
"effectiveness" of internal control is a subjective
judgement resulting from an assessment of whether the
five components are present and functioning effectively.
Their effective functioning provides the reasonable
assurance regarding achievement of one or more of the
stated categories of objectives. All five criteria must
be satisfied but some tradeoffs may exist between
components. For example, when considering any one
category of objectives control over financial reporting,
all five criteria must be satisfied in order to conclude
that internal control over financial reporting is
effective.
The IA works in a similar way. His or her main emphasis
is however in the internal control evaluation (or
determination of internal control risk) where he or she
would have to determine whether the internal control that
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is established is sufficient to prevent material errors
and fraud from happening.
SIAS 1 (ZIA, 1989) states that:
The purpose of the review for adequacy of the system
of internal control is to ascertain whether the
system established provides reasonable assurance
that the organisation's objectives and goals will be
met efficiently and economically.
(IIA 1989, SIAS 1, "Control Concepts and
Responsibilities", Guideline 300.02, "Scope of
audit work")
Regarding the ability of the internal control system to
prevent material errors or fraud from happening, Mautz
and Sharaf (1985) suggested that,
The existence of a good internal system of internal
control eliminates the probability of
irregularities.
(Mautz and Sharaf 1985, 141)
Note that it is the "probability" of irregularities that
is eliminated and not irregularities themselves.
Irregularities are still possible under a good internal
control system but they are no longer probable. On the
other hand, if the internal control is not satisfactory,
then errors and irregularities should be considered more
than probable.
The quality of the internal control system is difficult
to evaluate and a research carried out by Wafa (1988) has
shown this to be the case. Wafa wanted to include
"quality of company's internal control system in his
survey as one of the factors determining audit fee but
was strongly rejected by both auditors and auditee for
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reasons such as "difficulties in quantifying and
measuring these subjective factors".
It is also impossible for the auditor to be completely
assured that the financial statements are accurate and
that is why the auditor only issues his opinion that the
financial statements are "true and fair". Auditing
Guideline 3.204 (APC 1980b) 4' states that:
No internal control system, however elaborate, can
by itself guarantee efficient administration and the
completeness and accuracy of the records; nor can it
be proof against fraudulent collusion, especially on
the part of those holding positions of authority or
trust. Internal controls depending on segregation of
duties can be avoided by collusion. Authorization
controls can be abused by the person in whom the
authority is vested. Management is frequently in a
position to override controls which it has itself
set up. Whilst the competence and integrity of
personnel operating the controls may be ensured by
selection and training, these qualities may alter
due to the pressure exerted both within and without
the enterprise. Human error due to errors of
judgement or interpretation, to misunderstanding,
carelessness, fatigue, or distraction may undermine
the effective operation of internal controls.
(APC 1980b, Auditing Guideline 3.204, 116)
As shown in the Figure 2.1, the "rain cloud analogy" has
been able to capture this situation whereby the financial
statements cannot be completely accurate. The "rain"
represents material errors and irregularities that can
happen within the company. As the rain passes through the
internal control system of a client it gets smaller in
volume as there are controls implemented by the client to
Although superseded by SAS 300 (APB, 1995a) but the
researcher feels that the explanation given by the guideline
encompasses the limitations of internal control.
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prevent it passing through. It gets even smaller as it
passes through the scrutiny of auditor's audit procedures
till there are only a few drops of rain left as it hits
the financial statements. The few drops of rain represent
material errors and irregularities that are left
"undetected". This is because the internal control system
and the audit procedures used by the auditor are not
sufficient to detect the material errors and
irregularities.
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Figure 2.1: The Rain Cloud Analogy
Source: KPMG Peat Marwick's transparency shown during one
of the training sessions in KPMG Peat Marwick Penang,
Malaysia in March 1992.42
42 Researcher was attached to KPMG Peat Marwick Penang,
Malaysia for a period of 5 months from February to June 1992.
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2.7 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AUDIT
Johnson, Kast and Rosenweig (1967, 113) suggested that a
"system" may be defined as " 	 an array of components
designed to accomplish a particular objective according
to plan". The components of the system are often referred
to as "subsystems".
Ackoff (1969, 28), suggested that the principal
characteristic of a system is that it is composed of
interacting subsystems, each of which has interest in its
own right. For example, the internal control subsystems
pertaining to sales, accounts receivable, inventory, and
cash receipts perform important functions when each is
considered by itself; however, these four subsystems
interact when a credit sale is made and the payment
received later.
In line with these lines of thought, financial statement
audit has also followed this approach, that is, dividing
the financial statement into various transaction cycles.
Transaction cycle is similar to the subsystem referred to
earlier and auditors are required to audit each
transaction cycle.
According to Arens and Loebbecke (1991, 148-151), audits
are usually performed by dividing the financial
statements into smaller segments or components. The
division makes the audit more manageable and aids in the
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assignment of tasks to different members of the audit
team. For example, most EAs treat fixed assets and notes
payable as different segments and each segment is audited
separately but not completely independently. For example,
the audit of fixed assets may reveal an unrecorded note
payable. After the audit of each segment is completed,
including interrelationships with other segments, the
results are combined. A conclusion can then be reached
about the financial statements taken as a whole. There
are different ways of segmenting an audit, and they are:
1.Individual account's approach that is to treat every
account balance on the statements as a separate
segment. Segmenting this way is usually inefficient. It
would result in the independent audit of such closely
related accounts as inventory and cost of goods sold.
2. The transaction cycle's approach which is a more
common way and a more efficient one. It divides the
audit in such a way as to keep closely related types
of transactions and account balance in the same
segment. For example, sales, sales returns, and cash
receipts transactions and the accounts receivable
balance are all a part of the sales and collection
cycle. Similarly, payroll and accrued payroll are a
part of the payroll and personnel cycle. To the
extent it is practical, the cycle approach combines
transactions recorded in different journals with the
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general ledger balances that result from those
transactions. Examples of cycles that are used by
auditors are:
a) Sales and collection involves the decisions and
processes necessary for the transfer of the
ownership of goods and services to customers
after they are made available for sale. It begins
with the request of the customer and ends with
the conversion of material or service into an
account receivable, and ultimately into cash.
b) Acquisition of payment cycle involves the
decisions and processes necessary for obtaining
the goods and services for operating a business.
The cycle typically begins with the initiation of
a purchase requisition by an authorized employee
who needs the good or services and ends with
payment for the benefits received.
c) Payroll and personnel cycle involves the
employment and payment of all employees,
regardless of classification or method of
determining compensation.
d) Inventory and warehousing cycle can be thought of
as comprising two separate but closely related
systems, one involving the actual physical flow
of goods, and the other the related costs. The
audit of inventories is often the most complex
and time-consuming part of the audit.
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e) Capital acquisition and repayment cycle includes
the payment of interest and dividends. Some of
the accounts included in the cycle are notes
payable, contracts payable, capital stock-common,
appropriations of retained earnings, treasury
stock, dividends payable and interest expense.
Transaction cycles are of major importance in the conduct
of the audit. For the most part, auditors treat each
cycle separately as the audit is being performed.
Although care should be taken to interrelate different
cycles at different times, the auditor must treat the
cycles somewhat independently in order to manage audits
effectively.
In this thesis, the "Payroll and Personnel cycle" or
"Payroll cycle" as sometimes it is called is examined.
Reasons for using this cycle are as explained in Section
5.3.2 of Chapter 5.
2.8 Common approaches or techniques of evaluation of 
internal control 
Considerable evolution in documentation and evaluation
techniques has occurred over the last ten to fifteen
years.. These changes are primarily the results of
internal efforts by practice units. For example, Deloitte
Haskins & Sells (DHS, 1985) has developed software that
assists in the documentation of the control system and
helps identify critical weaknesses. Mock and Willingham
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(1983) describe an internal control documentation and
learning approach used by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
(1976). These firm specific techniques represent an
important starting point for describing and evaluating
current documentation policies and/ or practices.
For the purpose of this thesis, three approaches of
internal control evaluation are used, that is: (a) ICQ;
(b) CO and (c) CR approach. Emphasis in discussion will
gear towards these three approaches compared with the
other approaches.
2.8.1 Internal control questionnaire (ICQ) technique
This is a traditional method used by EAs and the most
commonly used method by EAs both to document the internal
control system and to evaluate the quality of an internal
control system.
ICO is an interrogative package designed to give the
auditor an overview of the controls operating in a system
and allowing the identification of weaknesses therein.
The questionnaire is so formulated that the answer "no"
indicates a weakness. A cross-referencing system is used
to link the control to a visual diagram of the system in
use (a flowchart) and to the audit programme (tests
undertaken).
From the answers given, the EA will be able to make a
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preliminary evaluation of the quality of internal
control.
2.8.2 Control objectives (CO) technique
Control objectives technique links up the ICPs
established by a client with the control objectives that
are set up by the company. Control objectives are usually
set up with the hope of preventing errors and
irregularities.
The relation between specific controls and financial
statement errors or control objectives has become a major
topic of the training and procedures manual used by CPA
firms and thus should be an important part of the
experienced knowledge store.
The control objective and the number of errors the
internal control can prevent is interrelated, that is if
the ICPs can meet the internal control objective, it can
help prevent errors that might occur. For example, the
ICP "Do personal records contain signatures of
employees?" can help meet the control objective "recorded
payroll are for work actually performed by nonfictitious
employees" and thus prevent the error of handling out pay
envelopes to the wrong person.
According to Loebbeck and Zuber (1980, 51)
The identification of specific control objectives is
the necessary first step in the process of
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evaluating an internal accounting control system.
The accountant must also identify the prescribed
control procedures that meet these objectives in
order to be satisfied that the system is suitably
designed to fulfil the broad objectives of internal
accounting control. This is a complex step.
They (Loebbecke 1980, 51 and 53) further comment that an
individual specific assertion may meet several specific
control objectives to varying degrees and a single
specific control objective may be met by one or more of
the control procedures. They suggested the use of a table
that relates specific control procedures to identified
specific control objectives.
In this thesis, the "CO" approach is based on the
suggested approach by Loebbecke and Zuber. However,
instead of examining only "internal accounting control"
procedures, it has been expanded to include
"administrative control" procedures as well.
They have thus suggested the use of a control matrix to
evaluate the internal control system. Figure 2.2
illustrates the "CO" approach that was suggested by Arens
and Loebbecke. The diagram is based on the suggestion of
Arens and Loebbecke (1980, Fig 2.55) and the example in
their book (Arens and Loebbecke, 1991, Figure 11-6, 389).
The internal controls refer to the internal controls that
were used in this thesis.
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Internal controls * Control Objectives
A B C D E
1. Are time cards and other source
documents checked before
processing by the payroll
department for casts and
calculations?
2. Are the tasks of both
timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated
from the	 task of payroll
preparation?
3. Is there adequate physical
security over personal files?
4. Are the duties of those
preparing the payroll rotated?
5. Are the names on the payroll
checked periodically against the
active employee file of the
personnel department?
6. Are the tasks of both payroll
preparation and payment of
employees adequately separated
from the tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation?
7. Are management reports used to
monitor the reliability of
financial data through comparisons
with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
8. Are formal procedures
established for changing names on
the payroll, pay rates and
deductions communicated to the
employees?
***Evaluation- Is the system
adequately designed to achieve the
control objective?
No No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Figure 2.2 :Internal control evaluation by means of "control
objectives" approach
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Figure 2.2 continued ...
How would you evaluate the internal control system?
1-extremely weak
	
4-some weakness
2-very weak
	
5-not quite adequate
3-substantial weakness	 6-adequate to strong
*Control objectives 
A= Recorded payroll are for work actually performed by
nonfictitious employee (validity)
B= Payroll transactions are properly authorised (authorization)
C= Payroll transactions are properly classified (classification)
D= Existing payroll transactions are properly recorded
(completeness)
E= Recorded payroll transactions are for the amount of time
actually worked and at the proper rates. Withholdings are
properly calculated (valuation)
The auditor is required to judge each of the internal
control procedure in order to determine whether the
procedure is able to fully achieve the objective/
objectives or partially achieve the objective/
objectives. If the procedure fully achieves the
objective/ objectives it is marked (\/) and if it
partially achieves the objective/objectives it is marked
\/. The auditor is then required to evaluate whether the
system is adequately designed to achieve the control
objective and at the end of it all, he is required to
evaluate whether the internal control system is weak or
strong. How many checks (\/) or \/ are needed to produce
a "Yes" is dependent on the auditor's judgement.
In summary, Loebbecke & Zuber described an approach to
the documentation of internal controls that begins with
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a pre-established list of objectives. The auditor then
lists auditee controls that in part or in full meet each
objective. This approach is comparable to methods that
begin with detailed listing of potentially material
sources of errors or with the completion of
questionnaires, but may be more efficient since
objectives approach should help identify redundant and
overlapping controls.
2.8.3 Audit risk model 
Concept of audit risk model will be discussed first which
will then be followed by the CR technique.
2.8.3.1 Concept of audit risk model
Audit risk model can be represented by the following
equation:
AR = IR * CR * SAR * SSR
AR or audit risk is the risk that the financial statement
is said to be true and fair when in fact it is not. It is
the probability that an EA issues an unqualified opinion
on materially misstated financial statements. It is
sometimes referred to as the probability of issuing an
inappropriate opinion on financial statements because
material errors, or irregularities, if they exist, will
not be detected. It is a measure of how willing the EA is
to accept that the financial statements may be materially
misstated after the audit is completed and an unqualified
opinion has been reached.
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According to SAS 47 (AICPA 1983),
Audit risk is the risk that the auditor (EA) may
unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his opinion
on financial statements that are materially
misstated
(AICPA 1983, SAS 47, AU Section 312, 11.02)
Oladeinde, Zeger & Patrick (1992, 6) define errors or
irregularities as "material" if knowledge of the
misstatement would affect the decision of a reasonable
user of the financial statements. Since the EA has a
broader spectrum of users (external) and since financial
statements might be used in sometimes unpredictable
circumstances (e.g a takeover), EAs might prefer lower
audit risk than IAs do.
COSO (1992c, "Reporting to External Parties") defines
"material weakness" in relation to an entity's financial
reporting objectives in the following way,
... the design or operation of the specific internal
control structure elements do not reduce to a
relatively low level the risk that errors or
irregularities in amounts that would be material to
the financial statements being audited may occur and
not be detected within a timely period by employees
in the normal course of performing their assigned
functions
(COSO 1992c, "Reporting to External Parties", 17)
According to SAS 47 (AICPA, 1983),
Financial statements are materially misstated when
they contain misstatements whose effect,
individually or in the aggregate, is important
enough to cause them not to be presented fairly, in
all material respects, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles, departures from
misapplications of generally accepted accounting
principles, departures from fact, or omissions of
necessary information.
(AICPA 1983, SAS 47, AU Section 312, 1.04)
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It should be borne in mind that the meaning of "material
weaknesses" for an EA is different from the meaning of
"material weaknesses" for an IA. It would be expected
that the materiality level of an IA would be likely to be
much lower than that of an EA since an IAs objective is
to advise management at all levels that the internal
control system is operating efficiently, effectively and
economically. However, EAs' material weaknesses are
concerned with whether the overall financial statements
show a true and fair view. Furthermore from an external
audit perspective, compensating errors, which
individually may be of considerable size, might "nett
out" so as to result in no significant errors in the
published financial statements.
IR or inherent risk is the risk that an error may occur
in a financial statement assertion, ignoring the effects
of internal controls.'" IR is assessed for individual
assertions rather than for accounts, since the risk may
vary between different assertions for the same account or
it may also vary between different populations for one
assertion. Some of the factors that can result in a high
inherent risk are lack of experience or competence of
accounting personnel, complex underlying calculations or
"For details definition of "inherent, control and detection
risk", please refer to SAS 47 (AICPA, 1983, AU Section 312, Audit
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit); AU Section 8006 (AICPA,
1991b, Risk Assessment and Internal Control) SAS 300 (APB, 1995a,
Accounting and Internal Control Systems and Audit Risk Assessment).
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principles or population consisting of a few individually
significant items. IR can also be said to be a measure of
the auditor's expectation of an error, assuming a
tolerable amount exists in a segment before considering
the effectiveness of internal accounting controls.
CR or control risk is the risk that internal controls
fail to detect or correct material errors that occur. It
is a measure of the auditor's expectation that errors
exceeding a tolerable amount in a segment will not be
prevented or detected by the client's internal control
structure.
Although, the concept of audit risk model is discussed in
conjunction with the external auditing profession, in
this thesis, EAs and IAs are required to determine
control risk qualitatively and the level of control risk
determined by EAs and IAs is statistically compared to
see if there is any significant difference.
SAR or substantive analysis risk is the risk that the
procedures used by the EA are not effective.
SSR or substantive sampling risk is the risk that the
sample selected is not representative of the whole
population.
The model suggests each component risk has the same
effect on overall audit risk.
124
According to KPMG's Peat Marwick (1988a) "Audit Program
Guide",
The extent of timing of substantive audit
procedures, and sometimes their nature, depends on
the components of audit risk model."
"SAR and SSR will change only if the auditor changes one
of the other factors" (Arens and Loebbecke, 1991, 255-
256). That means to say that they will only be determined
after the auditor has assessed both inherent risk and
control risk. The key factor in the formula is therefore
the determination of SAR and SSR, since it determines the
amount of evidence to be gathered.
SAR and SSR are sometimes collectively referred to as
"detection risk" (DR)". It is a measure of how willing
the EA is to accept that the audit evidence to be
obtained for a segment will fail to detect errors
exceeding a tolerable amount, should such errors exist.
Detection risk can also be said to be the risk that
auditing procedures applied on a certain chosen sample
can detect errors exceeding a tolerable amount in that
sample.
The EA can use the following formula to calculate the
detection risk and the amount of evidence to be gathered.
Normally, an EA has his own AR (eg 5%) and will calculate
the detection risk (DR) and the amount of evidence to be
4 4 As mentioned in KPMG Audit Manual (1988, Part II, pg 14).
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gathered, given the inherent risk (IR) and control risk
(CR) of the client.
As an illustration, using notional figures by way of
example let us say that an EA has already predetermined
the audit risk that he is willing to accept, that is an
audit risk of 5%. If after evaluation, he then assesses
inherent risk (IR) as 10% and control risk (CR) as 20%,
he would therefore have a product of both substantive
analysis risk (SAR) and substantive analysis risk (SSR)
as follows:
AR =( IR * CR )* ( SAR * SSR )
.05
2.5
SAR
=	 (.10
=SAR *
* SSR =
*	 .20)
SSR
250%
* (SAR * SSR )
That means to say that he would have a very high % of SAR
and SSR. "Very high" % of SAR or SSR implies that the
auditor can accept a very high degree of risk in
designing his substantive sampling and other procedures
(SAR), that is he can be more relaxed in determining what
audit procedures to use in carrying out audit tests; or
he can accept a very high degree of risk in determining
sample size (SSR), that is he can afford to use smaller
sample sizes; or both.
By contrast "low" means that the EA can accept a low
risk, with correspondingly larger sample sizes or more
extensive other substantive audit procedures.
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Detection risk is the risk that an EA's auditing
procedures applied on a certain chosen sample in that
sample can detect risk.
According to SAS 47 (AICPA, 1983, AU Section 312, 5.09),
the components of audit risk model can also be assessed
qualitatively, that is whether it is low, moderate or
high instead of quantitatively.
In essence, a high product of IR and CR would require a
low product of SAR and SSR given a certain assessment of
audit risk and vice-versa. Thus, an EA would need to
assess IR and CR first before he can determine the audit
procedures that he wants to use or the sample size that
is needed to be tested.
SAS 39, (AICPA, 1981) states that the risk analysis model
expresses the general relationship of the risks, and
cautions that the model is not intended to be a
mathematical formula including all factors that may
influence the determination of individual risk
components. Some of the important assumptions of the
model are as follows: (a) the individual risk components
are assumed to be independent of each other; (b) the non-
sampling risk component of the model is assumed to be
negligible; (c) inherent risk, because it is costl y to
measure is set conservatively at one.
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The concept of audit risk is directly related to the
third standard of fieldwork (GAAS) that is to gather
sufficient evidence to support the audit opinion.
"Sufficient" will be a judgement, finding a balance
between doing the necessary work while still respecting
cost-effectiveness of the audit. It should be borne in
mind that the IA is less confronted with the choice and
responsibility between the quality and amount of audit
work and cost of the audit, since those factors are
mostly determined by management.
The IA's role is to decrease control risk by evaluating
and improving the client's internal control structure.
This way, a cooperation between IAs and EAs eventually
makes it possible to decrease the audit risk.
2.8.3.2 Control risk (CR) technique
For the purpose of this thesis, only "control risk" is
examined. This is because determination of inherent and
detection risk would require much more information. The
auditors are required to determine the extent of which
each ICP (which consist of "accounting" and "non-
accounting" controls) can prevent or detect material
errors from occurring and they were then required to
assess the overall control risk i.e the extent to which
the internal control system can prevent or detect
material errors from occurring. It is known as "CR"
approach in this thesis.
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According to AU Section 8006 (AICPA, 1991b),
To assess control risk, the auditor (EA) should
consider the adequacy of control design, as well as
test adherence to control procedures. In the absence
of such an assessment, the auditor should assume
that control risk is high.
Assessing control risk is the process of evaluating
the effectiveness of an entity's accounting and
internal control systems in preventing or detecting
material misstatements in the financial statements.
After obtaining the understanding of the accounting
and internal control systems, the auditor (EA)
should make a preliminary assessment of control risk
for the relevant assertions in the financial
statements.
(AICPA 1991b, AU Section 8006, 5.22 and .23),
In summary, EA may evaluate the control risk as "high"
(internal control system is not effective in preventing
or detecting material misstatements in the financial
statements) when he,
(a) is not able to identify policies and procedures of
the accounting and internal control systems relevant
to specific assertions which are likely to prevent or
detect material misstatements in the financial
statements; and
(b) plans to perform tests of control to support
the assessment
2.8.4 Objective internal control evaluation technique
Brown (1962, 50-52) has suggested this approach and he
sees it as an improvement to the ICQ. He suggested that
EAs should weigh each of the ICPs according to its
importance (i.e importance in preventing an error). He
suggested that a scale of 1-5 be used whereby 1 would
indicate the least important and 5 would indicate the
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most important. This numerical weights is given on the
assumption that the ICPs are adhered to strictly. The EA
would then carry out tests to see the extent of
compliance with the procedures and then he would be
required again to use his judgment in assigning weights
to the ICPs to the extent that he thinks that the
procedure is being complied with. Again a numerical scale
will be assigned.
After both weights are assigned, he would then calculate
an effectiveness index (E.I)
E.I = 100 *	 Sum of actual values resulting from
testing (extent that there is compliance)
Sum of potential values for that audit
area (assuming strict compliance)
The end result would indicate the effectiveness of the
internal control system (i.e strong or weak)
Eg. E.I = 100 * 111
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= 89%
In summary, Brown suggests that the EA assign weights to
ICQ responses based on a subjective ranking of each
question's importance. The sum of the weights of the
positive answers provides a quantitative measure of the
quality of the internal controls. These quantitative
measures must then be used subjectively to plan
subsequent audit procedures.
2.8.5 Computer-assisted approach
More efforts are being made to make use of the computer
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as an analytical tool to evaluate the internal control
system. Computer-based decision support systems are used
to aid in structuring audit decisions and expert systems
in order to partially automate auditor expertise.
For example, Burns and Loebbecke (1975) described their
approach towards achieving this objective by the
following basic steps:
Step 1: Describe quantitatively each type of error
or irregularity that could occur in the
circumstances....
Step 2: Identify all pertinent controls that might
either detect and correct or prevent the
occurrences of any errors or irregularities
believed possible
Step 3: Chart the flow of potential errors and
irregularities through the accounting and
internal control procedures in question
Step 4: Convert the error flow diagram into a
flowchart of computer logic
Step 5: Translate the computer logic flowchart into
computer language code
Step 6: Gather or create any detailed accounting
data necessary to run the computer program
Step 7: Test the program for accuracy and
completeness
Step 8: Run the program several times, setting
internal control compliance levels at
different feasible values during each run
Step 9: Evaluate the output generated by the
computer program
(Burns and Loebbecke 1975, 64-68)
The output from each run of this computer simulation
consists of the mean dollar value of net error, the mean
dollar error as a percentage of the account being
examined, and the standard deviation of the expected
dollar error. After simulating several levels of
compliance, the auditor would have a concrete basis for
the establishment of tolerable compliance levels.
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In summary, Burns and Loebbecke (1975), use a computer
simulation to determine a tolerable upper limit on
compliance deviations or systems of considerable
complexity.
Bailey et al. (1985) have developed a comprehensive
computer decision support system, TICOM, to assist in
documentation and learning of EDP controls.
Meservy et al. (1986) used expert systems concepts to
develop an expert emulator of the evaluation process used
by auditors in evaluating internal accounting controls.
Dungan (1983) form an operating model of an audit
judgement from an expert (computer) system. The work was
facilitated by a software package called AL/X, developed
by Intelligent Terminals, Ltd of Edinburgh. The
resultant system, called AUDITOR, provides advice on the
likely collocate of individually large, delinquent trade
accounts receivable of a commercial audit client.
McDermott (1986) develop a hierarchical model to support
the judgement process of auditors with respect to the
Internal Accounting Control System (IACS) in a
microcomputer environment. The model relates the control
considerations of particular concern in this environment
to a set of risks and controls and provides a framework
adaptable to specific audit or electronic data processing
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(EDP) consulting situations. The results of this study
indicate that it is a viable process for supporting
decisions in the complex area of the IACS. Methods for
assisting the judgement process are particularly useful
in advanced EDP system environments. Although the
objectives of internal control remain the same in any
processing environment, the specific controls and
procedures for evaluating these controls may be
different. This study demonstrates the applicability of
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach and
identifies a set of control considerations, risks, and
controls of major concern in a microcomputer processing
environment.
2.8.6 Mathematical models 
Mathematical models of the internal control process if
ultimately accepted and found useful by practitioners,
could replace the subjective techniques now in use.
The reliability model approach, for example used by Yu
and Neter (1973), Cushing (1974), and Bodnar (1975) is an
alternative method of describing internal controls.
Recent examples include Srivastava (1983) and Srinidhi
and Vasarhelyi (1986). Drawing on reliability theory as
developed in engineering, these models characterize
accounting transaction cycles and related controls as
error generation processes. The development of such
models offers a number of advantages including explicit
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consideration of the unconditional probability of
explicit types of errors, careful analysis of control
interrelatedness and numerical outputs to assist in the
auditor's evaluation of internal control. However, these
models have not found a great deal of acceptance either
in practice or as research technologies.
Implementation in practice may not be attractive because
of the high costs of setting up the initial model. In
addition, internal control systems may not be especially
stable across time which would indicate relatively high
maintenance costs. Also, the existing models employ
simplifying assumptions that are difficult for
practitioners to accept. A complete reliability model of
an auditee's control system can at most assist the
auditor in documentation and learning. Reliability theory
does not appear to meet this need very easily and
possibly for this reason has not attracted a large
following.
2.8.7 Protocol analysis 
Protocol analysis or process-tracing models are developed
by having an expert speak aloud into a tape recorder as
he or she thinks through a decision. The results are then
studied for an underlying logical process which may be
captured in a computer algorithm. This type of approach
would enable an in depth investigation of the auditor's
decision behaviour (e.g., see Biggs and Mock (1983),
134
Gibbins and Wolf (1979). These studies attempt to
identify decision behaviour in a controlled case-oriented
scenario by having a subject verbalize continuously his
or her thoughts while using the provided materials to
reach a decision. These verbalizations (protocols) are
then carefully analysed to identify decision strategies
and identify important case features.
Protocol analysis is an important means of obtaining
detailed knowledge of how EAs evaluate internal controls
and use those evaluations to plan subsequent audit
procedures, although it is perhaps subject to weaknesses
such as the possible propensity of subjects to say what
they think the researcher wants to hear and not to
verbalize key thoughts.
One of his findings was the existence of "considerable
variability among prior distributions (of error rates)
assessed by different EAs for each audit case." Because
error rates are a function of internal control, it may be
inferred that EAs differed in their evaluation of
internal control.
2.8.8 Chernoff faces 
This approach uses visual representations of internal
control (by means of a diagram of faces) to help EAs in
their evaluation of the internal control system.
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Smith (1984) conducted a study to test two decision aids
for EA's preliminary evaluations of internal accounting
control. The two aids were Chernoff faces and dyadic team
decision making. The primary research issue was whether
the aids increase the consistency of preliminary
evaluations. EAs made preliminary evaluations of twenty
simulated internal control systems. The information for
their evaluations was presented to them by means of a
completed internal control questionnaire and Chernoff
faces. Each EA performed the preliminary evaluation task
with both informational modes. The findings indicate
that individual differences in consistency with the faces
were observed. EAs showed greater consensus in their
preliminary evaluations from the Chernoff faces.
To date, the use of Chernoff faces in internal control
evaluation were not recommended for use in current
practice as more research was called for.
2.9 COOPERATION BETWEEN EAs AND IAs 
Cooperation between EAs and IAs is beneficial to all
parties. A study sponsored by the IIA suggested that EAs .
are already relying more than before upon the work of IAs
(Baker 1986, 6).
Both groups of auditors would be able to produce better
quality work within lesser time. With an increasing
turnover of experienced auditors it would be most helpful
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if IA could be of some assistance. From the standpoint of
an EA, an efficient internal audit department may be
looked on as a valuable contribution to internal control.
As such, it encourages him to decrease the extent of his
detailed audit tests and to place greater reliance in
general on the company's accounting records and
procedures.
Auditing Guideline 3.408 (APC, l984)
	 that
An external auditor may be able to place reliance on
internal audit as a means of reducing the work he
performs himself in:
• the documentation and evaluation of accounting
systems and internal controls;
• compliance and substantive testing
It is frequently impossible for an EA to visit and
examine all the branch establishments of a client company
every year. The EA can work out a schedule so that every
office is visited at least once each year for a thorough
examination by either the IA or EA. Sometimes the
programme to be followed is developed by IA in
consultation with the EA; often representatives from the
2 staffs might team up to examine a given location or
division. Management would also have to pay lesser audit
fees because of lesser time taken to complete the audit
by the EAs. IAs will be able to learn from the helpful
comments of EAs who have been auditing a lot of internal
controls. Furthermore, with internal control reports
45 Although superseded by SAS 500,"Considering the work of
internal audit", the researcher feels that the guideline is able to
explain the relationship between EAs and IAs better.
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made mandatory, cooperation between IAs and EAs would
prove significant.
Statement on Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal Auditing (IA, 1989) states that,
The scope of internal audit should encompass the
examination and evaluation of the adequacy and
effectiveness of the organisation's system of
internal control and the quality of performance in
carrying out assigned responsibilities.
(IIA 1989, Standard 300, 6)
Auditing Guideline 3.204 (APC, 1980b) 46 , states that
before reliance can be placed on IA, EA will make a
preliminary assessment of internal auditor on the
following matters;
a)the degree of independence of internal auditor
from those whose responsibilities he is
reviewing (management)
b)the number of suitably qualified and
experienced staff employed in the internal
audit function
c)the scope, extent, direction and timing of the
tests made by the internal auditor
d)the evidence available of the work done by the
internal auditor and of the review of that work
e)the extent to which management takes action
based upon the reports of the internal audit
function.
(APC 1980b, Auditing Guideline 3.204, ¶19)
EAs and the IAs often carry out their work by similar
means. For this reason, EAs and the IAs should cooperate
on the work they carry out to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
46
Although superseded by SAS 300 (APB,1995a), the
researcher feels that it is worth mentioning as SAS 300 does not deal
with the issue. However, some of the points are also mentioned in SAS
500 (APB 1995c, 5 14).
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Cooperation between EA and IA is much in line with the
"total audit concept" which is a term that comes into
being in response to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA). The concept suggests that there should be an
audit committee (which should be composed exclusively of
outside directors) who will be responsible for looking
into management reports and audit reports and an IA who
works together with the EA to test controls in the
organisation.
In the United States, SAS 9 (AICPA, 1975a), "The Effect
of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of the
Independent Auditor" states,
External auditors relied on the internal audit
function primarily in gaining an understanding of
the internal control structure and in assessing
control risk.
SAS 65 (AICPA, 1991a), "The Auditor's Consideration of
the Internal Audit Function in an audit of Financial
Statements" expands on SAS 9 by permitting additional
reliance on IAs in performing substantive tests and by
encouraging coordination between the two audit functions.
.... the internal auditors ... may confirm certain
accounts receivable ... The results of these
procedures can provide evidence the (external).
auditor may consider in restricting detection risk
for the related assertions. Consequently, the
auditor (EA) may be able to change the timing of the
confirmation procedures, the number of accounts
receivable to be confirmed ....
(AICPA 1991a, SAS 65, ¶17).
According to Venables and Impey (1985, 33), "the external
auditor's role may be perceived as that of judging of
actions, whilst the internal auditor monitors day to day
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operations, the two auditors co-operating to maximise the
use of audit resources to benefit both owners and
management." It is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The relationship between senior management,
EAs and IAs.
Source: Venables, J.S.R and Impey, K.W. 1985. Internal 
Audit. London: Butterworths, pg 33.
Statement for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing (IA, 1978, Standard 550) states that,
The director of internal auditing should coordinate
internal and external audit efforts. Coordination of
audit efforts involves:
• periodic meetings to discuss matters of mutual
interest
• access to each other's audit programs and
working papers
• exchange of audit reports and management letters
• common understanding of audit techniques, methods
and terminology.
(IIA, 1978, Standard 550, T.01 and 1.02)
As IA's responsibility is to senior management, and not
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to the EA, IA may only assist EA in so far as directed by
senior management. There is a difference between the
objectives of IAs and EAs. Whilst the main objective of
an EA is to ensure the truth and fairness of financial
statements, the main objective of IA is to ensure that
the operation of management is run efficiently,
economically and effectively or to perceive risks and
opportunities for improvement on behalf of management.
However, IAs can cooperate with EAs by assisting them
with understanding of the internal control system in
operation and in explaining the steps that have been
taken by management to identify and rectify control
weaknesses. In these circumstances, the IA can make a
greater contribution to audit fee savings which would
otherwise attract undue external audit attention.
According to Mautz (1964, 8), IA's work compares
favourably with that done by EA, although there is some
difference in point of view and emphasis. Much of the
work of EA is directed at the verification of factual
data rather than procedures. IA pays more attention to
the examination of the operating procedures and practices
with a view towards discovering any deviations from the
company's prescribed rules and policies as well as to
discover more efficient methods of record keeping and
performance. Therefore, IA emphasizes the procedural
aspects of accounting, although it is also interested in
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the factual accuracy of the data produced by the
accounting department.
IA tends to combine the intimate knowledge of a company's
operations, obtained through constant study and work
within the company. Thus, they are in a favourable
position to pass judgment on policies and practices of a
general business nature as well as of an accounting
nature.
EA give somewhat lesser attention to operating and
accounting procedures and relatively more to ascertaining
the reliability of accounting data. Neither EA or IA can
examine all (100%) transactions except in relatively rare
and limited situations. However, IAs can cooperate with
EAs by assisting them to develop an understanding of the
internal control system in operation and in explaining
the steps that have been taken by management to identify
and rectify control weaknesses. In these ways IAs may be
able to make a significant contribution to containing
external audit fees by reducing the amount of work the EA
would otherwise have to conduct. The relationship
between internal and external audit may be one of co-
ordination or one of substitution. Both audits have
their own distinctive objectives to achieve. If IAs
conduct external audit-type work on behalf of the EA
there is a risk that internal audit will not be able to
meet important internal audit objectives through shortage
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of time for "genuine" internal audit work. Managements
may ask internal audit to be effective at containing
external audit costs by substituting for what would
otherwise have to be performed by external audit, but
this may be a counter-productive strategy if taken to
excess. In addition it is unlikely that there will be a
one-for-one saving through this type of internal audit
substitution since the EA will need to spend time
assessing the validity of the work done by internal
audit. Except in the case of out-sourcing, it is
unlikely that the opposite will occur: in other words,
external audit are unlikely to substitute for internal
audit in order to contain internal audit costs since they
would have to charge the client for this work.
Nevertheless there is both scope for, and a need for, co-
ordination between the two audits so that they can avoid
overlap and both have sight of, and be able to rely upon,
each other's work in areas of mutual interest which
contribute towards the achievement of both audits'
differing audit objectives.
Contemporary approaches followed by management often
include what have become known as "business process re-
engineering", "downsizing" and "empowerment" - the
latter two often being component parts of the former. In
the context of internal auditing, "empowerment" may often
be associated with allocating to line management and
staff the responsibility to review their internal control
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risk arrangements systematically, participatively and
regularly. This is becoming known as "control self
assessment" or "control risk self assessment". Sometimes
it is termed "a self assessment programme" in which case
in addition to control it may comprise a consideration of
quality and other issues as well. Internal audit may act
as facilitator of control self assessment by management
and staff.
Whether as part of a formal business process re-
engineering project driven in part by a perceived need to
downsize, or more a matter of an ad hoc change of
business practices, many businesses are actively
examining how they can contract out many of their non-
core activities. Core activities are generally defined
as those that at heart of the enterprise's purpose which
the enterprise can conduct as well or better than anyone
else. Internal audit is now often seen as a candidate
for out-sourcing (or "contracting out") following a
process of market testing during which an existing in-
house internal auditing may be given the opportunity to
tender for the work. One rationale for out-sourcing is
that specialist businesses may be able to provide the
service for better value for money; in-house provision of
non-core activities is often associated with premium
employment costs offered to all in-house staff but not
necessary as terms and conditions of employment for non-
core staff.	 Out-sourcing may also provides the
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enterprise with a better opportunity to vary the amount
they spend on the service in question since they are not
carrying the fixed overhead of permanent employees
conducting that activity. Finally, out-sourcing reduces
the overall establishment of staff so making the
enterprise simpler to manage and potentially more
flexible in changing direction to adjust to future
change. Management are then able to focus on core
activities.
There are attractions to out-sourcing internal audit -
not least because there are large firms of public
accountants and others for whom auditing is their own
core business. The findings of this research have a
bearing on the case for or against out-sourcing. If EAs
come to similar judgements as in-house IAs about systems
of internal control, then managements (all other things
being equal) may have some confidence in entrusting the
provision of internal auditing services to people who are
not full-time employees of the business.
There are of course many other factors to be taken into
account. For instance, whoever undertakes internal audit
does need in-depth understanding of the workings of the
enterprise and this may be hard for an outsider (even an
EA) to come by.
According to Venables and Impey (1985, 33-34), areas of
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the common interest between the two parties are:
• the operation of an effective and efficient system of
internal check, ensuring internal control is adequate.
• the reliability of records
• an adequate reporting system to provide senior
management with sound financial information
• prevention of fraud and waste
Management is involved in the day-to-day monitoring of
the system, whilst IA helps management to maintain a
current audit of the system. EA, on the other hand is
much more concerned with the balance sheet.
Existence of an internal audit staff does not make an
annual examination by EA less desirable. Neither can be
fully supplanted by the other. Substitution of EA's work
with IA's work is explicitly prohibited by SAS 9 (111) and
implied by SAS 65.
The activities of an internal audit department usually
overlap those of an independent auditor to a significant
degree-sometimes they are completely parallel-but their
purposes and functions are different. EA's function is to
understand the client's system as a basis for relying on
the end results of those systems so as to give an opinion
on the financial statement. IA's function is to
understand the company's systems in order to see that
company policy is followed and the systems function with
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maximum efficiency at minimum cost. Since EAs and IAs
have so much in common, they must work together to
minimise duplication. For example, IA can help EA prepare
listings, account analyses and help in mailing out
confirmation letters to accounts receivable.
In terms of audit theory, a degree of reliance on IAs is
justified on the principle that a capable, well
functioning internal audit department provides
disciplinary control so reliable than an EA can limit his
testing of other parts of the system.
2.10 FACTORS AFFECTING JUDGEMENT OF EAs AND IAs 
To date, research in internal control evaluation has
examined the effects of experience, educational level,
position level, independence of IAs, firm size and
personality variables on decision-making judgements of
auditors (Ashton, 1974; Hamilton and Wright, 1977;
Bailey, 1981; Hall, Yetton and Zimmer, 1982; Landry,
1989; Moore, 1993, to name a few). The findings indicate
mixed results from no effect on judgement (Ashton, 1974);
negative results (Hall Yetton and Zimmer, 1982) to
positive results (Landry, 1989).
In this thesis, only three of the factors, that is,
"experience, educational and position level" were
investigated to see their effects on the judgement model
of each group of auditor. In addition, firm size and
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independence of IAs on the judgement of auditors in the
ratings of the cases were also examined.
2.10.1 Experience, education and position level 
Several writers have identified the attributes of
experience as determinants of information processing
abilities (Taylor, 1975; Ashton, 1974; Weber, 1978 to
name a few). Practitioners often claim experience to be
an important determinant of decision making quality
(Weber, 1978, 372).
Mautz (1964, 470-472) lists some factors that can
indicate that the IAs are independent and they are:
• internal auditing department is organised quite
separately from accounting and treasurer's department
• the head of the department reports directly to the
Board of Directors or to an officer holding a position
at least equivalent to the heads of these two
departments
• if the employees within the internal auditing
department are competent, that is, have a thorough
understanding of accounting, audit techniques and
procedures, sufficient background of education and
experience.
On the issue of competency, SAS 1, (AICPA, 1972b) have
stated that,
In the course of his day-to day practice, the
independent auditor encounters a wide range of
148
judgement to the occasional extreme of deliberate
misstatement. He is retained to audit and report
upon the financial statements of a business because,
through his training and experience, he has become
skilled in accounting and auditing and has acquired
the ability to consider objectively and to exercise
independent judgement with respect to the
information recorded in books of account or
otherwise disclosed by his audit.
(AICPA 1972b, SAS 1, AU Section 210, ¶.05)
In summary, SAS 1 elaborates on the characteristics of
"competence" in the following way. First, the EA is to
acquire the appropriate education. At a minimum, this
education includes the basic accounting and auditing
knowledge. Second, the EA is to be properly trained. This
training includes knowledge and application of firm
procedures, as well as continuing education about new
developments. Third, "competency" includes acquiring
professional experience. This on the job training enables
the auditor to make judgements over time. These three
characteristics will sum up auditors' knowledge and this
knowledge is what the EAs need in order to be competent
in conducting financial statement audits.
Besides having the appropriate education and training,
experience is very important in the work of an auditor in
order to enable the auditor able to make professional
judgements. Hall (1980) states that,
An auditor's sense of materiality lies at the heart
of his professional judgement. An appreciation of
the concept may be innate ..., but experience
nurtures, refines and sharpens it.
Hall (1980, 78)
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The same also applies to IAs as stated in Auditing
Guideline 3.308, AICPA 1990, ¶15. IAs should also have
the appropriate experience, training and continuing
professional education in order to be effective.
Regarding position level, the researcher thinks that it
has some influence on the ratings of internal control
system as auditors in different position levels have
different experiences and educational background.
A typical audit is illustrated in the following
paragraphs in order to show the effect of the auditors at
the various position levels on an audit.
A typical audit would involve a preliminary evaluation of
the internal control system before proceeding with the
other audit procedures. As a first step, the EA will have
to go through the procedures manual and interview
management to be able to understand the system of
internal control that has been established. The auditor
will then have to document the system by means of a
flowchart or a narration or some other methods (as
discussed later in 2.6). After the documentation, the
auditor would have to conduct "compliance testing" to
ascertain whether the internal control system is
operating as it should be. This test can be done by a
"walk through" test where literally speaking, the auditor
would have to walk through the place of work and observe
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whether the control procedures are being followed. The
auditor can also take a sample of transactions and follow
them through from the source documents to their final
recording in the accounts.
A typical independent audit would have 4 to 5 people
working as a team. The auditor-in-charge (usually the
most senior), would assign these jobs of compliance
testing to his or her group of juniors and then evaluate
the strength of the internal control by means of the
materials that are given to him or her. In charge seniors
or auditors are the auditors who take direct
responsibility for the performance of audit fieldwork.
The backbone of a good audit staff is found in the
auditor-in-charge. The auditor does not only direct the
fieldwork, supervise, and give on-the-job training to the
assistants, but it is upon him that the final
responsibility for recognising any serious problem rests.
The auditor would have to consider whether the system
that has been established by the client is sufficient to
prevent errors and irregularities or sufficient to meet
the control objectives and consideration should also be
given to the extent of compliance with the system. In
short, it requires a lot of judgement on the part of the
auditor. In evaluating internal control, any weaknesses
should be stated as precisely as possible so that the
most useful audit steps can be applied to discovering
whether the weaknesses would result in any errors and
irregularities.
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Dunn (1991) discusses the basic structure of any given
audit team as follows:
Partner - The partner is ultimately responsible for
the completion of the audit. He will sign the audit
report on behalf of the firm. The partner will not
be actively involved in the routine audit work.
Manager - The audit manager will be responsible for
the overall supervision of the detailed audit
testing. He will also liaise between the company's
management and the partner. If the firm is auditing
the statements of a group of companies, the manager
will coordinate the efforts of the various audit
teams involved.
Senior - The senior will be directly responsible for
the day-to-day supervision of the staff engaged in
the collection of evidence. The senior may be a
qualified accountant, but could be a trainee who is
about to become a member of one of the professional
bodies.
Juniors - The junior audit staff will collect audit
evidence, working under the supervision of the
senior and manager. Juniors may be relatively recent
recruits who are training with the firm or,
increasingly, could be accounting technicians who
are employed to support the qualified staff.
(Dunn 1981, 48)."
From a look at the organisational charts of certain
internal audit companies (Banks and Computer companies)
it can be said that the structure of internal audit firms
follow along the same lines. There will be the head or
deputy head of the internal audit firm, audit manager,
senior internal auditors and junior internal auditors
respectively, each performing the same function as those
with similar levels in an audit firm.
2.10.2 Independence/ objectivity of lAs
Independence or objectivity of EAs and IAs in performing
47
Please refer to Mautz (1964, 476) for further description
of the position level of auditors.
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audits is also important. However, in this thesis only
"independence" of IAs is being considered.
In Chapter 13 of The CPA Handbook, Mr E.B. Wilcox writes,
Independence is an essential auditing standard
because the opinion of the independent accountant is
furnished for the purpose of adding justified
credibility to financial statements which are
primarily the representations of management. If the
accountant were not independent of the management of
his clients, his opinion would add nothing ... He
must fulfil this obligation even when it means
opposing and denying the wishes of those who have
employed him, and who, he knows, may cease to do
so... The continued prestige and usefulness of
accounting depends in large measure on its continued
achievement.
"Independence" is a key attribute for IAs. One of the
potential impairments to "independence" is the
performance of duties that conflict with the internal
audit role. Schneider (1984) found that "freedom from
conflicting duties" is an important element of perceived
internal audit "independence".
SAS 65 (AICPA 1991a, AU Section 9, T.10) states that EAs
should look into the following factors when assessing the
"objectivity" of IAs. The factors are: (a) whether the IA
reports to an officer of sufficient status; (b) whether -
the IA has direct access; (c) reports regularly to the
board of directors, the audit committee and (d) whether
IAs audit areas where they were recently assigned or are
scheduled	 to	 be	 assigned	 on	 completion	 of
responsibilities in the internal audit function.
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Thus as can be seen from the definition (part (d) above),
"objectivity" of IAs is impaired when the auditor is
asked to audit a system or program for which he was
previously involved in designing or had some other
decision making responsibility. For instance, Ward and
Robertson (1980, 66) suggest that one of the steps in
considering "objectivity" is to "review the IAs' freedom
from operational responsibilities". The Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA),the General Accounting Office
(GAO) and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy (CIPFA) standards all explicitly mention this
type of conflict.
Standard 120 (IA, 1989) states,
Designing, installing and operating systems are not
audit functions ... Performing such activities is
presumed to impair audit objectivity
(IIA 1989, Standard 120, S.03)
The GAO standards states,
There are circumstances in which auditors cannot be
impartial ... These circumstances include ...
Previous involvement in a decision making or
management capacity that would affect current
operations of the entity or program being audited
(Controller General of the United States 1981, 18)
The CIPFA standards states,
Internal audit should not be directly responsible
for the development or implementation of new
systems, or engage in any other activity which they
would normally review and appraise since this could
compromise their independence
(CIPFA 1979, 7)
There is some empirical evidence that indicates IAs
sometimes do expose themselves to these types of
conflicting duties. A study by Clay and Haskin (1981), 5%
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of the chief financial officers surveyed responded that
their 1As develop or install procedures that they would
normally audit. In a recent survey of internal audit
directors, Greenberg and Murphy (1989) report that, on
average, 14.2% of their internal audit staff time is
spent on systems development activities.
Coopers & Lybrand (1984, 69) suggests that the IA should
not develop or install control procedures or prepare the
accounting record upon which he is expected to comment as
auditor if it wants to be effective and has a measure of
independence.
Auditing Guideline 3.308, (APC, 1990, 1111) states that
IA's independence can be achieved through the
"organisational status" and "objectivity" of IAs."
Regarding "organisational status", the guideline (1112)
states that the head of internal audit should have direct
access to, and freedom to report to, all senior
management including the chief executive, board of
directors and, where one exists, the audit committee.
According to the guideline (1113), an IA's "objectivity"
can be determined through the following ways:
(a) the internal auditor, notwithstanding his
employment by the organisation, should be free
from any conflict of interest arising either
from professional or personal relationships or
from pecuniary or other interests in an
48 Similar to SIAS 1 (IIA 1989, 9).
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organisation or activity which is subject to
audit
(b) the internal auditor should be free from undue
influences which either restrict or modify the
scope or conduct of his work or over-rule or
significantly affect judgement as to the
content of the internal audit report
(c) the internal auditor should not allow his
objectivity to be impaired when auditing an
activity for which he has had authority or
responsibility
(d) an internal auditor should be consulted about
significant proposed changes in the internal
control system and the implementation of new
systems and make recommendations on the
standards of control to be applied. This need
not prejudice that auditor's objectivity in
reviewing those systems subsequently
(e) an internal auditor should not normally
undertake non-audit duties but where he does
so, exceptionally, he should ensure that
management understands that he is not then
functioning as an internal auditor.
The IA needs to declare if he is involved in any of the
above situations, so that another auditor could be
arranged to take over the audit assignment (Auditing
guideline 3.308, T14).
Abdel-Khalik et al. (1983, 218) states,
... organisational independence of the internal
audit staff is a surrogate of its objectivity."
Their foundation for this surrogate was SAS 9 (AICPA,
1975a) which relates "objectivity" to the "organisational
level" to which the IAs report.
When considering the objectivity of internal
auditors, the independent auditor should consider
the organisational level to which internal auditors
report the results of their work and the
organisational level to which they report
administratively. This frequently is an indication
of the extent of their ability to act independently
of the individuals responsible for the functions
being audited...
(AICPA 1975a, SAS 9, 17).
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If the IA reports to either the managing or finance
director, it is important that he should always have the
right to report directly to the chairman, on matters of
importance. Auditing literature has recommended that IAs
report to an independent body known as the audit
committee.
Chambers, Selim and Vinten (1990) listed the benefits of
audit committees. Some of them are:
• assists directors in their legal obligations
• strengthens audit independence
• improves contact between auditors, directors and
management
• encourages higher quality accounting and audit
(Chambers, Selim and Vinten 1990, Table 22.1, 279)
A study carried out by Rittenberg (1977) involved
investigating whether IAs can make important electronic
data processing design-phase audit contributions to an
organisation without impairing independence. Rittenberg
divides "independence" into: (a) organizational and
(b) individual.
"Organisational independence" is largely outside the
direct sphere of power of the internal audit and involves
the reporting level and top management support.
As for "individual independence", the IAs would have some
say in cooperation with management. Individual
independence is in turn divided into: (a) economic and
other influences and (b) individual mental state.
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As can be seen in Figure 2.4, one of the examples of
"economic and other influences" is "assignment of
auditors to design phase and post-installation audit
work" which is the issue discussed earlier on regarding
auditors' "conflict of interest".
As for "individual mental state" it involves, "personal
characteristics" and "competence of auditor to perform
tasks". Thus Rittenberg extended the definition of IAs'
independence to include three components:
(a) organisational level; (b) economic and other
influences (assignment of auditors to design phase and
post-installation audit work) and (c) competence of
auditor to perform tasks.
The major conclusions of the study may be summarized as
follows:
• organisational factors rated highest
• individual factors such a competence rated moderately
important and
• economic and other influences (assignment of auditors
to post-installation audits) rated low.
For the purpose of this thesis, types of internal
independence follow closely Rittenberg's categories, that
is: (a) reporting level; (b) competence and (c) economic
and other influences.
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Figure 2.4: A model of internal audit independence
Source: Rittenberg, L. 1977. Audit Independence and
Systems design, pg.19. Florida: IIA, Inc.
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In the questionnaire, there are questions asking:
(a) to whom is the head of internal audit accountable?
This question relates to "organisational independence".
(b) whether the IA has completed and passed professional
and accounting qualification and IAs' length of
auditing experience.
This question relates to "competency".
(c) whether the IA is involved in compliance testing,
making recommendations for improvement in internal
control systems, developing detailed proposals for
design or redesign of internal controls,
implementation of control changes and administering
or operating any internal controls.
This question relates to "economic and other influences".
These three factors (organisational independence,
competency and economic and other influences) were used
as a measure of IAs' independence.
Based on the answers given to the questions, IAs will be
grouped as to their independence, i.e "high, moderate or
low". The method of determining this is based on
Rittenberg's findings as to which factors were found to
be most important, moderately important and least
important in determining independence of IAs. Detail
calculation is shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.8.
According to SAS 65 (AICPA, 1991a, V.09), some of the
factors that can determine IA's competency are
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educational level, professional experience, professional
certification and continuing education of IAs.
2.11 INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF IAs 
Whittington & Margheim (1993, 51) argues that the reason
for AICPA issuing SAS 65 in 1991 to supersede SAS 9 that
was issued in 1975 was because of the increasing prestige
of IAs and the need for the increased external audit
effectiveness and efficiency.
SAS 65, considers three factors when making judgements
about the extent of usage of internal audit work, that is
inherent risk factors, materiality and the subjective
evidence to be evaluated about an audit assertion."
As discussed earlier on in the Chapter, in Cadbury's Code
of Best Practice (CFACG, 1992), the board of directors
are encouraged to report on the quality of internal
control and whether the company can operate on an ongoing
basis although it is acknowledged that the introduction
of these reports may be deferred pending clarification on
the nature of "internal control" and of "going concern".
Paragraph 4.4 of the Code states that,
The directors should explain their responsibility
for preparing the accounts next to a statement by
the auditors about their reporting responsibilities"
49 SAS 9, primarily discussed about IAs characteristics,
namely, competence, objectivity and work performance that should be
evaluated by EAs in assessing IAs' reliability.
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The directors are also required to report on the
effectiveness of the company's system of internal control
and whether the business is a going concern by means of
paragraph 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
Paragraph 4.5 of the Code states that,
The directors should report on the effectiveness of
the company's system of internal control.
Paragraph 4.6 of the Code states that,
The directors should report that the business is a
going concern with supporting assumptions or
qualifications as necessary.
With the new Code, the role of IAs may become more
significant.
Research by Ward (1979) indicated that EAs believe the
IA's function "should be viewed as an integral part of
the internal control system rather than merely a check on
the system" and that "external audit costs should usually
be materially less when IAs are relied upon than what
they would have been without reliance".
A survey by Ward and Robertson (1980) showed that
"virtually all EAs rely on IAs to some extent" and about
38% of EAs surveyed think there should be reliance on IAs
with respect to evaluation of internal accounting
control. The survey also asked the participants, which
consist of both IAs and EAs, to predict reliance on the
IAs in the next 10 years and both of the groups suggest
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that there should be an increase due to certain factors.
Some of the factors are listed below:
• Because of their widening legal responsibilities,
managements and audit committees seem more committed to
increasing the quality, quantity and objectivity of
personnel in internal audit departments.
• Clients are increasing the pressure for more audit
efficiency to reduce or stabilize audit fees. The need
to be competitive and timely will cause independent
auditors to use whatever resources are available to
them.
• As governmental regulation of industry increases and
business systems grow larger and more complex, EAs will
increase their reliance on IAs who should have a
"better knowledge of company systems".
• EAs have difficulty obtaining and retaining enough
qualified entry-level accountants to handle their
needs. Thus increased reliance on IAs will become
necessary to achieve adequate audit coverage. Some of
the factors listed above correctly depict the current
situation.
Venables and Impey (1988, 3), considers internal audit as
an agent for change. In their words,
Internal audit is the management function which
monitors the continuing validity of management
control systems and effective compliance. In
fulfilling this role the internal auditor has an
excellent viewpoint from which to recognise
opportunities for strengthening systems and
procedures, for improving methods and for achieving
greater efficiency all with the object of increasing
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the contribution each management sector can make
towards achieving corporate objectives.
Hobgood & Sciarrino (1972) noted that some companies are
able to hold their fees down by using effective internal
audit staff.
Briston & Perks (1979) indicated that considerable
savings in audit efforts and audit costs should result if
there is a combination of internal and external audit
function within a truly independent audit department.
MAPI (1983) also found that "the increased IA's efforts
and the improved quality of the financial management were
apparent reasons for the external audit fee decreasing
from 1976 to 1980 for companies belonging to Machinery
and Allied Products Institute."
Wafa (1988), found that one of the ways to minimize audit
fees by companies whose audit fees were considered
"high", was to "increase cooperation both by the company
and the external auditor in terms of using effective
internal audit staff and sufficient internal audit
planning".
Lurie (1976) indicated that the time required by
companies' personnel to provide the EA with information
and data represents a significant hidden audit cost which
should be considered like any other factor which enters
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into the cost of the annual audit such as, size,
complexity, computerization of the company, and
efficiency of its accounting department. Lurie suggested
that by planning the audit and budgeting for its audit
cost, audit fee can be reduced. Planning the audit was
described as a joint venture in which top personnel from
the company's staff and the audit firm participate to
develop a preliminary plan which best starts shortly
after the completion of the current year's audit to avoid
any mistakes and problems which are still in the minds of
all participants.
Moore (1993, 14) summarizes the reason for the increase
in reliance on IAs by EAs as follows:
First, ... competitive pressures on external
auditors to reduce their fees led to more reliance
on the internal audit function. Second, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 emphasized the
importance of a strong internal control structure.
Third, internal auditing took steps to be recognized
as a profession.
In view of the increasing reliance of EA on IA, it would
be timely to conduct a research to examine whether
there is consensus between IAs and EAs with regards to
their internal control evaluation. If it is so, then
there is justification for reliance on the IA's work.
2.12 SUMMARY
In this chapter, definitions of internal control,
techniques of evaluation of internal control, factors
affecting judgements of both IAs and EAs were discussed.
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Emphasis of discussion were towards the techniques of
evaluation used in the research instrument, namely: ICQ,
CO and CR and factors examined in the research instrument
that were thought to influence the judgements of both EAs
and IAs, namely: experience, educational and position
level. In addition independence of IAs was also examined.
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CHAPTER 3
NATURE OF JUDGEMENT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this thesis is to find out whether
EAs and IAs will come out with the same conclusion
(judgement) regarding a particular internal control
situation.
This chapter attempts to explore the meaning of judgement
and try to describe the "inner feelings" or "thought
processes" of the auditors when making a judgement. The
purpose is to help understand what governs the auditors
when making the internal control judgements. Discussion
of the "output" or the "outcome" of judgement will also
be discussed since this thesis only examined this issue.
Examining the "outcome" of judgement is similar to the
approach of "Brunswik lens model" which will also be
discussed in this chapter.
Statistics used to measure "judgement" namely:
correlation, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) together with the justification of
using them will be discussed as these are the techniques
used in this thesis to measure judgement.
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Other issues such as factors affecting judgement,
definition of "judgement insight" and the use of
"judgement consensus" and "consistency" as a surrogate
for "correct judgement" are also discussed in this
chapter. This thesis will compare EAs' and IAs'
judgements along the lines of these three issues (i.e
"consensus", "consistency" and "insight").
The chapter will start off by relating judgement to the
other thought processes. It will then attempt to relate
the thought processes to a typical internal control
evaluation.
3.2 CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT PROCESSES
Various literature to explain judgement can be found
(Dewey, 1910; Wallas, 1926; Patrick, 1937; Shelly &
Bryan, 1964 and Johnson, 1971) but the most complete
attempt is made by Johnson. He describes three categories
of thought processes in an attempt to structure the
complexity of thought into identifiable categories:
a) preparation for intellectual activity b) productive
thought; and c) judgement.
According to Johnson (1971, 53), "in any complex act of
thought any of the three processes may be the source of
individual differences in the final outcome."
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3.2.1 Preparation for Intellectual Activity
The first category, that of "preparation", includes
everything that precedes and influences thought. The
primary occurrence involved in preparation is the
formation of a psychological "set". A set is usually
defined as "a readiness to make a specific response to a
specific stimulus" (Johnson, 1971, 65).
The term readiness in the definition means that the
stimulus-response coordination is prepared in
advance, so that when the stimulus is perceived, the
response follows with little delay. On the stimulus
side, the organism is prepared to select from its
repertoire of responses certain acts rather than
others.
(Johnson 1971, 65).
Johnson (1971, 67-70) suggested that the set adopted by
a particular individual for a particular situation is
largely determined by four major influences: a) the
individual's motives; b) instructions or suggestions
concerning the situation which were given to the
individual by another person. When there is a conflict of
the instructions or suggestions with his individual's
motives, he would not be willing to accept them; c) a
previously acquired set may be reinstated, that is, the
influence of experience". It has been shown that a set
which has been developed during the solution of one
problem is likely to be transferred, for better or worse,
to the solution of subsequent problems of a similar
nature and d) the individual may develop a new set during
50 Prior knowledge has been shown to influence performance in
problem-solving tasks and in learning tasks (Britton & Tesser, 1982).
169
the performance of a task. He may be partially prepared
for the task when he begins but modifying his set as he
proceeds.
When the activities of an auditor are compared with the
psychological set, it can be seen that in performing his
task, the auditor is usually given instructions or
suggestions by his superiors on how to perform the task.
He may use the instructions or suggestions by his
superiors if they suit the particular task that he is
looking into but if it does not, then he will make use of
his past experiences or the firm's policies or
instructions on handling the task. Thus he has to modify
his set according to the particular work that he is
attending to.
Bonner (1990, 77) states that,
In general, auditors acquire knowledge of relevant
cues and how to weight them for judgement tasks by
several means including collegiate auditing courses,
audit firms' training programs, performance of the
tasks in question, or by reviewing other auditors'
performance of the tasks.
A complex judgement is facilitated if the stimulus
pattern to be judged can be compared with a standard or
ideal pattern.
Complex judgements are those in which the object of
judgement is complex and the stimulus aspect or
aspects to be judged are not distinctive. When a
foreman is asked, for example, to rate the merits of
his crew or when a conscientious voter tries to
select the best candidate for public office ....
(Johnson 1971, 286).
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, Harrison (1940) expressed the
importance of the ideal type very well as observed from
the following quotation of his book on judging dairy
cattle.
The purpose of a true type cow, as adopted by the
various breed associations, is to set forth a
standard that can be used as the basis of judging.
The successful judge actually compares each cow that
he studies with the ideal or true type cow, and
selects the cow that most nearly approaches this
perfection. It is highly important, therefore, that
a student of judging study the true type model so as
to acquire a knowledge of the type that constitutes
perfection in a dairy cow.
(Harrison 1940, 313).
In summary, it is likely that the situation which
surrounds a real-world complex judgement is compared with
similar situations that the judge has faced in the past
or an ideal type of situation.
In the internal control situation, the auditor might be
influenced by his past experiences in judging which
internal control is better or the auditor might use the
knowledge that he has learned before he becomes an
auditor, such as through formal education or through in-
house training or through the firm's policies. This is
evidenced in the following statement which refers to
internal control by Broeker (1967).
The independent auditor should acquire a proper
understanding of the forces of internal control as
they operate within the client's business. The
acquisition of such knowledge requires that the
investigation be made by an experienced auditor.
(Broeker 1967, 76)
In summary, Johnson (1971) has stated that "preparation"
accomplishes three things:
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The thinker is alerted, prepared for action at the
appropriate time. The stimulus objects, data, or
materials of judgement are specified; i.e., the
thinker is sensitized to, or set for, some aspects
of the environment or of memory rather than others.
Third, the form of the response or the alternative
response categories are specified.
(Johnson 1971, 286)
3.2.2 Productive thought
Johnson's second classification of thought, that of
production, concerns the examining of alternatives on
solving a problem. Thus, production is considered an
elaborating process, a process of exploring alternatives.
It can in fact be equated to the process of deliberation
where Churchman and Eisenberg (1964, 50-52) has defined
it as the act of "processing data through opposite logics
and somehow arriving at a judgement on the basis of these
processes". This stage of judgement is affected by task
characteristics and the amount of information presented.
Evidence in the literature suggests that when objects
have been categorized into groups, the perceiver tends to
overestimate the degree of dissimilarity between groups
(Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963).
Chapman (1967) introduced the term "illusory correlation"
to refer to the erroneous report by an observer regarding
the degree of association between two variables or
classes of events. Chapman argued an illusory
correlation may be based either on the associative
meaning that exists between two events or on the pairing
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of distinctive events. In either case, the subject "sees"
the two events as "going together" with more regularity
than has actually been done.
Results from a number of studies aimed at investigating
the effect of amount of information available in
judgement behaviour (Einhorn, 1971; Hayes, 1964;
Hendrick, Mills & Kiesler, 1968 and Oskamp, 1965) seem to
indicate that the effects of increasing the amount of
information are to increase the variability of the
responses and to decrease the quality of the choices. In
other words, decision makers make poor decisions "because
there was too much information for human intelligence to
cope with".
Bearing in mind the points discussed above, the internal
control case study presented in this thesis involves a
task which is not swamped with too much information and
as far as possible each internal control procedures
chosen to represent the internal control system was
distinct from the other.
3.2.3 Judgement 
Johnson (1971, 280) states that "the thinker halts his
productive activity to judge the merit of what he has
produced". Judgement is thus considered to be the last
phase of problem-solving. In his book, Johnson offers the
following definitions of "judgement".
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	 judgement is a conclusive or decisive process,
not a productive one, that brings a thoughtful
episode to an end.
(Johnson 1971, 282)
Judgement may be identified as the evaluation or
categorising of an object of thought. This is
logically differentiated from productive thought in
that typically nothing is produced. The material is
merely judged, i.e., put into one category or
another.
(Johnson 1971, 51).
A definition offered by Shelly and Bryan (1964)
If we need to limit it [the term "judgement") in
some way beyond its intuitive content, we can say
that roughly a "judgement" refers to any verbal
reaction (or its equivalent) that is the "direct"
product of the individual's processing his sensory
inputs in combination with his memories of "stored
experiences". This would exclude reactions such as
reading number off a dial.
(Shelly and Bryan 1964, 9)
According to Johnson, judgement is a
... process in that the thinker takes into account
the motivational and instructional conditions that
initiated the thoughtful episode. The preparation
sets up two or more alternatives, between which a
choice is made. These alternatives may be perceived
from the past or they may be produced ... by a
creative process.
(Johnson 1971, 282)
In these definitions the emphasis is upon choosing
between alternative responses, or placing the object of
judgement into one category or another. It may be argued
that EAs' and IAs' overall evaluation of an internal
control subsystem fits such a description. The auditor
categorizes the internal control subsystem and places it
at some point on a continuum of strength or weakness,
although both the point and the continuum may be ill-
defined.
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Most real life judgements are complex, which means that
the stimulus material is heterogenous, with no one
prominent dimension to which the judge can be easily
prepared to respond. The response is therefore correlated
with more than one aspect of the stimulus material. The
ability to make good judgements of complex stimulus
depends upon:
(1) abstracting the pertinent data from the complex
situation; (2) adopting and maintaining a set for
these pertinent data; (3) attending to several data
simultaneously; (4) weighting each appropriately;
(5) integrating all this information somehow so that
it is related to one of the response alternatives
rather than the others. Presumably such judgement
requires (6) delaying or inhibiting response, i.e.,
carefulness, caution, or deliberateness. Errors
could be made in any of these aspects of complex
judgement and some people are better than others in
any or all aspects.
(Johnson 1971, 421-422).
The process is also done by IAs and EAs when they are
evaluating an internal control system where they have to
attend to several data simultaneously, weighting each
appropriately and somehow integrating all the pieces
together so that they can come out with their judgement
on the quality of internal control system.
3.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH PERCEPTION
Berelson & Steiner (1964, 33) states,
In human behaviour, the process of giving meaning to
stimuli is referred to as perception. It is a
complex process by which people select, organize,
and interpret sensory stimulation into a meaningful
and coherent picture of the world.51
51 As cited in Pisharodi, Ramohan. 1985. A Behavioral Process
Model of Customer Service Evaluation Based on Supplier-Customer
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In his book, Johnson stated that judgement is not the
same as perception. He differentiates it in the following
manner:
If one perceives the situation clearly enough that
the activity under way may proceed, no
distinguishable act of judgement occurs. But if the
perceptual field is not clear ... choosing one of
the alternatives may be called an act of judgement.
(Johnson 1971, 284).
Johnson (1971, 283) said that perception and feelings are
not directly observed but they may be inferred from
judgements made under controlled conditions. The
experimenter is usually not interested in the response
made in the form of judgements but rather is interested
in the underlying process it communicates.
In the internal control evaluation case, the experimenter
is interested not only in the response being made by both
group of auditors but also the underlying factors that
account for the differences. As Brown (1962) puts it,
... several auditors might judge the effectiveness
of a given system of internal control quite
differently ... This condition develops primarily
from the use of different methods of appraisal, but
can also arise because auditors place different
emphasis on the relative importance of various
factors of internal control.
(Brown 1967, 50)
The relevance of the concept of perception to auditing
arises from the fact that the quality of the internal
control system has to be perceived by the auditor. The
characteristics or features of the internal control
Differences in Perception. Ph.D diss., The University of Tennessee.
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system are communicated to the auditor in the form of
sensory stimuli. These are perceived by the auditor as
attributes of the quality of the internal control system.
Apparently, these perceptions should influence the
auditor's judgement. Perception can be said to be similar
to the "preparation" stage as defined by Johnson.
3.4 AN APPROACH TO THE REPRESENTATION OF JUDGEMENT
The intention of the internal control study is to find
out the response in the form of judgement made by the two
groups of auditors and also the factors that might cause
the differences in judgement. It is interesting to find
out if there are differences between the judgements of
both EAs and IAs as their past experiences and the ideal
type of internal control situation might differ and thus
the judgements that they made might also be different.
Johnson (1971, 294) stated that if one wished to identify
which aspects of the complex stimulus the judge takes
into account, the responses must be tabulated and
compared with the various aspects of the stimulus.
Johnson especially likes the correlational technique for
analyses of this type.
When data on judgement suitable for correlational
analysis can be obtained, the correlation approach
offers a sharper method for evaluating the
contribution of a number of characteristics of the
material of judgement to the final judgement.
(Johnson 1971, 302).
He goes on to say that the ultimate in this type of
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correlational analysis would be multiple regression.
The ideal of this type of analysis ... appears to be
a multiple regression equation, identifying and
weighting all the variables that have significant
effects on the final overall judgement. The
variables must of course be known to the
experimenter and the subjects in order that they can
be correlated with the overall judgement.
(Johnson 1971, 303).
3.5 THE USE OF "LENS MODEL" FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF
JUDGEMENT 
The lens model was developed initially by Brunswik
(1952). It is a way of summarizing correlational
relationships between a decision-maker's response
(judgement or decision), the "outcome" which is
eventually observed (the criterion event) and a set of
cues which are related to both.
According to Biddle (1983, 39), "the lens model gets its
name from the fact that the decision-maker views the
criterion event through a 'lens' made up of cues." The
side of the lens relating the criterion event and the 
cues is referred to as the environment or left side while 
the relationship between the cues and the response form
the decision-maker or the right side. A linear regression
model is often employed on the left side to summarize the
relationship between the cues and the criterion event and
to make event predictions. Similarly, a linear regression
model is used on the right side to summarize a decision-
maker's use of cues and to predict responses as shown in
Figure 3.1.
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Environment Side
	 Cues	 Decision-maker side
Predicted	 I	 Predicted
Event	 Response
..
Ye = ao + a / Ci + a 2C1 +
(linear regression)
..
Ys = bo + b1 C1 + b2C2 +
(linear regression)
. + an Cn
+ b11 CD
Figure 3.1: A Simplified Lens Model
Source: Biddle,Gary,C. 1983 . Decision -Making in
Auditing: Alternative Research Strategies. In Symposium
on Auditing Research 1982:Discussion Papers, 40. Glasgow:
University of Glasgow Press.
In an internal control evaluation setting, the set of
cues becomes the items of information concerning internal
control which he has gathered. The variable Ifs becomes the
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auditor's judgement of the degree of weakness in the
internal control system. Y„ however, maybe interpreted as
the "true" state of internal control system and is
therefore not observable. In order for the relationship
between Ys (judgement) and the various cues to be
estimated, repeated occurrences of judgements and the
various cues must be observed and a laboratory experiment
is the only way to achieve this.
One of the assumptions of the lens model is that the cues
are linearly related to a criterion event or response.
The emphasis of the lens model is on "how well" rather
than "how" a decision is reached.
Ashton (1973, 58)
... it appears that he (Brunswik) intended for
multiple correlation methods to be applied to both
sides of the model.
However, some researchers feel that analysis of variance
(ANOVA) formulation of the lens model is better than the
original multiple regression formulation for some
purposes.
Ashton (1973) states,
Support for the analysis-of-variance model comes
from the fact that it can be used to reveal both
linear and confiqural cue utilisation. The latter is
thought to be one significant type of nonlinear cue
usage. Configurality is revealed by the
"interactions" generated by the analysis-of-variance
computations. 52
(Ashton 1973, 68-69).
52 For a detailed discussion please refer to Ashton (1974, pgs
64-71).
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In this research, the analysis of variance with
covariates (ANCOVA) was used. This was because many of
the previous researches have found conflicting results on
the effect of "educational level, position of auditors in
the firm and experience level" of auditors on the
judgement of auditors (Landry, 1989; Ashton, 1974; Ashton
& Kramer, 1980; Hamilton & Wright, 1977; Hall Yetton &
Zimmer, 1982). Thus, it is seen as a necessity to control
for all these variables (covariates) before examining the
effect of the cues (ICPs) on the judgement of auditors.
Furthermore, Johnson has repeatedly mentioned in his book
that "past knowledge or experiences" and the 'ideal type'
of a similar situation to the one that the judge is
evaluating might influence the judge's judgement.
"Experience" and "educational level" will have an effect
on the 'ideal type' and thus it was thought that it would
be worthwhile to include both these variables in the
study. These three variables are not completely
independent of each other, as usually the higher the
"experience level" and "educational level", the higher
the "position level" of an auditor and the higher the
"experience level" of an auditor the higher the
"educational level" is.
Huitema (1980) states,
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model represents an
integration of analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the
analysis of regression model.
(Huitema 1980, 13)
Basic advantages of ANCOVA over ANOVA is that it has
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generally greater power and reduction in bias caused by
differences between groups that exist before experimental
treatments are administered.
Mead (1990) states that,
The object of the experiment is to compare the
experimental treatments as precisely as possible.
The precision of comparison is determined primarily
by the background variation, represented by the
variance, a2 , of the error term, i. If some of the
error variation can be related to variation in the
additional variables, measured on each experimental
unit, then the effective background variance, &will
be reduced and treatment comparisons, which may
require adjustment to allow for uneven patterns of
values of the additional variables, can be made more
precise.
(Mead 1990, 247)
...the main purpose in introducing the covariates is
to improve the precision of estimation of treatment
parameters.
(Mead 1990, 250-251)
Amongst the important assumptions of analysis of
covariance are that: (a) each group's values should be
drawn from a normally distributed universe; (b) each of
the two groups must be drawn from populations of equal
variances; (c) the two groups are randomly selected from
some defined population; (d) they are randomly and
independently assigned to the treatment groups;
(e) response Y (judgement) is linearly related to the
covariates and (f) the slope of the straight-line
relationship is assumed to be the same for all
treatments."
53 For detailed discussion of the assumptions, please refer to
Huitema, Bradley, E. 1980. The Analysis of Covariance and
Alternatives. John Wiley & Sons, pgs 98-122.
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Ott (1977) explains the difference between analysis of
variance and covariance in the following manner:
Now in addition to measuring the response variable
on each experimental unit, we measure a second
variable x, often called a covariable, or a
covariate.
(Ott 1977, 611).
His comments when there were two or more covariates are
as follows,
Including more than one covariate in the model
merely means that we have more than one quantitative
independent variable in our model. For example, we
might wish to compare the social status y of several
different occupational groups while incorporating
information on the number of years x/ of formal
education beyond high school and the income level x2
of each individual in a group ... Thus we might have
a response related to two covariates (x1 and x2 ) and
t=3 treatments ...
(Ott 1977, 618-619).
Basic advantages of analysis of covariance (analysis of
variance with covariates) over analysis-of-variance is
that it has generally greater power and there is a
reduction in bias caused by differences between groups
that exist before experimental treatments are
administered.
Landry (1989) has suggested the use of this approach as
an extension to his study which compares the judgements
of internal and external EDP audit experts on an EDP
internal control system.
A possible extension of this study would be to use
analysis of covariance procedures in the
methodology. This procedure could answer the
question of what causes the differences in consensus
between external and internal auditors.
(Landry 1989, 119).
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In this thesis, the analysis was done by means of ANOVA
with covariates using SPSS (Statistical Package for
Social Scientists); covariates being "experience",
"educational" and "position level". The other treatments
or independent variables were the 8 ICPs.
3.6 JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS AND CONSISTENCY
There are difficulties in assessing the validity of
auditor's judgement. One of these is the absence of
suitable criteria by which to distinguish correct from
incorrect judgements. Because strict guidelines for
evaluation do not exist, there are no clearcut "right"
judgements available with which to compare individual
professional judgements in most audit tasks. This is one
of the reasons why only the "right side" of the Brunswik
model as shown in Figure 3.1 could be experimented on and
it is also the justification for using an experimental
design.
"Consensus" is usually used as a surrogate for correct
judgement, as is evidenced by the following statements.
Joyce (1976) has stated that "if there exists a common
core of knowledge that is important to auditing, and if
the education, certification, and training process
auditors undergo are successful in imparting that
knowledge, one would expect to find agreement among the
judgement of different auditors in the same audit
situation." She also stated that a lack of consensus may
184
result in excessive audit costs. Thus, it is valid to say
that consensus (that is the degree to which the auditors
concur in their professional judgements) should be used
as a criterion for evaluating these judgements.
The importance of the use of "consensus" as a criterion
for evaluating judgements is also evidenced by statements
such as:
The standard of care which the auditor owes to the
client is that degree of care which would ordinarily
be exercised by other members of the profession in
similar circumstances.
(Willingham and Carmichael 1971, 19).
He (the "prudent man") must exercise as sound
judgement as would another possessed of the same
extent of information available to him at the time.
(Mautz and Sharaf 1961, 132).
In the best of all possible worlds, every auditor,
given the same set of facts, would select the same
auditing procedures and apply them to the same
extent.
(Hicks 1964, 39).
Einhorn (1974) argues that convergent validity (consensus
among experts) is one of several necessary conditions
(although not sufficient on its own) for evidencing the
existence of professional expertise. He goes on to say
that "judgement consistency" is important because it is
positively related in the long-run to "judgement
accuracy", and because "judgement consistency" is
considered a necessary condition for expertise.
If professional people have a high degree of "judgement
consistency", it also facilitates the development of the
profession's approach, as developments are made from the
basis of a common ground.
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In this thesis both "judgement consensus" and "judgement
consistency" were investigated together with "judgement
insight".
"Judgement insight" is how well an auditor is aware of
his own judgement formation processes. In this thesis,
"insight" refers to the extent of agreement between the
auditor's allocation of points in relative importance to
the 8 ICPs and the relative importance of the 8 ICPs as
obtained from the judgement model.
As there is no correct answer for whether the internal
control situation is good or bad, "judgement consensus"
is sometimes equated to "judgement accuracy".
Ashton (1985) has conducted a research and found that
there is a highly positive relationship between
"consensus" and "accuracy".
3.7 SCOPE OF THESIS
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, the scope of this
thesis is as follows:
1) to investigate:
(a) "judgement consistency", or the agreement over
time between the judgements of the same auditor
using the same data and
(b) "judgement consensus", or the degree of
agreement between the judgements of different
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auditors using the same data at the same point
in time,
2) to determine similarity in ratings using different
approaches of internal control evaluation, that is by
using ICQ, CO and CR approach.
3) to determine the judgement model of EAs and IAs by
means of analysis of variance with covariates. The
judgement model consists of eleven treatment
variables which comprise of three covariates (being
experience level, educational level and position
level of auditors) and the 8 ICPs. A judgement model
was produced for each group of EA and IA as compared
to previous research which produced multiple models
for each participating auditor. The current analysis
of covariance is not "orthogonal"" (because of the
presence of covariates), eventhough the experimental
design is from Kempthorne's h replicate of 28
design."
Mead (1990, 251) states,
Whether or not the block and treatment effects
54 For a detailed discussion of "orthogonal", please refer to
Cochran, W. G and G.M. Cox. 1968. Experimental Designs , 2nd ed. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., page 63.
55 Thus statistical analysis such as "omega-squared" used by
Ashton (1973) and his followers was not able to be used. Ashton used
the "omega-squared" statistic to calculate the proportion of variance
in judgement that is explained by each main effect and two factor
interactions.
In this thesis, priority of importance of each variable in explaining
the ratings given by the auditors was based on the "significance
level" as shown by the "f ratio". The more significant the level is,
the more important the variable is presumed to be.
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were orthogonal in the original design model,
it will usually not be true that they are
orthogonal after adjustments for the effect of
covariates.
Due to this, explanation tends to be more descriptive in
nature because for statistical calculations such as
omega-squared (which could be used to calculate the size
of effect of cues as widely used in previous research)
it would require a balanced or "orthogonal design".
4) to investigate the effects of the following factors on
judgement consensus and consistency:
(a) experience, professional qualifications and
position level in the organisation and
(b) independence of IAs and size of firms
5) to investigate other factors such as:
(a) whether EAs have any preference of "accounting
controls" over "administrative controls" and
vice-versa
(b) whether the auditors would rate the "accounting
controls" more able to achieve "completeness,
existence and valuation" control objectives
as compared to the other two objectives ("rights
and obligations" and "presentation and
disclosure" objectives)
(c) whether "judgement insight", which is the extent
of agreement between the auditor's subjective
(i.e self-reported) description of his or her
judgement process and an objective description
derived from mathematical or statistical
techniques differs between EAs and 1As.
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Although Ashton (1974, 246) has recommended that in
future experiments, "the characterization of the internal
control subsystem in terms of a questionnaire" should not
be modified but research done later than that has found
otherwise.
Bailey (1981, 117) found that several subjects in his
study do not make use of the questionnaire approach for
internal control evaluation. Instead, the subjects
recommended an approach which identifies specific control
objectives and appropriate controls to achieve those
objectives. This is similar to the "CO" approach
discussed in Chapter 2.
Thus in this thesis, besides the "ICO" approach, the
auditors were also asked to evaluate the internal control
system by means of a "CO" and "CR" approach. The auditors
were asked to make their judgements on a "visual analog
scale" with "extremely strong" and "extremely weak" on
either side of a line, unlike in previous research which
used "likert scale". The difference in the scale used
was that the "visual analog scale" was a continuous/
interval measurement whereas the "likert scale" was an
ordinal measurement. As the auditors' judgement model
were designed according to Kempthorne's 34 replicate of 28
design using ANOVA, it thus requires a "continuous"
measurement. According to Schneider (1984) studies have
used data which is not well suited for ANOVA. His
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comments were for the studies made on the evaluation of
internal audit strength by EAs but it can be applied to
the studies on internal control evaluation as well.
All of these studies used ANOVA which may not have
been appropriate for the data collected. Each
required auditors to make judgements about a
qualitative attribute (e.g., IA's competence, IA's
reliability) by using a four-point or a seven-point
numerical rating scale. These judgements were
interpreted as having interval scale properties,
with ratings unique up to linear transformations.
That is, the auditors' assignments of numerical
values to the internal audit profiles were
interpreted such that equal distances between the
numbers assigned represented equal differences in
the strength of internal auditing, as represented by
the profiles. This interval scale assumption raises
two questions of internal validity. First, the
descriptive phrases (e.g., "mostly reliable") may
have different meanings for different auditors; and
second, any given auditor may not perceive the
intervals as being equally distant in terms of
internal audit strength.
(Schneider 1984, 659).
However, Andersen (1961, 310) disagrees with this and
supported the use of ANOVA with "likert scale". Further
discussion regarding this matter will be made in chapter
5, section 5.11.3.1 and chapter 6, section 6.4 .
3.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has described the three stages of judgement
and how judgement is related to perception. However,
according to Allen Newell (1968), one of the foremost
contributors to the study of human problem solving,
"Judgement", is an umbrella term, like "perception",
"thinking", "learning" and "cognition". Its purpose,
like that of the others is to designate a class of
phenomena well enough so that one knows where to
start in the development and evaluation of
scientific theory. It is a mistake to believe it can
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(or should) be a technical term or precisely
defined.
(Newell 1968, 1)
However, an attempt is made in this chapter to define
judgement in the context of internal control evaluation.
Most of the definitions are based on Johnson's (1971).
Influences on judgement such as the nature of judgement
tasks, one's past experiences and one's comparison to the
ideal type were also mentioned.
This chapter also described the Brunswik's Lens Model as
an approach by which to study human judgement. The
extension of that model makes use of factorial designs
and analysis of variance. The chapter concluded with the
scope of the thesis or the main issues that are going to
be investigated in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to explore the
importance of those variables introduced in Chapter 2 and
to examine critically the research methodology used in
previous research into internal control evaluation. The
variables examined in previous research, the approaches
to statistical analysis and the findings of previous
research are noted and compared with the present study.
Chapter 6, Table 6.40 gives a summary of the findings of
the current study as compared to previous studies.
4.2 SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROLS 
The auditor's obligations in the evaluation of internal
control strengths and weaknesses and in subsequent
planning of audit evidence collection are described in
professional standards (APC 1980b, Auditing Guideline
3.204, T12).
According to Felix and Niles (1988),
From the perspective of an auditor forming an
opinion on financial statements ... the auditor's
essential internal control related activities are:
1. to learn and document components of the internal
controls that could affect reported financial
information
2. to evaluate the apparent quality of the internal
controls to assist in planning audit evidence
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collection, and
3. to re-evaluate the internal controls as a part of
error assessment decisions up to and including
the final opinion and reporting decisions.
(Felix and Niles 1988, 43)
While the extent of internal control related audit
activities varies across engagements, this classification
captures their basic nature.
Much auditing research on internal control is a part of
behavioural research on human decision processes
(Carmichael, 1970) as it involves a combination of
complex qualitative and quantitative judgements.
Three primary research methodologies have been used in
studies of audit decision-making - the lens model,
probabilistic judgement and predecisional behaviour.
Biddle (1982) states,
The difference in perspectives between the lens
model and probabilistic judgement methodologies
relates primarily to their levels of abstraction.
The lens model methodology examines relationships
between decisions (or judgements), a set of factors
(cues) which are assumed to affect decisions, and
observable outcomes which are the objects of the
decisions and which are related to cues.
Probabilistic judgement focuses more narrowly on the
sequence of steps by which decisions are made and
the probabilistic nature of many real-world
judgements.
The predecisional behaviour methodology examines the
influence of contextual variables on the way in
which a decision-maker structures a task and how
this may affect the resulting decision. Thus,
characteristics of the decision setting are viewed
as possible determinants of decision-making
behaviour.
(Biddle 1982, 38-39)
Examples of probabilistic judgement research are Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), Joyce and Biddle (1981). Joyce and
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Biddle deals specifically with biases associated with the
representativeness heuristics.
Pre-decisional behaviour research can be said to be in
the early stages compared with the other two. An example
of it is Biggs and Mock (1980) which employed verbal
protocols to explore the process by which auditors make
auditing sample selections.
Since the current study follows the "lens model"
approach, discussion here is limited to that approach.
Studies by Ashton (1974) 56
 and Joyce (1976) are
illustrations of the "lens model" approach, which may be
referred to as "policy capturing" models rather than
models which explore the "cognitive processes" of
auditors.
In short, the lens model approach looks at the judgement
(response) of a subject and tries to relate the
judgement to the factors (cues) that are important in
contributing to that response rather than to the
cognitive processes that are involved in getting that
response. It makes use of analysis of variance (ANOVA)
based on an experimental design.
56 Ashton completed his Ph.D in 1973 and published a paper
regarding the findings of his thesis in 1974. Thus, Ashton 1973 and
1974 refers to the same subject matter.
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In this thesis, the lens model approach is used as it is
an exploratory study with the objective of examining
whether the judgements of IAs and EAs differ given the
same internal control situation that they have to
evaluate. The majority of past research discussed in
this chapter was also of this type.
4.3 PRIOR RESEARCH INTO INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION
During the past three decades, attempts to systematize
the formulation of judgements about internal control have
appeared in the literature. They were at their peak
during the 1970s, initially with Ashton. 	 Much other
research was done following his research. These studies
focussed on certain "segments" of the internal control
system. These "segments" have been referred to as
"subsystems" (Ackoff, 1961) or "cycles" (Arens and
Loebbecke, 1991). The studies involved experimental
tasks based on case studies described in narrative form
or in ICC' form.
Earlier research on internal control evaluation had
established that there are difficulties in assessing the
validity of an auditor's judgement (Ashton, 1974;
Hamilton and Wright, 1977 and Ashton and Brown, 1980).
One of these is the absence of suitable criteria by which
to distinguish correct from incorrect judgements. Because
strict guidelines for evaluation do not exist, there are
no clear-cut "right" judgements available against which
to compare most individual professional audit judgements.
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Much of past research on evaluation involved asking the
auditor or student subjects to respond to varying
internal control case situations. Usually a selected set
of internal controls was used in a laboratory setting to
attempt to identify the controls that seemed to cause
important differences in auditor behaviour.
Most studies in this area replicated or extended the work
of Ashton (1973) with the purpose of testing the
"generalisability" of the Ashton study. or of confirming
Ashton 's findings.
4.4 CATEGORIES OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In this thesis, prior research on internal control
evaluation by auditors is classified into a number of
categories to ease discussion (Figure 4.1):
(a) research involving individual judgements
(b) research involving group judgements
(c) research comparing EAs' and IAs' judgements
(d) other relevant research in accounting
(e) other relevant research not in accounting
(f) research on reliance of IAs by EAs
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Figure 4.1: Categories of prior research
4.4.1 Research involving individual iudgements in the
area of internal control evaluation
Ashton (1974) was the first to research internal control
evaluation using an experimental design and an ANOVA
analysis in the modelling of judgements. He asked
sixty-three auditors from four different public
accounting firms to evaluate the quality of a
hypothetical firm's payroll internal control subsystem.
The subjects were employed by four public accounting
firms in the Minneapolis/ St. Paul area of the United
States. The four firms consisted of two large national
firms, a regional firm, and a local firm. A large 
majority of the auditors had two or three years' 
experience. The experiment was conducted by visiting the
public accounting firms and meeting with the auditors in
small groups. The subjects were given a brief oral
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introduction to the judgement task and were presented
with the case materials. The subjects were selected
"primarily on the basis of availability".
The average time spent completing the questionnaire was
30 to 40 minutes. The second stage of the experiment,
which was necessary in order to assess consistency of
judgement over time, was conducted in the same manner as
the first. On the second, later stage of the experiment
(two weeks after the administration of the first
questionnaire), the subjects again worked on the same
task for 30-40 minutes. Their judgements were made on a
six-point scale from one (1) extremely weak to (6)
adequate to strong. Ashton systematically manipulated the
patterns of answers (either "Yes" or "No" for each
internal control question) through a 1/2 fractional
replication of a 2 6 analysis of variance design. Each of
the six internal control questions was treated as a
factor. Thus, each subject made judgements with regard to
each of 32 different stimulus combinations. Among the
findings reported by Ashton were a moderately high degree
of consensus (agreement among the subjects given the same
stimulus combinations) and a high degree of -judgement 
stability (agreement between a given subject's judgement
at one point in time and his judgement at a later point
in time given the same stimulus combination). Ashton also
reported that, on average, agreement among subjects'
within firms was the same as agreement among subjects'
between firms.
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Two types of consistency were evaluated:
(a) "consensus", or consistency across auditors at the
same point in time: consensus was evaluated by
correlating the ratings (judgements) given to the 32
cases by all pairs of auditors.
(b) "stability" or "consistency" over time for the same
auditor using the same data: stability was evaluated
by correlating the judgement ratings of each auditor
at the first stage with his or her own ratings from
the second stage. For the purpose of constructing
descriptive models of judgement, F ratios were
computed for the 6 main effects and fifteen 2 factor
interactions from the data of each auditor. Then w2
(omega squared) was computed for each main effect
and 2 factor interaction. W2 measured the extent to
which each auditor utilized each of the 6 ICQs (and
their interactions) in formulating internal control
judgements.
In summary, Ashton's research objective was to determine
the degree to which the auditors were consistent in their
internal control quality evaluations. He found the
responses of the individual auditors to be highly
consistent over time and consistent with other auditors.
2 separation of duties controls were the most important
design factors in the overall evaluation. The effect of
the audit firm which employed the auditor and the
experience of the auditors were reported as being
statistically insignificant.
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For "judgement consensus", the average correlation
between the ratings of all pairs of auditors on the
thirty-two cases was approximately .70. On the average,
•
an auditor agreed with members of other firms (or
experience levels) as much as the auditor agreed with
members of his/ her own firm (or experience level).
For "judgement stability", the average correlation was
.81. The coefficients differed very little across firms
or experience levels. In general, stability was greater
than consensus - indicating greater agreement between an
individual's judgement at two points in time than between
different individuals' judgement at the same point in
time.
Ashton constructed a descriptive analysis of variance
model for each auditor to obtain further information
about judgement consistency. Ashton (1974) states,
On the average, the total of the omega-squared
values for the six main effects was just over 80
percent (the range was 48% to 96%). For the fifteen
interactions, this total was 6.4% (the range was
zero to 17%). The latter indicates that the auditors
did not look for patterns of answers to the six
questions. Instead, they evaluated the effect of
each question independently of the effects of the
other questions in the same case. At least five of
the six main effects were significant (at the 0.05
level) for two-thirds of the auditors, while the
number of interactions reaching significance was
generally zero or one.
(Ashton 1974, 152)
In order to investigate the degree of insight that an
auditor has into his or her own judgement process, each
auditor was asked to allocate 100 points to the six
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internal control factors so as to indicate the relative
importance of each factor in his or her judgements. The
auditor was asked to do this after he or she had rated
the 32 cases. This represented the subjective weights.
"Calculated weights" for the 6 factors were then obtained
by norming all the omega squared indices to add to 100
for the main effects alone, that is an "adjusted omega
squared statistic" was derived for each main effect for
each person by adding to the main effect, omega-squared
all the interaction omega squares which included that
main effect; the "adjusted omega-squared" values for the
6 main effects were summed; then each adjusted omega-
squared value was divided by this sum.
An "insight index" was computed for each auditor by
correlating his or her subjective weights with his or her
calculated weights over the 6 factors.
In this thesis, judgement insight for each group of EA
and IA (but not for individual auditors) was calculated.
Thus the relationship of judgement insight to the seven
variables (as will be discussed in Chapter 5, that is
experience level, educational level, position level, firm
size, independence level, types of independence and types
of organisational level) cannot be determined. This
thesis will only consider the relationship of judgement
insight to the seven variables and compare it with
previous studies.
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Judgement insight was found to decrease with increasing
experience. Ashton argued that this might have been due
to the fact that the less experienced auditors have
formed some "rules of thumb" to help them form their
decisions. For example, the "separation of duties" cues
were always emphasised in the auditing literature to be
quite significant in strengthening the internal control
system of a client company, whereas the more experienced
auditors might not have judged the cues to be equally
important, as it could be that from experience the
auditor has gathered that even with the absence of those
cues, other compensating controls, if present, would be
equally helpful in determining the strength of internal
control. A different interpretation from Ashton's of
this finding would be that the further removed an auditor
was from the date of qualification, the more out of touch
was that auditor likely to be with the reality of control
- at least in a system such as payroll.
Hamilton and Wright (1977) replicated Ashton's study and
extended it by considering explicitly the relationship
between years of experience and judgement consensus, the
stability of judgements, the relative weighting
(importance) of and the degree of self-insight into the
relative weighting of internal control indicators.
Relative to prior studies, they included a much broader
range of experience levels (0 to 28 years) and a larger
percentage of relatively experienced auditors (45% with
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more than 3 years of experience) and thus provided the
first opportunity to investigate the generalisability of
previous results to more experienced auditors. The
subjects were 17 practising auditors in Minneapolis/ St.
Paul in the United States consisting of 5 CPA firms, 2
Big Eight and 3 multi office non Big Eight.
A large student sample was also obtained from 2 groups of
auditing students enrolled in the introductory auditing
course at the University of Minnesota. The experiment was
administered after the topic of internal control
questionnaires had been discussed in class.
The participants were divided into 3 experience
categories; a) no experience (represented by the
students), b) less than or equal to 3 years
(inexperienced auditors) for comparability with Ashton's
results and c) more than 3 years experience (experienced
auditors) which were both represented by the auditors.
Hamilton and Wright omitted 2 of the original six
questions and divided the 2 separation of duties
questions into 3 questions in order to "isolate a more
detailed classification of separation of duties".
In this thesis, three experience categories were also
investigated although the definitions of the three
categories vary; a) inexperienced refers to auditors with
0 to 3 years of auditing experience; b) moderately
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experienced refers to auditors with 3 to 6 years of
auditing experience and c) very experienced refers to
auditors with more than 6 years of auditing experience.
Justification for the three categories is as discussed in
Chapter 5, Section 5.8.
Hamilton and Wright presented their subjects with all 32
combinations of the "Yes and "No" answers to these 5
questions. The auditing subjects were members of
professional staffs from 5 firms, each of whom received
the materials from a contact person from his /her own
firm (either a partner, audit manager, or training
managers).
Each contact person was further instructed to choose at
random subjects to participate in the research, excepting
only that about half should have had up to 3 years audit
experience and half over 3 years audit experience. If a
subject was unavailable because of a vacation or out-of-
town clients, a replacement was chosen. A second request
was made by the contact person to the subjects who failed
to return the materials by the end of 2 weeks.
In terms of subject selection, this research study was
more impartial than had been Ashton' s. The sample
selection for the research which is the subject of this
thesis corresponded more closely to Ashton' s. 	 In
essence, the subjects where those who were available
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rather than a group which was randomly selected and then
persuaded into completing the research instrument. This
sample selection was for pragmatic reasons. The research
which is the subject of this thesis required sixty four
matched pairs of IAs and EAs (that is, 128 auditors
determined by means of Kempthorne's 1/4 replicate of 28
design) as well as a few additional ones to complete a
research instrument which typically took between one and
a half hours and four hours to do so in each case. The
chances of finding so many respondents at random to
complete this work were regarded as unrealistic. In
addition, the requirement to work with matched pairs of
IAs and EAs would have meant that entirely random
selection would have required a much larger total number
of subjects to complete the research instrument in order
to arrive at 64 matched pairs. So many completed
questionnaires would have had to be discarded. It is
very improbable that selection of respondents by those
initially approached within the firm of public
accountants or within the internal audit department will
have biased the data collected over such a large sample,
addressing so many issues and where availability for
selection was in part dictated by correspondence to
conforming to the matched pairing requirements.
In Hamilton and Wright's research, of the 105 packets
handed out, 73 were returned by the end of two weeks. The
average reported completion time for the 32 cases was
about 30 minutes.
205
Each subject's degree of consensus over the 32 cases was
measured by the "average product-moment correlation" for
a subject's judgements and the judgements for all other
subjects within the subject's experience category.
As can be seen from Ashton's and Hamilton and Wright's
studies, the auditors were asked to answer 32 cases in
order to ascertain the judgement model of each individual
auditor. This thesis requires each auditor (both EAs and
IAs) to answer 8 cases" as it was thought to be just the
right number before the auditors will get bored. However,
the effect of having each auditor answering 8 cases only,
was that the judgement model for each individual auditor
cannot be determined but only the judgement model for
each group of EA and IA was able to be determined. Since
the objective of the thesis is to determine whether there
are any differences between the two groups of auditors,
it was thought to be appropriate.
Consistent with Ashton's work, it was found that there 
was a negative association between years of experience
and consensus (-.20) using Spearmen correlation. The
amount of experience accumulated by auditors was also
unrelated to judgement stability, but there was a
positive association between self-insight and experience.
57 The auditors were also required to answer two more questions
besides the eight cases.
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This could be due to the wider range of experience and
relatively larger percentage of auditors with more than
three years of experience. Furthermore, "inexperienced"
in Ashton's research referred to auditors who were
already working in the audit firm but in Hamilton and
Wright's study, they referred to "auditing students". It
could thus suggest that whilst "inexperienced" auditors
in Ashton's study had formed rules of thumbs about what
to look for in a good internal control system,
"inexperienced" auditors in Hamilton and Wright might not
have really understood or not aware of what constitutes
a good internal control system.
Ashton and Brown (1980) extended Ashton's study by
including 2 additional internal control questions and
five times as many hypothetical cases. They also
presented the internal control questions in different
order. A 1/2 replicate of 2 8 design was used which enabled
all 28, two-cue interactions and all 56, three-cue
interactions to be evaluated.
The subjects were thirty-one practising auditors from the
Chicago, Dallas, Houston and San Antonio offices of "Big
Eight" accounting firms. Like those of the original study
(Ashton, 1974), virtually all (29) of these subjects had
between one and three years of auditing experience. On
average, there was a greater spread of experience than
Ashton but lesser spread than Hamilton and Wright.
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50 packets of materials were mailed to EAs who had been
recruited through personal contacts by one of their
associates. The packets contained a general description
of the hypothetical company, the 128 cases resulting from
a 1/2 replication of 2 8
 factorial design, and 32 repeat
cases included for the purpose of assessing the stability
(test-retest reliability) of judgements. Subjects had to
evaluate 160 cases consisting of 128 principal cases and
32 repeat cases. The cases were arranged in random order
and the same case order was used for all subjects. The
repeats were always cases 129 through 160.
The findings suggest that interactions were quite
unimportant in terms of explaining variance in auditors'
judgements. The 2 original separation of duties cues
explained much more judgement variance than did any one
of the other cues. The mean w 2 values for the third
separation of duties cue (new one) was only 4.3%, which
was virtually identical to the average of the mean w2
values for the remaining 5 cues (4.2%).
The mean total w 2 for the 3 separation of duties cues in
the current study (50.9%) was very near the mean w 2 for
the 2 separation of duties cues in the Ashton's study
(51.4%). The two cue orders used in this study did not
result in difference in importance of the 2 original
separation of duties cues.
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In this thesis, out of 8 internal control procedures
(ICPs) or cues, there were 2 "separation of duties" cues.
In addition, the 8 ICPs were divided equally into
"administrative" and "accounting" controls of which both
the 2 separation of duties cues formed part of the
"administrative" controls. The 8 ICPs were then placed in
three different orders at random. The rationale of doing
this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Correlational statistics were used to assess insight,
stability and consensus as in Ashton (1974). Values for
judgement insight were high with a mean of 0.86 and
values for judgement stability assessed by 32 repeat
cases were also high, with each value being approximately
.10 above those found by Ashton (1974). The results
showed that experience differences in the 1 to 3 years
category were not significant. Neither the addition of a
third separation of duties cue in the current study, nor
the decomposition of the 2 original cues into 3 simpler
cues in the Hamilton and Wright (1977), significantly
affected the proportion of judgement variance explained
by the separation of duties.
Thus, although it may be feasible to present subjects
with more complex experimental tasks (for example, to
include a greater number of cues and/or cases), it
appears to be unnecessary to do so. The results also
showed a significant association for years of experience
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and self insight as had been found by Hamilton and Wright
(1977) but unlike Ashton' earlier study (1974).
Reckers and Taylor (1979) believed that part of the high
consistency of the auditors in Ashton's (1974) study
resulted from the fact that only six questions had been
used. They therefore used 36 questions from an audit
firm's questionnaire but used only 5 cases per auditor.
They argued that the questionnaire that they used was
more representative of the ones used by CPA firms.The
cases required an hour or more to answer and they were
mailed to the subjects. The subjects consisted of 30
auditors from 6 offices of four of the "Big Eight" and
one of the "near Big Eight" firms working in Washington
D.C., or Baltimore, Maryland with 71/2 years average
experience. The subjects were "not randomly selected";
instead, officials of the six firms were selected because
of their willingness to cooperate and the officials were
asked to distribute the case materials to personnel of
all ranks - a selection method which corresponded closely
with that used in the research which is the subject of
this thesis. The subjects returned the case materials to
the researchers directly by mail - again similar to this
research.
Reckers and Taylor (1979) were concerned with the level
of consensus among the reliability ratings made by their
thirty auditor-subjects. Consensus was evaluated by
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correlating the ratings given to the five cases by all
pairs of auditors. The subjects were asked to evaluate
internal control on a reliability rating scale of 0-100%
which is an "interval" scale. This is the first time that
an "interval" (continuous) rather than an "ordinal"
(Likert) scale was used. As discussed in Chapter 6, ANOVA
which is the technique used to determine the judgement
model of the auditor works best with an "interval" rather
than an "ordinal" scale.
The mean of these correlations across the thirty auditors
was 0.1554, the mean for the fifteen auditors with less
- (more) than the median amount of experience (i.e 71/2
years) was 0.135 (.357). The fact that "none of the five
cases represented extreme conditions" tended to bias the
mean correlation downward. This number was considerably
smaller than that found in any of the prior work.
The experience-related differences in consensus reported
by Reckers and Taylor must be interpreted very cautiously
until they are substantiated with a larger group of
subjects. This is because Ashton conducted a statistical
test on the Reckers and Taylor data to determine if the
difference between the mean consensus index of the more
experienced auditors and the less experienced auditors
was statistically significant. He found that it was not
significant even at the relatively liberal c>c level of
0.10 used by Reckers and Taylor .
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In this thesis, the relationship between the variables
examined were tested for significance using either one-
way ANOVA or t-test. The variables were then examined
using pearson correlation to examine their relationship
to judgement consensus and judgement consistency.
Ashton and Kramer (1980) repeated the original study with
a group of 30 auditing students. The results indicated
that the internal control questions used explained a
smaller amount of variance (65.6%) in the students'
judgements than in those of auditors, that the average
values of both consensus and insight were lower for the
students than for the auditors, and that this could be
traced to the fact that the 2 separation of duties
questions were less important for the students. On
average, these two questions accounted for only 36.9% of
the variance in the students' judgements.
When the data from each subject were analysed via
analysis of variance, the results showed a "high
incidence of significant main effects" but very "low
significant interactions". This indicates that the
students' responses varied systematically with the
answers to particular questions rather than to patterns
of answers. There was a great deal of similarity in the
overall cue utilization patterns of the two subject
groups.
The two groups (auditing students and auditors) viewed
questions 1 and 2 (separation of duties questions) as
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more important than any other questions for both subject
groups. The results indicated that the internal control
questions used explained a smaller amount of variance
(65.6%) in the students' judgements then in those of the
auditors'. In addition, the average values of both
consensus (0.66) and insight (0.77) were lower for the
students than for the auditors.
Joyce (1976) examined the judgement process between
preliminary data collection and audit program planning.
As in Ashton's study, the independent variables were
dichotomously scaled and manipulated in an orthogonal
analysis of variance design. The research studied a
different	 internal	 control	 sub-system	 (accounts
receivable vs. payroll) and a different type of
hypothetical firm (tyre wholesaler vs. air conditioning
equipment manufacturer). It used practising auditors from
public accounting firms as subjects and applied
correlational studies to assess consensus and analysis of
variance so as to model individual subjects' decision
behaviour. Thirty-five practising auditors from four
large, national public accounting firms served as
subjects. Thirty-two worked in the Chicago offices of
their respective firms and three worked in firm offices
in Midwestern cities near Chicago. As with the research
which is the subject of this thesis, subjects were "not
selected at random" from each of the 4 firms as random
selection was not feasible since the experiments were to
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be carried out during the busy season for public
accounting firms and the participation of randomly
selected subjects could not be assured due to scheduling
problems. Nevertheless, as with our research, there is
no reason to believe that the lack of random selection
would have led to a biased sample participating in the
research.
Subjects were secured by contacting partners in each of
the firms, explaining the nature of the proposed
research, and requesting cooperation in the form of ten
to fifteen auditors to perform the experiment. The
selection of the subjects within each firm was made
internally on the "basis of availability", as with the
research which is the subject of this thesis. The only
restriction placed on participants was that each subject
should have had experience in audit programme planning
for accounts receivable. In the research of this thesis
it is similarly likely that respondents (whether IAs or
EAs) would not have been unfamiliar with payrolls systems
- the internal control subject chosen.
Two experiments were conducted. Experiment I was a 1/2
replication of 2 factorial design and was performed by
subjects from firms 1 and 2. Experiment 2 was a complete
replication of a 2 5
 factorial.
In experiment 1, subjects were required to make twenty
judgements including four replicates. In experiment 2,
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subjects were required to make thirty-six judgements,
four of which were replicated in order to assess test-
retest reliability. The research written up in this
thesis similarly made use of replicate testing to test
for judgement consistency.
Joyce's results showed a Pearson product moment
correlation (.373) lower than Ashton (.70). Each
subject's judgements on the original 4 stimulus
combinations were correlated with his or her judgements
on the duplicates in order to assess test-retest
reliability. This was perhaps due to the study on a
different internal control subsystem, that is accounts
receivable as compared to payroll. The task given to the
auditors were also different. Instead of requiring
auditors to evaluate the quality of the internal control
system directly, the auditors were asked to determine the
budgeted hours that would be assigned to the various
cases which would probably reflect an implicit internal
control quality evaluation. However, Joyce did not take
into account the fact that budgeted hours could also
reflect different audit tecnologies and approaches used
by the different firms of the respondents and the
difference in the use of substantive tests.
Gaumnitz et al (1982) combined tasks from both Ashton and
Joyce. They found results consistent with Ashton for the
internal control judgements but found consensus to be
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higher than did Joyce for the audit planning task.
Gaumnitz et al. suggested that the requirement to provide
an explicit judgement on the strength of internal control
enabled their subjects to operationalize the inverse
relationship, which resulted in a higher correlation as
compared with Joyce's results.
Kaplan (1985) found no difference in the level of
consensus between the subjects who made evaluations of
internal control strength prior to their audit planning
judgements and the subjects who made only audit-planning
judgements as suggested by Gaumnitz et al. (1982). In
addition, Kaplan found that his average correlation for
audit hours was higher than that reported by Joyce (1976)
but lower than reported by Gaumnitz et al. He also
explored the effect of environmental stability on planned
audit hours combined with both implicit and explicit
evaluations of an internal control system. He found that
the stability interacted with the strength of controls,
and that auditors did distinguish between control
strength in different environments.
Eggleton and Choo (1983) used different sub-control
systems. The objective of their study was to assess the
systematic effects of auditors' cognitive structures on
their judgements. Instead of requiring auditors to
evaluate a series of cases from one sub-system, as had
been the usual practice in audit judgement experiments,
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the auditors were required to assess the strength of
internal control of 16 sets of cases. Each set comprised
one case drawn at random from a 1/2 replicate of 2 fixed
effects ANOVA design (with repeated measure on all
factors) for each of five accounting subsystems: namely,
accounts receivable, payroll, investments, inventories
and cash disbursements. Each auditor evaluated the same
16 sets of cases, with cases within sets always appearing
in the aforementioned order.
However, the order of presentation of the sets of cases
was independently randomized for each auditor. The
format of cases was similar to that used in other
comparable audit judgement experiments. Each case
comprised five internal control features which were
declared to be present (yes) or absent (no). The auditors
were asked to record their evaluations (from "extremely
weak" [1] to "adequate" [61) by circling the appropriate
number. A separate response booklet comprising 16 pages,
one for each set of cases, was provided.
In this thesis, the presentation of the 64 sets of cases
was also randomized for each pair of auditors (EAs and
IAs). In addition, this study also randomize the ICPs in
the 64 sets of cases. One difference is that while they
used a "likert" scale, this study used an "interval"
scale.
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Sixty male auditors working in a large New Zealand city
participated in the experiment. The mean (median) length
of auditing experience was 6.2 (4.0) years.
It was found that the level of judgement consistency
observed for the accounts receivable sub-system was
significantly higher than reported by Joyce (1976), but
that for payroll it was significantly lower than reported
by Ashton (1974). The reason that it was higher than
Joyce's could be because the respondents were asked to
rate the quality of internal control instead of assigning
budgeted hours as an indication of the quality of
internal control. Comparisons with other audit judgement
studies regarding levels of consensus however revealed
similarities (Ashton, 1974; Gaumnitz et al., 1982;
Hamilton and Wright, 1982). Correlations between
consensus and consistency were positive and highly
significant for all subsystems and confirmed those
reported by Trotman, Yetton and Zimmer (1983). The
absence of systematic associations between auditors'
experience and both their level of cognitive complexity
and related judgement attributes was consistent with most
studies of audit judgements which have reported no
significant correlations (Ashton, 1974; Ashton and Brown,
1980) or only occasional low significant correlations
(Ashton and Kramer, 1980; Hamilton and Wright, 1977)
between years of experience and various judgement
attributes.
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In summary, Eggleton and Choo had demonstrated that
presenting the auditors with many subsystems do not have
a major effect on the judgement of the auditors. Thus, in
this thesis it was thought appropriate to just examine
one internal control system and the results can then be
generalized to the other subsystems.
As has already been discussed, most of the prior studies
required auditors to make their response on a "Likert"
scale which was "ordinal" in nature. Judgement model for
the auditors were then computed using ANOVA. However (as
discussed in Chapter 6), ANOVA works best with "interval"
scale data. Based on this argument, this thesis use
"visual analog scale" which is an "interval" scale to
predict the judgement models of each group of EA and IA.
4.4.2 Research involving group judgements in the area
of internal control evaluation
Trotman, Yetton and Zimmer (1983) found similar results
with group evaluations. Similar to previous studies,
subjects evaluated the internal control systems
represented by thirty two audit checklists by circling a
position on a six-point scale. Booklets of simulated
checklists were compiled by adapting ten questions used
in previous studies of internal control over payroll.
Cues in the form of yes/ no answers to the questions were
systematically varied from case to case in accordance
with a 1/32 replication of a 2" factorial design.
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The subjects were 105 accounting majors in advanced
auditing classes at the University of New South Wales.
Over 80% of the subjects were part-time students with
three or more years work experience. The study consisted
of two phases. In phase 1, subjects were provided with
the booklets at the beginning of a class in week 12 of a
14 week advanced auditing course. They were requested to
judge the adequacy of each payroll system. After
completing the thirty-two cases, subjects were given the
opportunity to revise their initial responses. To
indicate the differential importance of each cue to their
judgements, subjects were then asked to distribute one
hundred points across ten cues.
In phase 2, subjects were randomly allocated to either a
two- or three-member group, leading to the formation of
twenty-one groups of each size. Each group then repeated
the evaluation task. The only difference in this repeat
evaluation was that a group rather than an individual
judgement was required.
The findings showed that the average consensus among
individuals (0.56) was significantly less than among unit
weight composites for both the two-member (.69) and
three-member (.79) composite group judgements. In making
their judgements, individuals used significantly fewer
cues (5.24) than did the 2-and 3-member unit weight
composites (6.47 and 7.85, respectively in both cases)
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and acted with less consistency (.73) than 2-and 3-member
unit weight composites (.89 and .91 respectively).
Self-insight for individuals (.58) was significantly less
than for interacting groups (.69) as measured by the
correlation between individuals subjective and objective
cue weights.
Thus, experiments involving students showed that group
consensus and consistency were higher than individual's.
Hall, Yetton and Zimmer (1982), extended the study to
include 2 personality variables, that is tolerance of
ambiguity and dogmatism. Subjects were auditors
practising in the Sydney metropolitan area and
participation was on a voluntary basis. Of approximately
65 questionnaires distributed, 26 responses were
received. The range of experience was three months to
ten years. The task was to assess the hypothetical
internal control system represented by thirty-two
abbreviated internal control checklists. The questions
were precoded "yes" or "no", consistent with a one eighth
replication of a 28 factorialdesign.
The auditors were given thirty-two cases to answer, which
after completion, they were given the opportunity to
review and revise their judgements and asked to complete
two secondary instruments. In one, they indicated the
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importance of each cue by allocating 100 points among the
eight questions. The other consisted of a personality
schedule for tolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism.
Amongst the findings were that there was a weak positive
correlation between reliance on subdivision of duties
questions and tolerance of ambiguity, self-insight was a
negative function of dogmatism and that there was a weak
but negative relationship between experience and
individual consensus.
Hall, Yetton and Zimmer suggested that the reason why
"there was a weak but negative relationship between
experience and individual consensus" could have been
because the task was viewed by the EAs as a "low stress"
activity and thus the more experienced they were, the
less they agreed to it as they might have taken the task
not too seriously.
Again as can be seen research examining individual and
group judgements used "ordinal scale" (likert scale)
rather than "interval scale".
4.4.3 Research comparing EAs' and IAs' iudgements in the
area of internal control evaluation"
Evaluation of internal accounting controls is a matter of
58 Please refer to Chapter 6, Table 6.50 for comparison of
the three studies.
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critical importance to both IAs and EAs. EAs rely upon
controls designed and maintained by IAs. Furthermore,
with the new requirements in UK and US, increased
reliance upon IAs is now likely to become even more
important so that the external audit will be cost
effective. Cooperation between IAs and EAs is likel y to
be even more beneficial to all parties.
A study conducted by Chang & Mann (1991) showed an
interesting result regarding the personality of EAs and
IAs. It showed that both IAs and EAs exhibited relatively
high managerial ability and self-esteem, and above
average faith and trust in others. The study also showed
that IA were more responsible, cautious and higher in
emotional stability than EAs but EAs were found to be
higher in sociability.
Bailey (1981) was the first to investigate the similarity
in EAs and IAs judgement in the area of internal control
evaluation. The approach used was similar to Ashton's
(1974) except that it was the cash receipts subsystem and
the cases were not in accordance with any experimental
design. There were 12 questions in the ICQ and the
answers to the twelve questions were varied to produce
eight different cases; each subject received only one of
the eight cases. Subjects were asked to rate the
importance of each of the twelve questions on the ICQ and
rate the overall quality of the internal accounting
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controls portrayed in the case. Five-point scales were
used for all ratings. Responses were received from 107
IAs and 116 EAs, representing response rates of 72
percent and 82 percent, respectively.
The results showed that EAs were found to be higher (less
strict) in their mean overall evaluations of the internal
control systems. However, t-test did not show this to be
significantly diferent. Consensus about the overall
evaluations was found to be higher among EAs than among
IAs. The judgement models could not be shown to differ
significantly in either of two comparisons, using both
the subjective ratings of the twelve questions on the ICQ
and the empirical models developed by multiple
regression analysis of the evaluation of the eight cases.
In the determination of the empirical model (or which he
called predictive model) of the auditors, he had to
exclude 6 out of 12 ICPs because as he admitted, it was
due to the weakness of his experimental design (pg 108).
Amongst the reasons stated were the small number of
hypothetical cases that each auditor was required to
answer (only one case) and the use of categorical data.
In this thesis, the experiment was carefully designed in
order to avoid these weaknesses.
Landry (1989) carried out an experiment to investigate
the differences in consensus between EAs and IAs in the
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evaluation of computer controls and to identify variables
as possible explanation factors that would account for
the particular level of consensus within each of the
auditor groups. 33 EAs and 52 IAs were asked to evaluate
computer controls in three areas: (a) separation of
functions control; (b) program code change controls and
(c) physical security access controls. They were also
asked to rank and weight the control questions within the
questionnaire.
Findings indicated that neither group of auditors was
more consistent in their judgements than the other group.
The group of EAs had more consensus among themselves than
the group of IAs. The EAs' level of consensus was
explained by the auditors' management level and the
particular Big 8 firm to which the auditor belongs but
IAs' differences in consensus level within the IAs group
could not be attributed to experience, education
background or management level. Significant differences
between EAs and IAs were found primarily in the logical
and physical access questions and lastly, very low
consistency and consensus level was found maybe due to
the nature of the task.
Moore (1993) in his research examining the similarity of
judgements between EAs and IAs used a different approach.
Instead of using only ICQ cases based on one scenario, he
gave the respondents (consisting of 53 IAs and 44 EAs) 12
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situations and each situation required a different kind
of judgement: The judgement required involved: (a)
selection of the best procedure that could achieve the
internal control objective and vice-versa; (b) evaluation
of the quality of internal control system; (c) procedure
which best prevents error from occurring; (d) assess the
risk of material misstatement and (e) the best management
assertion that could be met by the control procedure and
others.
These judgements were analysed within a framework that
studied both the context (internal control test vs
substantive test) and the nature (objective vs subjective
of the audit judgements). The results of this study
demonstrate that IAs and EAs do not make similar
judgements. Judgements in areas involving substantive
tests and subjective assessments were not similar."
However, similar judgements were made for judgements
relating to internal control tests and objective
assessments. The study identifies a consistent bias by
IAs to not place as much reliance on the internal control
structure as EAs. Experience, organisational
independence, IIA membership and position level do not
59 Evaluation of internal control system was categorized as
"subjective assessment" in an internal control test". The auditors
were given 3 cases and 2 out of the 3 cases showed that there is a
significant difference between External auditors' and Internal
auditors' judgements. Moore concluded that there "is a significant
difference" between the judgements of External auditors and Internal
auditors.
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,seem to explain the cause for the variation in
judgements.
To date, none of the research involving both EAs and IAs
in prior research had followed an experimental design as
detailed or as thought out as this thesis. An
experimental design would enable the researcher to
examine all the variables which the researcher believes
that would have an effect on the judgements of EAs and
IAs. In this thesis, all the variables of interest were
able to be examined.
4.4.4 Other relevant research in accounting
Tabor's (1983) study involved 109 auditors from Big Eight
firms. The auditors were given 12 cases and amongst the
judgements that they were required to make was judgements
about the degree of reliability (7 point scale) of
internal accounting controls, given background
information on company, information on sales cycle and
specific audit objectives. He found consensus levels
similar to Ashton (1974) and Ashton & Brown (1980).
Basu's (1992) research objective was to investigate the
influence of control environment attributes specified in
SAS 55 (AICPA, 1985) on EAs' evaluation of the internal
control structure. The study utilized an experimental
methodology, similar to Ashton's (1974). Practising
auditors from four Big Six public accounting firms were
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assigned the task of evaluating the internal control
structure of a hypothetical client. The only difference
was that the case instrument contained internal control
checklists where control environment attributes were
manipulated as positive or negative instead of ICPs. The
subjects' responses were statistically analysed using the
Brunswick's lens model to determine how factors in a
client's control environment affect the internal control
reliability judgement of practising auditors. In
addition, the study also examined differences in
judgement between auditors, differentiated by levels of
experience, position in organization and affiliation with
public accounting firm.
This thesis also examined these issues in addition to
educational level, types of independence, types of
experience and independence level.
The results from Basu's study indicate that control
environment attributes are considered important by
practising auditors, and that not all attributes are
assigned equal weights. The auditors' judgements with
respect to control environment evaluations across various
levels of experience were significantly different.
However, no significant difference was detected when the
auditors were grouped according to their ranks. The
results also did not support the hypothesis that auditors
from different public accounting firms would evaluate
internal control environments differently. The findings
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showed that experience level affect the auditor's
judgements, but not firm size or position level.
Haskins (1984) investigates the need for a client control
environment evaluation prior to the design of an EA's
internal control tests. The purpose of the study was to
determine what specific client attributes comprise a
client's control environment and to investigate EA's
perceptions regarding the importance of these attributes.
In addition, auditor's insights regarding the attributes'
relation to various notions of control and risk were
explored. Interviews and questionnaires were used in
order to investigate the importance of various control
environment concepts for specific audit engagements. A
total of 146 auditors, from all the "Big 8" CPA firms,
responded to the questionnaires. Partners in both
practice and Executive offices of several "Big 8" firms
were interviewed. Research results indicate a consistent
ranking of the control concepts across various auditor
partitionings. Moreover, it was found that the more
important control concepts were consistently labelled as
"accounting control" and "control risk" related while the
least important control concepts were viewed as
"administrative control" and "inherent risk" related.
This thesis examines the same issues that is whether
there are such labels as "accounting" and
"administrative" controls and whether both types of
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auditors would place different importance to the two
types of controls. In addition, the thesis also examines
whether "accounting" controls can better achieve
"completeness, existence and valuation" objectives better
than "administrative" controls.
Haskin found that auditors believed that more audit
attention should be focused on these client attributes
than was actually being given. Another major finding
indicated that firm affiliation, years of audit
experience, audit firm client specialty, management
structure of the client, and client total assets
exhibited some of the strongest associations with the
various auditor responses. It was found that the AICPA
"accounting/ administrative" control dichotomy was not a
useful notion to auditors. Moreover, it appears that
auditors do not distinguish between "inherent" and
"control risk" elements.
Findings indicated that there were differences in the
ratings along auditor and client's demographic variables.
This suggests a need to tailor the audit in accordance to
the type of client. Differences in ratings along auditor
and audit firm demographic variables, however, could
suggest a potentially dangerous lack of consensus among
auditors and audit firms.
Han (1987), conducted a research which amongst the
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objectives were: (a) to investigate individual vs. audit
team judgements in internal control evaluation and audit
program planning judgements; (b) to examine whether
auditors who have different professional and/or cultural
backgrounds (Korean versus US auditors) make similar
judgements when placed in the same audit judgement
setting; and (c) to examine experience and firm
difference effects on auditor judgements. The
experimental task and setting used here were similar to
those used by Joyce (1976) and Gaumnitz et al. (1982).
It was found that audit team judgements groups exhibited
significantly higher consensus than individual auditors
but it was not statistically significant. The average
consensus and stability shown by non-affiliated Korean
auditors were similar to those shown by US-affiliated
Korean auditors. Finally, results of this study exhibited
no impact of experience and firm difference effects on
consensus and stability measurements.
The study conducted by Moffeit (1985) examined the
possibility that cognitive style (defined as the mode of
processing which individuals use in their perceptual
activities) could explain some of the variance in
internal control judgements. The Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI) was used to measure the cognitive style
of auditors. A second instrument, an audit judgement
case, was prepared by the researcher to elicit (a) an
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auditor's estimate of the reliability of internal
controls in a computerized payroll application and (b)
his assessment of the perceived relevance of case
information to his reliability judgement. Ninety auditors
attending training sessions completed the task. The
participants were primarily senior-level auditors with
three years' experience. The statistical methods used in
this study included the t-test and ANOVA. Results of the
study indicated "lack of consensus" in the "internal
control reliability" estimates of the participants. The
findings also indicated that the number of cues
identified as important by the participants was not
significantly related to their perceptual mode (sensing
or intuitive) or to their internal control reliability
judgement.
Geary (1982) wanted to find out why there was such
diversity among auditor's judgements with respect to
internal control evaluation and audit planning and why no
close relationship between internal control evaluation
and audit planning (as prescribed by GAAS) had been
demonstrated. It was hypothesized that the degree of
standardization, formalization, and specialization
inherent in the audit processes of different audit firms
(hereafter termed audit structure) was significantly
related to variability among professional judgements
pertaining to internal control evaluation and audit
planning. Audit structure is relevant to the current
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auditing environment since several firms have recently
developed more structured audit methods. The major
contention of the research is that a home firm
environment in which audit planning and administration
are structured, and by implication, the extent of
individual judgement called for is decreased, will be
associated with more uniform internal control evaluation
and audit planning decisions, and a closer relationship
between the two, than is found in less structured
environments. An experiment was performed in which
practising auditors were given basic interim audit
information and asked to make decisions relating to
internal control evaluation and subsequent audit
planning. Significant findings may be summarized as
follows: (a) in general, the evidence fails to indicate
that more structured audit methods have led to the
purported benefits; (b) it appears that a large
percentage of auditors may not approach internal control
evaluation in the fashion prescribed by GAAS and (c) the
evidence fails to indicate the existence of the close
relationship between internal control evaluation and
audit planning called for by GAAS.
4.4.5 Other relevant research not in accounting
4.4.5.1 Psychology
Research by psychologists provides a frame of reference
for evaluating the judgemental performance of auditors.
It is in the psychological literature that justification
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is found for the use Of a linear regression or an ANOVA
model, as opposed to a process-tracing, algorithmic
model." Studies by Rorer et al. (1967), Hoffman (1960)
and Slovic, Fleissner and Bauman (1972) are some
examples. These studies do not involve evaluation of
internal control system but involve the use of
experimental design to determine the judgement model of
the participants. The two most important findings from
the research were: a) large individual difference in the
judgement model of the participants were found and b)
overwhelming significance of main effects were found as
compared to that of interactions."
4.4.5.2 Organisational Behaviour
Meixner (1985) explored the judgement processes of
professional government auditors (PGAs) in the evaluation
of internal accounting control (IAC). The primary
objective of this study was to determine whether the
position of PGAs within the auditing organization had an
effect on the level or degree of consensus in 1AC
60 ANOVA and linear regression models are two similar
statistical techniques which may be used to explain the systematic
variation in auditors' judgements in terms of information cues
(independent variables) that the auditors are using to form their
judgements. A process-tracing model replicated the sequential
thinking of an auditor, rather than simply explaining the variation
through statistical relationships. In this thesis, ANOVA is used to
determine the judgement of EAs and IAs.
61 For further research done in psychology, please refer to
Ashton (1973, 72- 82).
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judgements among those auditors. One hundred and nine
auditors participated in this study (employees of the
State Auditor's Office, State of Texas). The major
results of the study indicated that (a) these subjects
exhibited a relatively high level of overall consensus;
(b) judgement consensus appears to be related to position
in the firm when measured within and among the
hierarchical levels and chains of command of this
auditing entity; (c) position seems to have a greater
effect on judgement consensus than does experience with
the firm; (d) judgement models support these findings and
(e) these subjects have high insight into their decision
process.
4.4.6 Research on reliance of lAs by EAs
According to Chambers, Selim & Vinten (1990, 223), the
level of cooperation between external and internal audit
has increased over the years. The purpose of this section
is to examine the factors that EAs looked for before
placing reliance on IAs.
Previous research on reliance of EAs made use of the
factors that EAs should look for in their reliance of IAs
as mentioned in SAS 9 or SAS 65. SAS 65 (AICPA, 1991a)
superseded SAS 9 (AICPA, 1975a).
Whittington & Margheim (1993, 50-51), stated the
difference between SAS 9 and SAS 65 as follows,
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Whereas SAS 9 provided guidance primarily about
assessing internal audit reliability, SAS 65 extends
the guidance by including a discussion of how to
determine the extent and type of usage of internal
auditor work after a reliability decision has been
made.
Ward and Robertson (1980) surveyed experience EAs and IAs
to: (a) obtain evidence on the extent to and the manner
in which EAs rely on IAs; (b) obtain evidence on the
views of each group as to whether this extent and manner
of reliance is sufficient; (c) elicit predictions of
change from both groups.
The results from the survey showed that EAs indicated
varying but typically substantial reliance on IAs. In
addition, the results tended to indicate that EAs were
relying on IAs to a greater extent in connection with
tests of the company's control structure than for direct
assistance in substantive testing. The results are also
supported by the findings of Whittington and Margheim
(1993) where it was found that EAs were willing to assign
more "tests of control work" than "tests of substantive
work" to IAs. In addition, Whittington and Margheim found
that EAs assigned more procedures that would achieve
"existence" and "rights" objectives as compared to the
"valuation" and "disclosure" objectives.
In this thesis, analysis was also done to determine if
EAs and IAs agree as to the procedures that would achieve
these objectives.
Moizer et al. (1986) studied the use of IAs' work in the
UK. Their study revealed that the extent of the use of
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IAs' work was primarily affected by the level of
materiality of the audit area. The results also indicated
that EAs use some form of questionnaire to assess the
reliability of internal audit function.
There are several research that examined the factors that
EAs looked for in an IA before placing reliance on them.
Brown (1983), for example used a 1/2 replication of the 2'
factorial design to examine this. He found that there
were two main factors that EAs looked at before placing
reliance on IAs: (a) work of lAs during the previous
audit and (b) whether the internal audit department
reports to an organisational level to assure independence
of operations". He also found a high level of consensus
across auditors. The average correlation between ratings
of all pairs of auditors was .70. Main effect accounted
for 74% of the variance whereas interactions only
accounted for 5%. Judgement insight was .64 and judgement
stability was .79.
Schneider (1985) conducted three related experiments
designed to obtain descriptive models of how EAs evaluate
the internal audit function. The three factors
recommended by SAS 9: (a) competence; (b) objectivity and
(c) work were used in constructing various case profiles
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of an internal audit function which were evaluated by 18
auditors. Findings from the study showed that auditors
viewed the "work" factor as most important, followed by
"competence" and then "objectivity". Degree of consensus
with regards to internal audit evaluation was .734.
Margheim (1986) conducted an experimental study in which
she examined whether EAs actually adjusted the nature and
extent of audit procedures due to reliance on internal
audit and if so, whether such reliance was related to
internal audit competence/ work performance (these were
combined) or objectivity. The experimental task for this
study included the evaluation of an accounts receivable
control system and the appropriateness of account
balances. The results indicated that EAs did reduce
planned audit hours if internal audit had a high level of
competence/ work performance, but did not alter their
tests in response to changes in the degree of IA's
objectivity.
Other studies by Clark et al. (1980) and Margheim & Label
(1990) have also made use of SAS 9 as a basis for their
research. Generally, the results indicate that
"competence" and "work performance" are considered to be
the most important determinants of EAs' judgements about
reliability. "Objectivity", while still significant, was
not found to be as important.
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Mills (1993) examined the role of cognitive style in an
auditor's decision to rely on the IA's work. The auditors
were divided into groups of various styles by means of
results of two tests given to them prior to the
experimental task. The findings showed that there is a
relationship between auditors' cognitive processes and
their decision processes. In addition overall consensus
among auditors in the reliance decision is moderate with
a correlation coefficient of 0.341.
4.5 SUMMARY
In summary, results of previous research have indicated
that: (a) separation of duties factors (cues)" are
important in influencing judgement of auditors; (b)
"order effects" of the factors (questions) in the ICQ,
that is placing it in different orders do not seem to
affect the judgement of auditors; (c) including more
"separation of duties" questions in the ICQ does not
affect the judgements of auditors; (d) two-cues and
three-cues factor interactions do not seem to have an
influence on the judgement of auditors; (e) mixed results
of the variables "experience level, position level,
educational level, size of firm, independence of IAs" on
judgement consensus consistency and insight; (f)
judgement consensus, stability and insight of students or
auditing professors were lower than auditors and (g)
62 Referred to as "ICPs" in this thesis.
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groups' consensus, consistency and insight is much higher
than individuals'.
Methodology used in the previous research were as
follows: (a) sample was chosen on "availability" through
contact persons; (b) substitution of sample was done if
the original auditor could not participate in the study
for various reasons; (c) experimental design was used to
determine judgement model of participants in the study;
(d) similar cases were used to assess "judgement
consensus" amongst all auditors; (e) repeat cases were
used to assess "judgement consistency" within himself;
(f) judgement insight was determined by comparing weights
allocated by the participants to the importance of the
factors (cues) in the ICQ and the weights of the
importance of the factors (cues) from the judgement
model; (g) questionnaires were sent through mail or
administered directly in the place of study. If mailed,
the questionnaires were either directly mailed to
participants or mailed to the contact persons and (h) use
of ICQ with "Yes" indicating the presence of the controls
and "No" indicating the absence of the controls.
Statistical techniques used in past research were as
follows: (a) correlational statistics were used to assess
insight, stability and consensus; (b) omega squared (w2)
was used to measure the extent to which each auditor
utilized each of the 6 ICOs (and their interactions) in
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formulating internal control judgements.
With regard to the research on reliance of EAs on IAs, it
was found that EAs perceived "objectivity" of IAs to be
the least important factor compared with "work" and
"competence" of IA when deciding to rely on IAs. This
differs from the finding of Rittenberg (1977)" which
involved investigating whether IAs can make important
electronic data processing design-phase audit
contributions to an organisation without impairing
independence. IAs rated "objectivity" the highest,
followed by "competence" and lastly by "work" factor
(referred to as "economic and other influences" in his
study). Thus, as can be seen, the ratings of EAs and IAs
of the three factors differ.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, for the purpose of this
thesis, the importance of the three factors is based on
Rittenberg's study, as it is thought to be more
appropriate.
This thesis also examines judgement of IAs and EAs using
other approaches of evaluation, namely "control
objectives" (CO) and "control risk" (CR) approaches in
addition to "ICQ" approach. An experimental design is
used in the determination of judgement model of each
group of auditor and a mail questionnaire was used. The
63 Please refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.11.2 for details of
the study.
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variables, experience, educational, position level,
independence of IAs and size of firm were examined to see
if they have any effect on two measures of judgement, i.e
"judgement consensus and consistency".
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY - EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter identifies the reasons for choosing the
payroll system, the phases of the research, the sampling
method used, judgement model of the auditors and
statistical analysis used in the research. Justification
is also given for the choice of the 8 ICPs used in the
study.
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF STUDY
This study is an extension of Ashton's (1974) study.
There are several ways in which the current study differs
from Ashton's.
First and foremost, this study investigated the judgement
of IAs in addition to EAs. However, it investigated the
judgement of "each group" of EAs and IAs instead of
examining the judgements of every auditor in each group.
This is because it was thought to be more appropriate as
examining each individual auditor's judgement would
require an enormous amount of cases to be answered by the
auditors.
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Secondly, in determining the judgement model of each
group of auditor, an "interval" scale data was used
instead of "ordinal" data. Further discussion regarding
this is made in section 6.4 of chapter 6.
Four more variables, that is "position level, educational
level, independence of IAs and types of independence" of
IAs were included to see whether they could account for
the variation in judgement in addition to "experience
level, length of experience and firm size" investigated
by Ashton.
As for "experience" variable, the categories of
experienced auditors differed from those of Ashton's. The
study has three categories of experience level:
(a) inexperienced auditors are those with less than three
years of auditing experience; (b) moderately experienced
auditors are those with more than three but less than six
years of auditing experience and (c) very experienced
auditors are those with more than six years of auditing
experience. Ashton did not categorize "experience level"
in this manner but had just reported the "actual" length
of auditing experience that the auditors had.
More open ended questions were included that gave a
chance to the auditors to explain their response. For
example, the auditors were asked to explain the factors
that they considered before giving their judgements
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regarding the quality of the internal control system and
whether they think that the cases do potray a good
internal control system.
Two more cases besides the eight cases which the auditors
were required to answer were included. The two cases were
represented by means of "control objectives" (CO) and
"control risk" (CR) approach, whereas the eight cases
were presented by means of the "internal control
questionnaire" (ICO) approach. The objective of including
the two cases was to look at whether the auditors would
come to the same conclusion when they were asked to judge
the cases by means of three different approaches, that is
"ICO", "CO" and "CR".
Other modifications include changing some specific
background data and the factors (or ICPs) to be included
in the questionnaire. There were 8 ICPs which were
divided equally into "administrative" and "accounting"
controls compared to Ashton's 6 ICPs which comprised of
only "accounting" controls. The reason was to determine
whether there were any differences attached to the "two
types" of controls by both groups of auditors. Amongst
the findings that the researcher was interested to see
were whether EAs would placed more importance on
"accounting controls" rather than "administrative"
controls and vice-versa for IAs because of their
differing audit objectives and secondly was to determine
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if the auditors perceived "accounting controls" more
able to achieve "completeness, existence and valuation"
objectives compared to "presentation and disclosure and
rights and obligations" objectives.
Two questions in Ashton's (1974) study were excluded and
they are; "Is the payroll audited periodically by IAs and
"Was the internal control over payroll found to be
satisfactory during previous examination?" as it is
believed that if the answer to either or both the
questions was "Yes" it may already be an indication that
the internal control system is strong and would result in
the subjects paying less attention to the other
questions.
5.3 THE EXPERIMENTAL TASK
5.3.1 Evaluation of a Subsystem
It is generally accepted in the auditing literature that
the system of internal control cannot be evaluated as a
whole. Instead, its various "subsystem" or "segments"
must be evaluated. As Mautz and Sharaf (1985) state:
Although we speak of the internal control as a
'system', our evaluation must be more concerned with
the parts or divisions of that system than with the
system as a whole.
(Mautz and Sharaf 1985, 149).
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According to Arens & Loebbecke (1991, 148-151), there are
two approaches to evaluate the "subsystems" and they are:
(a) transaction cycle's approach and (b) individual
account's approach.
The two approaches were discussed in chapter 2, section
2.7. Currently, there is an inclination towards using the
"transaction cycle's approach". It divides the audit in
such a way as to keep closely related types of
transactions and account balances in the same segment.
Typically, there are 5 types of transaction cycles:
a) sales and collection; b) acquisition and payment;
c) payroll and personnel; d) inventory and warehousing
and e) capital and acquisition.
5.3.2 Selection of the payroll subsystem
In order to prevent the experimental task from becoming
too complex, it deals with only one internal control
subsystem; that pertaining to payroll. This is because,
previous research has shown that (Eggleton and Choo,
1983) including various sub-systems in the study do not
show varying results and furthermore as discussed in
chapter 3, Section 3.2.2, too much information (in this
case presenting the auditors with various or more
difficult sub-systems) would result in poor decisions.
The choice of system was not a straightforward matter.
It was necessary to choose a system which both IAs and
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EAs would relate to in the sense that they would both be
likely to have a good level of understanding about the
nature, purpose and potential for effectiveness of the
internal controls (or features" of the system). Without
this pre-requisite being in place, differences in
auditors' judgements might have been due, wholly or in
part, to misconceptions caused by respondents'
unfamiliarity with the subject system rather than being
due to one or more of the potential influencing factors
which this research was set up to explore.
It would have compounded the complexity of the research
to have had to attempt to "control" for varying degrees
of familiarity with the subject system between those who
helped with this research. The research instrument was
complex enough (and very demanding of those who used it)
without extending it to provide the means of measuring
degrees of familiarity with the subject system of
different respondents. Had the research instrument been
so extended, the statistical analysis would have been
much more complex and the results correspondingly less
reliable.
To reduce the risk of unfamiliarity it was necessary to
choose a subject system which exists generally within all
businesses and thus potentially within the programmes of
6.4 Referred to as internal control procedures (ICPs) in this
thesis.
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all auditors - internal and external. It was essential
to choose a system which both IAs and EAs were likely to
be familiar, would be relevant to meeting both internal
and external audit objectives and would be likely to be
within the scope of both internal and external audit
plans.
Specialisation in auditing means that not all auditors
(and therefore not all respondents who used the research
instrument of this thesis) are likely to have the same
degree of familiarity with any possible subject system.
For instance, EAs early in their career are likely to be
set to work on less complex aspects of the audit - such
as the audit of cash or the audit of payroll. Those in
management positions of an external audit assignment are
likely not to have had recent "hands-on" experience of
detailed audit work (such as compliance testing)
especially in the more straightforward aspects of
auditing. Nevertheless these more "senior" EAs are
likely to have had earlier auditing experience of the
detail associated with payroll systems and they now have
payroll system perspective of an audit partner or an
audit manager. It would thus be interesting to see if
there is consensus between the "junior" and "senior"
audit staffs regarding the quality of an internal control
system.
In selecting a subject system it was necessary to guard
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against the risk that some auditors might have had no
first hand experience of the subject system - as it may
never have featured in their day-to-day audit work, nor
in their training. The judgement was made that this was
unlikely to be so in the case of the payroll system -
either for IAs or EAs. Furthermore, in the unlikely
event that it were so, the interface which all employed
people have with at least one payroll system guarantees
a certain level of familiarity with payroll systems -
which, for an auditor with general audit training and
general audit experience, could be put to good effect in
assisting with this research. As can be observed from
Table 6.6, all the auditors participating in the study
have experienced auditing the payroll system before.
The researcher was, of course, aware that other seminal
research on internal control evaluation had used payroll
as the subject system (Ashton, 1974; Hamilton and Wright,
1977 and others as discussed in chapter 4). This had
been the case even when the research focussed on EAs
alone with IA judgements being outside the scope of the
research. There were advantages for the research of this
thesis in building on earlier research, for instance with
respect to choice of factors (ICPs) to be included within
the research instrument of this research.
Criticisms of selecting payroll as the subject system
might revolve around the potential of a research study
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oriented around this system to tease out differences in
judgement between auditors (for instance between IAs and
EAs) which might show up, or show up more clearly, in
research focussed on other subject systems. This may be
so and it is an area for further research. We must be
cautious about the generalisability of the research
conclusions of this thesis to the evaluation of any other
system of internal control, or to internal control in
general. Much research in many subject areas consists at
least in part of testing the replicability of earlier
research findings to other subject areas. Nevertheless,
it is not immediately apparent why and in what ways the
conclusions drawn from this research might have been
different if a different subject area had been chosen.
In view of the different objectives of internal and
external audit, there are few subject areas which could
have been chosen for this research which would not have
presented the problem of disproportionate degrees of
familiarity between the respondents. EAs subject areas
can be regarded as the lines on the balance sheet and
profit and loss account. IAs subject areas can be
regarded as the systems of internal control within the
enterprise. This research needed to be based on a
subject area likely to be present in all enterprises and
familiar to all auditors. Payroll was the strongest
candidate. Not even "Fixed Assets" qualified so strongly.
It was considered that only one system was needed for the
251
research. Accounts receivable could have been the chosen
subject for this research, but payroll had the advantage
of being likely to be more familiar to all of the
respondents. The structure of the payroll system is
usually similar across firms as compared with other
cycles, maybe due to the relatively slight degree of
interactions with other cycles which in turn should make
the results of the experiment more generalizable.It would
also be easier to find auditors who would be willing to
participate in the study.
Also, payroll, not being a balance sheet item in itself,
was also likely to be viewed by both IAs and EAs more
from the perspective of achieving the same operational
objectives. On the other hand, EAs would have been
likely to have majored on true and fair balance sheet
statement objectives for accounts receivable whereas IAs
would not have done, or would not have done to the same
extent. This likely difference between the two groups of
auditors would have made it more difficult for us to use
the research to compare and contrast between the two
audits for the issues which this research addresses.
The evaluation of payroll internal control subsystem (or
transaction cycle) is less difficult than the evaluation
of many other transaction cycles as evidenced in
practice. Therefore, if the judgements of the auditors in
this experiment reveal large individual differences (a
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great degree of inconsistency) or indicate that the
auditors have little insight into their own judgement
processes, it may be expected that these conditions would
be more pronounced in the evaluation of more complex
subsystems. This could also be an area for further
research.
5.4 PAYROLL ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES 
The audit of the payroll transaction cycle attempts to
establish the credibility of the accounting records and
to ascertain the reasonableness of expense and liability
account balances. Some of payroll errors and
irregularities that can happen are (Mautz 1964, 399-400):
1. inclusion of fictitious employees on the payroll. This
results in the preparation of cheques or pay envelopes
for people not actually working. The person
responsible for this type of error must then obtain
the cheques or pay envelopes and convert them to his
own use.
2. continuance of employees who have left. When an
employee leaves his job permanently, sometimes it is
possible still to have a cheque written under his
name. The person responsible must obtain the payroll
cheque and convert it to his own use.
3. conversion of unclaimed wages. When employees serve
their employment during a pay period, they sometimes
neglect to return the following pay day to obtain
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their pay cheques or to make other arrangements to
obtain their final pay. Therefore, it is possible for
someone to obtain those cheques and convert them to
his own use.
4. overfooting of payroll sheets. Under most payroll
systems, a separate bank account is used to disburse
payroll cheques. This is desirable in order that
special provisions for cheque signing less strict
than for general cash cheques, can be established. The
amount to be deposited in the payroll account is
generally the net pay, that is gross pay less
deductions for income and social security taxes, any
hospitalization or insurance costs.
5. overstated rates, overstated hours and erroneous
extension (multiplication of rate by hours).
6. erroneous extension. Multiplication of rate by hours
is done wrongly.
7. understatement of deductions.
5.5 STEPS IN PAYROLL VERIFICATION •
Much has been written concerning the auditing procedures
necessary to detect the errors in the accounts that are
caused by these payroll irregularities. Mautz (1964) has
condensed the verification of payroll into ten steps.
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1. foot payroll sheets and tie net payroll in to
disbursement record
2. trace names on payroll sheets to personnel files
for authenticity
3. trace names on payroll sheets to social security
reports
4. compare returned cheques with payroll examining
amounts, payees' signatures and endorsements
5. trace rates on payroll sheets to wage rate
authorizations in personnel file, to union
contracts, or to some other reliable source
6. trace hours shown on payroll sheets back to time
clock cards to paymaster's reports, or to some
other reliable source
7. verify extensions by recomputations
8. trace all payroll amounts, gross pay, net pay
and deductions into the books of original entry
and the general ledger, scrutinizing entries for
propriety
9. reconcile payroll bank account
10. supervise distribution of payroll cheques to
employees and follow up any unclaimed cheques
(Mautz 1964, 401).
Attwood & Stein (1989) list an example of a "good"
questionnaire that ensure that the payroll and personnel
transaction cycle can be achieved. They consist of "key"
and "subsidiary" questions. It is recommended that the
auditor personally answers the subsidiary questions and
refers to the client's staff only if further
clarification becomes necessary. All answers to key
questions should be supported by explanations and
appropriate cross-references both to the relevant
flowcharts and subsidiary questions. If for any reason,
the subsidiary questions were not able to be answered, it
could be an indication of a weak internal control.
The questions are as follows:
Key question: 
1. Can employees be paid for work not done?
Subsidiary questions: 
a) Are time clocks supervised by a responsible
official?
b) Are time records and piecework sheet and other
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source documents,
i) controlled by persons independent of the
payroll department?
ii) approved by a responsible official before
being processed?
c) Are time records, piecework sheets and other
source documents checked before processing by the
payroll department for;
i) appropriate authorization as to their
correctness?
ii) casts and calculations?
d) Are proper controls exercised over adjustments
for lateness, sickness and absenteeism(holidays,
etc)?
e) Are separate payroll bank accounts operated,
credited with the exact amount required and
regularly reconciled?
f) Are adequate safeguard operated over wages and
salaries and paid to employees in cash and over
unclaimed wages?
g) Are adequate controls operated over the
processing of payrolls into the accounting
records?
Key question: 
2. Can the payroll be inflated in any way?
Subsidiary questions: 
a) Are individual personal records (including
contracts of employment) maintained independently
of the payroll department?
b) Are written authorizations required for all,
i) employees added to the payroll?
ii) changes in rates of pay?
iii) employees take off the payroll?
c) Is the payroll section effectively notified by
the personnel department of any changes?
d) Are payrolls checked,
i) with clock cards or other relevant time
records?
ii) for salesmen's commissions based on
periodic sales?
iii) for correct rates applied?
iv) for casts and calculations?
e) Are payrolls and payroll summaries approved and
initialled by a responsible official?
f) Are all payments for casual labour approved and
made against proper documentation?
g) Are payrolls periodically checked against the
independent personal record?
h) Is written authorizations required for overtime,
and are rates clearly laid down?
i) Are movements between successive payrolls
reconciled in terms of numbers and values?
j) Are wages and salaries regularly compared with
budgets costing records or other management
information and significant variances are
investigated?
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k) Are payroll deductions reconciled with the
nominal ledger?
1) Is the cash for payroll kept entirely separate
from any other sources of cash(example sales,
petty cash)
m) Are all payroll deductions settled by cheques?
Key question
3. Can other errors occur in payroll calculations?
Subsidiary questions 
a) Are there proper authorizations for all payroll
deductions other than statutory deductions?
b) Does the system provide adequate safeguards for
dealing with PAYE statutory deductions and are
these reconciled regularly?
c) Are the gross wages or salaries and total tax
deducted agreed with PAYE returns to the inland
revenue?
d) Is the issue of luncheon vouchers satisfactorily
controlled?
The record of the systems and the information
obtained from completing the ICQ provides the basis
for a preliminary evaluation of the extent of
internal control with the system. Such evaluation
should be each key control question. It will be this
preliminary evaluation which will determine the
nature and extent of the audit tests planned.
(Attwood and Stein 1989, 119-121)
5.6 INTERNAL CONTROL OF PAYROLLS
The extent of application of these verification steps is
determined by the quality of internal control over
payroll that exists in the company.
Mautz (1964) summarizes the control procedures in a
payroll and personnel transaction cycle that indicate the
existence of a "good" internal control system.They are;
1. use of cheques for all disbursements as it would
be an evidence the moment it is written up for
payment
2. review and approval of payrolls, including hours
worked, rates of pay, overtime hours, deductions
and the like, before payment so that any flagrant
attempts at padding or misstating essential facts
maybe discovered. If the payroll consists of a
great number of employees it maybe necessary to
have different individuals review the payroll for
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different departments or sections
3. preparation of an independent payroll bank
account reconciliation monthly. This is required
for payroll cash as well as for general cash. If
the payroll transactions are handled through a
general bank account instead of through a special
account, no additional reconciliation is
required. Its use cannot be said to affect
seriously the internal control over payroll
disbursements.
4. adequate separation of duties with respect to:
a) hiring employees and establishing rates of
pay
b) approval of hours worked
c) payroll preparation including listing
employees, entering hours and rates,
extending and footing
d) cheque signing
e) cheque distribution and
f) bank reconciliation
(Mautz 1964, 430-431)
Ingredients of a good internal control system over
payroll which an auditor can rely on were mentioned in
Chapter 2, Section 2.4 and comprise of "organisation,
segregation of duties, physical, authorization and
approval, arithmetical and accounting, personnel,
supervision and management".
5.7 Internal Control Procedures (ICPs) Selected for this
Experiment 
For this experiment, 8 ICPs were selected to be dealt
with explicitly, as an experimental study cannot deal
with all the ICPs" relevant to an evaluation of payroll
internal control.
Some ICPs may be more important than others and this may
6 5 It would require more auditors to participate in the
research if more internal control procedures were included.
Discussion regarding this matter can be found further on in the
chapter under section 5.11.2.
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differ among auditors; such differences in judgement are
investigated in this thesis. The 8 ICPs" are listed
below:
Q.1 Are time cards and other source documents checked
before processing by the payroll department for casts
and calculations?
0.2 Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated from the task of
payroll preparation?
0.3 Is there adequate physical security over personal
files?
0.4 Are the duties of those preparing the payroll
rotated?
4.5 Are the names on the payroll checked periodically
against the active employee file of the personnel
department?
0.6 Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment
of employees adequately separated from the tasks of
payroll bank account reconciliation?
0.7 Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of financial data through comparisons
with budgets and following up of variance reports?
4.8 Are formal procedures established for changing names
on the payroll, pay rates and deductions?
6 6 
ICPs 2,6, and 8 are taken from Ashton's (1973) study.
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An example of one of the 8 cases that was given to
subjects to evaluate is shown in Figure 5.1.
Internal controls Yes No
1. Are time cards and other source documents checked
before processing by the payroll department for
casts and calculations?
2. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated from the	 task of
payroll preparation?
3.	 Is there adequate physical security over personal
files?
4. Are the duties of those preparing the payroll
rotated?
5. Are the names on the payroll checked periodically
against the active employee file of the personnel
department?
6. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and
payment of employees adequately separated from the
tasks of payroll bank account reconciliation?
7. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of financial data through comparisons
with budgets and following up of variance reports?
8. Are formal procedures established for changing
names on the payroll, pay rates and deductions
communicated to the employees?
Figure 5.1 : Case number 1
The 8 ICPs can be divided into "accounting" and
"administrative"" controls as follows:
67 Definitions of "accounting" and "administrative" controls
was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4. The sub-category under both
types of controls, such as "physical, segregation of duties" have
also been discussed in Chapter 2, under the same section.
260
ACCOUNTING CONTROLS: 
A. Arithmetical and accounting
0.1 Are time cards and other source documents checked
before processing by the payroll department for casts
and calculations?
0.4 Are the duties of those preparing the payroll
rotated?
0.5 Are the names on the payroll checked periodically
against the active employee file of the personnel
department?
B. Physical 
Q.3 Is there adequate physical security over personal
files?
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: 
A. Segregation of duties
0.2 Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated from the task of
payroll preparation?
0.6 Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment
of employees adequately separated from the tasks of
payroll bank account reconciliation?
B.Management and Supervision
0.7 Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of financial data through comparisons
with budgets and following up of variance reports?
0.8 Are formal procedures established for changing names
on the payroll, pay rates and deductions properly
communicated to the employees?
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As has been mentioned earlier, the main intention of
dividing the 8 ICPs into "administrative" and
"accounting" controls is to see whether EAs and IAs place
a different emphasis on the importance of the 2 types of
internal controls. It is assumed that EAs would place
more importance on the "accounting" controls since they
might be of the opinion that this type of controls would
better ensure the true and fair view of the financial
statements than administrative controls. On the other
hand, IAs might think that the "administrative" controls
are more important for a more efficient running of the
organisation. Thus their opinion might differ because of
their differing objectives in evaluating the internal
control system.
As discussed in Chapter 1, COSO (Internal Control-
Integrated Framework) and UK Final Guidance suggested
that "effectiveness" of internal control is a subjective
judgement resulting from an assessment of whether the
five components (control environment, monitoring, risk
assessments, information and communication & control
activities)" are present and functioning effectively.
Their effective functioning provides reasonable assurance
regarding achievement of one or more of the stated
categories of objectives. For example when considering
68 For detail discussion of the five components, please refer
to chapter 2, section 2.4.
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any one category of objectives: "control over financial
reporting", all five criteria must be satisfied in order
to conclude that internal control over financial
reporting is effective.
Factors selected for this experiment also tried to
include all the five components. Question 7 and 8
represents "control environment" but specifically
question 7 relates to "monitoring"; question 8
represents "information and communication"; question 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 represents "control activities".
If an attempt to match COSO's definition with the
definition given earlier regarding internal controls is
made, "control activities" can be said to comprise of
both "accounting and administrative" controls. The other
four components represent "administrative" controls.
In this thesis, a case with all 8 ICPs present is
included to ascertain whether the existence of the 8 1CPs
comprising "administrative and accounting" controls would
result in a good internal control system. Previous
studies have only concentrated on "accounting" controls.
5.8 JUDGEMENT MODEL 
The judgement model is shown in Figure 5.2. As can be
seen from the model, the main thrust of the study is to
determine whether EAs and IAs will make similar
263
judgements ("judgement consensus") when given similar
cases to evaluate and whether they will make consistent
judgements ("judgement consistency") when evaluating the
same case over time."
If there is "judgement consensus" and "judgement
consistency" between EAs and IAs, there could be
increased reliance on IA's report by EAs and vice-versa.
On the other hand, if there is no "judgement consensus"
and "judgement consistency" between EAs and IAs,
training programmes for both auditors explaining the
importance of certain variables could be encouraged. This
could increase professionalism of both auditors.
Internal control variables in the model refer to the ICPs
contained in each ICQ.
69 In this thesis however, judgement consistency is
investigated through a repeat cases.
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No NO
n\\
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS' MODEL OF INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION
Training to improve professionalism 
<
PERSONAL
VARIABLES
Experience
Position
Education \
\\\
EVALUATION
OF
INTERNAL
Yes Yes
STENCY1
INTERNAL
CONTROL ->--CONSENSUS-- CONS
VARIABLES / CONTROLSYSTEM
Authorization &
approval
rithmetic &
accounting
1
Physical
Segregation of
duties
No No
Management &
supervision
Training to develop understanding of internal control variables
1. Reliance on internal auditor's report by external auditors
2. Reliance on external auditor's report by internal auditors
and Board of Directors
Figure 5.2: Internal and external auditors' judgement
model of internal control evaluation
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The following definitions are made for the purpose of
matching IAs and EAs in order to conduct statistical
analysis.
Personal variables in the research model have the
following meaning:
1. Education: Consists of auditors who have "professional
qualifications in accounting" and those that do not.
In this thesis, "professional" and "non-professional"
qualifications are defined as follows:
(a) Professional qualification: Auditors who have
completed and passed at least one of 'United
Kingdom's accounting or internal auditing
professional examinations which consist of:
CACA, CIMA, CIA, CA, MIIA and CIPFA.
(b) No professional qualification: Auditors who
have passed "all other examinations" such as
AAT, CISA, QICA, ACIB, ACII and others are
excluded. The researcher realized that these
examinations are also tough but after a
deliberation on this issue, it was concluded
that the syllabuses of the examinations are not
considered to be as thorough or in depth as
those considered as "professional examinations"
and they do not include a lot of "accounting"
subjects.
2. Experience: Consists of three categories which are as
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follows:
(a) Very experienced : Auditors who have a length
of auditing experience of above 6 years.
(b) Moderately experienced : Auditors who have a
length of auditing experience of between 3 to
6 years, and
(c) Inexperienced : Auditors who have a length of
auditing experience of between 0 to 3 years.
The interval period of 3 years was thought to be
appropriate because it takes an average of 3 years
before an auditor can pass his professional
qualification. Usually, a junior auditor will be
promoted to a senior position when the junior auditor
has passed his professional qualification which is
approximately three years. Promotion to manager level
maybe a further 3 years.
From the perspective of the research, it is enough to
pointout that the researcher has taken three different
durations of experience: the labels that have been
assigned to each level of experience are of secondary
importance.
3. Position levels 
a) Position levels of IAs: Starting from the top of
the organisation consist of: (i) Head and Deputy
Head; (ii) Audit Manager; (iii) Senior Internal
Auditors and (iv) Internal Auditors.
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b) Position levels of EAs: Starting from the top of
the organisation consist of: (i) Partner;
(ii) Manager; (iii) Senior and (iv) Junior.
Position level of both types auditors were
matched according to the hierarchy level in the
organisation i.e manager (EAs) will be matched
with audit manager (internal auditor) and so on.
Other terms which are relevant to the thesis but not
included in the model are defined in the following
manner:
4. Types of qualifications: Auditors were grouped into
three categories: (a) strong on external audit
training; (b) strong on company accounting and
(c) strong on internal audit training. Auditors who
are strong on external audit training are said to have
passed professional qualifications ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI.
Auditors who are strong on company accounting are said
to have passed CIMA, CACA and CIPFA. Auditors who are
said to be strong on internal auditing are said to
have passed MIIA and CIIA.
5. Firm size: Audit firms and internal audit
organisations were categorized into: a) large and
b) others (which includes small to medium sized).
"Large" firms/ organisations are those with turnover
worldwide, net assets worldwide and annual profit
worldwide of more than £100 million and total number
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of auditors working at the firm/ organisation of more
than 100 people as at 31 December 1993. "Others" are
firms/ organisations not falling in these categories.
Information regarding size of firms/ organisations
were gathered through the questionnaire (please refer
to Appendix 5cii); list supplied by IIA and FAME
(Financial Analysis Made Easy).
Firms are only categorized into "large" and "others"
because there were not enough firms that belong to the
small to medium sized firms.
6. Types of independence of lAs: There are three types
of independence: (a) organisational independence;
(b) economic and other influences and (c) individual
mental state of mind which is referred to as
"competency" in this thesis. Definition is based on
Rittenberg's (1977) suggestion. Details are
discussed in chapter 2, section 2.11.2. In this
thesis the three categories are defined in the
following manner:
"Organisational independence" which refer to the
level of reporting of the internal auditor;
"economic and other influences" which refer to
auditors' involvement in either compliance
testing, making recommendations in improvement in
internal control systems, implementation of
control changes or administering or operating any
internal controls and "competency" which refer
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to whether the auditors are professionally
qualified and the length of auditing experience
that they have. Please refer to Figure 5.3 for
the factors that determine these three
categories.
Figure 5.3 shows the "calculation of types of
independence" and the "categorisation of
independence level" for "each type" of
independence.
-
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Starting with most important:
1.0rganisational independence 
It was decided that if IAs report to FC(financial controller),
he is considered to have "least organisational independent" and
thus would be given the minimum score. Organisational independence
of IAs increases as the auditor moves down the line. IA is seen to
have the "most organisational independence"
audit committee.
when he reports to an
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 points
I I I i 1 i i 1 I I f
FC FC FC FC FC CE CE CE BOD BOD AC
& & CE BUD & BOD &
CE AC & & AC & AC
AC AC AC
01	 05	 06	 10 08	 02 07	 11	 09	 03	 04 value
codes
The abbreviation stands for the following:
Value	 Frequency
Finan cont (FC)
Chief exec (CE)
Board of drs (BOD)
Audit Comm (AC)
Finan cont & chief exec(FC&CE)
Finan cont & audit comm(FC&AC)
Chief exec & audit comm(CE&AC)
Finan cont,board of drs &
audit comm(FC,BOD&AC)
Chief exec,board of drs &
audit comm(CE,BOD&AC)
Finan cont,chief exec &
audit comm(FC,CE&AC)
Board of drs &audit comm(BOD&AC)
TOTAL
01 17
02 3
03 4
04 12
05 3
06 12
07 4
08 2
09 1
10 5
11 1.
64
Figure 5.3 : Calculation of "types of independence" of IAs
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Figure 5.3 continued ...
2. Competency
IA will be given the appropriate points according to the experience
and educational level that the auditor has.
35	 40	 45	 0	 45 points
Inexp Modexp Veryexp	 No Yes
( 1 )	 (2)	 (3)	 (2) (1) value codes
Experience	 Have prof
level	 qualifctns
3. Economic & other influences
Similarly with the above two types of independence, IAs will be
given the appropriate points in accordance to which activity (work)
he does.
1 2 3	 4 5 6	 7 8 9	 10 10 10	 11 11 llpoints
YPN* YPN	 Y P N	 Y P N	 Y P N
132 	 132	 132 	 132	 13 2 value
codes
involve
	
involve
	
involve-	 involve
	 involve
admn	 implement	 design	 recommen	 compl
*Y P N -Yes,partly,no
It was decided that if the score of:
1. Organisational independence was "50 thru 54" then the auditors
were considered as "least independent"; a score of "55 thru 57,
means that the auditors are "moderately independent" and a score
of more than 58 mean that the auditors are "very independent".
2. Competency was "35 thru 40" then the auditors were considered
as "least independent"; a score of "40 thru 85", means that
the auditors are "moderately independent" and a score of more
than 85 means that the auditors are "very independent".
3. Economics & other influences was "33 thru 34" then the auditors
were considered as "least independent"; a score of "34 thru 36",
means that the auditors are "moderately independent" and a score
of more than 36 means that the auditors are "very independent".
7. Level of independence of IAs: IAs were divided into
three categories: (a) very independent; (b) moderately
independent and (c) not independent, based on the
total points they obtained from the three types of
independence. The higher the point, the more
independent they are.
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Calculation of points that determine the "three types"
of independence and in turn the "three levels" of
independence for "each type" is shown in Figure 5.3.
This means that each "type" of independence has these
three "levels" of independence, i.e for
"organisational independence" there are "least,
moderately and very independent" auditors and so on.
The purpose of calculating the "three types" of
independence and the "three levels" of independence
is to determine the correlation coefficient of the
"three types" and "three levels" of independence of
IAs so that their relationship to "judgement
consensus" and "judgement consistency" can be
determined."
In order to calculate the correlation coefficient of
the "three types" of independence, the number of
auditors for each type of independence had to be
determined first through the calculation shown in
Figure 5.3. Then by means of pearson correlation, the
correlation coefficient for each type of independence
was calculated.
70 This is also true for determining the other variables
namely: a) education level; b) experience level; c) position level;
d) types of qualification and e) firm size.
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As for correlation coefficient of the "three levels"
of independence, they were determined by multiplying
the correlation coefficient of "each type" of
independence by a "factor weight". Organisational 
independence was assigned a "factor weight" of 3 (the
highest since it is the most important); competency
with a "factor weight" of 2 (second most important)
and economics and other influences with a "factor
weight" of 1 (least important).
The "factor weights" were assigned to the "three
types" of independence based on Rittenberg's findings.
His findings indicated that "in priority of
importance, organisational factors were rated the
highest, competency was rated moderately important and
there were varied ratings for economic and other
influences."
For example in order to determine the correlation
coefficient of "least independent auditors", assuming
that the correlation coefficient of the "three types"
of independence were given, would be as follows:
Least independent auditors:
1. Organisational	 .79 * 3 =	 2.37
2. Competency
	
.80 * 2 =	 1.60
3. Econs & Other	 .71 * 1 =	 .71
influences
Total	 4.68 
Coefficient correlation of
least independent auditors	 = 4.68/6 =.78
For detail calculation, please refer to Chapter 6,
Section 6.5.3.
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5.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES
As mentioned in Chapter one, the research question "Do
IAs and EA make similar judgements?" has 4 main
objectives, which were to examine:
1) whether EAs and IAs reached the same consensus as to
the quality of a given internal control system
2) whether EAs and IAs were consistent in the ratings of
two similar internal control systems
3) the effect of certain factors on judgement consensus
and judgement consistency, and
4) the judgement model of both groups of auditors
Consensus of EAs and IAs which was the main thrust of the
study, was looked at in 6 ways:
1) consensus in the ratings of the 6 similar cases given
to both groups of auditors
2) consensus in the ratings of a case using different
techniques/ approaches of evaluation
3) consensus in the ratings of whether ICPs were able to
achieve control objectives
4) consensus in the ratings of the ability of the ICPs to
detect or correct material errors (control risk)
5) consensus in the weights (i.e relative importance)
given to the ICPs and
6) consensus in the ratings and relative weights given by
the auditors to the "accounting controls" and
"administrative controls"
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Findings will be discussed according to these four main
issues (i.e consensus, consistency, factors affecting
consensus and consistency and judgement model of
auditors).
Summary of the hypotheses to be tested relating to the
four issues are shown in Table 5.1 to 5.6.
ISSUES HA: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN
JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND EAs
1) Similar
cases
Hla: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of the 6 similar cases between EAs and
IAs
Hlb: There is a significant difference in the
variation of judgement of the 6 similar cases
between EAs and IAs
H1c: There is a significant difference in the
mean ratings of the 6 cases between EAs and IAs
Hid: There is a significant difference of
consensus level on the 6 cases between EAs and
IAs
2) Techniques
of
evaluation
H2a 1 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" as compared
to "CO" approach
H2a2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as compared to "CO"
approach
H2a3 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared to "CO"
approach
H2b1 : There is a significant difference between
the ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" as
compared to "CR" approach
H2b2 : There is a significant difference between
the ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as compared to
"CR" approach
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,H2b3 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared to "CR"
approach
H2c1 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs and IAs using "CO" as compared
to "CR" approach
H2c2 .,  There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs using "CO" as compared to "CR"
approach
H2c3 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "CO" as compared to "CR"
approach
3) Whether
ICPs
achieve
COs
H3a: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve each
CO between EAs and IAs
H3b: There is a significant difference of
consensus level to achieve COs between EAs and
IAs
H3c: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of the overall internal control
system's ability to achieve each CO between EAs
and IAs
H3d1 : There is a significant difference in the
mean ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the
overall internal control system's ability to
achieve each CO amongst EAs
H3d2 : There is a significant difference in the
mean ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the
overall internal control system's ability to
achieve each CO amongst IAs
4) Level of
CR of ICPs
H4a: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of the level of CR for each ICP between
EAs and IAs
H4b: There is a significant difference of
consensus level on the ratings of CR between
EAs and IAs
H4c: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of CR for the overall internal control
system between EAs and IAs
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H4d1 : There is a significant difference in the
mean ratings of CR for each ICP and the mean
ratings of CR for the overall internal control
system amongst EAs
H4d2 : There is a significant difference in the
mean ratings of CR for each ICP and the mean
ratings of CR for the overall internal control
system amongst IAs
5) Importance
of ICPs
H5a: There is a significant difference
in the total points allocated to overall
internal control system between EAs and IAs
H5b: There is a significant difference in the
mean points for each ICP between EAs and IAs
6) Types of
controls
H6a1: There is a significant difference in the
mean weighting of "accounting" and
"administrative" control amongst EAs
H6a2 : There is a significant difference in the
mean weighting of "accounting" and
"administrative" control amongst IAs
H6b: There is a significant difference in the
mean weighting of "accounting" controls between
EAs and IAs
H6c: There is a significant difference in the
mean weighting of "administrative" controls
between EAs and IAs
H7a1 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of "accounting" and "administrative"
control for the 5 control objectives amongst
EAs
H7a2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of "accounting" and "administrative"
control for the 5 control objectives amongst
IAs
H7b: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of "accounting" controls for the 5
control objectives between EAs and IAs
H7c: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of "administrative" controls for the 5
control objectives between EAs and IAs
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H8a1 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of control risk of "accounting" and
"administrative" controls amongst EAs
H8a2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of control risk of "accounting" and
"administrative" control amongst IAs
H8b: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of control risk of "accounting"
controls between EAs and IAs
H8c: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of control risk of "administrative"
controls between EAs and IAs
Table 5.1: Summary of hypotheses on "judgement consensus"
ISSUES HB: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN
JUDGEMENT CONSISTENCY BETWEEN IAs AND EAs
1) Repeat
cases
HB1: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of case 1 and case 7 between EAs and IAs
HB2: There is a significant difference in the
variation of judgement of the 2 repeat cases
between EAs and IAs
HB31 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of case 1 and case 7 amongst EAs
HB32 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of case 1 and case 7 amongst IAs
Table 5.2: Summary of hypotheses on "judgement consistency"
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VARIABLES HC: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WITH RESPECT
TO THE FOLLOWING 7 VARIABLES LISTED BELOW
USING THE "ICQ" APPROACH
1) Experience HC1: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
experience levels using the "ICQ" approach
2) Have prof
qualifctns
HC2: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors who have
passed the professional examinations and
those that have not using the "ICQ" approach
3) Types of
qualifctns
HC3: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
"types of qualifications", i.e those who are
strong on external audit training, strong on
company accounting and strong on internal
auditing using the "ICQ" approach
4) Position
levels
HC4: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
position levels using the "ICQ" approach
2
5) Size of
firms
HC5: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors from
different size firms/ organisations using the
"ICQ" approach
6) Levels of
independence
of IAs
HC6: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs of various
"levels of independence" using the "ICQ"
approach
7) Types of
independence
of IAs
HC7: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs of different
"types of independence", i.e organisational,
competency, economic and other influences,
using the "ICQ" approach.
Table 5.3: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
"judgement consensus" (ICQ)
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VARIABLES HD: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WITH RESPECT
TO THE FOLLOWING 7 VARIABLES LISTED BELOW
USING "CR" APPROACH
1) Experience HDI: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
experience levels using "CR" approach
2) Have prof
qualifctns
HD2: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors who have
passed the professional examinations and
those that have not using "CR" approach
3) Types of
qualifctns
HD3: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
"types of qualifications", i.e those who are
strong on external audit training, strong on
company accounting and strong on internal
auditing using "CR" approach
4) Position
levels
HD4: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
position levels using "CR" approach
5) Size of
firms
HD5: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors from
different size firms/ organisations using
"CR" approach
6) Levels of
Independence
of IAs
HD6: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs
of various "levels of independence" using
"CR" approach
7) Types of
independence
of IAs
HD7: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs of different
"types of independence", i.e organisational,
competency, economic and other influences
using "CR" approach.
Table 5.4: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
"judgement consensus" (CR)
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VARIABLES HE: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS REGARDING
THE WHO HAVE AND THOSE THAT DO NOT HAVE THE
CHARACTERISTICS LISTED BELOW USING "CO"
APPROACH
1) Experience HEl: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
experience levels using "CO" approach
2) Have prof
qualifctns
HE2: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors who have
passed the professional examinations and
those that have not using "CO" approach
3) Types of prof
qualifctns
HE3: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
types of professional qualifications ,i.e
those who are strong on external audit
training, strong on company accounting and
strong on internal auditing using "CO"
approach
4) Position
levels
HE4: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of various
position levels using "CO" approach
5) Size of firms HE5: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of different
size firms/ organisations using "CO" approach
6) Level of
independence
of IAs
HE6: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs of various
"levels of independence" using "CO" approach
7) Types of
independence
of IAs
HE7: There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs with different
"types of independence", i.e organisational,
competency, economic and other influences
using "CO" approach.
Table 5.5: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
"judgement consensus" (CO)
282
VARIABLES HF: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSISTENCY LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WITH
RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING VARIABLES LISTED
BELOW
1) Experience HF1: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of various
experience levels
2) Have prof
qualifctns
HF2: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors who have
passed the professional examinations and
those that have not
3) Types of
prof
qualifctns
HF3: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of various
types of professional qualifications ,i.e
those who are strong on external audit
training, strong on company accounting and
strong on internal auditing
4) Position
levels
HF4: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of various
position levels
5) Size of
firms
HF5: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors from
different size firms/ organisations
6) Level of
independence
of IAs
HF6: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between IAs of various
"levels of independence"
7) Types of
independence
of IAs
HF7: There is a significant difference of
consistency level between IAs of different
"types of independence", i.e organisational,
competency, economic and other influences.
Table 5.6: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
"judgement consistency"
Amongst the factors that were found to have an influence
on "judgement consensus" and "judgement consistency" in
previous studies (as discussed in Chapter 4) were: a)
size of firm; b) education level; c) position level and
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d) experience level of the auditors. Specifically for
IAs, "independence of IAs" would also be examined to see
its effect on the consensus level of IAs. Only one study
(Moore, 1993) has examined the effect of "independence"
of IAs to date.
As for the judgement model of each group of auditor the
main concern is to see if the 8 ICPs and the three
covariates (educational, experience and position level)
do affect the ratings of the auditors.
5.10 DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS TO BE DONE
Parametric test was carried out on the testing of
hypotheses. Detail reasoning for its use will be
discussed in section 6.4, chapter 6.
The main statistical tests used were: a) a paired t-test;
b) analysis of variance (ANOVA) and c) analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA).
A paired t-test was done on the hypotheses that involve
one 2-level independent variable; a one-way ANOVA was
done on the hypotheses that involve more than 2-level
independent variables and ANCOVA was done on hypotheses
that involve several independent variables
simultaneously.
Consensus level was calculated by correlating the
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responses for all pairs of auditors. Consensus level for
the fl ICO n approach was calculated based on the ratings
for the 6 similar cases; the "CO" approach was calculated
based on the 40 ratings for the control objectives and
the nCR" approach was calculated based on the 8 ratings
for determining the level of control risk. A t-test based
on the consensus level was then carried out. Consistency
level was calculated by correlating the 2 repeat cases
for all pairs of auditors. Spearmen and Pearson
correlation was done to see whether the variables were
significantly related.
The judgement model of each group of IAs and EAs were
based on Kempthorne's design of h replicate of 2 8
 design.
The dependent variables were the responses on a visual
analog scale given by the auditors using the ICQ approach
and the independent variables were the 8 ICPs and the
three covariates (educational, experience and position
level). Analysis of variance with covariates using
regression approach was used in the analysis.
5.11 PHASES OF THE RESEARCH
There were roughly three phases involved in the thesis;
pilot study, list of voluntary participants with their
profiles" and primary study.
71 Profiles referred to the 3 covariates; educational, position
and experience level.
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5.11.1 "First phase"-pilot study
The draft questionnaires were sent out to 4 EAs and 4 IAs
on the 28th September 1993." The draft questionnaires
were returned in late October. Comments from the
respondents were taken into consideration and the primary
questionnaires were then prepared.
One of the comments from the pilot study was that there
is usually no internal control system that can be rated
"strong" or "very strong"." Thus, the response scale was
changed from an ordinal scale to a continuous scale with
"extremely weak" on one end and "extremely strong" on
another. Please refer to Appendix 5cii) for an
illustration. This is so because had the ordinal scale
been used, there would be a tendency that the scale
marked strong onwards would not be chosen.
In the pilot questionnaire, there was a poor response to
the questions that asked for net assets, net profit and
number of employees. The auditors were required to
provide these information by filling in a on a "blank
line" that was provided. The primary questionnaire still
72 KPMG Peat Marwick and Cattle's (Holdings) plc took part in
the pilot test.
73 The auditors were required to mark their response on a 7
point rating scale as follows:
I 	 I 	  I 	  I 	  I 	  I 	  I
extremely	 very	 weak	 adequate strong	 very extremely
weak	 weak	 strong strong
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included these questions but had provided a "range of
answers" for the auditors to put a "tick" against it in
the hope that it would encourage more response.
Comments were also obtained from an academician and a
statistician with regards to the presentation of the
questionnaire. They suggested asking the background
information first prior to the questions pertaining to
the evaluation of the internal control systems, in order
to encourage more response. The objective was to present
to the auditors the "easy" questions first before
requesting their help on the more "difficult" questions.
The primary questionnaire thus follows this format.
The other comment was to include more "open-ended"
questions so that the auditors could explain what their
views were. Thus the inclusion of 2 more "open-ended"
questions in the primary questionnaire. Please refer to
Appendix 5c(ii) for the primary questionnaire.
5.11.2 "Second phase" -list of auditors who were
willing to participate
The second phase was to send out a list to the "large'
external audit firms and organisations where the internal
audit department was thought to be quite "large" (based
on the number of auditors). The list was sent out to a
"contact person" in the firm who would then help to find
the auditors who would be willing to participate. The
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names, addresses (if different from the firm's
organisation)' and their personal information such as
their position levels in the firm, their qualifications
and length of auditing experience were also requested.
These variables were looked into as they were thought to
be most influential on the judgements of the auditors.
Please refer to Appendix 5a(i) to 5a(v) for the letters
and lists sent to both EAs and IAs.
The total number of EAs requested were at least 8
auditors each from the "partner" and "manager" levels
and at least 12 auditors from each of the "senior" and
"junior" levels and total number of IAs requested were at
least 3 auditors each from the "Head and Deputy Head of
Internal Audit" and "Audit Manager" levels and at least
6 audit ors from each of the "Senior Internal Auditor"
and "Internal Auditor" levels. The numbers varied because
it was thought there would be more EAs working in an
audit firm compared with IAs that worked in an
organisation.
The list was sent out to 17 contact persons in different
external audit firms and to 40 contact persons in
different organisations that were thought to be "medium
to large" organisations so that roughly the same number
of IAs and EAs could be obtained. The list was obtained
7 4 The contact person can help to find auditors not only in
his/ her firm but also in other divisions/ offices of the firm.
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through personal contacts of the researcher's supervisor,
as it was recognised that if the list had been sent out
at random to the firms, the response would be very
poor.' The list was sent out by the end of January 1994
and a follow-up letter was sent out in March 1994.
The contact person from each firm/ organisation had to
fill in the names of auditors who would be willing to
participate in the study. The list requires the contact
person to fill in the "length of experience, position
level and whether the auditors have passed professional
qualifications". Please refer to Appendix 5aiv) for
illustration. The number of EAs and IAs who were willing
to participate in the study was noted. This number is the
deciding factor on whether to use a "1/2 replicate of 28
design" or a "1/4 replicate of 28 design" or for that matter
whether to use a "1/4 replicate of 2 9 design".
A "1/2 replicate of 2 8 design" or a "14 replicate of 29
design", would require 128 auditors from each group and
a "1/4 replicate of 28 design" would require the use of 64
auditors .
75 Although the process of selecting which firms would be
willing to participate was "not random", the process of assigning the
questionnaires to the list of available auditors who were willing to
participate was "random". The results would therefore be from a
"random" sample. Previous researchers in this area, as discussed in
Chapter 4 have all used "sampling on availability" as they recognised
that random selection would be difficult to obtain.
289
By 20th February 1994, there were 194 IAs but only 95
EAs. Please refer to Appendix 5f 1) for the number of EAs
and IAs available for selection. An attempt was made to
seek help from further firms to participate but to no
avail. Thus a "1/4 replicate of 2 8 design" was used in this
research.
The IAs and EAs were then grouped according to the three
variables (or personal variables) and they were then
matched using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences). For example, an EA who is "very experienced",
who is "a partner" and who has "a professional
qualification" will be matched with an IA who is also
"very experienced", who is a "head or deputy head" of
internal audit and who has a "professional
qualification". Please see Appendix 5f(i) and 5f(ii) for
the grouping and selection of pairs of the 2 groups.
5.11.3 "Third phase" -primary questionnaire
By 31st March 1994, the primary questionnaires were then
mailed direct to the individual auditor (unless requested
otherwise by the contact person) so as to ensure that the
auditor would get the correct set number meant for him/
her.
The subjects were required to complete the task
individually without any discussion with one another.
They were required to complete the materials within 2 or
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3 weeks. Please see Appendix 5ci) and 5cii) for the
letter and the primary questionnaire.
5.11.3.1 Contents of the questionnaire
The response for the evaluation of cases were made on a
visual analog scale. Visual analog scale is a direct
estimation method and is designed to elicit from the
auditors a direct quantitative estimate of the magnitude
of an attribute. According to Streiner & Norman (1991),
The visual analog scale (VAS) is the essence of
simplicity- a line of fixed length, usually 100mm,
with anchors like 'no pain' and 'pain as bad as it
could be' at the extreme ends, and no words
describing intermediate positions.
(Streiner & Norman 1991, 23)
The method has been used extensively in medicine to
assess a variety of constructs; pain (Huskisson, 1974),
mood (Aitken, 1969) and functional capacity (Scott and
Huskisson, 1978), among others.
Most of the internal control evaluation research that
used ANOVA models76 had made use of a 6 point "likert
scale". These judgements were interpreted as having
"interval scale" properties, i.e, the	 auditors'
assignments of numerical values to the external audit
profiles were interpreted such that "equal distances
between the numbers assigned represented equal
differences in the strength" of internal auditing, as
76 Except for Reckers & Taylor, 1979 who made use of a
numerical point rating scale.
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represented by the profiles. However, this may not be
true. First, the descriptive phrases (e.g., "mostly
reliable") may have different meanings for different
auditors; and second any given auditor may not perceive
the intervals as being equally distant in terms of audit
strength. According to Siegel (1956, 19), it is
preferrable to use "continuous or interval data" with
ANOVA. However, Andersen (1961, 310) disagrees with
this."
Besides evaluation of cases based on the "ICQ" approach,
auditors were also required to answer a case based on the
"CR" and "CO" approach. Other questions include dSSiql2.1174Z
weights to each ICP out of 20 points according to their
relative importance. The auditors were also asked to
answer demographic and personal information about
themselves.
5.12 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A ;4 replicate of 28 based on Kempthorne's design (1952,
Table 20.5, 403) which is a factorial design was chosen
because although the number of auditors who had
volunteered to participate in the study exceeded 64, it
was less than 128 auditors.
77 For details, please refer to Norman H. Andersen. 1961.
Scales and Statistics: Parametric and Nonparametric. Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 58, No.4: 305-316.
292
In this design, all main effects and all 28, two cue,
interactions are estimable. 3 cue interactions are not
intended to be measured as previous studies have
indicated that they account for none or negligible
interaction. The design involved 63 degrees of freedom:
one degree of freedom is used in testing each of the 8
main effects and 28 two factor interactions. The
remaining 27 are to test other higher order interactions
or other explanatory factors thus totalling 63 degrees of
freedom. Combination of "Yes's" and "No's" answers for
the 64 cases according to Kempthorne's 14 replicate of 28
design are shown in Table 5.7. Please note that only case
1 follows this design. The design of the other 6 cases is
shown in Table 5.10.
Case Number 01 02 03 04 95 06 07 08
1 N N N N N N N N
2 Y Y N N N N N N
3 N N Y N Y N N N
4 N N N Y Y N N N
5 Y N Y N N N N Y
6 N Y Y N N N N Y
7 Y N N N Y N N Y
a Y N Y Y Y N N Y
9 r N N N Y Y N N
10 N Y N N Y Y N N
11 Y N Y N N Y N N
12 Y N N Y N Y N N
13 N N Y N r Y N Y
14 Y Y Y N Y Y N Y
15 N N N N N Y N Y
16 N N Y Y N r N Y
17 N Y N V N N N Y
18 Y N N Y N N N Y
19 N Y Y Y Y N N Y
20 N Y N N Y N N Y
21 Y Y Y Y N N N N
22 N N Y Y N N N N
23 Y Y N Y Y N N N
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Case Number 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
24 Y Y Y N r N N N
25 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y
26 N N N Y Y Y N Y
27 r Y Y Y N Y N Y
28 Y Y N N N Y N Y
29 N Y Y Y Y Y N N
30 Y N Y Y Y
_.
Y N N
31 N Y N Y N Y N N
32 N Y Y N N Y N
33 N Y N N Y N Y
34 Y N N N Y N Y N
35 N Y Y N N N  Y N
36 N Y N Y N N Y N
37 Y Y Y N Y
h
N Y Y
38 N N Y N Y N Y Y
39 Y Y N N N N Y Y
40 Y V Y Y N N Y Y
41 Y Y N N N Y Y N
42 N N N N N Y Y N
43 Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
44
r
Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
45 N Y Y N N Y Y Y
46 Y N Y N N Y Y
7
Y
47 N Y N N Y Y Y Y
48 N Y Y Y Y Y V Y
49 N N N Y Y N Y Y
50 Y r N Y Y N Y Y
51 N N Y Y N N Y Y
52 N N N N N N Y Y
53 Y N Y Y Y N Y N
54 N Y Y Y Y N Y
7
N
55 Y N N Y N
I
N Y N
56 Y N Y N N N Y N
57 Y N N V N Y Y Y
58 N	 . Y N Y N Y Y Y
59 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
60 Y N N N Y Y Y Y
61 N N Y V N Y Y N
62 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N
63 N N N Y Y Y Y N
64
_	
N N Y N Y Y Y N
Table 5.7: 64 combinations of the factor levels
Source: Kempthorne, 0. 1952. The Design and Analysis of
Experiments, Table 20.5, pg 403. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc.
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The purpose of using a "factorial design" is so that the
effects of a number of different variables are
investigated simultaneously. According to Cochran & Cox
(1968)
...the single-factor approach is likely to provide
only a number of disconnected pieces of information
that cannot easily be put together. In order to
conduct an experiment on a single factor A, some
decision must be made about the levels of other
factors B, C, and D, say, that are to be used in the
experiment ... The experiment reveals the effects of
A for this particular combination of B, C, and D,
but no information is provided for predicting the
effects of A with any other combination of B, C, and
D. With a factorial approach, on the other hand, the
effects of A are examined for every combination of
B, C, and D that is included in the experiment. Thus
a great deal of information is accumulated both
about the effects of the factors and about their
interrelationships.
(Cochran & Cox 1968, 151).
According to Ashton (1973),
Factorial designs are advantageous when the
objective is (1) to obtain a broad picture of the
effects of various numerous variables or (2) to
study interactions among different variables.
(Ashton 1973, 117).
The effect of various variables indicates the degree of
influence each variable has upon the final judgement.
This is also known as the "main effect" of each variable.
In the case of the internal control evaluation, it would
be the effect of the eight ICPs and the three covariates
(experience,educational and position level) on the final
rating on the "visual analog scale" by the auditors.
The effect of interactions among different variables
indicates the effect of a combination of 2 or more of the
variables upon the final judgement. This is called
295
"interaction effect". In the case of the internal control
evaluation, it would be the effect of a combination of
two or more of the independent variables (eight ICPs and
the three covariates) on the dependent variable, i.e the
final rating of the auditors on the "visual analog
scale". In other words, the importance of each
independent variable depended upon the answer given to
the other independent variables.
64 IAs and 64 EAs were chosen on a voluntary basis. Each
IA and EA will be given I set of cases (consisting of 8
cases) in addition to the rest of the questions to
answer. Thus, there will be 64 sets of cases for both
IAs and EAs to answer. Out of the 8 cases, there will be
2 repeat cases which will always be placed as case 1 and
case 7m.
78 Case 1 made use of the combination of "Yes's" and "No's"
from Kempthorne's k replicate of 2 8 design. Case 7 was the exact
duplicate of case 1 but the ICPs were arranged differently in the
hope that it would not be too obvious to the auditors that they were
"repeat cases". Thus each pair of auditors had a unique set of cases
1 and 7. The objective of having case 1 and case 7 is to test for
"judgement consistency", i.e, given 2 similar cases, would an auditor
rate the 2 cases in a similar manner? The objective of having case
1 is to determine the "judgement model" of each group of EA and IA.
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The rest of the 6 cases" were cases which could not be
found in 14 replicate of 2 8 design which is the source from
where the combination of repeat cases is taken. The
reason for choosing the 6 cases outside the model of 14
replicate of 2 8 design is to avoid making an error of
including 2 or more repeat cases in a questionnaire.
In order to camouflage the "repeat" cases, the ICPs of
the cases were placed in 3 different orders.
5.13 ORDER OF CASES 
Using a random number table (Ott,1977, Table 8 of the
Appendix, 690), the 8 ICPs were placed in the 3 different
orders as shown in Table 5.8.
79 The 6 cases were chosen based on 2 conditions:
i) the cases should consist of combinations of "Yes's" and "No's"
other than those found in Kempthorne's	 replicate of 2 8 design
ii) the number of ICPs with a "Yes's" should increase. The objective
of increasing the number of "Yes's" was to find out if the
quality of internal control system was judged based on the
"quantity" of the ICPs present and not based on the "type" of ICP
present.
All auditors had the same 6 cases included in their
questionnaire. The objective of having the 6 cases was to test
for "judgement consensus", i.e to find out whether given the same
cases, the auditors would give the same rating.
Case 4 for has all the ICPs present. The objective of having case
4 was to find out 2 things:
i) whether with all the 8 ICPs present, the auditors would
perceive the internal control system as "strong".
ii) since case 4 was presented by means of "ICQ" approach, the
rating given to it would represent the evaluation of an
internal control system using the "ICQ" approach. This rating
could then be compared to the rating given to the same
internal control system when it is presented by means of a
"CO" or a "CR" approach.
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Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Ql Time crds Q2 Task tkeepng &
pymnt
Q5 Names checked
Q2 Task tkeepng
& pymnt
Q5 Names checked Q3 Physical
security
Q3 Physical
security
Q6 Task
pyrollpreptn &
pymnt
Ql Time crds
Q4 Duties
rotated
Q7 Mgmnt reports Q2 Task tkeepng
& pymnt
Q5 Names checked Q4 Duties rotated Q8 Formal
procedures
Q6 Task
pyrollpreptn &
pymnt
Ql Time crds Q7 Mgmnt reports
Q7 Mgmnt reports Q3 Physical
security
Q4 Duties
rotated
Q8 Formal
procedures
Q8 Formal
procedures
Q6 Task
pyrollpreptn &
pymnt
Table 5.8: Three different orders of the 8 "ICPs"
Again using a random number table from the same source,
case 1,2 and 8 were placed in the first order, case 4 and
6 were placed in order 2 and case 3,5 and 7 were placed
in order 380 	 results were as shown in Table 5.9.
ORDER 1 ORDER 2 ORDER 3
case 1 case 4 case 3
case 2 case 6 case 5
case 8 case 7
Table 5.9: Three different orders of the 8 "cases"
80 Previous research (Ashton and Brown, 1980) has shown that
the "different orders" will not affect the ratings of auditors.
Please refer to Chapter 4 for details.
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5.14 METHOD OF CHOOSING THE 6 CASES 
The 6 cases were chosen so that the number of yes's
(presence of ICPs) increases. Case number 4 was a case
with all the ICPs present. The combination of the factor
levels of the 6 cases were then compared with the
combination of the factor levels of the model of h
replicate of 2 8 design (as shown in Table 5.7) so as to
avoid including the "repeat" cases in the 6 cases. Please
refer to Table 5.10 for the combination of the factor
levels for the 6 cases.
Case 2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
N N N N Y Y N N
Case 3 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
N N N N Y Y Y N
Case 4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Case 5 Q1 02 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
N N N N Y Y Y Y
Case 6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Case 8 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 5.10: Combination of the factor levels of the 6
cases
The objective of giving the same case (the repeat cases
being case 1 and 7) to the same auditor was to determine
whether they would make "consistent judgements" regarding
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the quality of the internal control system.
The objective of giving the same cases (the 6 cases being
case 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) to all the auditors was to
determine whether all the auditors would make the same
"judgement (consensus)" regarding the quality of the same
internal control system.
The objective of having case 4 (i.e with all the ICPs
present) was to determine whether the auditors would be
of an opinion that if all the 8 ICPs were present it
would indicate that the internal control system was
"strong". The other reason for having case 4 was to find
out whether the auditor would come out with the same
judgement regarding the quality of the internal control
system if asked to evaluate the internal control system
by means of a different technique or for that matter if
the same case were presented differently, i.e. by means
of "ICQ", "CO" and "CR" approach.
The 6 cases would then be given together with the 2
"repeat" cases to the 64 pairs of auditors for them to
evaluate the quality of the internal control system.
A 14 replicate of 2 8
 design is used on the assumption that
all interactions involving 3 or more factors are zero and
thus would not be determined. All main effects and 2
factor interactions are assumed to be important and are
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measurable. For further discussion please see Kempthorne
(1952, 401-403).
The combination of 8 cases for the 64 sets thus consists
of Case 1 which follows Kempthorne's h replicate of 2'
design, Case 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 were the similar cases
given to the auditors and Case 7 was a repeat of case 1
but arranged in a different sequence. For example, Set 1 
of the questionnaire, after taking the "design rules"
into consideration will be as shown in Table 5.11.
Q 1 Q2 Q3 Q4 , Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Case 1 if N N N N N N N N
Case 2 * N N N N Y Y N N
Case 3 * N N N N Y Y Y N
Case 4 * Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Case 5 * N N N N Y Y Y Y
Case 6 * N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Case 7 # N N N N N N N N
Case 8 * N N Ir N Y Y Y Y
Table 5.11: Combination of the factor levels of the 8
cases for Set 1
* "Similar" cases given to "all auditors". Case 4 has all
the ICPs present.
# "Unique" cases given to "each pair of auditors" (one EA
and one IA). Case 1 follows h replicate of 2' design.
Case 7 is a repeat case of case 1.
5.15 MATCHING PROCESS 
The various firms were assigned a number whereby the
external audit firm was given a number starting with a
"1" and the internal audit organisation was given a
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number starting with a "2". Each auditor was assigned a
number according to the page number on which their names
had been filled in. For example, if an external audit
firm was given the number 104 and the auditor who
volunteered to participate had his name filled in on page
10, then he would be assigned number 10410.
The various auditors were first of all grouped into EAs
and IAs. They were then grouped according to the 3
variables, i.e position level in firm, whether they
possessed professional qualifications and their length of
auditing experience.
The assumptions made in order to make this process
possible was to:
i)	 assume that all EAs and IAs in each position level
will behave in the same manner
ii) assume that the position levels of EAs and IAs are
the same and comprise 4 levels:
EAs	 Equivalent to
	 IAs
a) Partner	
	 >	 Head of dept/ Deputy head
of dept
b) Manager	
	 >	 Audit Manager
C) Senior	
	 >	 Senior Internal Auditor
d) Junior	
	 >	 Internal Auditor
iii) assume that IAs belonging to a position level of the
internal audit organisation will act in the same
manner as EAs belonging to the same position level
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in the external audit firm.
v) assume that auditors having professional accounting
/auditing qualifications would behave in the same
manner.
vi) assume that auditors having the same length of
auditing experience would behave in the same manner.
The length of auditing experience was classified into 3
levels, inexperienced (auditors having less than 3 years
of auditing experience); moderately experienced (auditors
having more than 3 years but less than 6 years of
auditing experience) and very experienced (auditors
having more than 6 years of auditing experience).
After the auditors were matched up acccording to the 3
personal variables/ profiles (length of experience,
position level and whether they have passed professional
qualification), there were 15 groups of EAs and 19 groups
of IAs. Please refer to Appendix 5f(i). The 64 auditors
to be chosen was dependent on the availability of EAs
since the number of EAs who volunteered was much lesser.
Thus, it had to be limited to only 15 groups.81
The auditors were then arranged in "ascending order"
81 The 4 groups of auditors which are available in IAs but not
In EAs were: (a) very experienced, audit manager, non-professional;
(b) very experienced, internal auditor, professional; (c) very
experienced, internal auditor, non-professional and (d) moderately
experienced, audit manager, non-professional. Thus, the auditors
belonging to this group of profiles could not be selected.
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based on the auditor number that they were assigned to.
For example, after selecting the auditors in the
appropriate group to be chosen, i.e, auditor number
10213, 10125 and 11401 who represent EAs and 22503, 22314
and 21718 who represent IAs, they would then be arranged
in ascending order as shown in Table 5.12.
EA IA
10125 21718
10213 22314
11401 22503
Table 5.12: Arrangement of EAs and IAs in ascending
order
After that, the auditors would be assigned the set number
randomly by means of a random number table (Ott, 1977).
An example is shown in Table 5.13.
External number Internal number Set number
10125 21718 4
10213 22314 64
11401 22503 19
Table 5.13: Assignment of set numbers to three pairs of
auditors
The same steps were done in the assignment of the 64 sets
of cases to the 64 matched pairs of auditors. Please
refer to Appendix 5f(iii).
5.16 AUDITORS' RESPONSE
The response from the auditors was quite slow. There were
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4 follow-up letters written by the supervisor and the
researcher between the periods from 29th April and 21st
July 1994. Please see Appendix 5d(i) to 5d(iv) for the
sample of the letters. Besides the letters, follow-up
calls were also made. To determine the effects of a "non-
response" bias, the method suggested by Oppenheim (1966)
was used.
... it has been found that respondents who send in
their questionnaire very late are roughly similar to
nonrespondents. We have open two methods to find out
whether and in what way a bias has been introduced:
first, by comparing respondents with nonrespondents
on the original sampling list (in terms of
geographical location, birth, sex, ... ), and second
by comparing early respondents with late respondents
(in terms of their answers to the questionnaire).
(Oppenheim 1966, 34)
In this thesis, the second method was used. The auditors
were divided into "early" and "late" responding groups
based on the date the questionnaires were received. The
questionnaires received before 31st May 1994 was grouped
as "early" respondents and those received after that date
but before 21st July 1994 (when non-random selection was
done) was grouped as "late" respondents. Their ratings to
the 8 cases were then compared. No significant difference
was found. Please refer to Appendix 5gi) for the results.
Comparison of demographic profiles of "early" and "late"
respondents through observation also showed no
differences.
After a lengthy discussion with a statistician and
several other academic staff, it was then decided that a
"random method" of selection was no longer feasible and
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the respondents who did not answer had to be substituted
by either:
a) auditors who had not been previously selected from the
list of voluntary participants. It was decided that if
there were respondents who were not able to return the
questionnaire for various reasons (has retired, on
secondment or were very busy), it was decided that the
same questionnaire set number could be sent to another
auditor in the same group as the auditors belonging to
the same group were assumed to behave in a similar
manner. This assumption had to be made in order to get
64 matched pairs so as to be able to draw some
reasonable conclusions from the data.
b) any EAs from the top 50 audit firms in UK.82
c) any IAs from the members of Institute of IAs who were
known on a personal basis by the researcher's
supervisor.
A "profile list" containing personal characteristics of
the respondents who had to fill in the questionnaire was
attached to the questionnaire requesting only persons
having that profile to fill it in. If none of the
auditors available fitted the profile, it was requested
82 List was given by IIA, which was taken from Accountancy
Magazine as at July 1994.
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that the questionnaire be returned. The letter was
addressed to the senior partner of each firm. Please
refer to Appendix 5ei) and 5e(ii) for the letter and the
profile list.
As a result of the approach we took, there were set
numbers that were answered by more than a pair of
auditors. For example, instead of being answered by one
EA and IA, the set numbers were answered by more than 1
auditor from each group. The method of choosing which
auditor to be included in the sample was by means of
firstly, the "most complete" basis . If all were
completed, then it would be on a "first received" basis.
Only by middle of December 1994, were we finally able to
obtain the 64 matched pairs of auditors." Using the same
approach as comparison of "early" and "late" respondents
as suggested by Oppenheim (1966), the answers given by
"randomly" selected and "nonrandomly" selected auditors
were compared." Again, no significant difference was
found. Please refer to Appendix 5gii) for the results.
Thus, it can be said that the method of selection that we
took was "random" at first but it had to be changed to
"non-random" later for practical reasons.
83 There were 9 extra auditors comprising 6 EAs and 3 IAs whose
response we did not include in the 64 matched pairs of auditors.
84 "Randomly" selected auditors are those whose questionnaires
were received before 21st July 1994 and "nonrandomly" selected
auditors were those whose questionnaires were received after that
date.
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5.17 SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes the research process. It
explained the inclusion of the questions in the
questionnaire and explained the operational definition of
the concepts to be measured. To sum up, there are
4 issues that are being investigated in this thesis, i.e
judgement consensus, judgement consistency, factors that
might influence judgement consensus and consistency and
judgement models of each group of IAs and EAs.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH FINDINGS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a description of the sample.
Research findings will be discussed by means of four main
issues, i.e, judgement consensus, judgement consistency,
the factors that might influence judgement consensus and
judgement consistency and judgement model of each group
of EAs and IAs. Prior to discussion of each issue, a
chart showing the statistical methods used and an overall
conclusion will be presented in the hope that it will aid
discussion. The results of this study were also compared
against the results of previous research.
6.2 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarizes the mean length and mean
range of audit experience of the auditors. Names of firms
that have participated in the research are also included.
Organisations No of
respond
-ents
Mean
age
Age
range
Mean
length
of
exper-
ience
Exper-
ience
range
102(Stoy
Hayward)
2 23 22-24 2.50 1-4
103(Clark
Whitehill)
7 31.43 27-42 8.79 5-18
104(Coopers&
Lybrand)
19 31.26 25-47 8.24 1-23
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Organisations No of
respond
-ents
Mean
age
Age
range
Mean
length
of
exper-
ience
Exper-
ience
range
108(1-lays Allan) 4 30.50 23-41 8.88 1.5-20
110(Price
Waterhouse)
8 34 28-47 11.69 6-22
113(Sam Rogoff) 3 39 34-44 17.33 5-27
114(Neville
Russell)
4 38.75 30-54 13.63 6-20.5
116(Grant
Thornton)
7 31 20-49 11.07 1-32
151(Kidsons
Impey)
1 28 28-28 7 7-7
152(Moore
Stephens)
1 22 22-22 4 4-4
153(Robson
Rhodes)
1 26 26-26 5 5-5
158(Saffery
Champness)
1 24 24-24 2 2-2
161(Hacker
Young)
2 28.50 27-30 7.50 6-9
162(Casson
Beckman)
2 30.50 24-37 9 2-16
180(Touche
Ross)
1 29 29-29 6 6-6
181(Arthur
Andersen)
1 43 43-43 14 14-14
EAs	 64	 35.45	 22-52	 9.48	 1-32
IAs	 64	 31.77	 20-54	 8.58	 1-20
Both groups	 128	 9.03	 1-32
Table 6.1 : Demographic information of EAs and "names
of external audit firms" that have participated in the
study
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Organisations No of
respond-
ents
Mean
age
Age
range
Mean
length
of
exper-
ience
Exper-
fence
range
232(Comet plc) 3 33.33 30-39 3.83 1.5-7
233(Arjo Wiggins
Appleton)
2 38 34-42 13.50 13-14
237(HM Treasury) 3 40.33 34-44 9.67 5-14
238(Girobank plc) 2 36.50 35-38 8.50 6-11
239(Leeds
Permanent Building
Society)
3 40.33 27-54 11.33 4-18
240(Legal and
General Assurance
Society Ltd)
4 28.75 26-34 5.45 3-11
241(Intervention
Board)
3 39 33-49 5.67 5-6
244(Burmah Castrol
House)
1 38 38-38 16 16-16
246(Post Office) 3 38 25-55 10 4-18
247(North West
Water Group)
5 31.80 27-39 7.10 3-10
248(Woolwich
Building Society)
3 30.33 26-34 3 1-5
249(Aire Valley
Internal Audit
Consortium)
4 32.25 24-37 9 3-12
250(Wrekin
District Council)
2 47.50 45-50 9.50 4-15
252(Lord
Chancellor's
Department)
5 40.80 36-51 9.40 5-14
253(Cattle's
Holdings plc)
2 44 42-46 20 20-20
254(Reckitt &
Colman)
2 37.50 22-53 12 10-14
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Organisations No of
respond-
ents
Mean
age
Age
range
Mean
length
of
exper-
ience
Exper-
ience
range
255(Cooperative
Bank)
2 41.50 41-42 12.50 11-14
259(Chemical
Banking
Corporation)
3 35.67 31-43 11.33 9-13
260(Portman
Building Society)
1 33 33-33 11 11-11
264(British
Waterways)
1 31 31-31 7 7-7
267(British
American Tobacco
Co.)
5 28.60 24-37 4.20 2-6
268(Devonport
Management Ltd)
1 39 39-39 18 18-18
269(Courage) 2 26 26-26 5 5-5
300(Commission for
the New Towns)
2 32.50 27-38 4.50 3-6
IAs	 64	 31.77	 20-54	 8.58	 1-20
EAs	 64	 35.45	 22-52	 9.48	 1-32
Both groups	 128	 9.03	 1-32
Table 6.2: Demographic information of IAs and "names of
organisation" of IAs that have participated in the study
As can be seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the age range of
EAs and IAs is about the same. However, there is a wide
spread of length of auditing experience amongst the
auditor; EAs' range is 1-32 and IAs' is from 1-20.
Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 summarize the position level,
experience level and professional qualifications of the
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auditors respectively.
Position EAs IAs Total
Qty %
Partner / Head or deputy head
of dept
16 16 32 25%
Manager / Audit manager 13 13 26 20%
Senior /	 Senior internal
auditor
20 20 40 31%
Junior / Internal auditor 15 15 30 24%
Total 64 64 128 100%
Table 6.3: Position level of the 64 matched pairs of
auditor
Although mainly "juniors" are involved with the actual
auditing of the payroll system, auditing is a team's
effort. Partners, managers and seniors are responsible to
oversee that the payroll system is being audited in a
correct manner. Thus, it is also the objective of this
thesis to find out if there is a consensus of views of
partners, managers and seniors with the views of "junior"
auditors regarding the quality of a given payroll system.
From Table 6.3, it can be seen that the majority of
auditors who participated in the study were in the
"senior" position level.
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Length of
experience
EAs IAs Total
Qty %
Very experienced 33 33 66 52%
Moderately
experienced
22 22 44 34%
Inexperienced 9 9 18 14%
Total 64 64 128 100%
Table 6.4: Experience level of the 64 matched pairs of
auditors
From Table 6.4, it can be seen that the majority of
auditors who participated in the study were in the "very
experienced" category.
Have
Profes-
sional
qualifi-
cation?
Types of
auditors
Total CACA CIMA CA CIPFA MIIA CIMA&
CIPFA
Yes EAs 52 2 49 1
IAs 52 3 7 15 6 20 1
Total 104 5 7 64 7 20 1
No IAs 12
EA 12
Total 24
Table 6.5: Professional qualification of the 64 matched
pairs of auditors
From Table 6.5, it can be seen that majority of EAs were
"CAs" (Chartered Accountants) and none of them had "CIMA"
qualification. IAs however were mostly MIIAs but they
also have the same qualification as EAs. It can be said
that EAs and IAs who participated in this study had quite
similar background. Figure 6.1 compare the "types of
professional qualifications" of EAs and IAs.
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Figure 6.1: Types of professional qualifications of EAs
and IAs
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Table 6.6 compares the experience level of auditors with
the number of times they have audited the payroll system
whilst Table 6.7 summarizes the number of IAs that report
to the various levels.
Experience levels Number of times EAs have
audited the payroll system
Total
1-3 4-6 6-8 8-10 >10
very experienced 1 1 2 2 26 32
moderately
experienced
2 3 1 17 23
inexperienced 2 2 1 1 3 9	 .
Total 5 6 3 4 46 64
Table 6.6: Table comparing experience level of EAs and
number of times they have audited the payroll system
It can be seen that all the respondents have experienced
auditing the payroll system before with the very
experienced auditors having audited it the most number of
times.
Reporting levels Number of
IAs
Financial controller 17
Financial controller & chief executive 3
Financial controller & audit committee 12
Financial controller ,chief executive & audit
committee
5
Financial controller,board of Directors &
audit committee
2
Chief executive 3
Chief executive & audit committee 4
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Reporting levels Number of
IAs
Chief executive,board of directors & audit
committee
2
Board of Directors & audit committee 1
Board of Directors 4
Audit Committee 12
Total 64
Table 6.7: Number of lAs reporting to the different level
of reporting (starting with the least independent)
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 summarize EAs and IAs with prior
internal and external audit experience. There were more
IAs who were EAs before as compared to EAs who were IAs
before.
Organisa-
tions
No. of
respon-
dents
EA with NO
prior IA
experience
EA with prior IA experience
Audtrno % of
length of
audit
experience
as an IA
No. of
respon-
dents
102 2 2
103 7 7
104 19 17 10416
10428
27%
80%
2
108 4 4
110 8 7 11010 5% 1
113 3 3
114 4 4
116 7 7
151 1 1
152 1 1
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Organisa-
tions
No. of
respon-
dents
EA with NO
prior IA
experience
EA with prior IA experience
Audtrno % of
length of
audit
experience
as an IA
No.	 of
respon-
dents
153 1 1
158 1 1
161 2 2
162 2 2
180 1 1
181 1 1
Total 64 61
Table 6.8: Number of EAs with and without prior
internal auditing experience
As can be seen from Table 6.8, only 3 EAs have prior
internal audit experience and their percentage of length
of audit experience as an IA ranges from 5% to 80%.
Organisa-
tions
No. of
respon-
dents
IA
with
NO
prior
EA
exper-
ience
IA with prior EA experience
Audtrno % of length of
audit exper-
fence as EA
No of
respon-
dents
232 3 2 23204 71% 1
233 2 1 23306 46% 1
237 3 2 23711 20% 1
238 2 2
239 3 2 23904 50% 1
240 4 3 24005 64% 1
241 3 3
244 1 24407 63% 1
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Organisa-
tions
No.	 of
respon-
dents
IA
with
NO
prior
EA
exper-
ience
IA with prior EA experience
Audtrno % of length of
audit exper-
ience as EA
No of
respon-
dents
246 3 3
247 5 1 24701
24704
24707
24709
90%
95%
79%
83%
4
248 3 2 24813 40% 1
249 4 3 24909 33% 1
250 2 2
252 5 3 25204
25214
21%
50%
2
253 2 2
254 2 2
255 2 2
259 3 3
260 1 26001 36% 1
264 1 1
267 5 3 26706
26712
60%
17%
2
268 1 26801 44% 1
269 2 26907
26908
80%
90%
2
300 2 1 30002 50% 1
Total 64 43 21
Table 6.9:Number of IAs with and without prior external
auditing experience
As can be seen from Table 6.9, 21 IAs have prior external
audit experience and their percentage of length of audit
experience as an EA ranges from 17% to 95%.
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As shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11, with regard to the
ability of the internal control system (ICS) in achieving
the control objectives, EAs rated it as 81.2% and IAs
rated it as 65.6%. As to the internal control system's
ability to detect or prevent material errors, EAs rated
it as 87.5% and IAs rated it as 73.4%. These figures
indicate that on the whole, the respondents had
confidence that the internal control system presented to
them was quite strong but IAs were more sceptical than
EAs.
Ability to achieve
the control
objectives
EAs IAs
Yes 81.2% 65.6%
No 18.8% 34.4%
Table 6.10: Comparison of EAs and IAs as to whether the
internal control procedures are able to achieve the
control objectives
Ability to detect
errors
EAs IAs
Yes 87.5% 73.4%
No 12.5% 23.4% #
Table 6.11: Comparison of EAs and IAs as to whether the
internal control procedures are able to detect or prevent
material errors
# 3.2% missing
6.3 THE DESIGN OF THE CASES
Chapter 5 discussed the ICPs that are included in each
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case. Below is a review of the 8 1CPs to assist
discussion. The 8 ICPs are shown in Table 6.12:
Internal control
procedure(ICP)
Content
ICP1(tcrd) Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
ICP2(tkpg) Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
ICP3(adesc) Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
ICP4(dutro) Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated?
ICP5(namck) Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee
file of the personnel department?
ICP6(pyrse) Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately
separated from the task of payroll bank
account reconciliation?
ICP7(mgtre) Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
ICP8(forpr) Are formal procedures established for
changing names, payrates and deductions?
Table 6.12: Explanation of the 8 ICPs
Throughout this thesis reference to "ICP1" or "tcrd"
would refer to the 1CP as stated in the "contents"
column. The same follows for the rest of the 1CPs.
8 cases with varying combination of the 8 1CPs were given
to each IA and EA to evaluate. The 8 cases were designed
as in Table 6.13.
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CASES Number of ICPs present
Case 1 using Kempthorne's 1/4 replicate of 28 design.
Case 2 ICP5 and 1CP6 present
Case 3 ICP5,ICP6 and ICP7 present
Case 4 ALL ICPS PRESENT
Case 5 ICP5,ICP6,ICP7 and ICP8 present
Case 6 ICP4,ICP5,ICP6,ICP7 and ICP8 present
Case 7 repeat case of case 1 (but presented in a different
order)
Case 8 ICP3,ICP4,ICP5,ICP6,ICP7 and ICP8 present
Table 6.13: Number of ICPS present in the 8 cases
Case 1 and Case 7 were repeat cases given to the auditors
in order to test for judgement consistency. A pair of
auditors (one EA and one IA) received a particular set of
case 1 and case 7 and there were 64 sets altogether which
were equivalent to 64 pairs of auditors. Each set
followed the design of Kempthorne's h replicate of 28
design. Configuration of the 64 sets of cases was shown
in Table 5.7 of Section 5.12 of Chapter 5.
A judgement model for each group of auditor was
constructed by means of ANOVA with covariates. The model
was based on case 1.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Bailey used ANOVA with
covariates as one of the means to determine the judgement
model of the auditors. However, he only took into
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account, the types of auditors (whether EA or IA),
covariate "experience" but did not take into account the
effect of the 12 ICPs in each case. In this research,
ANOVA with covariates took into account the types of
auditors, the three types of covariates; "experience,
educational and position level" as well as the effect of
the 8 ICPs.
Case 2, case 3, case 4, case 5, case 6 and case 8 were
"similar" cases given to all auditors to test for
judgement consensus. The configuration of cases was
carefully chosen so that they are not the same as those
found in Kempthorne's design, so as to avoid duplication.
6.4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Parametric tests was used in this thesis both for data
with an "interval" scale (which refers to the ratings of
the 8 cases based on the visual analogue scale) and for
data with an "ordinal" scale. Examples of these
parametric tests are the t-test and f-test. Parametric
tests are recommended for data involving "interval" data.
Conover (1971, 66) has stated that the "interval" scale
involves the concept of a unit of distance, and that the
distance between any two measurements may be expressed as
a number of units, for example, degress of the scale by
which temperature is measured. He further stated that
"ordinal" scale measurements refers to measurements where
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in essence only the comparisons "greater, less than, or
equal to" are relevant. The numeric values of the
measurements are used only as a means of arranging the
elements being measured in order from the smallest to the
largest. It is this need to "order" the elements on the
basis of the relative size of their measurements that
gives the name to the "ordinal" scale.
As can be seen in Appendix 5cii), data involving
questions 1, 3, 6b and 9b" of Section B, involved
"interval" data and thus parametric tests can
legitimately be used to examine them.
However, questions 4, 5 ,7 and 8" of Section B, involved
"ordinal data" but parametric tests were still used on
these data. This is because the researcher considered in
these cases that parametric tests had greater power and
versatility than non-parametric tests. In studying the
statistics literature, it was concluded in these cases
that the "type of measuring scale used had little
relevance to the question of whether to use parametric or
85 This questions relate to the ratings by auditors for the
8 cases and ratings of the overall internal control system using the
"CR" and "CO" approach.
" The questions relate to the ratings of ICP's and the
overall internal control system's ability to achieve the control
objectives and the ability to detect or correct material
misstatements.
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non-parametric tests" (Anderson 1961, 316)." Thus t-
tests were carried out to test the hypotheses that
involved the " ordinal" data.
Lord (1953) pointed out that:
"The statistical test can hardly be the cognizant of
the empirical meaning of the numbers with which it
deals. Consequently, the validity of a statistical
inference canot depend on the type of measuring
scale used."
Andersen (1961, 310-311) illustrated an example where two
students P and Q were assigned to investigate a process
(a ball rolling on a plane). The students made the same
observations, except that they used different measuring
scales. Both used "interval" scales; P measures the
process using "time interval" and Q measures the process
using "speed of the process" (example feet per second).
Since both of them used "interval" scales, they used
"means" and applied parametrics tests in writing up their
lab report. However, they found considerable differences
in their descriptive statistics and graphs. Anderson thus
concluded that using parametric tests on "interval" data
does not guarantee that results will be the same. The
point he was trying to make was that a research should
87 Previous research (Ashon,1974 and his followers) as
discussed in Chapter 4 had used likert scale or ordinal data but used
parametric statistics.
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not be overly concerned as to the type of data being used
before deciding to use parametric or non-parametric tests
because as he had shown applying parametric statistics on
two types of "interval" data regarding the "same
experiment" does not guarantee similar results.
Anderson (1961, 309) in fact presented an example of the
use of the F-test (which is a parametric test) with a 7
step "attitude towards church" scale (which is an ordinal
scale).
Eventhough the researcher of the study which is the
subject of this thesis could have converted the questions
that used "ordinal" data into "interval" data, it was not
thought to be appropriate in particular because doing so
would have made more difficult the task of evaluation for
the responding auditors. This is because the questions
were judgemental in nature and involved questions such as
determining the ability of ICPs to achieve control
objectives and determining whether the ICPs could detect
or correct material mistatements. Thus, weighing the pros
and cons of using "ordinal" data and bearing in mind the
arguments put forth by Anderson, the researcher
considered the use of parametric tests with "ordinal"
data to be appropriate on balance.'
However, to test whether the results from parametric and
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non-parametric tests were the same, the researcher also
conducted a "parallel" non-parametric test.
For example, besides conducting a t-test for "matched
pair" on the ordinal data, an equivalent non-parametric
test was also done using the "Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed ranked test". The results were the same for both
t-test and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests.
Please refer to Appendix 6aiv).
Cohen (1982) states,
"The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test is
appropriate ... to assess the significance of
difference between two samples consisting of matched
pairs of subjects. Matched pairs of subjects would,
of course, include two measures taken on the same
subject. The Wilcoxon test is the non-parametric
counterpart of the t-test for correlated data."
(Cohen 1982, 193-194).
Cohen (1982, 190) defines t-test for correlated data as
t-test for "two matched samples on one occasion".
In most parametric tests, one of the stated and main
assumptions is that the variable being examined has a
normal distribution. Other assumptions are based on the
type of parametric test chosen. A paired t-test and ANOVA
for example, has a further added assumption of having the
same variance between the populations investigated."
88 Hypothesis Hlb which test the variation in judgement of
the auditors for the similar cases and hypothesis HB2 which test the
variation in judgement for the repeat cases shows that the assumption
of the same variance between the population is met.
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Using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences)
"normal probability plots" were done on the difference in
mean to check on the normality assumption. Please refer
to Appendix 6a1).
Norussis (1991), suggested the use of Shapiro-Wilks and
Liliefors test as the two tests to be commonly used to
check the normality assumption. In this thesis, the
"Liliefors test" was carried out. If the test indicates
a "small observed significance level, it indicates that
the distribution is not normal". If the distribution is
normal, the "normal plot should fall, more or less, on a
straight line".
According to them,
It is almost impossible to find data that are
exactly normally distributed. For most statistical
tests, it is sufficient that the data are
approximately normally distributed.
(Norussis 1991, 102).
The plots showed that most of the times the distribution
is normal. Thus it is decided that parametric tests could
be carried out on the hypotheses.
Conover (1971, 85) supported this by saying that what is
required is "approximate normality" and not "absolute
normality".
Main method of testing hypotheses in this theses was
through a paired t-test.
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A paired sample is used because the intention is to test
a "matched pair" of IAs' and EAs' ratings. The auditors
were matched according to their length of auditing
experience, current position and whether they have
completed and passed any of the researcher's listed
professional examinations. Thus, if there is any
significant difference, it is most likely due to the
"type" of auditor, that is external or internal.
Other methods of analysis were through simple plots,
graphs, correlation, t-tests group, one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).
Graphs were initially plotted to have an overall view of
the data. Graphs comparing the 2 groups of auditors
ratings on the 8 cases were plotted. Since definite
patterns were not easily seen from the graphs, the
difference of any 2 ratings was plotted against the mean
of that 2 ratings. Please refer to Appendix 6aii).
Bland and Altman (1986, 308) suggested this idea.
A simple plot of the results of one method against
those of the other ... is a useful start but usually
all the data points will be clustered near the line
and it will be difficult to assess between-method
differences. A plot of the "difference between the
methods against their mean" may be more informative.
Besides the "plots","overlay plots" were also done to
compare the ratings of cases between IAs and EAs. Please
see Appendix 6aiii).
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6.5 DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES 
The 4 main objectives of the study were to examine:
1) whether EAs and IAs reached the same consensus as to
the quality of a given internal control system
2) whether EAs and IAs were consistent in the ratings of
two similar internal control systems
3) the effect of 7 variables on judgement consensus
and judgement consistency, and
4) the judgement model of both groups of auditors
Findings will be discussed according to these four main
issues. In order to present a clearer view of how the
four issues are going to be tested and in order to ease
understanding of discussion of findings, a chart will be
presented that depicts the "method, statistical
techniques used and the general conclusion of the tests
that have been conducted". The chart will be presented
for each issue that is tested.
6.5.1 CONSENSUS
HA: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN JUDGEMENT
CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AS A GROUP AND EAs AS A GROUP.
Agreement in the evaluation of internal controls is very
important due to increased reliance to be placed on IAs
by EAs. According to Felix and Kinney (1982,245), the
financial statement audit should be carried out using the
same process regardless of whether the auditor is
internal, independent (external) or governmental. An
integral part of the financial statement audit is the
evaluation of internal control system.
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Consensus of EAs and IAs which was the main thrust of the
study, was looked at in 6 ways (as shown in Figure 6.2):
1) consensus in the ratings of the 6 similar cases given
to both groups of auditors
2) consensus in the ratings of a case using different
techniques/ approaches of evaluation
3) consensus in the ratings of whether ICPs were able
to achieve control objectives
4) consensus in the ratings of the ability of the ICPs to
detect or correct material errors (CR)
5) consensus in the weights (i.e relative importance)
given to the ICPs and
6) consensus in the ratings and relative weights given by
the auditors to the "accounting" and "administrative"
controls.
CONSENSUS
I
i
I i i	 i i I
I I I	 I I I
I I I	 I I I
CASES TECHNIQUES WHETHER	 WHETHER IMPORTANCE ADMN
OF ICPS	 ICPS OF ICPS CONTROL
EVALUATION ACHIEVE	 ACHIEVE VS ACCTG
CONTROL	 CONTROL CONTROL
OBJECTIVES	 RISK
Figure 6.2: Summary of types of consensus examined in this study
331
6.5.1.1 Cases 
CASES
METHOD Mean ratings All 6 cases
of 6 cases
GROUP EAs vs IAs
	
EAs vs IAs
TYPES
Corr on	 Corr
the 6 similar on all
cases given to 6 cases
ALL auditors	 (avg rtg)
EAs vs IAs	 EAs & IAs
1	 1	
1
STATIS- 1.t-test pair 1.visual	 1. t-test grP	 1.Pearson's
TICAL	 -ns	 -EAs gives	 -ns	 corr
TESTS &	 a higher	 - highly
FINDINGS
	 rtg than	 - +ve
IAs	 - and sig
2.Spearmen's
corr
2.t-test paired	 - highly
-ns	 - +ve
- and sig
3.f-test of
homogeneity
of variance
-ns
CONCLUSION	 1. There is no significant difference between
consensus of EAs and IAs
2. EAs are less strict (gives a higher ratings)
on the ratings of the cases
Figure 6.3: Summary of findings on cases 
Hla: There is a significant difference in the
ratings of the 6 similar cases between EAs and IAs
A paired sample t-test	 was used on two occasions.
Firstly, to test whether the ratings given by the pairs
of auditors were the same for the 6 similar cases.
Secondly, to test whether the mean ratings for the 6
cases were similar between IAs and EAs. The results are
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as shown in Table 6.14.
a) Ratings of the 6 similar cases
CASE FINDINGS
Case 2-
ICP5 and
ICP6 present
EAs(excn2)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn2)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64	 .7163	 .539 64	 .8609	 .629 -1.49 .141
Case 3-
ICP5,ICP6
and ICP7
present
EAs(excn3)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn3)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 1.7025	 .948 64 1.6725	 .951 .19 .853
Case 4-
All ICPs
Present
EAs(excn4)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn4)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 4.7047 .679 64 4.7222	 .749 -.14 .891
Case 5-
ICP5,ICP6,
ICP7 and
ICP8 present
EAs(excn5)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn5)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 2.3903 1.113 64 2.2427
	 .971 .83 .411
Case 6-
ICP4,ICP5,
ICP6,ICP7
and ICP8
present
EAs(excn6)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn6)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 2.6577 1.011 64 2.5627 1.059 .49 .624
Case 8-
ICP3,ICP4,
ICP5,ICP6,
ICP7 and
ICP8 present
EA5(excn8)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(incn8)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 2.9094	 .967 64 2.7851	 .74 .63 .465
Table 6.14: Consensus in ratings of cases by IAs and
EAs
Conclusion: Reject Hla. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of the 6 similar cases between
EAs and IAs.
As can be seen from Table 6.14, the greater the number of
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ratings. Overall, it can be said that EAs
2 cases,
in their
were less
for case 5, case 6 and case 8. For the other
the 2 groups of auditors were quite similar
ICPs present, the higher is the mean rating for the cases
for both EAs and IAs. Thus, IAs and EAs could very well
based their ratings on the "quantity" of the ICPs
present. However, out of 128 auditors who were asked to
explain the factors they considered when rating the
cases, only one auditor who answered said that the
"number of yes's" had influenced his/ her ratings.
Figure 6.4 compares EAs i and IAs'ratings for the 6 cases.
IAs seem to have rated case 2 higher than EAs, but lower
strict (gave a higher rating) in the evaluation of the
cases.
One reason for why EAs are seen to be more lenient than
IAs could be because of IAs' preoccupation with the
compliance on the controls. Thus, they were more cautious
with giving a higher rating to the cases.
Another reason could be that IAs realizing the potential
for independence concerns, may over-compensate in such
assessments. Correspondingly, IAs may also recognize
their lack of competence in internal control evaluation
area and select the more conservative response.
Examples of answers given by repondents when asked to
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explain the factors that they considered before rating
the cases were,
"I ranked the controls in order of importance and
then assessed how these fitted into my 'extremely
weak versus extremely strong' framework, taking into
account the 'yes and no' answers given."
"I assigned rough weights to the factors".
"I matched the ICPs' ability to detect errors, such
as avoiding ghost employees..."
"Controls were prioritized on a risk basis and
weaknesses in some controls carried a greater
weighting than others."
"I took into account risk of material error, risk of
fraud, segregation of key tasks and supervisory
controls."
Other factors that the auditors took into account in
their ratings of the cases were that the controls were:
a) able to prevent fraud and error; b) ability of the
controls to achieve control objectives; c) whether there
were any compensating controls that can offset the
controls which to their mind were not effective;
d) the importance of the controls and e) whether there
were any separation of duties controls.
From the answers given by the auditors, it can be
observed that they made use of control objectives
approach and control risk (CR) approach in evaluating the
internal control system.
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Figure 6.4: Evaluation of the 6 similar cases by EAs and
IAs
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b) F-test of variation in judgement consensus of the
cases 
Hlb: There is a significant difference of variation in
judgement consensus of the cases between EAs and
IAs
The objective of this hypothesis is to find out if there
is any significant difference in the spread of the
answers of the "similar" cases between EAs and IAs.
An F-test is to compare whether the sample variance for
the 2 groups of auditors is the same and which of the 2
groups has a greater variance. At the same time, the
results from this test can help to determine whether one
of the assumptions of a t-test and ANOVA, i.e, whether
the sample variance of the 2 groups is the same can be
tested.
According to Lyman Ott (Ott 1985, 348-349), rules in
using an F-test are as follows:
(a) If F observed value =s 2 larger, is > F table value
s2 smaller
where s2 larger is the sample variance of the group
having the larger sample variance, and s2 smaller
is the sample variance of the group having the
smaller variance, then one can say that the sample
variance is different.
(b) If there is a significant difference between the 2
samples' variance, the sample variance which is
larger has a higher variability/ spread then the
sample with a lower sample variance.
To prove the hypothesis, F tests were conducted on both
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the individual cases as well as on the mean of the 6
cases.
Referring to table 4 (Ott, 1977, 662-663) with a of 0.05
of the same reference, only the F table values for the
degrees of freedom of 60 and 120 were given. Thus,
interpolation was done.
F=1.53 (dfl=df2=60) 	 and F=1.47 (df1=60 df2=120).
Thus for a degree of freedom of 63 (applicable to the
case at hand), it was calculated as follows:
0.06 	  60 df
3 df= 0.06 * 3/60 =0.003.
Thus for 63 df= 1.53 -0.003=1.527
Variable Variance Observed value Reject/AcceptH2.
Case2-EAs .291 .396 /.291 <	 1.527
-IAs .396 =1.3608 Not sig
Case3-EAs .898 .904 /.898 <	 1.527
-IAs .904 =1.0067 Not sig
Case4-EAs .460 .561	 /	 .460 <	 1.527
-IAs .561 =1.2196 Not sig
Case5-EAs 1.238 1.2387.944 <	 1.527
-IAs .944 =1.3114 Not sig
Case6-EAs 1.023 1.122 /1.023 <	 1.527
-IAs 1.122 =1.0968 Not sig
Case8-EAs .934 1.308 7.934 <	 1.527
-IAs 1.308 =1.400 Not sig
Mean	 -EAs .421 .4727.421 <	 1.527
cases -IAs .472 =1.121 Not sig
Conclusion: Reject Rib. There is no significant
difference of variation in judgement between IAs and EAs.
The results also show that the sample variance of the 2
groups are the same, thus fulfiiling one of the
assumptions of the t-test and ANOVA.
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Since the mean variance of IAs is greater than that of
EAs, it can be said that the variability of IAs is 
greater than EAs. 
c) Mean ratings of the 6 cases 
Inc: There is a significant difference in the mean
ratings of the 6 cases between EAs and IAs
Consensus in the mean ratings of cases was as follows:
EAs(exmncn)	 IAs(inmncn)
mean sd
	 n mean sd	 t val siq
64 2.5135 .649	 64 2.4743 .687	 .35 .729
Conclusion: Reject I-11c. There is no significant
difference in the mean ratings of the 6 cases between
IAs and EAs.
Mean of the difference between the pairs of auditors
ratings on the 6 cases were as follows:
Mean diff Std Dev Min Max N No of ICPs
in rtgs present
Case 2 .14 .78 2.40 1.06 64 2 ICPs present
Case 3 .03 1.29 4.03 3.37 64 3 ICPs present
Case 4 .02 1.02 2.22 3.69 64 ALL ICPs present
Case 5 .15 1.43 3.59 3.38 64 4 ICPs present
Case 6 .10 1.54 3.25 3.63 64 5 ICPs present
Case 8 .12 1.35 2.66 3.72 64 6 ICPs present
Mean difference between the pairs of auditors' ratings
showed that there was greatest consensus between pairs of
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auditors when all the ICPs were present (i.e Case 4).
However, consensus between EAs and IAs does not increase
with increase in the number of ICPs present eventhough
the mean ratings of the cases did increase with increase
in the number of ICPs present (as shown in Table 6.14).
This means to say that both groups of auditors placed
different degree of importance on the ICPs.
d) Correlation on the 6 similar cases 
Hid: There is a significant difference of the consensus
level on the cases between EAs and IAs
Previous research on internal control evaluation (Ashton,
1974; Reckers & Taylor, 1979; Hamilton & Wright, 1977;
Bailey, 1981 and others) has measured consensus by
correlating the ratings of each auditor with the ratings
of each other auditor.
In this study, each EA's ratings to the 6 cases were
correlated with every other EA's ratings to all the cases
using Pearson correlation coefficient. A mean level of
consensus was then calculated for each EA. This procedure
was repeated for all IAs. A t-test pair was then
performed to see if the mean consensus between the 2
groups of auditors was significant. The result was as
follows:
EAs(econcs)	 IAs(iconcs)
mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val siq
64 .8241 .064	 64 .8053 .099	 1.29 .201
Conclusion: Reject Hid. The test showed that there is no
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significant difference of the consensus level on the
cases between EAs and IAs. It also showed that the mean
consensus of EAs (.8241) is much higher than that of IAs
(.8053).
Although hypothesis Hlb has shown that there is no
significant difference between the spread of the ratings
of the similar cases between EAs and IAs, it is
interesting to observe the spread of their ratings by
means of a frequency distribution.
Table 6.15 summarizes the frequency distribution of the
different consensus level for EAs and IAs based on the
case ratings. The higher the consensus level, the more
the auditors agree with each other.
Consensus level EAs IAs
Number of
auditors
% Number of
auditors
0.91 -1.00
0.81- 0.90 47 73 43 67
0.71- 0.80 10 16 17 27
0.61- 0.70 7 11 2 3
0.51- 0.60 1 1.5
0.41- 0.50
0.31- 0.40
0.21- 0.30 1 1.5
0.11- 0.20
0.0- 0.10
Total 64 100 64 100
Table 6.15: Comparison of consensus level of IAs and
EAs based on the cases ratings
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It can be seen from the table that the spread of
consensus level was "tighter" for EAs than IAs. EAs'
consensus level was between .61 to .90. IAs' lowest
consensus level was .21 but with only one auditor in this
category. The rest of the auditors fall in the range of
between .51 to .90.
Table 6.16 lists down the consensus level of previous
research. As can be observed, compared with previous
research, the range of consensus in this study was much
tighter with less dispersion. The mean consensus level of
this study was also higher. Bailey did not report the
exact consensus level of EAs and IAs but reported a
relationship (measured through correlation) between EAs'
and IAs' ratings of the cases of .7468.
Previous research Avg.level of
consensus
Range of
consensus
EAs:
.70
.70
.67
.1554
.617
.66
.56(individual)
.69(2 group team)
.79(3 group team)
.06 to	 .93
Internal control evaluation
Ashton (1974)
Hamilton & Wright (1977)
Ashton & Brown (1980)
Reckers & Taylor (1979)
Gaumnitz et al (1982)
Students and others:
Internal control evaluation
Ashton & Kramer (1980)
Trotman, Yetton & Zimmer
(1983)
EAs:Other types	 of research
.373 -.687 to	 .937Joyce (1976)
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Other types of research not
in accounting:
Hoffman et al.	 (1968)-
radiologists
.38
Reliance on IAs:
Brown (1983) .70
Schneider (1985) .734
Mills	 (1993) .341
IAs and EAs: Evaluation of:
a) EDP control system-
Landry (1989) Ext EDP .49 .30 to .60
b) Cash receipts system-
Int EDP .44 .25 to .60
Bailey (1981) EA to IA .7468
Table 6.16: Summary of judgement consensus in previous
studies
6.5.1.1.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ON THE RATINGS OF
THE SIMILAR CASES 
Contrary to US findings, this research indicates that EAs
and IAs in UK shows no significant difference in their
ratings of the similar cases or in their consensus level.
There was also no significant difference in the spread of
their answers to the 6 similar cases.
A possible explanation could be a relatively more similar
educational background, and type of professional
qualifications possessed by the auditors in the UK as
shown in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.1. This must be the
subject of further research. Certainly, impressionistic
"evidence" suggests that the MBA qualification is rather
more of a standardised qualification for business in the
US whereas the professional accounting qualification to
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a large extent is the equivalent qualification in the UK.
A higher proportion of qualified CPAs in the US are more
likely to work in professional accounting practices than
their UK-accounting-qualified equivalent. A higher
proportion of IAs in the UK are likely to be
professionally qualified acountants than in the US where
a higher proportion are likely to be MBA graduates.
Furthermore, IAs who participated in the study are likely
to have behaved more like EAs because 21 IAs had prior
external audit experience and their length of audit
experience as EAs ranged from 17% to 95% as shown in
Table 6.9.
As for EAs, only 3 EAs had prior internal audit
experience and their percentage of length of audit
experience as IAs ranged from 5% to 80%.
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6.5.1.2 Techniques of evaluation
TECHNIQUES OF EVALUATION
1
I	 I
METHOD	 Mean ratings	 Mean ratings	 Mean ratings
of ICQ
	 of ICQ	 of CR
and CO	 and CR	 and CO
approach	 approach	 approach
I	 I	 I
1 
I	 1	 I	 I	 1	 1	 I	 1
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
GROUP	 EAs EAs IAs	 EAs EAs IAs	 EAs EAs IAs
TYPE	 Vs	 Vs	 Vs
IAs	 IAs	 IAs
I	 I	 I	 1	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
STATIS- 1.t-	 1.t- 1.t-
	
1.t- 1.t- 1.t-	 1.t- l.t- 1.t
TICAL	 tst	 tst	 tst	 tst	 tst	 tst	 tst tst tst
TESTS & pr	 pr	 pr	 pr	 pr	 pr	 pr pr pr
FINDINGS -ns	 -s	 -s	 -ns	 -s	 -s	 -ns -ns	 -ns
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
2.Pr* 2.Pr 2.Pr	 2.Pr. 2.Pr 2.Pr	 2.Pr 2.Pr 2.Pr
corr corr corr	 corr corr corr	 corr corr corr
coef coef coef	 coef coef coef	 coef coef coef
-ns
	
-s -ns	 -ns -s -ns	 -ns -s -s
weak	 weak	 strong strong
tve	 tve	 tve	 tve
corrn	 corrn	 corrn corrn
3.visual represen-
tation: "ICQ" showed
greater consensus
followed by "CO"
and "CR" approach
CONCLU-1. Pearson correlation coefficients for EAs, showed that the
SION	 most strongly correlated approach is "CO and CR",
followed by "ICQ and CO" and lastly "ICQ and CR".
2. When a t-test was performed, there was no significant
difference betwen EAs and IAs for all approaches. Means
that on the whole, both groups perceive the three methods
as not different from each other. However, when t-tests
were performed for each group, EAs and IAs showed that
there was a significant difference for approaches "ICQ
and CO" and "ICQ and CR", but no significant difference
was found for" CO and CR" approach.
*Pr Pearson
Figure 6.5: Summary of findings on techni ques of
evaluation 
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Different approaches or techniques of internal control
evaluation should come to the same conclusion regarding
the quality of a given internal control system. Most of
the previous research has examined the use of the "ICQ"
approach only, but there is a change in trend to turn to
other approaches as well. The two common approaches to
date are the "control objectives" approach (or the "CO"
approach referred to in this thesis) and the "control
risk" approach (or the "CR" approach referred to in this
thesis). The auditors who participated in the study also
indicate that they do use these two approaches in their
evaluation of the internal control system (as discussed
earlier in Section 6.5.1.1).
The "CO" approach requires the internal control
procedures (ICPs) in an internal control system to be
matched with the control objectives (CO) which the ICPs
can achieved. There are different levels of achievement
of control objectives and the ICP/ICPs that can achieve
the most control objectives is said to be the most
important in an internal control system. Please refer to
section 2.8.2, chapter 2 for further details.
The "CR" approach makes use of the audit risk model where
an auditor has to ascertain the level of audit risk first
before the auditor embarks on any audit. The components
of an audit risk model are control risk, inherent risk
and detection risk as discussed in Section 2.8.3 in
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Chapter 2. The auditor is required to determine the
control risk of an internal control system before the
auditor can say that the internal control system is
satisfactory. Control risk is the risk that the internal
control system is not able to detect or prevent any
material errors from occurring. The "higher" the ability
of the internal control system in preventing or detecting
fraud, the "lower" the control risk" is.
Thus, the current study examined whether the auditors
would come out with the same conclusion about the quality
of a given internal control system, using the three
different techniques of evaluation, and which of the
technique gave the highest consensus.
As discussed earlier, case 4 represents the "ICQ"
approach because it represents a situation where all the
8 ICPs are present, which is similar to the case being
evaluated by means of the "CO" and "CR" approach.
al) Ratings using ICQ as compared with CO approach
between EAs and IAs 
H2al :There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" as compared with
"CO" approach
The difference in ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" is
compared with difference in ratings of EAs and IAs using
"CO"for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. The result
is as follows:
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ICQ(exindicq)
	 CO(exindco)
mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val 
64 -.0175 1.016
	
64	 .1252	 1.466	 -.71	 .482
Conclusion: Reject H2al . There is no significant
difference in the ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" as
compared with "CO" approach.
a2) Ratings using ico as compared with CO approach
amongst EAs 
H2a2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CO"
approach
ICO(exicq)	 CO(exco)
	
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val siq
	
64	 4.7047	 .679	 64	 3.5028	 .947	 10.11 .000
Conclusion: Accept H2a2 . There is a significant
difference in the ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as
compared with "CO" approach.
a3) Ratings using ICQ as compared with CO approach
amongst IAs 
H2a3 :There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CO"
approach
ICQ(inicq)
	
CO(inco)
mean
	
sd	 mean	 sd	 t val siq
•
64	 4.7222	 .749	 64	 3.3777
	 .919	 9.69 .000
Conclusion: Accept H2a3 . There is a significant difference
in the ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CO"
approach.
348
bl) Ratings using ICO as compared with CR approach
between EAs and IAs 
H2b1 :There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ" as compared with
"CR" approach
ICQ(exindicq)	 CR(exindcr)
mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 siq
64	 -.0175	 1.016 64	 .1959	 1.477 -1.04	 .302
Conclusion: Reject H2bi . There is no significant
difference in the ratings of EAs and IAs using "ICQ"
as compared with "CR" approach.
b2) Ratings using ICQ as compared with CR approach
amongst EAs 
H2b2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CR"
approach
ICO(exicq)
	 CO(excr)
	
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 siq
64 4.7047 .679 64 3.6016 .820 10.16 .000
Conclusion: Accept H2b2 . There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CR"
approach.
b3) Ratings using ICQ as compared with CR approach
amongst.IAs 
H2b3 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CR"
approach
ICQ(inicq)
	 CO(inco)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val siq
64	 4.7222 .749
	
64	 3.4056 1.071
	 8.45 .000
Conclusion: Accept H2/3 3 . There is a significant difference
in the ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as compared with "CR"
approach.
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cl) Ratings using "CO" as compared with "CR" approach
between EAs and IAs 
H2c1 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs and IAs using "CO" as compared with
"CR" approach
CO(exindco)	 CR(exindcr)
	
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 siq
	
64	 .1252	 1.466	 64	 .1959	 1.477	 -.68	 .497
Conclusion: Reject H2c1 . There is no significant
difference in the ratings of EAs and IAs using "CO"
as compared with "CR" approach.
c2) Ratings using CO as compared with CR approach 
amongst EAs 
H2c2 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of EAs using "CO" as compared with "CR"
approach
	
ICQ(exco)	 CO(excr)
	
mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val siq
64 3.5028 .947 64 3.6016 .820 -1.37 .175
Conclusion: Reject H2c2 . There is no significant
difference in the ratings of EAs using "CO" as compared
with "CR" approach.
c3) Ratings using CO as compared with CR approach
between IAs 
H2c3 : There is a significant difference in the
ratings of IAs using "CO" as compared with "CR"
approach
ICQ(inco)
	
CO(incr)
mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 siq
64 3.3777 .919 64 3.4056 1.071 -.40 .694
Conclusion: Reject H2c3 . There is no significant
difference in the ratings of IAs using "CO" as compared
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with "CR" approach.
Thus it can be said that the EAs and IAs view all the
three approaches to be quite similar. However, for a
group of auditors, be it EAs or IAs, the group only views
"CO and CR" approach to be quite similar compared with
"ICQ and CO" and "ICQ and CR" approach.
To examine how strongly the variables were correlated,
Pearson correlation was calculated since it involves a
continuous variable.
Approach/ Pearson corr.coef
Techniques of evaluation
EAs As
/CQ and CO .3524* .1251
ICQ and CR
	
•
.3394* .0955
CO and CR .7964** .8494**
Table 6.17: Coefficient correlation comparing the three
different techniques of evaluation
* signif at .01 level	 ** signif at .001 level
From the table it can be seen that the approaches "ICQ
and CO" and "ICQ and CR" are weakly correlated for the
group of EAs but are not related at all for the group of
IAs. However, there is a strong and significant
relationship for the approach "CO and CR" for each group
of auditors.
The reason for this could be that EAs have more practice
in the use of these approaches in their audit work and
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are more aware of the internal control evaluation
techniques that exist to date, and their potential.
While internal control evaluation is at the heart of the
purpose of internal audit (while being only a means to a
different end for the EA) in general, most of the most
sophisticated tools for internal control evaluation have
been, and are being, developed and used within external
audit firms rather than within internal audit functions.
The research believes this to be a function of the much
greater level of resources available for technical
research, development and training in the large firms of
public accountants compared with the almost infinitely
smaller internal audit function. Furthermore, the well
developed practice of recruiting into the big firms of
public accountants direct from universities and then
investing heavily in the development and training of
those recruits means that EAs may be more open to
training needs than may be internal audit functions.
Figure 6.6 compares the evaluation of the internal
control system using different techniques of evaluation
between EAs and IAs. As can be seen from the graph,
their ratings are most closely related using the "Iar
approach, followed by the "CO" approach and lastly by the
"CR" approach.
This could be due to the fact that°ICetechnique were
the initial technique used in the evaluation of internal
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control before the "CO" approach became popular in early
1980s and the "CR" approach which was used in the late
1980s. Please refer to Chapter 2 for a detail discussion
of these three techniques. The 1990s, also saw the
development of other techniques that could be used for
internal control evaluation such as the use of "Chernoff
faces" or the use of "computer programs".
Because of this, the auditors may have associated the
"CR" and "CO" techniques closely than they would have
done with the "ICQ" and these two methods.
6.5.1.2.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON TECHNIQUES OF
EVALUATION
As discussed earlier, figure 6.6 (on page 355) also shows
that EAs and IAs were closest in their ratings (in
agreement) using "ICQ" technique, followed by 'CO"
technique and then "CR" technique. Familiarity with "ICQ"
and "CO" techniques better than "CR" technique could have
contributed to this based on when the techniques were
introduced.
Another reason could be that amongst the 3 techniques,
"CR" technique is the most "subjective" technique and
hence resulted in the least agreement between EAs and
IAs.
As one respondent said,
"This question is too subjective . . . risks as
defined are 'too subjectively put'."
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Another reason could be that EAs and IAs might have
different views of what is considered as "material
errors". As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.8.3.1, the
materiality levels of EAs and IAs might also differ; IAs'
materiality level being much lower than EAs'.
Figure 6.6 shows that no matter what technique was used,
EAs always gave a higher rating than IAs. EAs' leniency
in ratings could also be observed in Figure 6.4. Thus,
EAs could be said to be more lenient in their ratings
than IAs.
Looking at each group of auditor, there was a significant 
difference in the ratings of the case for each group of
EA and IA using "ICQ and CO" and "ICQ and CR" technique
though there was no significant difference between "CO
and CR" technique. This again confirms that each group of
auditor thinks that there is a relationship between "CO
and CR" technique.
Results from pearson correlation coefficient shows that
there is a weak significant correlation for EAs' ratings
of the case using "ICQ and CR" and "ICQ and CO" technique
but showed no relationship for IAs. Again, it could be
due to the fact that EAs were more familiar with the
techniques of internal control evaluation as compared to
IAs.
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Figure 6.6: Evaluation of internal control system using
different techniques of evaluation by EAs
and IAs
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6.5.1.3 Whether internal control procedures (ICPs) and 
internal control system (ICS) achieve control 
objectives (CO) 
WHETHER INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES(ICPS) AND ICS ACHIEVE
CONTROL OBJECTIVES(CO)
METHOD	 Mean rtgs Corr on Rtgs	 Mean rtgs
on each 40 rtgs# on overall	 on each
ICP's	 Internal	 ICP Vs
ability	 Control	 rtgs on
to achieve	 System's(ICS) overall
each CO	 ability to	 ICS's ability
achieve	 to achieve
each CO	 each CO
7-1-1
I	 I
GROUP	 EAs Vs
	
EAs Vs	 EAs Vs	 EAs	 IAs
TYPES	 IAs	 IAs	 IAs	
I	 I
I	 I
STATISTICAL 1.t-tst
	
1.t-tst 1.t-tst 1.t-tst 1.t-tst
TESTS &
	
pair	 group	 pair	 pair	 pair
FINDINGS
	 -7 out	 -s	 -ns	 -s	 -s
of 40
is s.
	
2.sprmn 2.sprmn 2.sprmn
corr	 corr	 corr
-ns	 -all	 -all
s except	 s
"Existence"
2.visual	 objective
representation-
EAs think ICP
less able to
achieve COs but
ICS more able
to achieve COs
CONCLUSION 1.Using corr as a measure of consensus, it was found that
there was a significant difference between the
consensus level of EAs and IAs.
2. Both groups of auditors agreed as to which CO could
be achieved by the overall internal control system.
3. There was a significant difference between the mean
ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve each CO and
the ratings of the overall internal control system's
ability to achieve each CO.
# 40 rtgs=8 ICPs * 5 CO. Missing cases were substituted with the mean
rtgs.
Figure 6.7: Summary of findings on achievement of control 
objectives (CO) 
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ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve each CO
between EAs and IAs
This hypothesis will test all 8 ICPs over the five
control objectives (i.e, completeness, existence, rights
and obligations, presentation and disclosure and
valuation).
Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Completeness objective
1.Time cards and other
source documents are
checked before
processing by the
payroll department for
casts and calculations.
EAs(ecompa)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(icompa)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
.15863 3.2063	 1.743 63 3.6190 1.475 -1.43
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and payment
of employees are
adequately separated
from the task of payroll
preparation.
EAs(ecompb)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(icompb)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64	 2.4531 1.321 64 2.6250 1.442 -.68 .499
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
EAs (ecompc)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(icompc)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
64 1.9219	 1.301 64	 2.1406 1.446 -.85 .398
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll
are rotated.
EAs(ecompd)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(icompd)
n	 mean
	 sd t val sig
.16164 2.0469	 1.147 64 2.3594	 1.252 -1.42
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against the
active employee file of
the personnel
department.
EAs(ecompe)
n	 sd_mean
IAs(icompe)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
.63363 3.2063	 1.788 63	 3.0635 1.684 .48
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Completeness objective
6.The tasks of both EAs(ecompf) IAs(icompf)
payroll preparation and
payment of employees are
n mean sd n mean sd t val sig
adequately separated
from the tasks of
payroll bank account
reconciliation.
62 2.5484 1.554 62 3.0323 1.536 -1.98 .052
7. Management reports EAs(ecompg) IAs(icompg)
are used to monitor the
reliability of payroll
n mean sd n mean sd t val sig
data through comparisons
with budget and
following up of variance
reports.
62 4.0161	 1.166 62 3.7419 1.402 1.19 .240
8. Formal procedures are EAs(ecomph) IAs(icomph)
established for changing
names, pay rates and
n mean sd n	 mean sd t val sig
deductions. 62 3.0323 1.708 62 3.3548 1.651 -1.06 .291
Table 6.18a: Achievement of "completeness" control
objectives by the ICPs
*significant at p < 0.05.
Eventhough there is a significant difference as to achievement
of completeness objective by ICP6, overall there is no
significant difference between the ratings of each ICP's
ability to achieve "completeness" objective between EAs and
IAs.
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Existence objective
1. Time cards and other
source documents are
checked before
processing by the
payroll department for
casts and calculations.
EAs(eexisa)	 IAs(iexisa)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
63	 2.9683 1.534 63	 2.8571	 1.795 .42	 .673
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and payment
of employees are
adequately separated
from the task of
payroll preparation.
EAs(exisb)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(iexisb)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
64 3.6250 1.558 64	 3.8125	 1.680 -.61	 .543
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
EAs(eexisc)
n	 sd_mean
IAs(iexisc)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
64 3.4375 1.622 64 3.2500 1.633 .62	 .537
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll
are rotated.
EAs(eexisd)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(iexisd)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 six
64 2.9219 1.276 64 2.9688 1.553 -.17	 .864
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
EAs(eexise)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(iexise)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
63 5.1587 1.234 63 5.2698 1.483 -.45	 .657
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation.
EAs(eexisf)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(inexisf)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
62 2.6935 1.532 62 3.0968 1.739 -1.37
	 .176
7. Management reports
are used to monitor the
reliability of payroll
data through
comparisons with budget
and following up of
variance reports.
EAs(eexisg)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(iexisg)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
62 3.4032 1.207 62	 3.5806 1.499 -.69	 .492
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Internal control
	
Existence objective
procedures (ICPs)
8. Formal procedures EAs(eexish) IAs(iexish)
are established for n mean sd n mean sd t val	 sig
changing names, pay
rates and deductions. 62 3.5484 1.616 62 4.2258 1.583 -2.27.027*
Table 6.18b: Achievement of "existence" control objectives by
the ICPs
*significant at p < 0.05.
Eventhough there is a significant difference as to
achievement of existence objective by ICP8, overall
there is no significant difference in the ratings of each ICP's
ability to achieve "existence" objective between EAs and IAs.
Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Presentation and Disclosure
1.Time cards and other
source documents are
checked before
processing by the
payroll department for
casts and calculations.
EAs(epredisa)	 IAs(ipredisa)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
63	 1.8413	 .937 63 2.4127 1.328	 -2.64	 .011*
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and payment
of employees are
adequately separated
from the task of
payroll preparation.
EAs(epredisb)	 IAs(ipredisb)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
64 1.8281	 1.176 64 2.5000 1.425 -3.00 .004*
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
EAs(epredisc)	 IAs(ipredisc)
n	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig_mean
64	 1.5781 1.066 64 1.9063 1.109 -1.77	 .081
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll
are rotated.
EAs(epredisd)
	 IAs(ipredisd)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 siK
64 1.6250 .845 64 2.2969 	 1.256 -3.74 .000*
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Presentation and Disclosure
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
EAs(epredise)
n	 mean	 sd n
63
IAs(ipredise)
mean	 sd t val slg
.10963	 1.6032	 1.129 1.8889	 .952 -1.62
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation.
EAs(epredisf)
n	 mean	 sd n
62
IAs(ipredisf)
mean	 sd t val.
1
sig	 4
62	 1.9839 1.248 2.6774 1.388 -3.00
4
.004*	 4
7. Management reports
are used to monitor the
reliability of payroll
data through
comparisons with budget
and following up of
variance reports.
EAs(epredisg)
n	 mean	 sd n
62
IAs(ipredisg)
mean	 sd t val sig
62 3.6452 1.590 3.8065 1.389 -.54 .590
8. Formal procedures
are established for
changing names, pay
rates and deductions.
EAs(epredish)
n	 mean	 sd n
62
IAs(ipredish)
mean	 sd t val sig
62 2.0161 1.443 3.2581	 1.514 -4.42 .000*
Table 6.18c: Achievement of "presentation & disclosure" control
objectives by the ICPs
*significant at p < 0.05.
Overall, there is a significant difference in the
ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve "presentation
and disclosure" objective between EAs and IAs with the
exception of ICP3, ICP5 and ICP7.
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Rights and Obligations objective
1. Time cards and other
source documents are
checked before
processing by the
payroll department for
casts and calculations.
EAs(ertsoba)
n	 mean	 sd n
63
.IAs(irtsoba)
mean	 sd t val sig
63 2.2857 1.313 2.5714 1.456 -1.15 .254
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and payment
of employees are
adequately separated
from the task of
payroll preparation.
EAs(ertsobb)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(irtsobb)
mean	 sd t val sig
64 3.1250 1.548 3.6719 1.634 -1.81 .076
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
EAs(ertsobc)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(irtsobc)
mean	 sd t val sig
.26864 3.0000 1.553 2.6719	 1.691 1.12
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll
are rotated.
EAs(ertsobd)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(irtsobd)
mean	 sd t val sig
64 2.4063 1.137 2.6719 1.248 -1.29 .201
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
EAs(ertsobe)
n	 mean	 sd n
63
IAs(irtsobe)
mean	 sd t val Lig
1.00063 3.2540 1.713 3.2540 1.657	 .00
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation.
EAs(ertsobf)
n	 mean	 sd n
62
IAs(irtsobf)
mean	 sd t val sig
62 2.7419 1.342 3.4194 1.532 -2.60 .012*
7. Management reports
are used to monitor the
reliability of payroll
data through
comparisons with budget
and following up of
variance reports.
EAs(ertsobg)
n	 mean	 sd n
62
IAs(irtsobg)
mean	 sd t val sig
62 3.1129 1.356 3.2258
	 1.476 -.44 .662
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Rights and Obligations objective
Formal EAs(ertsobh)	 IAs(irtsobh)procedures
are established for
changing names, pay
rates and deductions.
mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val
62	 3.8871	 1.472 62	 3.6129 1.540	 1.13	 .265
Table 6.18d: Achievement of "rights & obligations" control
objectives by the ICPs
*significant at p < 0.05.
Overall, there is no significant difference in the
ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve "rights and
obligation" objective between EAs and IAs with the
exception of ICP6.
Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Valuation objective
1. Time cards and
other source documents
are checked before
processing by the
payroll department for
casts and
calculations.
EAs(evala)	 IAs(ivala)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd t val	 siK
63	 4.8413 1.537 63	 4.9206 1.451 -.29	 .770
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
task of payroll
preparation.
EAs(evalb)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivalb)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
64	 3.1719 1.316 64 3.2656 1.566 -.38	 .704
•
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
EAs(evalc)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivalc)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 gig
64	 2.4375 1.367 64 2.6875 1.622 -.91	 .364
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Valuation objective
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll
are rotated.
EAs(evald)	 IAs(ivald)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
64	 2.3125 1.153 64	 2.5469 1.284 -1.12	 .268
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
EAs(evale)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivale)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
63	 1.9524 1.288 63	 2.3175 1.584 -1.50	 .138
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation
and payment of
employees are
adequately separated
from the tasks of
payroll bank account
reconciliation.
EAs(evalf)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivalf)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
62	 2.8226 1.635 62	 2.7903 1.590 .12	 .906
7. Management reports
are used to monitor
the reliability of
payroll data through
comparisons with
budget and following
up of variance
reports.
EAs(ivalg)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivalg)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 lig
62	 3.8065 1.316 62 3.6774	 1.400 .54	 .592
8. Formal procedures
are established for
changing names, pay
rates and deductions.
EAs (evalh)
n	 mean sd
IAs(ivalh)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
62	 3.9194 1.334 62	 3.9194 1.516 .00	 1.000
Table 6.18e: Achievement of "valuation" control objective by
the ICPs
*significant at p < 0.05.
There is no significant difference between the ratings of each
ICP's ability to achieve valuation objective between EAs and
IAs.
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Conclusion: Reject H3a. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of each ICP's ability to
achieve control objective between EAs and IAs. Only 7 out
of 40 ratings are significant. Five of the significantly
different ones relate to the achievement of "presentation
and disclosure" objective, one relates to "rights and
obligation objective" and one relates to "existence"
objective. EAs and IAs seem to agree on the achievement
of the rest of the objectives.
b) Correlation on the 40 ratings 
H3b: There is a significant difference of consensus
level on the ability of each ICP to achieve each CO
between EAs and IAs
Similar to the consensus level on the cases, EA's ratings
on the 40 control objectives were correlated with every
other EA's ratings on all the 40 ratings using Pearson
correlation coefficient. A mean level of consensus was
then calculated for each EA. This procedure was repeated
for all IAs. A t-test pair was then performed to see if
the mean consensus between the 2 groups of auditors was
significant. The result was as follows:
EAs(econco)	 IAs(iconco) 
n	 mean	 sd	 n mean sd	 t val siq
64	 .3278 .069	 64 .2313 .087	 6.94 .000
Conclusion: Accept H3b. There is a significant difference
of consensus level on the ability of each ICP to achieve
each CO between EAs and IAs.
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c) ratings of internal control system's (ICS) ability to
achieve CO
H3c: There is a significant difference in the ratings on
the overall internal control system's ability to achieve
each CO between EAs and IAs
INTERNAL
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness
EAs(ecompal)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(icompal)
mean	 sd t val Big
64	 4.4688 1.054 4.2500 1.098 1.04 .300
CO2-
Existence
EAs(eexisal)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(iexisal)
mean	 sd t val sig
64	 4.8594 1.006 4.7344 1.198 .64 .526
CO3-
Presentation
& Disclosure
EAs(epredisal)
n	 mean	 sd n
63
IAs(ipredisal)
mean	 sd	 t val gig
.06263	 3.2698 1.347 3.6508 1.003 -1.90
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
EAs(ertsobal)
n	 mean	 sd n
64
IAs(irtsobal)
mean	 sd	 t val sig
64	 4.1406 1.006 4.0469 1.061 .53 .600
CO5-
Valuation
EAs(evalal)
n	 mean	 sd n
63
IAs(ivalal)
mean	 sd t val sig
63	 4.7619 1.132 4.3651	 1.222 1.74 .087
Table 6.19: Consensus in ratings of overall internal
control system in achieving the control
objectives
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Reject H3c. There is no significant
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difference in the ratings of the overall internal control
system's ability to achieve each CO between EAs and IAs.
To examine further to see whether there is a relationship
between how well the overall internal control system can
meet the internal control objectives between EAs and IAs
a spearmen correlation was carried out because it
involves "ordinal" data.
CONTROL OBJ.(CO) FINDINGS
C01-Completeness.
Overall internal control system
can achieve this objective
(ecompal by icompal).
n
64
spearm.	 t val	 sig
corr.coef.
-.14901	 -1.18654.23994
CO2-Existence
Overall internal control system
can achieve this objective
(eexisal by iexisal).
n
64
spearm.	 t val sig
corr.coef.
.94219.00925	 .07282
CO3- Presentation & Disclosure
Overall internal control system
can achieve this objective
(epredisal by ipredisal).
n
63
spearm.
	
t val sig
.37948
corr.coef.
.11263	 .88529
C04-Rights & Obligations
Overall internal control system
can achieve this objective
(ertsobal by irtsobal).
n
64
spearm.	 t val sig
corr.coef.
.60509.06586	 .51975
CO5-Valuation
Overall internal control system
can achieve this objective
(evalal by ivalal).
n
63
spearm.	 t val sig
corr.coef.
.22173-.15613	 -1.23455
Table 6.20: Correlation in ratings of EAs and IAs on
how well the overall internal control system can achieve
the control objectives.
*significant at p < 0.05.
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There is no significant correlation between the ratings
of EAs and IAs regarding the ability of the overall
internal control system in achieving the five COs.
dl) Mean ratings of each internal control procedure (ICP) 
and the ratings of the overall internal control 
system in achieving each control obiective (CO) 
Hall :There is a significant difference in the mean
ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the overall
internal control system's ability to achieve each CO
amongst EAs
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness
Mean ICP
(emncomp)
n	 mean sd n
61
Overall ICS
(ecompal)
mean	 sd
l
t val	 sig
61 2.7602 .930 4.4918 1.074 -11.33	 .000*
CO2-
Existence
Mean ICP
(emnexis)
n	 mean sd n
61
Overall ICS
(eexisal)
mean	 sd
(
t val	 sig
61	 3.4590 .807 4.8852 1.018 -9.73	 .000*
CO3-
Presentation
& Disclosure
Mean ICP
(emnpredis)
n	 mean sd n
60
Overall ICS
(epredisal)
mean	 sd t val	 sig
60	 2.0104 .745 3.3000 1.357 -9.61	 .000*
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
Mean ICP
(emnrtsob)
n	 mean sd n
61
Overall ICS
(ertsobal)
mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 2.9693 .839 4.1639 1.019 -9.53	 .000*
CO5-
Valuation
Mean ICP
(emnval)
n	 mean sd n
60
Overall ICS
(evalal)
mean	 sd t val	 sig
60 3.1125 .788 4.8000 1.147 -12.85	 .000*
Table 6.21: Consistency in ratings of EAs on how well
ICP and the overall internal control system can achieve
the control objectives
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Accept H3d 1 . There is a significant difference
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in the mean ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the
overall internal control system's ability to achieve each
CO amongst EAs.
To examine further to see whether there is a relationship
between how well the ICPs can meet control objectives and
how well the overall internal control system can meet the
control objectives, a spearmen correlation was carried
out.
CONTROL OBJ.(CO) FINDINGS
C01-Completeness.
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP" is
related to	 the achievement of
this objective by the "overall
ICS"(emncomp by ecompal).
n
61
spearm.	 t val sig
corr.coef.
.27973	 2.23862 02901*
CO2-Existence
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP" is
related to	 the achievement of
this objective by the "overall
ICS"(emnexis by exisal).
n
61
spearm.	 t val	 sig
corr.coef.
.20863	 1.63860 .10662
CO3- Presentation & Disclosure
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP" is
related to	 the achievement of
this objective by the "overall
ICS"(emnpredis by epredisal).
n
60
spearm.	 t val	 sig
corr.coef.
.61739	 5.97702	 .00000*
C04- Rights & Obligations
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP" is
related to	 the achievement of
this objective by the "overall
ICS"(emnrtsob by ertsobal).
n
61
spearm.	 t val	 sig
corr.coef.
.42419	 3.59798	 .00066*
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n spearm. 	 t val 
corr.coef. 
60 .50874	 4.50036 0.00003*
CO5- Valuation
How well the achievement of
this objective by "mean IC?" is
related to the achievement of
this objective by the "overall
ICS"(emnval by evalal).
Table 6.22 : Correlation in ratings of EAs on how well
ICP and the overall internal control system can achieve
the control objectives
*significant at p < 0.05.
Overall, the results show that there is a significant but
weak correlation (except for "existence" objective)
between the mean ratings of each CO and the overall
internal control system between EAs and IAs.
H3d2 : There is a significant difference in the mean
ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the overall
internal control system's ability to achieve each CO
amongst IAs
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness
Mean ICP
(imncomp)
n	 mean sd
Overall ICS
(icompal)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
61	 2.9672 .842 61 4.2131
	 1.097 -8.50 .000*
CO2-
Existence
Mean ICP
(imnexis)
n	 mean sd
Overall ICS
(iexisal)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
61	 3.6598 .839 61 4.7705 1.203 -8.84 .000*
CO3-
Presentation
& Disclosure
_
Mean IC?
(imnpredis)
n _mean sd
Overall ICS
(ipredisal)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
60 2.5833 .614 60 3.6500 1.022 -7.80 .000*
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CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
Mean ICP
(imnrtsob)
n	 mean sd n
61
Overall ICS
(irtsobal)
mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 3.1475 .906 4.0984 1.060 -6.83	 .000*
CO5-
Valuation
Mean ICP
(imnval)
n	 mean sd n
60
Overall ICS
(ivalal)
mean	 sd t val	 sig
60	 3.2333 .753 4.3667 1.248 -6.89	 .000*
Table 6.23: Consensus in ratings of IAs on how well ICP
and the overall internal control system can achieve the
control objectives
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Accept H3d2 . There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of each ICP and the ratings of the
overall internal control system's ability to achieve each
CO amongst IAs .
To examine further to see whether there is a relationship
between how well the ICPs can meet the control objectives
and how well the overall internal control system can meet
the control objectives a spearmen correlation was carried
out.
CONTROL OBJ.(CO) FINDINGS
C01-Completeness.
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP"
is related to the achievement
of this objective by the
"overall ICS" (imncomp by
icompal).
n
61
spearm. t val sig
corr.coef.
2.87008 .00569*.35002
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CONTROL OBJ.(CO) FINDINGS
CO2-Existence
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP"
is related to the achievement
of this objective by the
"overall ICS" (imnexis by
iexisal).
n
61
spearm.	 t val six
.00001*
corr.coef.
.53227
	 4.82940
003- Presentation &
Disclosure
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP"
is related to the achievement
of this objective by the
"overall ICS" (imnpredis by
ipredisal).
n
60
spearm.	 t val siK
.05035*
corr.coef.
.25383	 1.99860
C04- Rights & Obligations
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP"
is related to	 the
achievement of this objective
by the "overall ICS"(imnrtsob
by ipredisal).
n
61
spearm.	 t val six
.00134*
corr.coef.
.40150	 3.6726
CO5-Valuation
How well the	 achievement of
this objective by	 "mean ICP"
is related to the achievement
of this objective by the
"overall ICS"(imnval by
ivalal).
n
60
spearm.	 t val sig
corr.coef.
.02955*.28115	 2.23117
Table 6.24: Correlation in ratings of IAs on how well
ICP and the overall internal control system can achieve
the internal control objectives
*significant at p < 0.05.
Overall, there is a significant but weak correlation
between the mean ratings of each ICP and the overall
internal control system's ability to achieve all the
objectives.
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Thus from table 6.20, 6.22 and 6.24, it can be seen that
there is no relationship between lAs' and EAs' ratings of
the ability of the internal control system to achieve the
control objectives, but there is a weak relationship
between mean IC? (average ratings of all ICPs) and the
internal control system's ability to achieve each control
objective amongst EAs and IAs.
Figure 6.8 (on page 375) compares the evaluation of
whether ICPs can meet control objectives and whether the
overall internal control system can achieve the control
objectives. It can be seen that the EAs think that each
ICP is less able to achieve the control objectives but
that the overall internal control system can achieve the
control objectives better than IAs. The opposite is true
for IAs. Both EAs and IAs do not seem to think that each
ICP's ability to achieve each control objective is
related to the overall internal control sytem's ability
to achieve each control objective.
The same analogy could be made through the findings by
Joyce (1976). Contrary to expectation (that is, the
number of budgeted hours allocated to audit an internal
control system is "directly" related to the quality of
internal control system), she found that the quality of
internal control system was "inversely" related to the
number of budgeted hours that were assigned to conduct
the audit. Gaumnitz et al. (1982) suggested that this
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could be due to the fact that the auditors were not asked
to evaluate the quality of internal control system 'first
before assigning the number of hours to audit the
internal control system.
Similar to the findings of this thesis, it was found that
in practice, although the auditors were asked to rate the
components (ICPs) of the internal control system first
before rating the overall internal control system, the
ratings that the auditors gave for the ICPs do not
contribute to the ratings of the internal control system
as a whole. The researcher had expected the results to
be otherwise. This is in line with Lebbecke and Zuber's
(1980) suggestion that in using the "CO" technique, the
auditors must: (a) firstly identify whether the ICPs are
able to meet the control objectives and then only (b)
give their opinions on the quality of the internal
control system.
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6.5.1.3.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS OF ABILITY OF ICPs
AND INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE THE
CONTROL OBJECTIVES
No significant difference was found between EAs and IAs
as to the ability of each ICP or the overall internal
control system to assist in the achievement of the
control objectives. This means to say that both groups
of auditors agreed as to (a) the extent that the 8 ICPs
were able to achieve the five control objectives, namely,
"completeness, existence, presentation and disclosure,
rights and obligations and valuation" and (b) the extent
that the overall internal control system was able to
achieve the same five control objectives.
However, when the mean ICP (average ratings of all ICPs)
was compared to the overall internal control system's
ability to achieve the five control objectives, a
significant difference was found for each group of EA and
IA.
This suggests that EAs' and IAs' evaluation of the
individual controls' (ICPs) ability to achieve the five
control objectives does not explain their evaluation of
the overall internal control system's ability to achieve
the five control objectives.
Brown (1962), as discussed in Chapter 3, suggested that
auditors might judge the effectiveness of a given system
of internal control differently either because they used
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different methods of appraisal or because auditors placed
different emphasis on the relative importance of various
factors of internal control. In this thesis, it was
found that auditors rated the quality of an internal
control system in the same manner even though they used
different techniques of evaluation. It was also shown
that the auditors do not take into account the evaluation
that they have made of the individual ICPs when they
evaluate the internal control system as a whole.
Both of the findings contradict Brown's suggestion that
"different methods of evaluation would lead to different
opinions on the quality of internal control" and
different emphasis on the relative importance of the
various factors of internal control (ICPs) would lead to
different opinions on the quality of internal control.
Figure 6.8 shows that (except for presentation and
disclosure objective), auditors do not think that the
evaluation of each ICP helps them in their evaluation of
the overall internal control system.
EAs consider that internal control system can achieve
control objectives better than IAs but that ICPs are less
able to achieve the control objectives. The converse is
true for IAs. These findings are consistent with table
6.10 where the auditors were asked to rate the ability of
the internal control system to achieve control objectives
and found that EAs (65.6%) rated it higher than IAs
(34.4%).
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However, there is no significant difference of ICP's or
internal control system's ability to achieve the control
objectives between EAs and IAs. This is contrary to
Moore's (1993) findings that EAs were more competent with
the specific control objectives and procedures used to
test these objectives compared to IAs because most of
EAs' procedures were assertion (control objectives')
based.
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6.5.1.4 Level of control risk (CR) of internal control 
procedures (ICPs) and internal control system
(ICS) 
WHETHER INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES(ICPS) CAN ACHIEVE CONTROL
RISK(CR)
i
1
METHOD
	
Rtgs
of each
ICP's
level of
CR
level of	 level of CR
	
1	 CR
	
1	 1	 1	 1	
1 	
1
GROUP	 Ms Vs	 EAs Vs	 EAs Vs	 EAs IAs
TYPES
	
1As	 IAs	 IAs
1	 1	 1	 1	 1
STATISTICAL 1.t-tst	 1.t-tst	 1.t-tst 1.t-tst 1.t-tst
TESTS &
	
pair	 grp	 pair	 pair pair
FINDINGS
	
-s	 -s	 -ns	
-s	 -s
2.sprmn 2.sprmn
corr	 corr
-weak,	 -ns
+ve,sig.
2.visual
representation-
EAs think ICP
more able to
achieve CR
CONCLUSION 1.Using corr as a measure of consensus, it was found
that there is a significant difference between EAs
and IAs. A t-test pair on rtgs of each ICP's ability
to achieve CR shows a sig result.
2. Overall ICS ability to achieve each CR was not sig.
Both groups of auditors agreed as to which CR could be
achieved by the overall ICS.
3.There is a significant difference between the mean
ratings of each ICP's ability to achieve CR and the
ratings of the overall ICS's ability to achieve CR
for the IAs. There is no significant difference
between the mean ratings of each ICP's ability to
achieve CR and the ratings of the overall ICS's
ability to achieve CR for the EAs.
# 8 rtgs=8 ICPS * 1 CR
Missing cases were substituted with the mean rtgs.
Figure 6.9: Summary of findings on CR 
I i 1
1 1 1
Corr on Rtgs Mean rtgs
8 rtgs# of overall of each
internal 'GP's level of
Control CR and rtgs of
System's(ICS) overall of ICS's
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a) ratings of level of CR of each ICP 
H4a: There is a significant difference in the ratings of
the level of CR of each IC? between EAs and IAs
Internal control
procedures
Ratings of Control Risk(CR)
1. Time cards and
other source
documents are checked
before processing by
the payroll
department for casts
and calculations.
EAs(erttcrds)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(irttcrds)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
62	 2.8548	 1.316 62	 3.2419	 1.351 -1.70 .095**
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
task of payroll
preparation.
EAs(erttkpg)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(irttkpg)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
60 3.1833	 1.214 60	 3.6167 1.290 -1.95 .056**
3. There is adequate
physical security
over personal files
which contain
information relevant
to the audit.
EAs (ertadesc)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(irtadesc)
n	 mean	 sd t val pig
61	 3.6721	 1.524 61 3.9836	 1.668 -1.08 .285
4. The duties of
those preparing the
payroll are rotated.
EAs (ertdutro)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(irtdutro)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
.40760	 3.6833 1.513 60 3.9167 1.344 -.83
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
EAs(ertnamck)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs(irtnamck)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
62	 3.0484 1.562 62	 3.7258 1.381 -2.85 .006*
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Internal control
procedures
Ratings of Control Risk(CR)
.
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation
and payment of
employees are
adequately separated
from the tasks of
payroll bank account
reconciliation.
n
61
EAs(ertpyrse)
mean	 sd n
61
IAs(irtpyrse)
mean	 sd t val sig
.000*2.9508 1.407 3.8525 1.459 -3.75
7. Management reports
are used to monitor
the reliability of
payroll data through
comparisons with
budget and following
up of variance
reports.
n
62
EAs(ertmgtre)
mean	 sd n
62
IAs(irtmgtre)
mean	 sd t val sig
3.2258 1.453 3.8065 1.424 -2.28 .026*
8. Formal procedures
are established for
changing names, pay
rates and deductions.
n
62
EAs(ertforpr)
mean	 sd n
62
IAs(irtforpr)
mean sd
1.517
t val sig
3.0968 1.399 3.8387 -2.62 .011*
Table 6.25: Consensus in ratings of the level of CR of
ICPs by IAs and EAs
*significant at p < 0.05. **significant at p < 0.10.
Conclusion: No conclusive decision can be made as to
whether to reject or accept H4a if a level of
significance of .05 is used. However, if a higher level
of significance of .10 is used, overall it can be said
that there is a significant difference in the ratings of
the level of CR for each ICP between EAs and IAs.
Figure 6.10 compares evaluation of whether ICPs can meet
internal control risk. EAs'ratings of level of CR of ICPs
are lower than 'As / or in other words they are of the
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opinion that ICPs can prevent or detect material errors
better. As discussed earlier, EAs gave a higher rating of
internal control system or are more lenient in their
ratings.
Similar to the conclusion on control objectives, it can
be said that lAs" do not think that the evaluation of
each IC!' would contribute to the evaluation of internal
control system. Thus once again contradicting Brown's
suggestion that evaluation of each factor (ICP) would
help in the evaluation of the internal control system as
a whole.
89 There was no significant difference for EAs when the mean
ratings of the ICPs was compared to the ratings for the overall
internal control system.
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b) correlation on 8 ratings
H4b: There is a significant difference of consensus
level on the level of CR of each IC? between EAs
and IAs
Similar to the consensus level on the cases and the
ratings on CO, EA's ratings on the 8 control risk were
correlated with every other EA's ratings to all the 8
control risk using Pearson correlation coefficient. A
mean'level of consensus was then calculated for each EA.
This procedure was repeated for all IAs. A t-test pair
was then performed to see if the mean consensus between
the 2 groups of auditors was significant. The result was
as follows:
EAs(econcr)
	
IAs(iconcr)
mean sd
	
n mean sd	 t val sig
64 .0794 .108	 64 .0430 .078	 2.16 .034*
Conclusion: Accept H4b. There is a significant difference
of consensus level on the level of CR of each IC? between
EAs and IAs.
c) ratings of control risk (CR) for the overall internal 
control system (ICS) 
H4c:There is a significant difference in the
ratings of CR for the overall internal control system
between EAs and IAs
EAs(ertcral)	 IAs(irtcral)
	
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
	
62	 3.0968
	
1.112	 62	 3.3226	 .954	 -1.05 .298
Conclusion: Reject H4c. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of CR for the overall internal
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control system between EAs and IAs.
d) mean ratings of CR for each ICP and the overall ICS
H4d1 : There is a significant difference in the mean
ratings of CR for each ICP and the mean ratings of
CR for the overall internal control system (ICS) amongst
EAs
Mean ICP(emnrt)	 Overall ICS(ertcral)
n, mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
58	 3.1940
	
.917	 58 3.1207 1.109
	 .48
	 .633
Conclusion: Reject H4d1 . There is no significant
difference in the mean ratings of CR for each ICP and the
mean ratings of CR for the overall internal control
system amongst EAs.
H4d2 :There is a significant difference in the mean
ratings of CR for each ICP and the mean ratings of
CR for the overall internal control system amongst IAs
Mean ICP(imnrt) 	 Overall ICS(irtcral)
mean	 sd	 ri	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
58 3.7241 .831 58 3.3621 .931 2.45 .018*
Conclusion: Accept H4d2 . There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of CR for each ICP and the mean
ratings of CR for the overall internal control system
amongst IAs.
To see how closely related the variables are, Spearmen
correlation is calculated.
385
ICPs FINDINGS
Mean ratings of CR of
ICPs as compared to CR
of overall ICS by EAs
n
58
spearm. t val sig
corr.coef.
2.91697 .00508*.36318(emnrt by ertcral).
Mean ratings of CR of
ICPs as compared to CR
of overall ICS by IAs
n
58
spearm. t val sig
corr.coef.
1.58031 .11967.20662auditors(imnrt by
irtcral).
Table 6.26: Correlation in mean ratings of ICP and
control risk
* significant,at p <.01
The mean rating of CR of ICPs as compared with CR of
overall internal control system of EAs is weakly
correlated at .01 level of significance but it is
uncorrelated for IAs. There seems to be little or no
relationship between the ratings of the level of CR for
each individual ICP and the ratings of the level of CR
for the overall internal control system.
6.5.1.4.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON THE LEVEL OF CONTROL 
RISK (CR) OF ICPs AND INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Control risk is defined in this thesis as the ability to
detect or correct "material errors". The results indicate
that there is a significant difference in the ability of
the ICP to detect or correct material errors, but there
is no significant difference of the overall internal
control system to detect or correct material errors
between EAs and IAs. Thus both groups of auditors do not
seem to agree on the ability of the ICPs to detect or
correct material errors but they seem to agree on the
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ability of the overall internal control system to detect
or correct material errors.
Figure 6.10 shows that EAs rated ICP's and internal
control system's ability to detect or correct "material
errors" higher than IAs or in other words, EAs rated
control risk as lower. It is also consistent with the
result in table 6.11 where the auditors were asked to
rate the ability of the overall internal control system
to detect or correct material errors, and EAs (87.5%)
rated it as higher than IAs (73.4%).
Thus EAs were more confident in the ability of the ICPs
and internal control system's ability to detect or
correct material errors. This could be due to the fact
that materiality levels of IAs are lower, that is more
severe than the materiality level of EAs.
As one respondent said,
There is no definition of "materiality". I generally
find that EAs' definition of material, while never
stated, is apparently much higher than IAs.
IAs are more strict in their ascertainment of
"materiality" than EAs. EAs may have a cut off limit of
10% of total assets or net income as a materiality level.
But it is different for IAs which are concerned with the
effectiveness of the internal control system and thus
would have a tighter (ie. lower) materiality level. Thus,
IAs would be expected to be more strict in their reliance
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on the ICP or the internal control system.
Comparing each group of auditor, it was found that there
is a significant difference when the mean ICP (average of
all ICPs) was compared to the overall internal control
system's ability to detect or correct material errors for
each group of EA and IA.
One reason why EAs are seen to be more lenient than IAs
could be as mentioned earlier on in the chapter is
because of IAs' preoccupation with control compliance.
Thus, IAs are generally more restrained in their risk
assessments and strength perceptions. Also as discussed
earlier, lAs realizing that they are less independent
than EAs, may over-compensate in such assessments.
Correspondingly, IAs may also recognize their lack of
competence in a certain area and select the more
conservative response.
Similar to the conclusion on control objectives, it can
be said that each group of auditor does not think that
the evaluation of each ICP would contribute to the
evaluation of the overall internal control system.
This raises the very interesting question as to whether
the effectiveness of a system of internal control is
something more than a mere aggregation of the quality of
its component parts (ICPs). This is perhaps the subject
of further research.
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6.5.1.5 Importance of ICPs
IMPORTANCE OF ICPS/WEIGHT OF ICPS
I
1I 	 1
METHOD	 Total
	
Mean	 Correlation
points
	
points	 of average
allocated
	
for each	 weights
to overall
	
ICP	 given to
ICPs	 ICPs
1	 1	 1
GROUP	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs and IAs
TYPES
	
1	 i	 f
STATISTICAL 1. t-test pair
	
1.t-test pair	 1. Pearson
TESTS &
	 -ns	 Only 2 out of 8	 corr
FINDINGS	 ICPs is sig	 -s
2. Pearson	 2.Spearmen
corr	 corr
-ns (low,-ve)	 -s
CONCLUSION	 1. There is no significant difference of the total
points allocated to the 8 ICPs between EAs and IAs.
2. There is a high,positive and significant rating
between the average weights given to each ICP by
EAs and IAs.
Figure 6.11: Summary of findings on the relative 
importance of ICPs 
a) total points allocated to ICS
H5a: There is a significant difference in the total points
allocated to internal control system between EAs and IAs
EAs(totex)	 IAs(totin)
n	 mean	 sd	 n	 mean	 sd	 t va/ siq
61	 100.8033 16.741 61 112.9836 29.726 -2.57 .013*
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Conclusion: Accept H5a. There is a significant difference
in the total points allocated to internal control system
between EAs and IAs.
Pearson correlation carried out to see if the weightings by
both groups of auditors were related.
Variable	 Pearson corr. 
totex by totin	 -.2126 (ns)
b)Mean points for each ICP
H5b:There is a significant difference in the mean
points given for each IC? between EAs and IAs
Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Mean points for each ICP
1. Time cards and
other source
documents are checked
before processing by
the payroll
department for casts
and calculations.
(ICP1/ tcrd)
EAs
(eactcrds)
n	 mean sd
IAs
(iactcrds)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
63 12.9524 4.437 63	 13.3810 4.198 -.54	 .592
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
task of payroll
preparation.
(ICP2/ tkpg)
EAs
(eadtkpg)
n	 mean sd
IAs
(iadtkpg)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
63 14.5556 3.596 63 16.0952 7.089 -1.50	 .140
.
3. There is adequate
physical security
over personal files
which contain
information relevant
to the audit.
(ICP3/ Adesc)
EAs
(eacadesc)
n	 mean sd
IAs
(iacadesc)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 six
63	 9.7619 3.987 63 11.6667 6.658 -1.93	 .058
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Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
Mean points for each ICP
4. The duties of
those preparing the
payroll are rotated.
(ICP4/ Dutro)
EAs
(eacdutro)
n	 mean sd n
63
IAs
(iacdutro)
mean	 sd t val sig
63	 8.4127 4.272 11.0159	 10.132	 -1.84 .071
5. The names on the
payroll are checked
periodically against
the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
(ICP5/ Namck)
EAs
(eacnamck)
n	 mean sd n
63
IAs
(iacnamck)
mean	 sd t val sig
63 12.0794 4.570 14.6190 5.569 -2.66 .010*
6.The tasks of both
payroll preparation
and payment of
employees are
adequately separated
from the tasks of
payroll bank account
reconciliation.
(ICP6/ Pyrse)
EAs
(eadpyrse)
n	 mean sd n
63
IAs
(iadpyrse)
mean	 sd t val sig
63	 13.5397 4.211 16.6349 5.771 -3.18 .002*
7. Management reports
are used to tmonitor
the reliability of
payroll data through
comparisons with
budget and following
up of variance
reports.
(ICP7/ Mgtre)
EAs
(eadmgtre)
n	 mean sd n
64
IAs
(iadmgtre)
mean	 sd t val sig
.65064 14.7969 4.036 15.1094 3.945 -.46
8. Formal procedures
are established for
changing names, pay
rates and deductions.
(ICP8/ Forpr)
EAs
(eadforpr)
n	 mean sd n
61
IAs
(iadforpr)
mean	 sd t val sig
.75861	 15.0164 3.196 14.7869 4.820 .31
Table 6.27: Consensus in weightings of ICPs by IAs and EAs
* significant at p < 0.05
Conclusion: Reject H5b. There is no significant
difference of the ratings in the mean points given for
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each ICP between EAs and IAs with the exception of ICP5
and ICP6.
As can be seen from Table 6.27, IAs rated "segregation of
duties" (which comprise of "ICP2" and "ICP6") higher than
EAs. Detail discussion regarding this would be done in
Section 6.7.4.
Figure 6.12 compares points given to the ICPs by EAs and
IAs. It shows that EAs gave consistently lower points for
all the ICPs, except for ICP8 ("Are formal procedures
established for changing names, payrates and
deductions?") as compared with IAs. However, this is not
significantly different.
The finding is contradicting EAs' leniency in ratings. As
discussed earlier, EAs when compared to IAs were more
lenient in their ratings that is, they gave a higher
rating when asked to evaluate the internal control system
using different techniques of evaluations, when asked to
rate the control objectives that can be achieved by the
internal control system and when asked to rate the
ability of the internal control system to detect or
correct "material errors". Thus, it would be expected
that they allocate higher points to the ICPs, but this is
not so. The converse could be said about IAs.
This could imply that both EAs and IAs do not consider
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the relevance of "each" ICP but rather they look at the
ICPs as a whole when evaluating the internal control
system.
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6.5.1.5.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
ICPs AND THE OVERALL INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM
There is no significant difference as to the points
allocated (importance attached) to each 1CP between EAs
and IAs, but there is a significant difference of total
points allocated (importance attached) to the overall
internal control system.
Again, similar to the comment made earlier on the ratings
given by the auditors for CO and CR, this means to say
that the auditors do not think that the importance of
each ICP contributes to the importance of the overall
internal control system.
From Figure 6.12, EAs gave consistently lower points for
all the 1CPs except for Forpr ("Are formal procedures
established for changing names, payrates and
deductions?"). However, this was found not to be
significantly different.
There seemed to be no relationship between EAs' opinion
of the "importance of ICPs" and "the ability of internal
control system to achieve the five control objectives" or
"the ability of the internal control system to detect or
correct material errors".
As far as the overall internal control system is
concerned, EAs placed lesser importance on the internal
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control system, but rated "the ability of the internal
control system to achieve the control objectives" and
"the ability of the internal control system to detect or
correct material errors" higher as compared to IAs. Thus,
although EAs were consistent in their judgements of "the
ability of the internal control system to achieve the
control objectives" and "the ability of the internal
control system to detect or correct material errors",
they were not consistent in determining "the importance
of the internal control system". The same could be said
about IAs.
As for the individual internal control procedures (ICPs),
EAs and IAs were consistent in their judgements regarding
"the importance of the ICPs" and "the ability of the ICPs
to achieve control objectives" but they were not
consistent in their judgements of "the ability of the
ICPs to detect or correct material errors". Also, it was
found that IAs rated "segregation of duties" controls
higher than the other controls but this is not the case
for EAs.
In summary, there is inconsistency in the ratings by the
auditors with regards to the importance of the ICPs/
internal control system, the ability of ICPs/ internal
control system to achieve the five control objectives and
the ability of the ICPs/ internal control system to
detect or correct material errors.
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6.5.1.6 Types of controls 
The two types of control examined in this thesis are
"accounting" and "administrative controls". Consensus of
EAs and IAs regarding the 2 controls is examined in three
ways as shown in Figure 6.13.
ADMN CONTROL VS ACCTG CONTROL
Points allocated
	 Control objectives The 2 controls'
to the 2 controls	 achieved by the
	
ratings of control
2 controls	 risk
Figure 6.13: Examination of accounting and
administrative controls
As discussed in Section 5.7 of Chapter 5, the 8 ICPs are
divided into accounting and administrative controls as
follows:
Accounting controls: 
ICP1/ Tcrd: Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
ICP3/ Adesc: Is there adequate physical security over
personal files?
ICP4/ Dutro: Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated?
ICP5/ Namck: Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee
file of the personnel department?
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Administrative controls: 
ICP2/ Tkpg: Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
ICP6/ Pyrse: Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately
separated from the tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation?
ICP7/ Mgtre: Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of financial data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
ICP8/ Forpr: Are formal procedures established for
changing names on the payroll, pay rates and
deductions properly communicated to the
employees?
The 4 ICPs in each category are combined for each group
of auditor in order to obtain "accounting" and
"administrative" controls. For the purpose of the
analysis of this hypothesis, there will be 4 variables:
(a) IA's accounting control; (b) EA's accounting control;
(c) IA's administrative control and (d) EA's
administrative control.
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Mean wts of
acctg Vs admn
controls
Mean wts of
acctg controls
Mean wts of
admn controls
METHOD
6.5.1.6.1 Points allocated to the 2 controls 
POINTS ALLOCATED TO ACCOUNTING (ACCTG) AND ADMINISTRATIVE
(ADMN) CONTROLS
GROUP	 EAs	 IAs	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs Vs IAs
TYPES
	
I	 1	 1	 I
	
1	 I	 I	 I
STATIS-	 t-tst t-tst	 t-test pair	 t-test pair
TICAL
	
pair	 pair	 -s	
-s
TESTS &	 -s	 -s
FINDINGS
CONCLUSION 1.Each group of auditors placed different emphasis on
"accounting" and "administrative" controls. Both of the
groups weight the "administrative" controls higher
than "accounting" controls.
2.There is a significant difference between the
weights given to "accounting" controls by EAs and IAs.
Similarly, there is a significant difference between
the weights given to "administrative" controls by EAs
and IAs. IAs seem to be more generous in their points
with regard to both the controls than EAs.
Figure 6.14: Summary of findings on points allocated to
the 2 controls 
al) mean weights of acctq vs admn controls for EAs 
H6al :There is a significant difference in the mean
weighting of accounting and administrative control
amongst EAs
Acctg	 Admn
(emnac)	 (emnad)
mean	 sd	 n mean sd	 t val sig
61 43.0492 10.783
	 61 57.7541 9.051 -10.66 .000*
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Conclusion: Accept H6a 1 . There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of "accounting" and
"administrative" control amongst EAs. EAs placed
different emphasis on the 2 types of controls. In this
case, EAs seem to think that "administrative" controls
(mean weight of 57.75) are more important than
"accounting" controls (mean weight of 43.05). This is
also substantiated by Table 6.49.
a2) mean weights of acctg vs admn controls for IAs
H6a2 :There is a significant difference in the mean
weighting of "accounting" and "administrative" control
amongst IAs
Acctg	 Admn
(imnac)
	 (imnad)
in_ mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val siq
61 50.4098 19.673 61 62.5738 12.033 -7.08 .000*
Conclusion: Accept H6a2 . There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of "accounting" and
"administrative" control amongst IAs.
IAs placed different emphasis on the 2 types of controls.
IAs also seem to think that "administrative" controls
(mean weight of 62.57) are more important than
"accounting" controls (mean weight of 50.41).
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b) mean weights of accounting controls between EAs and
IAs
H6b: There is a significant difference in the mean
weighting of "accounting" controls between EAs and IAs
EAs	 IAs
(emnac)	 (imnac)
n	 mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val siq
63 43.2063 10.698 63 50.6825 19.416 -2.54 .014*
Conclusion: Accept H6b. There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of "accounting" controls between
EAs and IAs with IAs giving higher points than EAs.
c) mean weights of administration controls between EAs
and IAs 
H6c: There is a significant difference in the mean
weighting of administrative controls between EAs
and IAs
EAs	 IAs
(emnad)
	
(imnad)
n	 mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val sig
61 57.7541 9.051 61 62.5738 12.033 -2.29 .026*
Conclusion: Accept H6c. There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of "administrative" controls
between EAs and IAs with IAs giving higher points than
EAs.
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6.5.1.6.2 Control objectives achieved by the 2 controls
CONTROL OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED BY THE 2 CONTROLS
METHOD	 Ratings of
control
objectives for
acctg Vs admn
controls
Ratings of
control
objectives for
acctg controls
Ratings of
control
objectives for
admn controls
GROUP
	
EAs	 IAs	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs Vs IAs
TYPES
1	 1	 1
I	 I	 H	 I	 Jill
C E PR VCEPRV
& &	 &&
D O	 DO
STATIS-	 t-tst t-tst
TICAL
	 pair pair
TESTS &
	
1	 1
FINDINGS
	
1	 1
i	 11111	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 111
1
CEPRV
& &
D O
I	 II	 I	 I•
I
	
If I 
t -test pair
I II
I	 II	 I	 II
1	 1	 1	 1	 1
CEPR V
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DO
11111
I	 II 
1
t-test pair
1
1
1
I
s s ssssnssss nsnss nsns	 ns ns s ns ns
CONCLUSION 1.Each group of auditors ratings of control objectives
that can be achieved by the 2 types of controls is
significantly different except for "existence"
objective for IAs.
2.0n the whole,there is no significant difference
between the judgements of both groups of auditors
regarding the ability of the two types of controls in
achieving the 5 control objectives
Figure 6.15: Summary of findings on control objectives 
achieved by the 2 types of controls 
402
al) rating of control obiectives of accounting vs 
administration controls for EAs 
H7al : There is a significant difference in the ratings
of "accounting" and "administrative" control for the 5
control objectives amongst EAs.
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness(C)
Acctg
(ecompacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(ecompadm)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 10.1639 3.946 61	 11.9180 3.926 -4.20	 .000*
CO2-
Existence(E)
Acctg
(eexisacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(eexisadm)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
61 14.4262 3.364 61 13.2459 3.740 3.09	 .003*
CO3-
Presentation &
Disclosure
(P & D)
Acctg
(eprediac)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(eprediad)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 6.5738 2.813 61 9.3770 3.861 -7.07	 .000*
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
(R & 0)
Acctg
(ertsobac)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(ertsobad)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 Lig
61 10.8852 .459 61 12.8689 3.792 -5.07	 .000*
CO5-
Valuation(V)
Acctg
(evalacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(evaladm)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61 11.4426 3.443 61 13.6557 3.847 -5.02	 .000*
Table 6.28: Consensus in ratings of EAs on how well the
control objectives can be achieved by the 2 types of
controls
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Accept H7al . There is a significant difference
in the ratings of "accounting" and "administrative"
controls for the 5 control objectives amongst EAs.
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a2) rating of control objectives of acctq vs admn
controls for IAs 
H7a2 :There is a significant difference in the ratings
of "accounting" and "administrative" controls for the 5
control objectives amongst IAs.
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness (C)
Acctg
(icompacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(icompadm)
n	 mean	 sd t val sig
61 11.1475 3.872 61	 12.5902	 3.712 -3.23.002*
CO2-
Existence(E)
Acctg
(iexisacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(iexisadm)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 14.3934 3.685 61	 14.8852 4.050 -.99	 .325
CO3-
Presentation &
Disclosure
(P & D)
Acctg
(iprediac)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(iprediad)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61	 8.3934 2.848 61	 12.1967 3.027 -9.20	 .000*
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
(R & 0)
Acctg
(irtsobac)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(irtsobad)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61 11.1475 4.061 61 14.0328 4.074 -6.11	 .000*
CO5-
Valuation(V)
Acctg
(ivalacc)
n	 mean sd
Admn
(ivaladm)
n	 mean	 sd t val	 sig
61 12.4918 3.505 61 13.5738 3.797 -2.16	 .035*
Table 6.29: Consensus in ratings of IAs on how well the
control objectives can be achieved by the 2 types of
controls
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Accept H7a 2 . There is a significant difference
in the ratings of "accounting" and "administrative"
controls for the 5 control objectives amongst IAs, with
the exception of "existence" objective.
404
b) ratings of control objectives with respect to 
accounting controls between EAs and IAs 
H7b:There is a significant difference in the ratings of
"accounting" controls for the 5 control objectives
between EAs and IAs.
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness(C)
EAs
(ecompacc)
n	 mean sd n
62
IAs
(icompacc)
mean	 sd	 t val sig
62 10.2903 4.279 11.1452 3.840 -1.14
	
.257
CO2-
Existence(E)
EAs
(eexisacc)
n	 mean sd n
62
IAs
(iexisacc)
mean	 sd	 t val
	 sig
62 14.4677 3.352 14.3226 3.697	 .21	 .833
CO3-
Presentation &
Disclosure
(P & D)
EAs
(eprediac)
n	 mean sd n
62
IAs
(iprediac)
mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62	 6.5968 2.796 8.4355 2.844 -3.79	 .000*
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
(R & 0)
EAs
(ertsobac)
n	 mean sd n
62
IAs
(irtsobac)
mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62 10.8387 3.572 11.1774 4.035
	 -.46	 .649
CO5-
Valuation(V)
EAs
(evalacc)
n	 mean sd n
62
IAs
(iva1acc)
mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62 11.4839 3.430 12.5161 3.482 -1.64	 .105
Table 6.30: Consensus in ratings of IAs and EAs on how
well	 the control objectives can be achieved by the
"accounting" controls
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Reject H7b. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of "accounting" controls for
the 5 control objectives between EAs and IAs with the
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exception of "presentation and discosure" objective.
c) rating of control objectives with respect to 
"administrative" controls between EAs and IAs
H7c:There is a significant difference in the ratings of
"administrative" controls for the 5 control objectives
between EAs and IAs.
INTERNAL
CONTROL OBJ.
(CO)
FINDINGS
C01-
Completeness(C)
EAs
(ecompadm)
n	 mean	 sd
1As
(icompadm)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
62 12.0000 3.946 62 12.7097 3.800 -.97	 .334
CO2-
Existence(E)
EAs
(eexisadm)
n	 mean	 sd
1As
(iexisadm)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 lig
62 13.2903 3.726 62 14.7097 4.248 -1.87.066
CO3-
Presentation &
Disclosure
(P & D)
EAs
(eprediad)
n	 mean	 sd
1As
(iprediad)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62 9.4355 3.857 62	 12.1935 3.002 -4.32 	 .000*
C04-
Rights
& Obligations
(R & 0)
EAs
(ertsobad)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs
(irtsobad)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62 12.9032 3.771 62	 13.9355 4.113	 -1.43	 .157
CO5-
Valuation(V)
EAs
(evaladm)
n	 mean	 sd
IAs
(ivaladm)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val	 sig
62 13.6774 3.819 62 13.6452 3.807	 .05	 .962
Table 6.31: Consensus in ratings of IAs and EAs on how
well the control objectives can be
achieved by the "administrative" controls
*significant at p < 0.05.
Conclusion: Reject H7c. There is no significant
406
difference in the ratings of "administrative" controls
for the 5 control objectives between EAs and IAs, with
the exception of "presentation and disclosure"
objective.
Control objectives that can best be achieved by the
"accounting" and "administrative" controls in priority of
importance are as shown in Table 6.32.
Control Objectives Accounting
Controls
Administrative
Controls
EAs IAs EAs IAs
Existence 14.47 14.32 13.29 14.71
Valuation 11.48 12.52 13.68* 13.65
Rights and Obligations 10.84 11.18 12.90 13.94*
Completeness 10.29 11.15 12.00 12.71
Presentation and Disclosure 6.60 8.44 9.44 12.19
Table 6.32: Comparison of EAs and lAs ratings of
"accounting" and "administrative" controls in achieving
the control objectives
* As for "administrative" controls, EAs rated "valuation"
objective higher than "rights and obligations" objective,
whilst IAs rated "rights and obligations" objective
higher than "valuation" objective. Overall, for both
types of controls, IAs are of the opinion that the two
types of controls are more able to achieve the control
objectives than EAs.
In theory, as discussed in chapter 2, it was said that
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"accounting" controls are better able to achieve
"completeness, existence and valuation" objectives than
"rights and obligations" and "presentation and
disclosure" objectives. However, the findings suggests
that both "accounting" and "administrative" controls are
rated by EAs and IAs to achieve "completeness, rights and
obligations and valuation objectives" better than
"completeness	 and	 presentation	 and	 disclosure
objectives".
Referring to the same table (Table 6.32),
"administrative" controls are rated by EAs and IAs as
more able to achieve the control objectives as compared
to the "accounting" controls (with the exception of
"existence" objective).
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6.5.1.6.3 Ratings of the level of control risk for
accounting and administrative controls 
RATINGS OF CONTROL RISK FOR ACCOUNTING AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROLS
1	 I	 1
I	 I	 I
METHOD	 Ratings of	 Ratings of
	 Ratings of
control risk	 control risk	 control risk
for	 for	 for
acctg Vs admn	 acctg controls	 admn controls
controls	
I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 I
GROUP	 EAs	 IAs	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs Vs IAs
TYPES	
I	 I	 I	 I
	
I	 I	 I	 1
STATIS-	 t-tst t-tst	 t-test pair	 t-test pair
TICAL	 pair pair	 -s	 -s
TESTS &	 -ns	 -ns
FINDINGS
CONCLUSION 1.There seemed to be a difference in opinions of the
ability of the 2 types of controls to detect or correct
material errors between EAs and IAs but not amongst
each group of auditor.
Figure 6.16: Summary of findings on the ratings of
control risk for "accounting" and "administrative" 
controls 
al) ratings of control risk for accounting and
administrative controls amongst EAs 
H8a1 :There is a significant difference in the ratings of
control risk of "accounting" and "administrative" control
amongst EAs
Acctg .	Admn
(ertacc)	 (ertadm)
n	 mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val sig
59 13.2373 4.232 59 12.5254 4.174 	 1.41 .165
Conclusion: Reject H8al . There is no significant
difference between the ratings of control risk of
"accounting" and "administrative" control amongst EAs.
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a2) ratings of control risk for accounting and 
administrative controls amongst IAs 
H8a2 : There is a significant difference in the ratings of
control risk of "accounting" and "administrative" control
amongst IAs
Acctg	 Admn
(irtacc)	 (irtadm)
in_ mean	 sd	 n mean sd	 t val sig
59	 14.7458 3.618 59 15.0169 3.785 -.62 .539
Conclusion: Reject H8a2. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of control risk of "accounting"
and "administrative" control amongst IAs.
b) ratings of control risk for accounting controls
between EAs and IAs 
H8b: There is a significant difference in the ratings of
control risk of "accounting" controls between EAs and IAs
EAs	 IAs
(ertacc)	 (irtacc)
n	 mean sd	 n mean sd
	
t val sig
60 13.2333 4.196 60 14.8167 3.6296 -2.33 .023*
Conclusion: Accept H8b. There is a significant
difference in the ratings of control risk of
"accounting" controls between EAs and IAs.
C) ratings of control risk for administrative controls
between EAs and IAs 
H8c: There is a significant difference in the ratings of
control risk of "administrative" controls between EAs and
IAs
EAs	 IAs
(ertadm)	 (irtadm)
n	 mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val siq
60 12.4667 4.164 60 15.0000 3.755 -3.54 .001*
Conclusion: Accept H8c. There is a significant
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difference in the ratings of control risk of
"administrative" controls between EAs and IAs.
Table 6.33 shows control risk ratings of "accounting" and
"administrative" controls by EAs and IAs.
Control risk Accounting
controls	 '
Administrative
controls
EAs IAs EAs IAs
Value of control
risk
13.23 14.82 12.47 15.00
Table 6.33: Comparison of ratings of control risk of
"accounting" and "administrative" controls between EAs
and IAs
As can be seen from table 6.33, EAs rated control risk of
"accounting" controls higher than "administrative"
controls. Since the higher the ratings of control risk
implies that the controls are less able to prevent or
detect material errors in the internal control system,
this suggests that EAs are of the opinion that
"administrative" controls can prevent or detect material
errors better than "accounting" controls. The opposite
can be said for IAs.
6.5.1.6.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON TYPES OF CONTROLS 
There were three aspects of "administrative" and
"accounting" controls tested in this section; (a) points
allocated to the two types of controls indicating which
type of control is more important; (b) ability of the two
types of controls in achieving control objectives and (c)
ability of the two types of controls in detecting or
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correcting material errors.
If in fact a separation of "administrative" and
"accounting" controls can be made in accordance to the
researcher's segregation (which was based on auditing
literature), there seemed to be a significant difference
of the importance of "accounting" and "administrative"
controls between and amongst EAs and IAs. Both groups of
auditors rated "administrative controls" higher than
"accounting controls".
Both groups of auditors also perceived "administrative"
controls better able to achieve the 5 control objectives
(though not statistically significant). The researcher
expected that both groups of auditors would rate
"accounting" controls as better able to achieve
"completeness, existence and valuation" objectives as
compared to the other two objectives ("presentation and
disclosure" and "rights and obligations"). However, the
results showed that the auditors rated both the controls
as able to achieve "existence, valuation and rights and
obligations" better than "completeness" and "presentation
and disclosure" objectives.
The researcher also expected that EAs would rate
"accounting" controls as better able to detect or correct
material errors as compared to "administrative" controls
and that IAs would rate "administrative" controls as
better able to detect or correct material errors compared
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to "accounting controls" because of the two groups'
differences in audit objectives. However, the results
showed the opposite; that is, EAs rated "administrative"
controls as better able to detect or correct material
errors, whereas 1As rated "accounting" controls as better
able to detect or correct material errors.
The findings indicate that eventhough in theory a
division of controls into "accounting" and
"administrative" could be made, in practice it was
difficult for the auditors to make this distinction. The
findings did not show that IAs relied more on
"administrative" controls rather than "accounting"
controls and vice-versa. In fact, it was found that IAs
rated "accounting" controls as better able to detect or
correct material errors and EAs rated "administrative"
controls as better able to detect or correct material
errors. As far as achievement of the five control
objectives is concerned, both groups of auditors rated
"administrative" controls as better able to achieve the
five control objectives.
Also, auditing literature suggests that "accounting"
controls can achieve "completeness, existence and
valuation" objectives better than "administrative"
,
controls. However, it was found that although it is true
that "accounting" controls could achieve "existence and
valuation" objectives, it was not true for "completeness"
objective.
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6.5.2 CONSISTENCY
CONSISTENCY
1
t
METHOD	 Difference in	 Mean rtgs of
mean rtgs of	 case 1 and case 7
case 1 and case 7
! 
1	 1	 1
I	 I	 1
GROUP	 EAs Vs IAs	 EAs	 IAs
TYPES	
1	 1	 1
1	 1	 1
STATISTICAL	 1.t-tst pair	 1.t-tst	 1.t-tst
TESTS &
	
-ns	 pair	 pair
FINDINGS	 -ns	 -s
2.F tst of	 2.pearson	 2.pearson
homogeneity
	
corr coef corr coef
-ns	 -s	 -s
3.visual repre-	 strong	 strong
sentation
	
+vely	 +vely
-10 set-
	
corrd	 corrd
numbers which 3.plots of case 1 against case 7
differ in rtgs	 - quite linearly related
greater or	 4.plots of cliff of case 1
less than 1".	 and case 7 against mean
differences of case 1 and
case 7
-13 EAs and 17 IAs shows
exactly the same ratings
-more respondents rated
case 7 higher than case 1
CONCLUSION	 1. There is a no significant difference of the
difference in mean ratings between EAs and IAs,
but there is a significant difference between
the mean ratings of case 1 and case 7 for IAs.
2. There is a strong and positive correlation between
the ratings of case 1 and case 7 for both groups of
auditors.
3. Most "senior" auditors seemed to be most
inconsistent in their ratings.
Figure 6.17: Summary of findings on consistency 
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6.5.2.1 Repeat cases 
HB:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN JUDGEMENT
CONSISTENCY BETWEEN IAs AND EAs.
(Consistency is defined as the variation in judgement
of case 1 and case 7).
a) Difference in ratings of case 1 and case 7 between EAs 
and IAs 
Examination of this hypothesis is important because one
of the criteria required for expert status is that an
individual should have high intra-judgemental consistency
(Einhorn 1974, 563).
Consistency was determined by the test-retest method.
Case 1 and case 7 were the repeat cases that are used for
the purpose of testing this hypothesis.
Hla:There is a significant difference in the difference
in the ratings of case 1 and case 7 between EAs and IAs
The difference in ratings of case 1 and case 7 for Eas is
compared with the difference in ratings of case 1 and
case 7 for IAs.
EAs(exdf17)
	
IAs(indf17)
	
mean sd	 n mean sd	 t val sig
	
64 -.0452 .782	 64 -.2637 .805	 1.47 .145
Conclusion: Reject Hla. There is no significant
difference in the difference in ratings of case 1 and
case 7 between EAs and IAs.
Figure 6.18 examines the differences in evaluation of
case 1 and case 7.
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Figure 6.18 shows that there are 10 setnumbers which the
auditors differ in their ratings of case 1 and 7 by a
difference of greater than -1" or +1". The setnumbers
are: 3, 4, 5, 18, 20, 27, 37, 43, 47 and 48. The pairs of
auditors who answered the setnumbers were noted and a
random check was done on the answers given by the
auditors to determine if they had rated the other
questions without giving much thought to them. From their
answers to the other questions, it was found that the
auditors concerned did appear to have answered them
cautiously.
In fact when the personal profiles of the auditors were
examined, it was found that 7 out of 10 pairs of auditors
that were involved were partners or head of departments,
were very experienced and have professional
qualifications. Thus it appears that the auditors who
were most inconsistent in their answers were the "senior"
auditors. This raises interesting questions for possible
further research into whether "senior" auditors were most
inconsistent in internal control evaluation and if so,
why?
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b) Difference in the variation of -judgement between EAs
and IAs 
Hlb:There is a significant difference in the variation
of judgement consistency between EAs and IAs
Variables	 Variance	 Observed value
Difference in
	 -EAs	 .611	 .6487.611
ratings of	 -IAs	 .648	 =1.061
case 1 and
case 7
Conclusion: Reject Hlb since the observed value is less
than the F value of 1.527. There is no significant
difference in the variation of judgement consistency
between EAs and IAs.
cl) Difference in ratings of case 1 and case 7 amongst 
EAs
There were two methods to test this hypothesis; one is by
running a paired t-test on the difference in ratings of
both cases within the 2 groups of auditors and the other
is by examining visibly by means of a graph. The graph
compares the difference in ratings of case 1 and case 7
and the mean in ratings of case 1 and case 7 for both of
the groups. 90
 Pearson correlation of coefficient was also
computed to see whether the ratings of case 1 and case 7
were highly correlated.
Previous research (Ashton, 1974; Bailey, 1981) have
calculated Pearson correlation of the repeat cases
9 0 Bland &Altman (1986) argued that plotting a graph of the
difference between two ratings against their mean is a better
approach than computing correlation coefficients.
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(number of repeat cases varying from 6 to 32) and use it
as a measure of consistency level. In this thesis, there
is only one repeat case and thus a graph would be more
informative. Nevertheless, a correlation coefficient
comparing the 2 ratings is also computed for the purpose
of comparing with previous results.
H1c1 :There is a significant difference in the
ratings of case 1 and case 7 amongst EAs
EAs	 EAs
(excnl)	 (excn7)
mean sd
	 n mean sd	 t val siq
64 1.8433 1.235 64 1.8884 .979 	 -.46 .646
Conclusion: Reject Hle. There is no significant
difference in the ratings of case 1 and case 7
amongst EAs.
Figure 6.19 is a plot comparing the evaluation of case 1
and case 7 by EAs and Figure 6.20 shows the plots
comparing the difference of evaluation of the two cases
against the mean of the cases for EAs.
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Figure 6.19: Plot of case 1 and case 7 for EAs
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Figure 6.20: Plot of difference in ratings of case 1 and
case 7 against the mean of the difference for case 1 and 
case 7 for EAs 
* DF17=(case 1- case 7).
MN17=(casel -case7)/2.
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As can be seen from the two figures, the plots of case 1
and case 7 can be said to be linearly related for the
EAs. EAs seem to have rated case 7 higher than case 1
because there are a lot of negative differences as
compared to positive differences.
c2) Difference in ratings of case 1 and case 7
between IAs 
Hle:There is a significant difference between the
ratings of case 1 and case 7 amongst IAs
IAs(incn1)	 IAs (incn7)
mean sd n mean sd t val siq 
64 1.6200 1.105 64 1.8837 1.098 -2.62 .011*
Conclusion: Accept Hle. There is a significant
difference in the ratings of case 1 and case 7
amongst IAs.
To examine the correlation between the ratings of the
repeat cases by EAs, Pearson correlation was calculated
since it involves "interval" data.
Variables Pearson coef. s(sig)/ns(not sig.)
excnl with excn7 .7746** ** s
Table 6.34: Coefficient correlation of case 1 and case 7
between EAs
** s-significant at .001 (1 tail).
The result shows that the ratings of the 2 cases is
strong and positively correlated for EAs.
Graphs comparing IA's ratings of Case 1 and Case 7 were
plotted as shown in Figure 6.21 and 6.22.
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Figure 6.21: Plot of case 1 and case 7 for IAs
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64 cases plotted.
Figure 6.22: Plot of difference in ratings between case
1 and case 7 against mean of the difference for case 1 
and case 7 for IAs 
* DF17=(case 1- case 7).
MN17=(casel -case7)/2.
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Similar to EAs, the plots of case 1 and case 7 can be
said to be linearly related for the IAs. As for the plots
of means against difference, there is more consistency
for IAs as there are a lot more auditors that fall on the
"0" line. The IAs also rate case 7 higher than case 1.
Pearson correlation was calculated to examine the
relationship between IAs' ratings of the two repeat
cases.
Variables Pearson coef. s(sig)/ns(not sig.) 
incnl with incn7 .7328** ** s
Table 6.35: Coefficient correlation of case 1 and case 7
between IAs
** s-significant at .001 (1 tail).
The result shows that the ratings of the two cases by IAs
is strong and positively correlated.
6.5.2.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON CONSISTENCY
Overall, the results showed no significant difference in
judgement consistency between EAs and IAs. When a t-test
was done for each group, EAs showed no significant
difference between the ratings of the repeat cases. There
was also a strong correlation between the ratings of the
2 cases. IAs, on the other hand showed a significant
difference between the repeat cases but there was also a
strong correlation between their ratings. EAs (.7746)
showed a higher consistency level than IAs (.7328) as
observed by the correlation coefficient.
Compared with previous results as shown in Table 6.36, it
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can be seen that EA's Average level of consistency of .77
and IA's average level of consistency of .73 is
consistent with previous results. Landry (1989) reported
an average level of consistency of .69 for External EDP
auditors and .72 for Internal EDP auditors. Ashton (1974)
and Ashton and Brown (1979) reported a slightly higher
consistency level of .81 and .91 respectively for EAs but
Hamilton and Wright (1977) reported a consistency level
of .76 for EAs which is consistent with this study.
Avg. level of consistency
EAs:
Internal control evaluation
Ashton (1974)
Hamilton & Wright (1977)
Ashton & Brown (1980)
Gaumnitz et al.	 (1982)
Students and others:
Internal control evaluation
Trotman,Yetton & Zimmer (1983)
.81
.76
.91
.825
.73(individual)
.89(2 group team)
.91(3 group team)
EAs:
Other types	 of research
Joyce (1976) .863
Other types of research not in
accounting:
Hoffman et al.
	 (1968)-
radiologists
.80
Reliance on IAs:
Brown (1983) •79
IAs and EAs:
Evaluation of:
a) EDP control system-
Landry (1989)
Ext EDP:	 .69
Int EDP:	 .72
•
Table 6.36: Summary of judgement consistency in previous
studies
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6.5.3 EFFECTS OF VARIOUS VARIABLES ON JUDGEMENT
CONSENSUS AND CONSISTENCY
The effect of 7 variables (i.e, experience level,
position level, educational level, types of professional
qualification, level of independence of IAs, types of
independence of IAs and firm size) on judgement consensus
and judgement consistency was investigated. As there were
basically three approaches or techniques of evaluation
("ICQ", "CO" and "CR") of internal control system
examined in this thesis, the effect of the variables was
investigated for all three approaches. Pearson
correlation was calculated for EAs and IAs according to
the different categories of the variables as shown in
Table 6.37 and 6.38.
A t-test group or a oneway ANOVA was then used (depending
on the number of categories available in each variable)
to examine the effects of the variables on judgement
consensus (by means of the "ICO", "CR" and "CO" approach)
and judgement consistency.
For example, "judgement consensus" for the variable
"experience" using the "ICQ" approach is calculated in
the following way:
(a) Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for
each different category using the formula below:
Total correlation - 1/(n-1) I
where 1 is deducted from the total computation as
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well as from "n" in order to minus the effect of
correlation with itself.
Pearson correlation is calculated for each group of EAs
and IAs separately.
(b) Since the variable "experience"has three categories,
a one-way ANOVA was used to examine the effect of
these categories on judgement consensus.
The same step of calculation is done for the rest of the
variables for judgement consensus using "CR" and "CO"
approach.
As for judgement consistency using the "ICQ" approach, a
Pearson correlation examining the relationship of case 1
and case 7 was calculated for the auditors in that
particular category of the "experience" variable. A one-
way ANOVA was then used to examine the effect of the
categories of the "experience" variable on judgement
consistency. The steps were repeated for judgement
consistency using "CR" and "CO" approach.
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EFFECT OF VARIABLES ON JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BY "ICQ" APPROACH
I	 II	 i•	 I	 I	 I
VARIABLES Exper- Have Type Position Firm Indepen- Types
	
ience prof of	 level	 size dence	 of
VARIA- 1.1-3
BLES	 2.3-6
CATE-	 3.>6
GORIES
RELA- 1.EAs
TION- none
SHIP 2.IAs
WITH none
JUDG-
MENT
CON-
SEN-
SUS
	
1.Yes 1.CA
	
1.Prtnr/ 1.1rge 1.very 1.0rgan
2.No 2.CACA/ Hd	 2.oths 2.mod	 a)very
	
CIMA 2.Mgr/	 3.1east b)mod
	
3.CIA/ Aud mgr	 c)least
	
MIIA 3.Sr/Sr	 2.Compet
	
IA	 a)very
	
4.Jr/Jr
	
b)mod
	
IA	 c)least
3.Econs
a)very
b)mod
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1.EAs 1.EAs	 1.EAs
	 1.EAs 1.EAs	 1.IAs:
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-ve *N/A	 Orgn:
	
2.IAs 2.IAs	 2.IAs
	 2.IAs 2.IAs	 none
-ve none	 none
	
none	 +ve	 Comp:
none
Econs:
none
STATIS-
TICAL
TESTS &
FINDINGS
1. Spearmen correlation was calculated for each
category of the variables. A t-test group was then
done on the categories. Although there are varying
correlation coefficients for the categories of each
variable (some positive and some negative), all the
variables show that there is no significant difference
within the categories of each variable.
*N/A - not applicable
Figure 6.23: Summary of findings of "variables" on
iudgement consensus using "ICO" approach
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2.IAs
-ve
1.EAs 1.EAs
	 I.IAs:
+ve N/A	 Orgn:
2.I ilis 2.IAs
	 none
+ve	 none	 Comp:
-ve
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none
Spearmen correlation was calculated for each
category of the variables. A t-test group was then
done on the categories. Although there are varying
correlation coefficients for the categories of each
variable (some positive and some negative),all the
variables show that there is no significant
difference within the categories of each variable.
Figure 6.24: Summary of findings of "variables" on
judgement consistency
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Spearmen correlation was calculated for each
category of the variables. A t-test group was then
done on the categories. Although there are varying
correlation coefficients for the categories of each
variable (some positive and some negative), all the
variables show that there is no significant
difference within the categories of each variable.
Figure 6.25: Summary of findings of "variables" on 
judgement consensus using "CR" approach
429
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Figure 6.26: Summary of findings of "variables" on
-judgement consensus using "CO" approach
HC: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF CONSENSUS AND
CONSISTENCY LEVEL BETWEEN EAs AND IAs WITH RESPECT TO THE
7 VARIABLES
The results showed that all the 7 variables had no effect
on judgement consensus or consistency by "ICO" approach.
The relationship of the variables with judgement
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consensus and judgement consistency (based on pearson
correlation coefficient) is presented in Table 6.37.
Variables Judgement
consensus
Judgement
consistency
#1 #2
EAs IAs EAs IAs
.82 .80 .77 .73
Experi-
ence
>6(33)* .81 .79 .71 .66
(Yrs) 3 to 6(22) .83 .80 .92 .75
1 to 3(9) .79 .80 .73 .93
Have
prof.
qualif-
icati-
ons
Yes(52) .83 .79 .81 .68
No(12) .77 .82 .70 .84
Type of 1(CA) .83 .78 .79 .77
qualif-
icati-
(49) (15)
ons
2(CACA,CIMA) .75 .78 .98 .89
(3) (17)
3(CIA,MIIA) no .80 no .33
audtr (20) audtr
Posi-
tion
1-Prtnr/Head of IA(16) .81 .78 .81 .46
level 2-Mgr/Audit Mgr(13) .80 .80 .45 .81
3-Sr/Sr IA(20) .82 .81 .89 .82
4-Jr/IA(15) .82 .78 .57 .87
Firm size 1-large .81 .80 .88 .75
(29) (32) (29) (32)
2-others .82 .80 .73 .73
(35) (32) (35) (32)
Independence of 1-very .79113 .80114
IAs
2-mod .79113 .86114
3-least .78113 .751/4
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Variables Judgement
consensus
#1
Judgement
consistency
#2
EAs
.82
IAs
.80
EAs
.77
IAs
.73
Types of Organisa- 1- .81 .90
independence of tional very
IAs #5 indepen-
dence
(17)
2-
mod
.78 .98
(8)
3-
least
.79 .60
(38)
Competen-
cy
1-
very
.79 .65
(31)
2-
mod
.80 .74
(25)
3-
least
.80 .93
(8)
Economics
and other
influen-
ces
1-
very
(38)
.79 .79
2-
mod
.80 .75
(20)
3-
least
.71 .83
(3)
Table 6.37: Comparison of EAs and IAs judgements
according to the different variables using "ICQ" approach
* number in (brackets) represents number of auditors
in each variable category
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#1 all calculations are based on the total correlations
of auditors in each group -1/(n-1); where n is the
number of auditors in each group. "1" is deducted from
the total correlation and from "n" in order to minus
the effect of correlation with itself. Pearson
correlation is calculated for each group of EAs and
IAs separately. Correlations are based on the repeat
cases (case 2, case 3, case 4, case 5, case 6 and case
8).
#2 all calculations are based on Pearson correlation of
coefficient of case 1 and case 7 of auditors in each
group
#3 Total independence"  coefficient of correlation 
for consensus using "ICQ approach" 
Least independent auditors:
1.0rganisational •79 * 3" = 2.37
2.Competency .80 * 2" = 1.60
3.Econs & Other
influences
.71 * 1" = .71
Total 4.68
Total independence coefficient
correlation(ICQ) = 4.68/6 =.78
#d- correlation coefficient is multiplied by 3 because it
is the most important factor.
#e- correlation coefficient is multiplied by 2 because it
is the second important factor.
#f- correlation coefficient is multiplied by 1 because it
is the least important factor.
9 1 Independence of IAs has been discussed in Chapter 2.
There are basically 3 types of independence mentioned in the auditing
standards and literature. These 3 types of independence
(organisational level, competency and economic and other influences)
are being used here. The calculation of types of independence is
shown in Chapter 5, Figure 5.3. The weighting of the types of
independence was based on Ritternberg's findings (1977, 19), whereby,
the respondents rated "organisational independence" the highest,
followed by "competency" and lastly "economic and other influences".
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Moderately independent auditors:
1.0rganisational
2. Competency
3.Econs & Other
influences
Total
.78 * 3= 2.34
.80 * 2= 1.60
.80 * 1= .80
4.74
Total independence coefficient
correlation(case)=4.74/6=.79
Very independent auditors:
• 1.0rganisational	 .81 * 3= 2.34
2.Competency	 .79 * 2= 1.60
3.Econs & Other	 .79 * 1= .80
influences
Total	 4.74 
Total independence coefficient
correlation(case)=4.74/6=.79
#4 Total independence coefficient of correlation for
consistency using the "ICQ" approach" 
Least independent auditors:
1.0rganisational 	 .60 * 3= 1.80
2. Competency	 .93 * 2= 1.86
3.Econs & Other	 .83 * 1= .83
influences
Total	 4.49 
Total independence coefficient
correlation(case)=4.49/6=.75
Moderately independent auditors:
1.0rganisational	 .98 * 3= 2.94
2. Competency	 . 74 * 2= 1.48
3.Econs & Other	 .75 * 1= .75
Influences
Total	 5.17
Total independence coefficient
correlation(case)=5.17/6=.86
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Very independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .90 * 3= 2.70
2. Competency .65 * 2= 1.30
3.Econs & Other
influences
.80 * 1= .80
Total 4.80
Total independence coefficient
correlation(case)=4.80/6=.80
Table 6.38 also showed that the 7 variables had no effect
on judgement consensus by the "CR" and "CO" approach.
Variables Judgement
consensus(CR)
Judgement
consensus(CO)
#1 #2
EAs IAs EAs IAs
.07 .03 .32 .22
Exper-
fence
>6(33)* .03 .02 .31 .21
(years) 3 to 6(22) .07 -.01 .29 .15
1 to 3(9) -.02 -.09 .25 .15
Have
prof
qualifi-
cations
Yes(52) .06 .03 .32 .21
No(12) .01 -.05 .25 .18
Type of 1(CA) .06 -.02 .32 .20
quail-
ficat-
(49) (15) (49) (15)
ions 2(CACA,CIMA,CIPFA) -.43 .01 -.12 .17
(3) (17) (3) (17)
3(CIA,MIIA) no -.03 no .16
audtr (20) audtrs (20)
Position
level
1-Prtnr/Hd of
IA(16)
-.02 -.03 .27 .17
2-Mgr/Audit .00 -.02 .28 .19
Mgr(13)
3-Sr/Sr IA (o) -.01 .30 .19
4-Jr/IA(15) .05 -.03 .27 .17
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Firm
size
1-large .06
(29)
.01
(32)
.30
(29)
.21
(32)
2-others	 • .04
(35)
.01
(32)
.31
(35)
.20
(32)
Independ 1-very #3 .18 #4
ence of .03
IAs
2-mod #3 .15	 1/4
-.22
3-least 1/3 .13	 1/4
-.11
Types of
independ
Organisa-
tional
1-very .00 .16
ence of •
IAs 2-mod -.08 .11
3-
least
.01 .22
Competency 1-very .01 .20
2-mod .00 .20
3-
least
-.10 .14
Econs and
other
influences
1-very .01 .21
2-mod .02 .19
3-
least
-.47 -.15
Table 6.38: Comparison of EAs and lAs judgement consensus
according to the different variables using "CR" and "CO"
approach
* number in (brackets) represents number of auditors
in each variable category
#1 all calculations are based on the total correlations
of auditors in each group -1/(n-1); where n is the
number of auditors in each group. "1" is deducted from
the total computation in order to minus the effect of
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correlation with itself. Pearson correlation is
calculated for each group of EAs and IAs separately.
Correlations are based on the ratings of internal
control risk (CR) for the 8 ICPs. Missing cases
(approximately 3) are substituted with the mean ICP
in order for the correlation to be computed.
#2 all calculations are based on the total correlations
of auditors in each group -1/(n-1); where n is the
number of auditors in each group. "1" is deducted from
the total computation in order to minus the effect of
correlation with itself. Pearson correlation is
calculated for each group of EAs and IAs separately.
Correlations are based on the extent to which the
auditors think that the 8 ICPs are able to achieve the
5 control objectives (CO). Missing cases
(approximately 3) are substituted with the mean ICP
in order for the correlation to be computed.
#3 Total indpendence coefficient correlation for
consensus using "CR" approach
Least independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .01 * 3= 0.03
2. Competency -.10 * 2= -.20
3.Econs & Other
influences
-.47 * 1= -.47
Total -.64
Total independence coefficient correlation(CR)=-.64/6=
-.11 
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Moderately independent auditors:
1.0rganisational -.08 * 3= -0.24
2.Competency .00 * 2= 0.00
3.Econs & Other
influences
.02 * 1= .02
Total -0.22
Total independence coefficient correlation(CR)=-0.22/6=
-.04 
Very independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .00 * 3= 0.00
2.Competency .01 * 2= 0.02
3.Econs & Other
influences
.01 * 1= .01
Total 0.03
Total independence coefficient correlation(CR)=0.03/6=
.005.
#4 Total independence coefficient correlation using "CO" 
approach
Least independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .22 * 3= 0.66
2.Competency .14 * 2= .28
3.Econs & Other
influences
-.15 * 1= -.15
Total .79
Total independence coefficient correlation(CO) =0.79/6=
.13
Moderately independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .11 * 3= 0.33
2.Competency .20 * 2= 0.40
3.Econs & Other
influences
.19 * 1= .19
Total 0.92
Total independence coefficient correlation(CO) = 0.92/6=
.15
Very independent auditors:
1.0rganisational .16 * 3= 0.48
2.Competency .20 * 2= 0.40
3.Econs & Other
influences
.21 * 1= .21
Total 1.09
Total independence coefficient correlation(CO) =1.09/6=
.18
Table 6.39 summarizes the relationship of the findings.
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It is based on the results of Tables 6.37 and 6.38.
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Table 6.39: Relationship of the variables on "judgement consensus"
and "judgement consistency" by using "ICQ", "CR" and "CO" approach
* "0,C E" represents the 3 types of independence of IAs
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As can be seen from Table 6.39, comparing the effect of
the 7 variables over judgement consensus and consistency,
it can be seen that "whether an auditor have professional
qualification" shows the greatest number of relationships
(either positive or negative) for both groups of
auditors. For judgement consensus using "CR" and "CO"
approach, there is a positive relationship of the
variable (have professional qualification) for both EAs
and IAs. Thus it seems that EAs and IAs that "have
professional qualification" can reach a consensus better
than those without professional qualifications.
However, for judgement consensus using "ICQ" approach,
there is a positive relationship of the variable for EAs
but not for IAs. This means to say that EAs that "have
professional qualification" can reach consensus better
than those without professional qualifications but this
is not true for IAs. The same comments can be made for
judgement consistency.
Other interesting observations are that "types of
qualification" have a positive relationship on judgement
consensus for EAs but that "position level" have no or
negative effect on the judgement consensus of both EAs
and IAs.
For the purpose of comparing the results from the present
study to previous research, Table 6.40 is prepared which
is based on information from Table 6.39 (using "ICQ
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approach" only as previous research had only used this
approach).
Van-
ables
Judgement
consensus
Judgement
consistency
Judgement
insight
None Ne-
ga-
ti-
ve
Po-
si-
ti-
tve
None Ne-
ga-
ti-
ve
Po-
Si-
ti-
ve
None Ne-
ga-
ti-
ve
Po-
si-
ti-
ve
Expe-
rien-
ce
Moo-
re
1993
Han
1987
Bai-
ley
1981
THIS
STU-
DY
1995
EAs
a
IAs
._	
„..
Ash-
ton
1974
Ham-
id -
ton
&
Wri-
ght
1977
Ha-
11,
Yet-
ton
&
Zim-
mer
1982
Joy-
ce
92
1976
Rec-
kers
&
Tay-
lor
1979
Ash-
ton
&
Bro-
wn
1980
Lib-
by
1985
Lan-
dry
1989
EAs
Has-
kins
1984
Basu
1992
93
Han
1986
Ham-
lit-
on &
Wri-
ght
1977
THIS
' STU-
DY
1995
EAs
THIS
STU-
DY
1995
IAs
Ash-
ton
&
Bro-
wn
1980
Ash-
ton
&
Kra-
mer
1980
Ash-
ton
1974
Hall
Yet-
ton
&
Zim-
mer
1982
Slo-
vic
et
al.
1972
Rec-
kers
&
Tay-
lor
1979
Ash-
ton
&
Bro-
wn
1980
Ham-
il-
ton
&
Wri-
ght
1977
92 Allocation of budget hours to ICPs unlike the rest which
requires auditors to evaluate internal control system.
93 Evaluation of control environment.
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Table 6.40: Comparison of findings from the current study with previous
studies over the 7 variables.
All the studies in comparison with the current study was done
in US with the exception of Hall, Yetton and Zimmer (1982),
which was done in Australia. Other studies (not included in the
Table) not done in US are studies conducted by Eggleton and
Choo (1983) which was done in New Zealand and Trotman, Yetton
and Zimmer (1983) which was done in Australia. The current
study is the first study of this nature in the UK. It is the
hope of the researcher that future studies could be done to
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enhance or resolve the issues that have been mentioned in this
thesis.
6.5.3.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS OF EFFECTS OF THE 7
VARIABLES ON JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS AND CONSISTENCY
The results showed that none of the 7 variables had an
effect on judgement consensus or consistency.
From Table 6.40, it can be seen that there is no relationship
between experience level and judgement consensus for both EAs
and IAs, which is consistent with research done by Han (1987),
Moore (1993) and Bailey (1981) but not consistent with others
(example, Ashton, 1974 and Hamilton and Wright, 1977).
Only three research (Bailey, 1981; Landry, 1989 and Moore,
1993) have been done to date that compares EAs' and IAs'
evaluation of the internal control system. Overall, it can be
said that findings from the present study are consistent with
Moore's findings than with the other two studies.
There can be no comparison of judgement insight from the
present study because there is only one judgement model for
each group of EA and IA as compared to previous research where
the judgement models were determined for all the auditors who
participated in the study. This is due to the fact that
previous research requires each auditor to answer many more
cases (example 32 cases in Ashton's research) compared to the
current research which requires auditors to answer 8 cases
only. Further discussions can be found in chapter 4.
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This research found that there is no effect of independence of
IAs on judgement consensus - which is consistent with Moore's
findings. Since previous researches have not investigated
types of independence of IAs on judgement consensus and
consistency, no comparison could be made with those studies.
Of the three types of independence, only "competency" showed
a negative effect on judgement consistency with "organisational
independence" and "economics and other influences" showing no
effect on either judgement consensus or consistency.
It is interesting to note from Table 6.40 that the effect of
the seven variables on judgement consistency is not in the same
direction for EAs and IAs with the exception of variable "firm
size" where the relationship is positive for both EAs and IAs.
This means to say that EAs and IAs who worked in bigger firms
have a greater judgement consistency than those that worked in
smaller firms.
6.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON HYPOTHESES
ISSUES HA:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
IN JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
FINDINGS
1) Similar
cases
Hla:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of the 6 similar cases
between EAs and IAs
not signif.
Hlb:There is a significant difference
of variation in judgement consensus of
the cases between EAs and IAs
not signif.
Hlc:There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of the 6 cases
between EAs and IAs
not signif.
Hld:There is a significant difference
of the consensus level on the cases
between EAs and IAs
not signif.
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ISSUES HA:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
IN JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
FINDINGS
2)Techni-
ques of
evaluation
H2a1:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs and IAs using
"ICQ" as compared to "CO" approach
not signif.
H2a2 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as
compared to "CO" approach
signif.
H2a3 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as
compared to "CO" approach
signif.
H2b1 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs and IAs using
"ICQ" as compared to "CR" approach
not signif.
H2b2 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs using "ICQ" as
compared to "CR" approach
signif.
H2b3 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of IAs using "ICQ" as
compared to "CR" approach
signif.
H2c1 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of EAs and IAs using
"CO" as compared to "CR" approach
not signif.
H2c2 :There is a significant difference
between the ratings of EAs using "CO"
as compared to "CR" approach
not signif.
H2c3 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of IAs using "CO" as
compared to "CR" approach
not signif.
3)Whether
ICPs
achieve
COs
H3a:There is a significant difference
in the ratings on each ICP's ability
to achieve each CO between EAs and IAs
not signif.
H3b:There is a significant difference
of consensus level on the ability of
each ICP to achieve each CO between
EAs and IAs
signif.
H3c:There is a significant difference
in the ratings on the overall ICS's
ability to achieve each CO between EAs
and IAs
not signif
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ISSUES HA:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
IN JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
FINDINGS
H3d1 :There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of each ICP and
the ratings of the overall ICS's
ability to achieve each CO amongst EAs
signif.
H3d2 :There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of each ICP and
the ratings of the overall ICS's
ability to achieve each CO amongst IAs
signif.
4)Level of
CR of ICPs
H4a:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of the level of CR of
each ICP between EAs and IAs
signif.
H4b:There is a significant difference
of consensus level on the level of CR
of each ICP between EAs and IAs
signif.
H4c:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of CR for the overall
ICS between EAs and IAs
not signif.
H4d1 :There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of CR for each ICP
and the mean ratings of CR for the
overall ICS amongst EAs
not signif.
H4d2 :There is a significant difference
in the mean ratings of CR for each ICP
and the mean ratings of CR for the
overall ICS amongst IAs
signif.
5)Importan
ce of ICPs
H5a:There is a significant difference
in the total points allocated to
overall ICS between EAs and IAs
signif.
H5b:There is a significant difference
in the mean points given for each ICP
between EAs and IAs
not signif.
6)Types of
controls
H6a 1 :There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of accounting
and administrative control amongst EAs
signif.
H6a2 :There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of accounting
and administrative control amongst IAs
signif.
I
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ISSUES HA:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
IN JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
FINDINGS
H6b:There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of accounting
controls between EAs and IAs
signif.
H6c:There is a significant difference
in the mean weighting of accounting
controls between EAs and IAs
signif.
H7a1 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of accounting and
administrative control for the 5
control objectives amongst EAs.
signif.
H7a2 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of accounting and
administrative control for the 5
control objectives amongst IAs.
signif.
H7b:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of accounting controls
for the 5 control objectives between
EAs and IAs.
not signif.
H7c:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of administrative
controls for the 5 control objectives
between EAs and IAs.
not signif.
H8a1 :There is a significant difference
in the ratings of control risk of
accounting and administrative control
amongst EAs
not signif.
H8a2 :There is a significant difference
between the ratings of control risk of
accounting and administrative control
amongst IAs
not signif.
H8b:There is a significant difference
between the mean ratings of control
risk of accounting controls between
EAs and IAs
signif.
H8c:There is a significant difference
in the ratings of control risk of
administrative controls between EAs
and IAs
signif.
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ISSUES HA:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
IN JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
FINDINGS
OVERALL
CONCLUSION
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN
JUDGEMENT CONSENSUS BETWEEN IAs AND
EAs
***NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.41: Summary of hypotheses on judgement consensus
*** The overall result is not significant since the main sub-
hypotheses of testing this hypothesis (concerning the ratings
made on the "similar cases" that is hypotheses Hla to Hid all
shows a non-significant result). Another reason for this
overall conclusion is that the main hypothesis (HA) is
concerned with judgement consensus between EAs and 1As and if
the sub-hypotheses are examined closely, majority of the sub-
hypotheses comparing EAs and IAs showed a non-significant
result.
ISSUES
-
HB:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN
JUDGEMENT CONSISTENCY BETWEEN IAs AND EAs
FINDINGS
1)Repeat
cases
Hla:There is a significant difference in
the difference in ratings of case 1 and
case 7 between EAs and IAs
not
signif.
Hlb:There is a significant difference in
the variation of judgement consistency
between EAs and IAs
not
signif.
H1c1 :There is a significant difference
between the ratings of case 1 and case 7
amongst EAs
not
signif.
Hicl :There is a significant difference
between the ratings of case 1 and case 7
amongst IAs
signif.
OVERALL
CONCLUSI
ON
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN
JUDGEMENT CONSISTENCY
BETWEEN IAs AND EAs
NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.42: Summary of hypotheses on judgement consistency
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VARIABLES HC:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
OF CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS
WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING
VARIABLES LISTED BELOW USING THE "ICQ"
APPROACH
FIN-
DINGS
1)Experience HC1:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various experience levels using the
"ICQ" approach
not
signif
2)Have prof
qualifctns
HC2:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors
who have passed the professional
examinations and those that have not
using the "ICQ" approach
not
signif
3)Types of
prof
qualifctns
HC3:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various types of professional
qualifications ,i.e those who are
strong on EAs audit training, strong
on company accounting and strong on
IAs auditing using the "ICQ" approach
not
signif
4)Position
levels
HC4:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various position levels using the
"ICQ" approach
not
signif
5)Size of
firms
HC5:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors
from different size
firms/organisations using the "ICQ"
approach
not
signif
6)Independen
ce of IAs
HC6:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between IAs of
various levels of experience using the
"ICQ" approach
not
signif
7)Types of
independence
of IAs
HC7:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between IAs with
different types of independence using
the "ICQ" approach.
not
signif
OVERALL
CONCLUSION
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WHO
HAVE AND THOSE THAT DO NOT HAVE THE
ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS USING THE "ICQ"
APPROACH
NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.43: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
judgement consensus using "ICQ" approach
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VARIABLES HD:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
OF CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS
WITH RESPECT TO THE VARIABLES LISTED
BELOW USING "CR" APPROACH
FIN-
DINGS
1)Experience HD1:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various experience levels using "CR"
approach
not
signif
2)Have prof
qualifctns
HD2:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors
who have passed the professional
examinations and those that have not
using "CR" approach
not
signif
3)Types of
prof
qualifctns
HD3:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various types of professional
qualifications ,i.e those who are
strong on EAs audit training, strong
on company accounting and strong on
IAs auditing using "CR" approach
not
signif
4)Position
levels
HD4:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors of
various position levels using "CR"
approach
not
signif
5)Size of
firms
HD5:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between auditors
from different size
firms/organisations using "CR"
approach
not
signif
6)Independen
ce of IAs
HD6:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between IAs of
various levels of independence using
"CR" approach
not
signif
7)Types of
independence
of IAs
HD7:There is a significant difference
of consensus level between IAs of
different types of independence using
"CR" approach.
not
signif
OVERALL
CONCLUSION
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WHO
HAVE AND THOSE THAT DO NOT HAVE THE
ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS USING "CR"
APPROACH
NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.44: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
judgement consensus using "CR" approach
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VARIABLES HE:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WITH
RESPECT TO THE VARIABLES LISTED BELOW
USING "CO" APPROACH
FINDINGS
1)Experience HEl:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of
various experience levels using "CO"
approach
not
signif
2)Have prof
qualifctns
HE2:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors who
have passed the professional
examinations and those that have not
using "CO" approach
not
signif
3)Types of
prof
qualifctns
HE3:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of
various types of professional
qualifications ,i.e those who are strong
on EAs audit training, strong on company
accounting and strong on IAs auditing
using "CO" approach
not
signif
4)Position
levels
HE4:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors of
various position levels using "CO"
approach
not
signif
5)Size of
firms
HE5:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between auditors from
different size firms/organisations using
"CO" approach
not
signif
6)Independen
ce of IAs
HE6:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAs of various
levels of independence using "CO"
approach
not
signif
7)Types of
independence
of IAs
HE7:There is a significant difference of
consensus level between IAsof different
types of independence
using "CO" approach.
not
signif
OVERALL
CONCLUSION
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSENSUS LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WHO
HAVE AND THOSE THAT DO NOT HAVE THE
ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS USING "CO"
APPROACH
NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.45: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
judgement consensus using "CO" approach
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VARIABLES HF:THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSISTENCY LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WITH
RESPECT TO THE VARIABLES LISTED BELOW
FIN-
DINGS
1)Experience HF1:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of
various experience levels
not
signif
2)Have prof
qualifctns
HF2:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors who
have passed the professional examinations
and those that have not
not
signif
3)Types of
prof
qualifctns
HF3:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of
various types of professional
qualifications, i.e those who are strong
on EAs audit training, strong on company
accounting and strong on IAs auditing
not
signif
4)Position
levels
HF4:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors of
various position levels
not
signif
5)Size of
firms
HF5:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between auditors from
different size firms/organisations
not
signif
6)Independen
ce of IAs
HF6:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between IAs of various
levels of independence
not
signif
7)Types of
independence
of IAs
HF7:There is a significant difference of
consistency level between IAs with
different types of independence
not
signif
OVERALL
CONCLUSION
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
CONSISTENCY LEVEL BETWEEN AUDITORS WHO
HAVE AND THOSE THAT DO NOT HAVE THE ABOVE
CHARACTERISTICS
NOT
SIGNIF
Table 6.46: Summary of hypotheses on effects of variables on
judgement consistency
6.7 DESCRIPTIVE JUDGEMENT MODEL OF AUDITORS
6.7.1 Experimental design used and results 
The design involves (Kempthorne 1952, 403) 63 degrees of
freedom: one degree of freedom is used in testing each of
the 8 main effects and 28 two factor interactions. The
remaining 27 are to test other higher order interactions
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or other explanatory factors thus totalling 63. The 64
combinations of factor levels (or cases) are shown in
Chapter 5, Table 5.7.
ANOVA computations are applied to the experimental
results for each group of auditor. F ratios are computed
for each main effect and 2 factor interactions.
For the purpose of constructing descriptive models of
judgement, F ratios are computed for the 8 main effects
and 28, 2 factor interactions from the data of each
auditor.
An analysis of variance was carried out to examine the
judgement model of the auditors, using educational level,
experience level and position level as covariates. The
main objective of the test was to see if the covariates
and the 8 ICPs have an effect on the ratings of each
group of auditors when they were considered
simultaneously.
Bailey (1981) looked at the effect of types of auditor
(whether external or internal); types of cases evaluated
(which of the 8 cases) in determining the factors that
effect EAs' and IAs' ratings but did not take into
account the effect of the 12 ICPs in the questionnaire.
He, too used ANOVA to examine the effects of the factors.
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In the determination of the judgement model (which he
called predictive model) of the auditors, he had to
exclude 6 ICPs out of 12 ICPs because as he admitted it
was due to the weakness of his experimental design (pg
108). Amongst the reasons he stated were the small number
of hypothetical cases (each auditor had only to answer
one of the 8 cases given to them) and the use of
categorical data.
Realizing the weakness of his experiment, Bailey
recommended that a judgement model be done for a group of
IAs and a group of EAs.
Such an experiment could be fruitful as an
exploratory technique to reveal basic differences in
the importance placed upon certain variables.
(Bailey 1981, 119)
In this thesis, the experiment was carefully designed in
order to avoid these weaknesses.
Using SPSS, the analysis of variance was used using the
regression approach and a 2 factor interaction. The
regression approach is where all effects are assessed
simultaneously, with each effect adjusted for all other
effects in the model. Only 2 factor interactions were
analysed because the model that is being used assumes
that 3 or higher order interactions are negligible.
For ANOVA to be used, the assumptions are that the values
of the dependent variable for each of the factor
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combinations must be normally distributed with the same
variance. ANOVA would be able to determine whether one
or more discrete factors has an effect on the dependent
variable and whether the effect of one factor depends on
the value of another factor (Norussis 1991, 212).
Norussis (1991) further states that,
The dependent variable must be interval level, and
one or more categorical variables define the
groups.These categorical variables are termed
factors. The ANOVA procedure also allows you to
include continuous explanatory variables, termed
covariates.
(Norussis 1991, 217)
In this thesis, the dependent variable is the rating of
the cases on a "visual analog scale" by the auditors.
"Visual analog scale" is a "continuous" scale or an
"interval" scale data. It thus meets the assumptions of
ANOVA which is a "parametric" test. This is the first
study that has ever used an "interval" scale data except
for Reckers and Taylor (1979) which used a "reliability
point scale". Previous studies have all used a "Likert"
scale which is an "ordinal" scale but used ANOVA to
determine the judgement models of the auditors.
The factors are the 8 ICPs given in the form of an "ICQ"
with an "absent or present" tick (which is "categorical",
again meeting the assumption of ANOVA). The covariates,
except for length of experience are "categorical" in
nature and had to be turned into "continuous" data as
warranted by ANOVA. Thus, professional qualification
and position level had to be turned into "binary"
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variables. ANOVA was done for the 2 groups of auditors
and results are as shown on the following pages.
6.7.2 Descriptive judgement model for EAs 
A h fractional replication of a 2 8 was chosen to determine
the judgement model for both EAs and IAs as discussed in
Chapter 5. In this particular design, all main effects
and all 28, two cue interactions are estimable. 3 cue
interactions are not intended to be measured as previous
studies have indicated that they account for none or
negligible interaction. An ANOVA by means of regression
approach was conducted on the ratings of the 64 EAs.
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MI (case number /) BY 	 TCRD; TKPG, ADESC,	 DUTRO, NAMCK, PYRSE, 	 MGTRE,
FOUR	 WITH LGTHEXP, HAVPROF, SENIOR, MANAGER, PARTNER
Source of Variation
	 Sum of Squares	 DF	 Mean Square	 F	 Signif of F
Covariates 7.501 5 1.500 2.260 .084
LGTHEXP 3.951 1 3.951 5.951 .023
HAVPROF .003 1 .003 .005 .943
SENIOR 2.059 1 2.059 3.101 .092
MANAGER .338 1 .338 .510 .483
PARTNER 1.835 1 1.835 2.764 .111
4a1n Effects 40.598 8 5.075 7.644 .000
TCRD 6.156 I 6.156 9.272 .006
TKPG 2.518 1 2.518 3.793 .064
ADESC .163 1 .163 .246 .625
DUTRO 1.960 1 1.960 2.953 .100
NAMCK 12.907 1 12.907 19.442 .000
PYRSE 3.412 1 3.412 5.139 .034
MGTRE 6.255 1 6.255 9.423 .006
FORPR 2.316 1 2.316 3.489 .075
2-way Interactions 29.694 28 1.060 1.597 .132
TCRD	 TKPG .001 1 .001 .002 .968
TCRD	 ADESC 1.535 1 1.535 2.312 .143
TCRD	 DUTRO .371 1 .371 .559 .463
TCRD	 NAMCK .331 1 .331 .499 .487
TCRD	 PYRSE .571 1 .571 .860 .364
TCRD	 MGTRE 1.334 1 1.334 2.009 .170
TCRD	 FORPR 1.374 1 1.374 2.070 .164
TKPG	 ADESC .147 1 .147 .221 .643
TKPG	 DUTRO .427 1 .427 .644 .431
TKPG	 NAMCK .036 1 .036 .054 .818
TKPG	 PYRSE 3.700 1 3.700 5.573 .028
TKPG	 MGTRE .046 1 .046 .069 .795
TKPG	 FORPR .000 1 .000 .000 .986
ADESC	 DUTRO .747 1 .747 1.125 .300
ADESC	 NAMCK 1.775 1 1.775 2.674 .116
ADESC	 PYRSE .105 1 .105 .158 .694
ADESC	 MGTRE .454 1 .454 .684 .417
ADESC	 FORPR .773 1 .773 1.164 .292
DUTRO	 NAMCK .032 1 .032 .048 .828
DUTRO	 PYRSE .293 1 .293 .441 .514
DUTRO	 MGTRE .165 1 .165 .249 .623
DUTRO	 FORPR .630 1 .630 .949 .340
NAMCK	 PYRSE .391 1 .391 .589 .451
NAMCK	 MGTRE .075 1 .075 .114 .739
NAMCK
	
FORPR .469 1 .469 .707 .409
PYRSE	 MGTRE .033 1 .033 .049 .826
PYRSE	 FORPR 6.934 1 6.934 10.446 .004
MGTRE	 FORPR 4.660 I 4.660 7.019 .015
lxplained 81.540 41 1.989 2.996 .004
Residual 14.605 22 .664
j'ntal	 96_745 69 1_576
Figure 6.28: Initial judgement model for EAs with all terms
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Norussis (1991, 250) summarizes the formula for R 2 and
FL 2 as follows:
R2 = 1- Residual Sum of Squares 
Total Sum of Squares
= 1- 14.605 
96.145
= 85%
Adjusted R2 is
= 1- Residual Sum of Squares/(N-p-1) 
Total Sum of Squares/(N-1)
where N is the number of cases and p is the number of
independent variables.
Thus, based on Figure 6.28, adjusted R2
= 1- 14.605/ 64-41-1 
96.145/64-1
= 1- .664 
1.526
= 56.5%
Adjusted R2 never decreases as independent variables are
added. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
equation with more variables better fits the population.
R2
 of 0 does not necessarily mean that there is no
association between the variables. Instead it indicates
that there is no linear relationship.
Norussis (1991) recommends the use of R a 2
 rather than R2.
Norussis states that,
...the sample R2
 in general tends to overestimate the
population value of W. Adjusted R2 attempts to
correct the optimistic bias of the sample R2.
Adjusted R2 does not necessarily increase as
additional variables are added to an equation, and
it is the preferred measure of goodness of fit
because it is not subject to the inflationary bias
460
of unadjusted R2.'
(Norussis 1991, 269)
The ANOVA model was able to explain about 56.5% of the
ratings of case 1. No analysis for case 7 was done as
from H3 it was observed that there are no significant
differences between the 2 ratings.
From the initial analysis, it appears that only the
covariate length of experience has an effect on the
rating of case 1. Position level and whether an EA has a
professional qualification does not affect their ratings.
As for the 8 ICPs, 5 out of the 8 ICPs are significant.
It appears that namckl has the most influence as to what
ratings the EAs are going to give, followed by mgtre,
tcrd and pyrse. The other 4; tkpg, adesc, dutro and forpr
are not significant."
95 For convenience, although Table 6.12 of Section 6.3 has
explained the 8 ICPs, below is an explanation of the 8 ICPs.
ICP1(tcrd): Are time cards and other source documents 	 checked
before processing by the payroll department for casts and
calculations?
ICP2(tkpg): Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated from the task of payroll preparation?
ICP3(adesc):Is there adequate physical security over personal files
which contain information relevant to the audit?
ICP4(dutro):Are the duties of those preparing the payroll rotated?
ICP5(namck):Are the names on the payroll checked periodically against
the active employee file of the personnel department?
ICP6(pyrse):Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment of
employees adequately separated from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
ICP7(mgtre):Are management reports used to monitor the reliability
of payroll data through comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
ICP8(forpr):Are formal procedures established for changing names,
payrates and deductions?
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However, for the purpose of comparison with weightings
given to ICPs, the priority of importance for the 8 ICPs
including the ICPs which are not significant is:
1)Namck
2)Mgtre
3)Tcrd
4)Pyrse
5)Tkpg
6)Forpr
7)Dutro
8)Adesc
There are about 3 significant 2 factor interactions but
the overall 2 factor interactions were not significant.
This is expected for the simple reason that as you test
a large number of hypotheses simultaneously, then even if
all the null hypotheses are true (no real difference),
there are bound to have some that are statistically
significant.
This is equivalent to saying that the more times you run
a test, the higher the probability that it is
significant.
It was decided to use "backward elimination" where the
terms (or independent variables) that are not significant
are eliminated one by one based on the least significant
term in order to determine the final model. The final
model would then consist of only terms that are
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significant to the rating of case 1. The first step was
to eliminate the 2 factor interactions in total and then
proceed with eliminating the insignificant term one by
one, starting with the least significant independent
variable.
CNI	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
ADESC
DUTRO
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
FORPR
WITH LGTHEXP length of audit experience
HAVPROF have professional qualification
SENIOR
MANAGER
PARTNER
Sum of Mean Signif
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
:lovariates 6.075 5 1.215 1.371 .251
LGTHEXP 4.694 1 4.694 5.298 .026
HAVPROF .039 1 .039 .044 .834
SENIOR .877 1 .877 .990 .325
MANAGER .247 1 .247 .279 .600
PARTNER 2.231 1 2.231 2.518 .119
lain Effects 41.387 8 5.173 5.839 .000
TCRD 6.295 1 6.295 7.105 .010
TKPG 3.756 1 3.756 4.239 .045
ADESC .264 1 .264 .298 .587
DUTRO 1.876 1 1.876 2.118 .152
NAMCK 13.209 1 13.209 14.909 .000
PYRSE 3.357 1 3.357 3.789 .057
MGTRE 7.268 1 7.268 8.204 .006
FORPR 2.608 1 2.608 2.943 .092
-Taplained 51.846 13 3.988 4.501 .000
Residual 44.299 50 .886
Total 96.145 63 1.526
Figure 6.29: Initial judgement model for EAs with no
two-factor interactions
The first step for backward elimination is to delete the
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2 factor interactions.
1) Delete 2 factor interactions since it is not
significant.
However, there is a need to check if the exclusion of 2
factor interactions has an effect on the model as a
whole.
Change in residual sum of squares /Change in residual
deg of free.
Residual sum of squares 	 /Residual deg of
for model with all terms 	 freedom with all
interactions
. (44.299-14.605)/50-22	 = 29.694/28	 = 1.60
14.605/22	 .664
If the value calculated is less than the F table value
for (28,22) degrees of freedom, therefore the term is not
significant and can be removed from the model. F table
value for (30,22)" degrees of freedom at a=.05 is 1.98.
Thus, the 2 factor interactions can be excluded from the
model since the calculated value is less than the value
of F table.
96 The conservative value for F table is chosen; that is by
taking a higher degree of freedom if the degree of freedom needed is
not available.
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CN	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
ADESC
DUTRO
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
FORPR
WITH LGTHEXP length of audit experience
SENIOR
MANAGER
PARTNER
Sum of
Source of Variation 	 Squares DF
Mean
Square
Signif
F	 of F
ovariates 6.036 4 1.509 1.736 .157
LGTHEXP 4.684 1 4.684 5.388 .024
SENIOR .981 1 .981 1.129 .293
MANAGER .212 1 .212 .243 .624
PARTNER 2.321 1 2.321 2.670 .108
lain Effects 42.645 8 5.331 6.132 .000
TCRD 7.255 1 7.255 8.345 .006
TKPG 4.503 1 4.503 5.180 .027
ADESC .288 1 .288 .331 .568
DUTRO 1.843 1 1.843 2.120 .152
NAMCK 13.444 1 13.444 15.464 .000
PYRSE 3.479 1 3.479 4.002 .051
MGTRE 7.434 i 7.434 8.551 .005
FORPR 2.584 1 2.584 2.973 .091
Explained 51.806 12 4.317 4.966 .000
Residual 44.338 51 .869
Total 96.145 63 1.526
Figure 6.30: Initial judgement model of EAs with no two-
factor interactions and no covariate "havprof"
2) Delete covariate havprof since it is the least
significant.
However, there is a need to check if the exclusion of
a factor has an effect on the model as a whole.
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Change in residual sum of squares /Change in residual
deg of free.
Residual sum of squares for 	 /Residual deg of freedom
model without interactions
	
without interactions
= (44.338-44.299)/51-50 
44.299/50
=	 0.039/1	 = .044
.8859
If the value calculated is less than the F table value
for (1,50) degrees of freedom, then the term is not
significant and therefore can be removed from the model.
F table value for (1,60) degrees of freedom at a=.05 is
4.00.
Thus, the factor can be excluded from the model since the
calculated value is less than the value of F table.
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CN1	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
ADESC
DUTRO
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
FORPR
WITH LGTHEXP
SENIOR
PARTNER
length of audit experience
Sum of
	 Mean Signif
source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
.3ovariates 5.824 3 1.941 2..266 .092
LGTHEXP 4.855 1 4.855 5.667 .021
SENIOR .772 1 .772 .901 .347
PARTNER 2.445 1 2.445 2.854 .097
gain Effects 42.447 8 5.306 6.193 .000
TCRD 7.778 1 7.778 9.079 .004
TKPG 4.378 1 4.378 5.110 .028
ADESC .356 1 .356 .416 .522
DUTRO 1.733 1 1.733 2.023 .161
NAMCK 13.699 1 13.699 15.990 .000
PYRSE 3.283 1 3.283 3.832 .056
MGTRE 7.347 1 7.347 8.575 .005
FORPR 2.398 1 2.398 2.799 .100
ftplained 51.595 11 4.690 5.475 .000
Residual 44.550 52 .857
rotal 96.145 63 1.526
Figure 6.31: Initial judgement model of EAs with no
two-factor interactions, no covariate "havprof" and
"manager"
The "deletion" process was carried on until only
significant terms were left in the model. The model which
contains the significant terms is the judgement model of
EAs. The terms deleted in order before the final
judgement model of EAs was obtained are as follows: (a)
covariate manager; (b) factor adesc; (c) covariate
senior; (d) factor partner; (e) factor dutro; (f)
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CN1
BY TCRD
TKPG
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
case number 1
Sum of Mean Signif
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Nain Effects 42.898 5 8.580 9.345 .000
TCRD 9.068 1 9.068 9.877 .003
TKPG 7.446 1 7.446 8.111 .006
NAMCK 13.423 1 13.423 14.621 .000
PYRSE 5.528 1 5.528 6.022 .017
MGTRE 7.432 1 7.432 8.096 .006
Explained 42.898 5 8.580 9.345 .000
Residual 53.247 58 .918
Total 96.145 63 1.526
covariate lgthexp and (q) factor forpr.
The variables in the final model are considered to be
important and they influence the EAs judgements of the
ratings of case 1. The final model for EAs is as shown in
Figure 6.32.
The final model for the EAs as a group is as follows:
Figure 6.32: Final judgement model of EAs
The final model adjusted R 2 is 1-.918/1.526 which is equal
to 39.8%. No covariates is influential in the ratings of
internal control system by EAs but 5 of the 8 ICPs are
influential in the ratings of internal control system by
EAs. In priority of importance the 5 ICPS are namck,
tcrd, mgtre,tkpg and pyrse.
6.7.3 Descriptive judgement model for IAs
An ANOVA by means of regression approach was conducted on
the ratings of the 64 IAs.
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CN1	 BY	 TCRD,	 TKPG,ADESC,	 DUTRO,	 NAMCK,	 PYRSE,
dITHLGTHEXP,HAVPROF, SENIOR, MANAGER, PARTNER
Source of Variation 	 Sum of Squares	 DF	 Mean Square	 F
Covariates
	 5.260	 5	 1.052	 1.377
MGTRE,	 FORPR
Signif of F
.271
LGTHEXP .272 1 .272 .355 .557
HAVPROF 2.443 1 2.443 3.196 .088
SENIOR .000 1 .000 .000 .998
MANAGER .000 1 .000 .000 .999
PARTNER .020 1 .020 .027 .871
nain Effects 27.700 8 3.462 4.531 .002
TCRD 1.507 1 1.507 1.972 .174
TKPG 2.044 1 2.044 2.675 .116
ADESC .028 1 .028 .037 .849
DUTRO .042 1 .042 .055 .817
NAMCK 14.852 1 14.852 19.435 .000
PYRSE 2.595 1 2.595 3.396 .079
MGTRE 4.665 1 4.665 6.104 .022
FORPR 1.220 1 1.220 1.597 .220
2-way Interactions 23.013 28 .822 1.075 436
TCRD	 TKPG
.203 1 .203 .265 .612
TCRD ADESC
.159 1 .159 .207 .653
TCRD DUTRO
.621 1 .621 .813 .377
TCRD NAMCK
.715 1 .715 .935 .344
TCRD PYRSE 2.813 1 2.813 3.680 .068
TCRD MGTRE
.270 1 .270 .353 .559
TCRD FORPR .137 1 .137 .179 .676
TKPG ADESC
.000 1 .000 .000 .983
TKPG DUTRO 2.315 1 2.315 3.030 .096
TKPG NAMCK
.934 1 .934 1.222 .281
TKPG PYRSE 1.461 1 1.461 1.912 .181
TKPG MGTRE
.039 1 .039 .052 .822
TKPG FORPR
.668 1 .668 .874 .360
ADESC DUTRO .094 1 .094 .123 .729
ADESC NAMCK
.077 1 .077 .101 .754
ADESC PYRSE
.244 1 .244 .320 •57
ADESC MGTRE 1.897 1 1.897 2.482 .129
ADESC FORPR .005 1 .005 .007 .935
DUTRO NAMCK .968 1 .968 1.266 .273
DUTRO PYRSE 1.181 1 1.181 1.545 .227
DUTRO MGTRE .097 1 .097 .127 .725
DUTRO FORPR 1.230 1 1.230 1.609 .218
NAMCK PYRSE 1.685 1 1.685 2.205 .152
NAMCK MGTRE .086 1 .086 .112 .741
NAMCK FORPR .848 1 .848 1.110 .304
PYRSE MGTRE 2.441 1 2.441 3.195 .088
PYRSE FORPR .069 1 .069 .091 .766
MGTRE FORPR .145 1 .145 .190 .667
Explained 60.082 41 1.465 1.918 .052
Residual 16.812 22 .764
Total 76.894 63 1.221
Figure 6.33: Initial judgement model of IAs with all terms
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Based on Figure 6.33,
R2
 = 1- Residual Sum of Squares
Total Sum of Squares
= 1- 16.812 
76.894
= 78.1%
Adjusted R2 is
Ra2 = 1- Residual Sum of Squares/(N-p-1) 
Total Sum of Squares/(N-1)
where N is the number of cases and p is the number of
independent variables.
= 1- 16.812/ 64-41-1 
76.894/64-1
= 1- .764 
1.221
= 37.4%
The ANOVA model was able to explain about 37.4% of the
ratings of case 1.
From the analysis, it appears that the covariates were
not significant.
As for the 8 ICPs, 2 out of the 8 ICPs were significant.
Again, it was found that that namck has the most
influence as to what ratings the EAs are going to give
and it is followed by mgtre. The other 4; adesc, dutro,
tcrd and forpr are not significant. There are no
significant 2 factor interactions.
However, for the purpose of comparison with weightings
given to ICPs, the priority of importance for the ICPs
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including the ICPs which were not significant were:
1)Namck
2)Mgtre
3)Pyrse
4)Tkpg
5)Tcrd
6)Forpr
7)Dutro
8)Adesc
Again, the same approach as for EAs (that is "backward
elimination") in determining the final model was used.
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CN1	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
ADESC
DUTRO
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
FORPR
WITH LGTHEXP length of audit experience
HAVPROF have professional qualification
SENIOR
MANAGER
PARTNER
Sum of Mean Signif
3ource of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
2ovariates 3.329 5 .666 .836 .531
LGTHEXP .678 1 .678 .852 .361
HAVPROF 1.556 1 1.556 1.954 .168
SENIOR .089 1 .089 .112 .740
MANAGER .117 1 .117 .147 .703
PARTNER .164 1 .164 .206 .652
gain Effects 30.298 8 3.787 4.755 .000
TCRD 2.639 1 2.639 3.314 .075
TKPG 3.320 1 3.320 4.168 .046
ADESC .030 1 .030 .038 .846
DUTRO .004 1 .004 .005 .944
NAMCK 14.283 1 14.283 17.932 .000
PYRSE 3.505 1 3.505 4.400 .041
MGTRE 4.710 1 4.710 5.914 .019
FORPR 1.361 1 1.361 1.708 .197
Sxplained 37.069 13 2.851 3.580 .001
Residual 39.825 50 .796
Total 76.894 63 1.221
Figure 6.34: Initial judgement model of IAs with no two-
factor interactions
The following steps show how the final model is derived
by means of elimination. The first step for elimination
is to delete the 2 factor interactions.
1) Delete 2 factor interactions since they are not
significant.
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However, there is a need to check if the exclusion of 2
factor interactions has an effect on the model as a
whole.
Change in residual sum of squares /Change in residual
deg of free.
Residual sum of squares 	 /Residual deg of freedom
for model with all terms 	 with all interactions
= (39.825-16.812)/50-22 	 = 	 .8218	 = 1.0758
16.812/22	 .764
If the value calculated is less than the F table value
for (28,22) degrees of freedom, then the term is not
significant and therefore can be removed from the model.
F table value for (30,22)" degrees of freedom at a=.05
is 1.98.
Thus, the 2 factor interactions can be excluded from the
model since the calculated value is less than the value
of F table.
9 7 The conservative value for F table is chosen;that is by
taking a higher degree of freedom if the degree of freedom needed is
not available.
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CN1	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
ADESC
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
FORPR
WITH LGTHEXP length of audit experience
HAVPROF have professional qualification
SENIOR
MANAGER
PARTNER
Sum of Mean Signif
3ource of Variation Squares OF Square F of F
]ovariates 3.376 5 .675 .864 .511
LGTHEXP .678 1 .678 .868 .356
HAVPROF 1.588 1 1.588 2.034 .160
SENIOR .093 1 .093 .119 .732
MANAGER .122 1 .122 .157 .694
PARTNER .165 1 .165 .212 .647
nain Effects 30.294 7 4.328 5.541 .0 it
TCRD 2.665 1 2.665 3.412 .071
TKPG 3.345 1 3.345 4.283 .044
ADESC .030 1 .030 .038 .846
NAMCK 14.289 1 14.289 18.297 .000
PYRSE 3.506 1 3.506 4.490 39
MGTRE 4.725 1 4.725 6.050 .017
FORPR 1.357 1 1.357 1.738 .193
3xplained 37.065 12 3.089 3.955 t
3esidua1 39.829 51 .781
Total 76.894 63 1.221
Figure 6.35: Initial judgement model of IAs with no tun,
factor interactions and no factor "dutro"
2) Delete dutrol as it has the highest F value or it
is the least significant.
However, there is a need to check if the exclusion of t
factor has an effect on the model as a whole.
Change in residual sum of squares /Change in residual
deg of free.
Residual sum of squares for /Residual deg of freedom
model excluding interactions excluding interactions
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= (39.829-39.825)751-50
	 = 0.004/1	 = 0.005
39.825/50	 .796
The value calculated is less than the F table value for
(1,50) degrees of freedom, therefore the term is not
significant and can be removed from the model. F table
value for (1,60) degrees of freedom at a=.05 is 4.00.
The other terms deleted in order before the final
judgement model of IAs was obtained were as follows:
(a) factor adesc; (b) covariate senior; (c) covariate
manager; (d) covariate partner; (e) covariate lgthexp;
(f) factor forpr and (g) factor havprof.
The final model for the IAs as a group with only
significant terms is as shown in Figure 6.36
CN1	 case number 1
BY TCRD
TKPG
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
Sum of Mean Signif
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
'fain Effects 32.609 5 6.522 8.541 .000
TCRD 4.569 1 4.569 5.984 .017
TKPG 5.153 1 5.153 6.749 .012
NAMCK 12.567 1 12.567 16.459 .000
PYRSE 5.325 1 5.325 6.974 .011
MGTRE 4.995 1 4.995 6.542 .013
:i.:xplained 32.609 5 6.522 8.541 .000
3esidua1 44.285 58 .764
Total 76.894 63 1.221
Figure 6.36: Final judgement model of IAs
The final model adjusted R 2 is 1-.764/1.221 which is equal
to 37.4%. Thus,the final model is able to explain 37.4%
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of the variation in the ratings of cases. Again no
covariates seem to have influenced the IAs judgement as
a group but 5 out of 8 ICPS seem important. In priority
of importance, the 5 ICPS are namck, pyrse, tkpg, mgtre
and tcrd."
98 Please refer to Table 6.12 for the full description of
the 8 ICPs. Explanation of accounting and administrative controls can
be found in Section 6.5.1.6.
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6.7.4 Comparison of judgement model weightings and
subjective weightings given by the auditors 
Internal control
procedures (ICPs)
EAs IAs
Subjec-
tive
weights*
Judge-
ment
model
Subjec-
tive
weights
Judge-
ment
model
Tcrds (Acctg procedure) 99 5 3 6 5
Tkpg (Admn procedure) 3 5 2 4
Adesc (Acctg procedure) 7 8 7 8
Dutro (Acctg procedure) 8 7 8 7
Namck (Acctg procedure) 6 1 5 1
Pyrse (Admn procedure) 4 4 1 3
Mgtre (Admn procedure) 2 2 3 2
Forpr (Admn procedure) 1 6 4 6
Table 6.47: Comparison of judgement model and subjective
weightings of EAs and IAs
* Subjective weights are the weights that the auditors
allocate to the individual controls in terms of the
importance of the controls. This is similar to Table
6.27.
As can be seen from Table 6.47, although EAs and IAs
placed some importance on "Forpr" (as seen from the
"subjective weights" column), but this was not found to
be the case when their judgement models were determined.
"Adesc" and "Dutro" are rated least important by both
groups of auditors.
Judgement insight was calculated based on the results of
9 9 Please refer to Table 6.12 or footnote 79 for the
explanation of the 1CPs.
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the table. Judgement insight was obtained by comparing
each group of auditors' subjective weightings and the
importance of the ICPs obtained from the judgement model.
It can only be calculated for the overall group.
Both spearmen and pearson correlation are done on the
auditor's subjective weights of the 8 ICPs (that
constitute each case) as compared with the importance of
the 8 ICPs as determined by the judgement model of the 2
groups of auditors. The result shows a judgement insight
of .29 for EAs and .62 for IAs. This implies that what
IAs do in practice has a closer relationship with what
they believe than is the case for EAs. The judgement
insight for EAs and IAs are on the low side compared with
previous research (as shown in Table 6.48).
Previous research Avg. level of self-insight
EAs:
Internal control evaluation
Ashton(1974)
Hamilton & Wright(1977)
Ashton & Brown(1979)
Students and others:Internal
control evaluation
Trotman,Yetton &
Zimmerman(1983)
.89
.89
.86
.77
.59(individual)
.69(group)
EAs:
Other types
	 of research
Joyce(1976) .53
Other types of research not in
accounting
Slovic et al(1972)-stockbrokers
.34
Reliance on IAs:
Brown(1983) .74
Table 6.48: Summary of judgement insight in previous
studies
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Rank EAs IAs
ICPs Subjective
weights
ICPs Subjective
weights
1 #Forpr 15.0164 Pyrse 16.6349
2 Tkpg 14.5556 Tkpg 16.0952
3 Mgtre 14.7969 Mgtre 15.1094
4 Pyrse 13.5397 Forpr 14.7869
5 *Tcrds 12.9524 *Namck 14.6190
6 *Namck 12.0794 *Tcrds 13.3810
7 *Adesc 9.7619 *Adesc 11.6667
8 *Dutro 8.4127 *Dutro 11.0159
Range(highest-
lowest)
6.6037 5.619
Table 6.49: Range of subjective weightings of EAs and IAs
* Accounting controls
# Please refer to Table 6.12 for the description of the
ICPs
As can be seen from Table 6.49, the range of difference
between the weights given to the most important and least
important ICP is greater for EAs than IAs. It is
consistent with Landry's (1989) findings. However, the
range of ratings is tighter with 1.1 point for EAs and
1.0 point for IAs. This could be due to the nature of the
ICPs included in the ICQ and the nature of the sub-
system. Landry has chosen the cash receipts sub-system as
the focus of his study and has not included any extreme
cases (that is with all ICPs present or vice-versa) in
his study.
Table 6.49 also shows that IAs placed greatest importance
on the two separation of duties controls ( "Pyrse" and
479
"Tkpg"), whereas EAs placed greatest importance on
"Forpr". Both groups of auditors placed most importance
on "administrative" controls rather than "accounting"
controls and placed least importance on "adesc" and
"dutro".
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6.8 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS RESEARCH WHICH INVOLVES 
IAS AND EAS 
So far as we are aware, all research on the same subject
has been done in the US. To date, three studies have
compared EAs and IAs and the findings of these and also
Our current results are shown in Table 6.50.
Bailey
(US, 1981)
Landry
(US, 1989)
Moore
(US, 1993)
This study
(UK, 1995)
Criteria for
selection: 
Criteria for
selection: 
Criteria for
selection: 
Criteria for
selection:
(A) EAS PASSED EXTERNAL AND IAs ARE 90% EAs AND IAs WITH
AICPA AND IA INTERNAL EDP PROFESSIONALLY DIFFERENT LEVELS
PASSED CIA
AND ARE MIIA
AUDITORS QUALIFIED, I.E
THEY HAVE
OF EDUCATIONAL,
POSITION AND
MEMBERS PASSED EITHER EXPERIENCE LEVELS
(B) ONLY PUBLIC CPA OR CIA. PARTICIPATED IN
CORPRTNS ARE EAs ARE 86% THE STUDY
TAKEN AS PROFESSIONALLY
REPRESENTING QUALIFIED,I.E
IIA ORGNS. THEY HAVE
BANKS ARE PASSED EITHER
EXCLUDED CPA,CIA,CIMA
BECAUSE THEY
ARE NOT
AFFECTED BY
FCPA ACT.
1 Consistency
level -not
examined
1. There is no
significant
difference in
consistency
level between
EAs and IAs
1. Consistency
level not
examined
1.There is no
significant
difference in
consistency
level between
EAs and IAs
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Moore
(US, 1993)
This study
(UK, 1995)
2.There is a
significant 
difference 
in judgements
between EAs
and IAs.
Moore
categorize
evaluation of
internal
control as
"subjective
assessments
in internal
control
test". He
gave 3 cases
to the
auditors and
found
significant
difference
for 2 out of
3 cases. He
therefore
concluded
that there
is a
significant
difference.
2. There is no
significant
difference in
judgement
consensus
between EAs
and IAs.
Bailey
(US, 1981)
2.There is a
significant 
difference in
consensus
level between
EAs and IAs
3. EAs less3. EAs less 3. EAs less3. EAs less
Landry
(US, 1989)
2. There is a
significant 
difference in
consensus
level between
EAs and IAs
strict in strict in strict in strict in
their ratings their ratings their their ratings
(higher (higher ratings (higher
ratings) ratings) (higher
ratings)
ratings).
4. Consensus is
higher for EAs
than IAs
4. Consensus is
higher for
EAs than IAs
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Bailey
(US,	 1981)
Landry
(US,	 1989)
Moore
(US,	 1993)
This study
(UK,	 1995)
5. Judgement
model using
multiple
regression
approach
shows no
significant
difference.
The
predictive
model for IAs
5. A 1/4 replicate
of 28 design
was used to
determine the
judgement
model of EAs
and IAs by
means of
analysis of
covariance-
multiple
regression
approach.
The final
model for EAs
was able to
explain about
33% of the
variation in
judgement
whilst that
of EAs was
was able to
explain 39.8%
of the
variation in
judgement
whereas the
final model
of IAs was
able to
explain about
41%.
able to
explain 37.4%
of variation
in judgement.
It is
consistent
with Bailey's
study.
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This study
(UK, 1995)
Moore
(US, 1993)
Bailey
(US, 1981)
g)
6.(a)Experience-
not
significant
(analysed
by means
of ANOVA
model)
(b) Educational-
not examined
(c) Position
level-not
examined
(d) Firm size-
not examined
(e) Independence
of IAs-
not examined
(f) Types of
independence
- not
examined
(g) Types of
qualifictns-
not examined
Landry
(US, 1989)
6. (a) Experience-
b) Educational
c) Position
level
d) Firm size
e) Indepen-
dence of
IAs
f) Types of
indepen-
dence
Types of
qualifttns
There is no
significant
relation-
ship
between the
7 variables
and "judge-
ment
consensus"
and
"judgement
consis-
tency".
6.(a)Experience
-not
significant
(b) Educational
-not
significant
(c) Position
level-not
significant
(d) Firm size-
not
examined
(e) Indepen-
dence of
IAs-not
examined
(f) Types of
indepen-
dence
(organi-
sational
indepen-
dence -not
significant
(g) Types of
qualifctns-
not
examined
6. (a)Experience-
not
significant
(b) Educational-
not
significant.
3 types of
education
were
examined,
i.e
accounting,
EDP and
continuing
education
(c) Position
level-
significant 
for EAs but
not
significant
for IAs
(d) Firm size-
significant 
(e) Independence
of IAs-not
examined
(f) Types of
indepen-
dence-not
examined
(g) Types of
qualifctns-
not examined
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Bailey
(US,	 1981)
Landry
(US,	 1989)
Moore
(US,	 1993)
This study
(UK,
	 1995)
7. Mean ranking
of ICPs
between EAs
and IAs-
mixed results
7. EAs consider
ICPs less able
to achieve
control
objectives.
However, the
ratings were
not
significantly
different for
both groups
of auditors.
Both groups
do not differ
in their
opinion as to
the ability
of the
overall
internal
control
system to
achieve the
5 control
objectives.
There is a
significant
difference
for both
groups
of auditors
in their
opinion as
to ability
of mean ICP
and ICS to
achieve the
control
objectives.
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Bailey
(US,	 1981)
Landry
(US,	 1989)
Moore
(US,	 1993)
This study
(UK,
	 1995)
8. EAs consider
ICPs less
important than
IAs (less
weight given) .
9. EAs consider
ICPs more able
to prevent or
detect errors
(lower control
risk). There
are mixed
results
relating to
the opinion of
both groups of
auditors as to
whether each
ICP is able to
achieve the
control risk.
However, there
is no
significant
difference as
to the ability
of the overall
internal
control system
to achieve the
control risk.
10.There is no
significant
difference in
the variation
of judgement
"consensus" and
"consistency"
between IAs
and EAs.
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Bailey
(US,	 1981)
Landry
(US,	 1989)
Moore
(US,	 1993)
This study
(UK,
	 1995)
,
11.There is a
significant
difference in
the weighting
given to
"adminis-
trative" and
"accounting"
controls by
both groups.
12. There is a
significant
difference in
the opinions
of EAS and
IAs as to
which ICPs
constitutes
"accounting"
controls" or
"administra-
tive"
controls.
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Bailey
(US,	 1981)
Landry
(US,	 1989)
Moore
(US,	 1993)
This study
(UK,	 1995)
13. Judgement
insight for
EAs (.29) was
lower than
that of IAs
(.62).
Judgement
insight is
the
correlation
coefficient
of how well
the
subjective
weightings of
the ICPs
coincide with
the
Importance
attached to
the ICPs by
way of the
judgement
model.
Table 6.50: Comparison of findings with previous research
6.9 GENERAL COMMENTS FROM AUDITORS
The main comments were that the questionnaire was quite
lengthy. Some said that they took one hour, others said
they took four hours and another said they took one and
a half days to complete it. The reason for the varying
length of time taken to complete the questionnaire was
because some concentrated on filling the questionnaire
till finish but some had to extend the task of filling it
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over days because of other urgent work to attend to.
However, on the average they all agreed that the time
taken to complete the questionnaire varied from one to
one and a half hours.
Other specific comments were discussed earlier on in the
chapter under separate discussion sections of each issue.
Majority of the auditors found filling the questionnaire
an exciting and fulfilling exercise.
6.10 SUMMARY
This chapter has reported the results of the study
according to the 4 main issues of: consensus;
consistency; factors influencing consensus and
consistency and judgement model for each group of EAs and
IAs. The overall conclusion showed that there was no
significant difference of judgement consensus and
judgement consistency between EAs and IAs and none of the
factors examined seem to have an effect on judgement
consensus and consistency.
Finally, the findings of this study were also compared
with previous research that dwells on the same issues.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This final chapter presents conclusions of this research,
recommendations for future research, and implications of
this research for accounting practice.
7.2 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AND RESEARCH APPROACH
Evaluation of internal control system is a critical area
in which the duties of IAs and EAs interface. IAs helped
management designed and maintained internal controls
which are evaluated, and often relied upon by EAs. With
the finalisation of internal control and financial
reporting by the Rutteman Committee in December 1994, it
is mandatory for listed companies registered in the UK
with accounting periods beginning on or after 1st January
1995 to report whether they are complying with the Code
of Best Practice in their annual reports and if not to
state the reasons why. Paragraph 4.5 of the Code states,
The directors should report on the effectiveness of
the company's system of internal control
However, the final guideline only requires the directors
to describe the procedures of internal "financial"
controls (compared with the system of internal control)
that exist in the company but the directors are not
required to state their opinion on the effectiveness of
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internal "financial" control.
The IA would most probably be the person responsible for
the preparation of the internal control report and the
work that is required to be done before the preparation
of the report since he is the person in charge of
ensuring that the internal control system is in place.
The EA would be required to evaluate the directors'
opinion in addition to his normal work of expressing his
audit opinion on the truth and fairness of financial
statements.
With this new development, the increase in cooperation
between the two groups of auditors is made more
important. Thus if there are basic differences between
the two groups of auditors, identification of these
differences should be of interest to both groups and
differences reduced if possible.
The user of financial statements is entitled to assume
that auditors' different types of opinions result from
underlying differences in the reliability of accounting
data and do not result from inconsistencies (either among
different auditors or with the same auditor over time) in
the application of judgement at some point in the
evaluation process. Since the result of the evaluation of
internal control would determine the "nature, timing and
extent" of the auditing procedures, inconsistencies in
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internal control may be especially serious. There is no
doubt that internal control evaluation involves some
judgement on the part of auditors but if the reasons for
the difference in judgement among auditors could be
determined, that would enable the accounting profession
to be more objective in their work. Some writers and
researchers in the field of auditing have attributed the
differences in judgement to the different internal
control procedures present in the internal control system
and the personal profile of the auditors such as their
educational level, position level and experience level.
Thus in this thesis such claims are being investigated by
means of a laboratory experiment.
7.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Findings will be discussed according to the four main
issues: a) consensus; b) judgement models; c) consistency
and d) effect of the variables on judgement "consensus"
and "consistency".
Strictly speaking, the results of the present study are
applicable only to the task and individuals involved.
Great care must be taken in attempting to generalize
these results to other types of internal control
subsystem, other hypothetical (or real) business firms,
other EAs, or other sets of internal control procedures.
Most of the auditors who participated in the study
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consist of partners/ head or deputy head of departments,
very experienced and were professionally qualified.
7.3.1 Consensus
Overall, the test showed no significant difference
between the ratings of EAs and IAs although visually, it
can be seen that EAs tend to give higher ratings to all
the cases. In other words there may be a tendency for EAs
to place a higher degree of reliance upon particular
controls than would IAs, but it was . not found to be
statistically significant. The spread of answers between
the two groups of auditors was not significant and their
answers were strongly and positively correlated.
No significant difference was found between both groups
of auditors using different techniques or approaches of
evaluation. They were closest in their ratings when they
used the "ICQ" 100 approach, followed by "C0"1"
100
"ICQ "approach. The auditors were presented with a list of
ICPs (8 of them) which were marked with a "Yes" indicating presence
of the control and a "No" indicating absence of the control and they
were required to base their judgement of the strength of internal
control system based on this list of ICPs.
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approach .The auditors were asked to match the internal
control procedures to the control objectives. There were five control
objectives which comprised of "completeness, existence, rights and
obligations, presentation and disclosure and valuation". Based on
their assessments, the auditors were then asked to evaluate the
quality of the internal control system.
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approach and then the "CR""2 approach. There was a
significant difference within each of the two groups of
auditors when the "ICQ" approach was used compared with
both the "CO" and the "CR" approach. However, no
significant difference was found within each group of
auditors when the "CR" approach was used compared with
the "CO" approach. This indicate that both groups of
auditors seem to agree that there was similarity between
the "CR" and "CO" approach of evaluation.
There was a significant difference of consensus level to
achieve control objectives between EAs and IAs. A t-test
done on their mean ratings showed that 7 out of 40 of
EAs' ratings were significantly different from IAs'
ratings. However, taking the system as a whole there was
no significant difference between EAs' and IAs' ratings
as to the system's capability to achieve any of the given
control objectives. Visually, it can be seen that EAs
thought that the ICPs (but not the overall internal
control system) to be less able to ensure the achievement
of the control objectives as compared to IAs. When
theoretical questions about the potential of ICPs to
achieve particular control objectives were asked, it was
found that EAs were more optimistic than IAs. This held
102 ,	 ,
'CR' approach. The auditors were asked to assess the ICPs
level of control risk or the ability of the ICPs to prevent or detect
material errors from occurring. Based on their assessment of the
control risk, the auditors were then asked to assess the quality of
the internal control system.
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true for their opinion of the overall internal control
system but not with the ICPs. On the other hand, IAs were
more pessimistic in placing more reliance on the
effectiveness of ICPs, which is in line with their
ratings of the overall internal control system but again,
not with their ratings of the ICPs. The results implied
that EAs and IAs do not seem to think that the ratings
that they gave for each ICP would contribute to their
ratings of the overall internal control system or in
other words they do not think that the ratings of the
components or features of the internal control system
would help in the evaluation of the overall internal
control system.
When the mean ratings of each ICP were compared with the
internal control system's ability to achieve each control
objective for each group of auditor, there was a
significant difference and their ratings were positively
and significantly correlated except for one control
objective.'"
There was a significant difference of consensus level on
the ratings of "control risk" or the ability of the
internal control procedures to detect or correct material
errors between EAs and IAs. However, they seem to agree
on the overall internal control system's ratings of
103 
"Presentation and Disclosure objective" for IAs and
"Existence" for EAs.
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control risk. Visually, it can be seen that EAs' ratings
of "control risk" were lower than those of IAs or, in
other words, EAs perceived that ICPs were more able to
prevent or detect material errors. This could be due to
the fact that materiality levels of IAs were more severe/
strict than materiality levels of IAs. A significant
difference was found for IAs (but not for EAs) when the
mean ratings of each ICP's ratings of control risk were
compared with the overall internal control system's
ratings of control risk. Again, the results implied that
IAs do not seem to realise that the ratings that they
gave for each ICP should contribute to their ratings of
the overall internal control system.
As to the two types of controls, EAs and IAs placed
greater importance on "administrative" controls rather
than "accounting" controls. Both groups of auditors
perceived "administrative" controls better able to
achieve the 5 control objectives. "Accounting" and
"administrative" controls were rated by the auditors to
be able to achieve "existence, valuation and rights and
obligations" objectives better than "completeness and
presentation and disclosure" objectives. EAs rated
"administrative" controls better able to detect or
correct material errors, whereas IAs rated "accounting"
controls as better able to detect or correct material
errors.
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7.3.2 Judgement models 
To the researcher's knowledge, this study is the first
attempt to make use of analysis of covariance using
regression approach based on an experimental design to
determine the judgement models of auditors. It has the
advantage of analyzing the effects of the covariates with
the other ICPs simultaneously in determining the
judgement model of auditors. This was made possible
because each EA was paired up with an IA based on similar
"covariates" (experience level, Position level and
educational level of the auditors)" 4 . The covariates
were not significant when they were examined together
with the 8 internal control procedures (ICPs)'° 5	for
104 Only three variables were examined because the number of
respondents were limited to 64 per group. A larger number of
respondents would have been required in order to test for a larger
number of variables.
105 ICP1 (tcrd): Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll department for casts and
calculations?
ICP2 (tkpg): Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees adequately separated from the task of payrollpreparation?
ICP3 (adesc):Is there adequate physical security over personal files
which contain information relevant to the audit?
ICP4 (dutro): Are the duties of those preparing the payroll rotated?
ICP5 (namck): Are the names on the payroll checked periodically
against the active employee file of the personnel department?
ICP6 (pyrse): Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment
of employees adequately separated from the task of payroll bank
account reconciliation?
ICP7 (mgtre): Are management reports used to monitor the reliability
of payroll data through comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
ICP8 (forpr): Are formal procedures established for changing names,
payrates and deductions?
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The final model for the EM as a group is as follows:
* * * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE * * *
CN1	 case number 1
BY TCRD106
TKPG
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
Sum of Mean Signif
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 42.898 5 8.580 9.345 .000
TCRD 9.068 1 9.068 9.877 .003
TKPG 7.446 1 7.446 8.111 .006
NAMCK 13.423 1 13.423 14.621 .000
PYRSE 5.528 1 5.528 6.022 .017
MGTRE 7.432 1 7.432 8.096 .006
pxplained 42.898 5 8.580 9.345 .000
Residual 53.247 58 .918
Total
64 Cases were
96.145
processed.
63 1.526
both groups of auditors. The same 5 ICPs out of the 8
ICPs were found to be significant or seemed to influence
the ratings of case 1 for both of the groups. The
priority of importance was however different. Please
refer to Figure 7.1 and 7.2 for the judgement model and
the priority of importance of the 5 ICPs.
Figure 7.1: Final judgement model of EAs
The final model adjusted R 2 was 1-.918/1.526 which was
equal to 39.8%. 5 of the 8 internal control
procedures(ICPs) was influential in the ratings of
internal control system by EAs. In priority of importance
the 5 1CPS were namck, tcrd, mgtre, tkpg and pyrse.
106 Please refer to footnote 85 for the explanation of the ICPs.
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The final model for the IAs as a group is as follows:
* * * ANALYSIS OF
CNI	 case number 1
BY	 TCRD1(
TKPG
NAMCK
PYRSE
MGTRE
VARIANCE ***
Sum of Mean Signif
Source of Variation Squares OF Square F of F
lain Effects 32.609 5 6.522 8.541 .000
TCRD 4.569 1 4.569 5.984 .017
TKPG 5.153 1 5.153 6.749 .012
NAMCK 12.567 1 12.567 16.459 .000
PYRSE 5.325 1 5.325 6.974 .011
MGTRE 4.995 1 4.995 6.542 .013
Explained 32.609 5 6.522 8.541 .000
Residual 44.285 58 .764
Total
64 Cases were
76.894
processed.
63 1.221
Figure 7.2: Final -judgement model of IAs
The final model adjusted R 2 was 1-.764/1.221 which was
equal to 37.4%. Thus the final model was able to explain
37.4% of the variation in the ratings of cases. Again 5
out of 8 internal control procedures (ICPs) seemed
important and seemed to have influenced the IAs judgement
as a group. In priority of importance, the 5 ICPs were
namck, pyrse, tkpg, mgtre and tcrd.
As can be seen from the results of the judgement models,
both groups of auditors considered the same five internal
control procedures(ICPs) to be important although in
different priority of importance. The five ICPs consist
107 Please refer to footnote 85 for the explanation of the ICPs.
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of two accounting procedures (namck and tcrd) and three
administration procedures (tkpg, pyrse and mgtre). "Tkpg"
and "Pyrse" represented the two separation of duties
procedures, and consistent with previous studies (Ashton,
1974; Hamilton and Wright 1977 and others), they were
found to be important in influencing the auditors'
judgement in evaluating the payroll internal control
system. The judgement model of EAs showed the two
accounting procedures to be most influential compared
with the other three administration procedures. As for
the IAs, the judgement model showed that there was a
mixed combination of procedures that were considered as
important.
Comparison of the subjective weighting given by the
auditors and the weighting obtained by the judgement
model gave a judgement insight of .29 for EAs and .62 for
IAs. This implied that what IAs do in practice had a
closer relationship with what they believed than was the
case for EAs. The judgement insight for EAs was on the
low side compared with previous studies which range from
.34 to .89.
The range between the ratings given to the most important
and least important control was 6.6037 for the EAs and
5.619 for the IAs, showing a wider spread for the EAs.
This implied a closer level of agreement between
different IAs than appeared to exist between EAs with
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respect to the importance of particular ICPs.
Both groups of auditors have considered the four
"administrative" ICPs to be more important than the 4
"accounting" procedures.
7.3.3 Consistency
No significant difference was found with regard to the
ratings given to repeat cases between EAs and IAs. Thus
they were consistent in their ratings. The difference in
spread of ratings between the two groups was also not
significant. However, when a t-test on the repeat cases
was done for each group of auditors, IAs showed a
significant difference but when Pearson correlation was
calculated, it showed that the ratings of the 2 cases
were highly and positively correlated. Thus, although
there was an inconsistency in the ratings of repeat cases
for IAs, the ratings were closely related.
Similar to the findings on consensus, none of the 7
variables (experience level, position level, educational
level, types of qualification, independence level of IAs,
types of independence of IAs and firm size) seemed to be
significant in determining judgement consistency of an
auditor.
With regard to the ability of the internal control system
in achieving the internal control objectives, EAs rated
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it as 81.2% and IAs rated it as 65.6%. As to the internal
control system's ability to detect or prevent material
errors, EAs rated it as 87.5% and IAs rated it as 73.4%.
These figures indicate that on the whole, the respondents
had confidence that the internal control system presented
to them was quite strong but IAs were more sceptical than
EAs.
7.3.4 Effect of the variables on iudgement "consensus" 
and "consistency" 
None of the variables (experience level, position level,
educational level, types of professional qualification,
independence level of IAs, types of independence of IAs
and firm size) 108
 examined singly seems to be significant
in determining the "judgement consensus" and judgement
consistency" of the auditors.
7.3.5 Conclusion of study
Our overall conclusion is that judgements of both EAs and
IAs are quite similar to each other in their ratings of
the internal control strength of a given system.
This differs from previous research results from the US
(Bailey, 1981; Landry, 1989 and Moore, 1993). Comparing
the results of this study with the US results it appears
108 Experience, educational and position level also showed
insignificant results when they were examined simultaneously with the
8 ICPs in determining the judgement models of the auditors.
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that there is greater judgement consensus between UK's
IAs and EAs than between US's IAs and EAs. This is likely
to be accounted for by a greater degree of similarity of
professional qualifications and background of UK's IAs
and EAs than may be the case in US. This is supported by
a "not significant" result when a t-test was done on the
types of professional qualifications possessed by EAs and
IAs. Further study examining this issue would be helpful.
While the researcher considers that the statistical
approach in this study to have been more robust than
those used in the three US studies, it would be hard to
argue that the US results are not dependable particularly
as they all came to broadly similar conclusions.
7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The results of this study should be considered in the
light of the following limitations:
(1) The design of the survey instrument represents a
tradeoff of "realism" and subject fatigue. To
simulate the "real world", the instrument would have
to include all crucial variables in each of the
cases. At the same time, the survey instrument had to
be of such a length that auditors would respond to it
meaningfully. In satisfying both constraints, perhaps
certain key variables were omitted which may have
affected the results of the study. For example, the
researcher had wanted to include the five components
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of internal control as recommended by COSO and the
UK Final Guidance but it was just not possible
because at the same time there had to be a
balance of "accounting" and "administrative" control
in addition to avoiding the questionnaire being too
lengthy.
Another factor to consider was the number of auditors
who were willing to participate. Since auditors who
were willing to participate consisted of 95 EAs and
192 lAs, it would only enable the use of 8 1CPs in
the cases (as explained in Chapter 5).
However, the final form and variables in the survey
instrument were considered only after many
discussions with academic staffs and a pilot test to
the practitioners.
(2) the sampling was not done at random. It was the
intention of the researcher to do a random selection
of the sample from the list of auditors who
volunteered to participate, but due to inevitable
factors (such as, the auditor has resigned, seconded
to another location), or for reasons that they were
too busy, substitution had to be done. This therefore
resulted in non-random selection.
Thus, the results may not be generalized beyond the
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audit firms and the companies studied. However, most
of previous research in the same area had been using
convenience sampling, .which is also a non-random
selection." 9
 Landry (1989) suggested that more
variables or ICPs should be included in future
research but he warned that,
unless respondents were to commit beforehand to
participate in the study, a mailed
questionnaire of this length would probably
have a poor response rate.
(Landry 1989, 118)
However, as shown in this study, even after the
auditors had volunteered to participate, there was
still a poor response rate.
(3) there were a few auditors whose personal profile
(experience, educational and position level) as stated
in the "list of auditors who were willing to
participate" did not match up with the personal
profile that they had filled in the primary
questionnaire. As there were about three months lapse
from the date the lists were sent and the primary
questionnaires were administered, the auditors could
have been promoted to a higher position or completed
and passed their professional examinations. Since the
EAs and IAs were matched according to the profile that
they had given in the lists, it was decided to use the
109 Ashton 1974; Hamilton and Wright 1977; Ashton and Brown
19806, to name a few..
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information in the list if there were any
discrepancies with the profile given in the
questionnaire.
(4) Internal control evaluation normally involves
teamwork. Auditors were asked in this study to make
control evaluations on an individual basis.
Interaction with fellow auditors thus was not tested,
and the possible effect of this interaction is not
included in this study.
(5) It was assumed in this study that EAs and IAs of
similar personal profiles will behave in the same
manner. This might not be the case. The assumption
had to be made so that the effect of the personal
profile on the evaluation judgement of the auditors
could be taken out first before the effect of the
8 ICPs on the auditors' evaluation judgement could be
tested by means of the analysis of covariance.
(6) Even though the respondents were instructed not to
discuss with other participants or not to use outside
aids for support, some participants may have used
such materials to improve their judgements.
(7) The classification of "administrative" and
"accounting" controls was not done by respondents but
by the researcher. It would have been better that
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the respondents were asked to classify the controls
into the two types of controls, but because the
questionnaire was lengthy, it was decided not to do
SO.
7.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY
These findings have shown that EAs can rely on the
judgements of IAs since there was no significant
difference in the evaluation that they made regarding a
given internal control system. Thus, the internal control
report that COSO and Cadbury's Code of Best Practice have
recommended management/ directors to prepare (and most
probably management/ directors will assign the task to
IAs) can be evaluated more confidently by EAs.
The judgement models of both groups of auditors were also
quite similar showing that the same ICPs were relied upon
by the auditors in evaluating a given case. None of the
variables (education level, experience level and position
level) were found to influence the judgements of EAs and
IAs in their ratings of the case. This suggests that
evaluation of payroll internal control system could be
done by relatively junior, inexperienced and those having
no professional qualification. Visually, it was observed
that "senior auditors" were most inconsistent in their
ratings though it was not found to be statistically
significant.
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Both groups of auditors agreed that "administrative"
(non-financial controls) were more important than
"accounting" controls (financial controls) which was not
what the researcher would have expected. Separation of
duties was considered as important by both groups of
auditors, though IAs placed more importance on them. One
interesting finding was that EAs rated ability of
"administrative" controls to detect or correct errors
better than "accounting" controls. The opposite was true
for IAs.
EAs were more lenient in their ratings of the cases as
compared to IAs. This could be due to the fact that IAs
were less familiar with the task of internal control
evaluation and thus were more cautious and conservative
in their ratings.
EAs rated ability of the internal control system to
detect or correct material errors better than IAs. This
could be due to EAs' lower materiality level. In practice
it was found that evaluation of the components or
features of the internal control system do not contribute
to the evaluation of the internal control system as a
whole.
Although the two groups were consistent with their
ratings when given similar cases to evaluate, however,
when compared within groups, IAs showed that there was a
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significant difference between their evaluation of the
cases. This could be due to the fact that IAs were less
familiar with recognising similar internal control
system.
Comparing our results with similar research in US, it
appears that there is greater judgement consensus between
UK's IAs and EAs than between US's IAs and EAs. This
could be due to the fact that there is a larger
difference in educational backgroud in US than in UK. The
implication of our finding is that there is an even
stronger justification for IAs and EAs to rely on each
other's work in the UK than would appear to be the case
in the US.
7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In future, it would be better if all the five components
of internal control as mentioned by COSO and Cadbury's
Code of Best Practice could be included in the
questionnaire. This would require more ICPs to be
included in each case. The researcher would suggest that
if this suggestion is taken up, there should be an effort
to gather EAs and IAs first who would be willing to
participate in the research. Objectives of the study, the
time that they have to spend in filling in the
questionnaire and the nature or content of the
questionnaire should be explained to each individual
auditor who is willing to participate. This step is very
important, as poor response rate would lead to non-random
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selection and a les representative sample. At least
three months should be spent on getting individual
auditors to participate.
If there were a larger number of auditors who would be
willing to participate, then a different factorial design
could be constructed to determine the judgement model of
auditors. In addition a larger number of covariates could
be used in the analysis (assuming analysis of covariance
using regression approach was used) for example "age".
One attribute of a decision maker which has been
found to be instrumental in determining information
processing ability is age. Age has been said to
contribute heavily to both the manner in which a
decision is reached and decision quality.
(Taylor 1975, 74)
Instead of mail questionnaires, the questionnaires could
be administered personally by the researcher. The
voluntary auditors could be gathered in one place and
asked to complete the questionnaires within the time
limit given. This method could also ensure that the
auditors do not discuss with one another or use decision
aids to help them fill up the questionnaire.
The existing research could be expanded and modified to
include the effect of peer pressure. In practice,
evaluations usually are not made by isolated auditors.
Individuals will influence one another's thinking, and
decisions may be subject to review. Thus the influences
of peer pressure and review by superiors would be a
potential area for investigation. Such pressures would be
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expected to increase 'consensus.
Instead of examining three approaches of internal control
evaluation as was done in this thesis, "CO" or "CR"
approach can be examined in depth as a single approach of
evaluation in future studies. One respondent has
commented that the "CO" approach is the more modern
approach to evaluation as compared to the "ICO" approach.
Another suggestion is to use a single organisation
involving the actual EAs and IAs in the organisation. The
internal control procedures could be included in the
questionnaire and the auditors could then be required to
assess the cases and make an evaluation of the internal
control system. The differences between their judgements
could then be examined and internal control procedures
that are most influential on their judgements could then
be determined. After a study of this nature has been
taken, it could be compared with another similar
organisation (in terms of size of the organisation and
the size of the audit firm, for example) and any
discrepancy between the judgements of any two pairs of
auditors in the first organisation could then be compared
with the judgements of the two pairs of auditors in the
second organisation. The five components of internal
control, i.e control environment, control activities,
assessment of risk, information and communication and
monitoring could then be assessed to ensure if these
components could have caused the discrepancy.
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Another suggestion would be to request the auditors to
identify which of the 8 ICPs they perceived as
"accounting" and "administrative" controls. This could
then be compared with the researcher's definition which
is based on auditing literature. An attempt can then be
made to compare the two controls' ability to achieve the
5 control objectives.
Another suggestion would be for the respondents to
quantify the materiality levels that they used so that
IAs' materiality levels could be compared with EAs'
materiality levels to determine if in fact the
materiality levels of IAs is lower than that of EAs.
7.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has mentioned the research conclusions,
limitations of the study, implications of the study and
suggestion for future research. In conclusion, the main
findings of this thesis have shown that there is a strong
justification for EAs to rely on IAs with respect to
internal control evaluation and vice-versa because both
categories of auditors have been shown in this research
to form closely similar judgements about internal
control. This should be an encouraging finding as with
recent developments of internal control reporting by
management (which would be prepared by the IAs) and as
EAs are required to evaluate the report, EAs could be
more confident with the internal control report that they
have to evaluate.
512
REFERENCES
Abdel-Khalik, A.R., Snowball D, and Wragge J.H. 1983. The
Effects of Certain Internal Audit Variables on the
Planning of External Audit Programs. The Accounting
Review (April): 215-227.
Abercombie, M.L., Johnson. 1960. The Anatomy of
Judgement: An Investigation into the Processes of 
Perception and Reasoning. London: Hutchinson.
Ackoff, Russell, L. 1961. Systems, Organizations, and
Interdisciplinary Research. In Systems: Research and
Design, Proceedings of the First Systems Symposium
at Case Institute of Techology, ed. Donald P.
Ackman, 28. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Quoted in
R.H Ashton. Judgement Formation in the Evaluation of
Internal Control: An Application .of the Brunswik's
Lens Model, Ph.D. diss., University of Minnessota,
1973.
Aitken, R.C.B. 1969. A Growing Edge of Measurement of
Feelings. Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, 62: 989-992.
American Institute of Accountants. 1936. Examination of
Financial Statements by Independent Public
Accountants. New York: MA.
American Institute of Accountants. 1963. Examination of 
Financial Statements by Independent Public
Accountants. New York: AIA .
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1949. Report on Internal Control: Elements of A
Coordinated System and Its Importance to Management 
and the Independent Public Accountant . New York:
AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1958a. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No.29, 
Scope of the Independent Auditor's Review of 
Internal Control (Oct). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1958b. AU Section 320, Evaluation of Internal
Control (Nov). In Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards (SAS) Numbers 1-7. New York:
AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1963. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 33, 
Auditing Standards and Procedures (Dec). New York:
AICPA.
513
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1971. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No.49, 
Reports on Internal Control (Nov). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1972a. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.1, 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, AU Section
150  (Nov). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1972b. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.1, 
Training and Proficiency of the Independent Auditor, 
AU Section 210  (Nov). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1972c. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No.29, 
Scope of Independent Auditor's Review of Internal 
Control. New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1972d. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No.52, 
Reports on Internal Control Based on Criteria
Established by Governmental Agencies (Oct). New
York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1972e. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No.54, 
The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal 
Control (Nov). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1974. AU Section 321, The Effects of EDP on the
Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control
(Dec). In Codification of Statements on Auditing
Standards, Numbers 1 to 7, AICPA, 41-63. Chicago:
Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1975a. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.9, 
The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the 
Scope of the Independent Audit (Dec). New York:
AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1975b. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 55, 
Consideration of theInternal Control Structure in a
Financial Statement Audit. New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1980. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 31, 
Evidential Matter (Aug). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1981. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.39, 
Audit Sampling (June). New York: AICPA.
514
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1983. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.47, 
Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit 
(Dec). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1985. Proposed Change to SAS No. 55, Consideration
of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial 
Statement Audit (Feb 23rd). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1988. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 60, 
Communication of Internal Control Structure Related
Matters Noted in an Audit (April). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1989. Audit Procedures Study (APS), The Independent 
Auditor's Consideration of the Work of internal 
Auditors. New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1991a. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.65, 
The Auditor's Consideration of the Internal Audit 
Function in an Audit of Financial Statements 
(April). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1991b. AU Section 8006, Risk Assessment and
Internal Control (Oct). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1993. Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements (SSAE) 2, Reporting on an Entity's 
Internal Control Structure Over Financial Reporting
(May). New York: AICPA.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
1995. Exposure draft. Proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards and Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements: Amendments to Statements on Auditing
Standards and Statements on Standards for
Attestation Engagements to incorporate the "Internal 
Control-Integrated Framework" report (Feb). New
York: AICPA.
Anderson, Urton Liggett. 1985. The Auditor's Assessment
of Control Risk: The Explanation Phenomenon in
Judgements of Event Uncertainty. Ph.D. diss.,
University of Minnesota. Dissertation Abstracts
International, 46, 3081A.
Anderson, H.M., Glese, J.W., & Booker, J. 1970. Some
Propositions About Auditing. The Accounting Review,
Vol. XLV (July): 524-531.
515
Anderson, Norman H. 1961. Scales and Statistics:
Parametric and Nonparametric. Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 4, 305-316.
Arens & Loebbecke. 1991. Auditing: An Integrated
Approach, 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall International.
Ashton, Alison H. 1985 Does Consensus Imply Accuracy in
Accounting Studies of Decision Making? The
Accounting Review, Vol. LX, No.2 (April): 173-186.
Ashton, R.H. 1973. Judgement Formation in the Evaluation
of Internal Control: An Application of the Brunswick
Lens Model. Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota.
Ashton, R.H. 1974. An Experimental Study of Internal
Control Judgements. Journal of Accounting Research,
Vol.12, (Spring): 143-157.
Ashton, R.H. 1979. Comment: Some Observations on
Auditors' Evaluations of Internal Accounting
controls. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance, (Fall): 56-66.
Ashton, R.H. and P.R. Brown. 1980. Descriptive Modelling
of Auditors' Internal Control Judgements:
Replication and Extension. Journal of Accounting
Research (Spring): 269-277.
Ashton, R.H and S.S. Kramer. 1980. Students as Surrogates
in Behavioral Research: Some Evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research (Spring): 1-15.
Attwood, Frank A. and Neil D. Stein. 1989. De Paula's 
Auditing, 17th ed. London: Pittman Publishing.
Auditing Practices Board. 1992.
of Auditing: A Paper to 
London: ICAEW.
The Future Development 
Promote Public Debate.
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1993. Statement of
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 600, Auditors' Reports
on Financial Statements (May). In Members Handbook
1994, Vol II: Accounting, Auditing and Reporting,
1994. London: ICAEW.
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1995a. Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 300, Accounting and
Internal Control Systems and Audit Risk Assessments,
(Mar). In Statements of Auditing Standards, 1995.
London: CCAB Ltd.
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1995b. Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 400, Audit Evidence,
(Mar).In Statements of Auditing Standards, 1995.
London: CCAB Ltd.
516
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1995c. Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 500, Considering the
Work of Internal Audit (Mar). In Statements of 
Auditing Standards, 1995. London: CCAB Ltd.
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1995d. Disclosures 
Relating to Corporate Governance (Revised) (Feb).
London: ICAEW.
Auditing Practices Board (APB). 1995e. Internal 
Financial Control Effectiveness (Apr). London:
ICAEW.
Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 1980a. Auditing
Guidelines 3.101, The Auditor's Operational Standard
(April). In Members Handbook 1994: Vol II, 
Accounting, Auditing and Reporting. 1994. London:
ICAEW.
Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 1980b. Auditing
Guidelines 3.204, Internal Controls (April). In
Members Handbook 1994: Vol II, Accounting, Auditing
and Reporting. 1994. London: ICAEW.
Auditing	 Practices	 Committee.
	
1984.	 Auditing
Guidelines 3.408, Reliance on Internal Audit (Nov).
In Members Handbook 1994 . 1994. London: Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 1989. Explanatory
foreword 3.0 Explanatory foreword (Jan). In Members
Handbook 1993: Vol II,Accounting,Auditing and
Reporting. 1993. London: ICAEW.
Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 1990. 	 Auditing
Guideline 3.308, Guidance for Internal Auditors
(Jun). In Members Handbook 1994: Vol II, Accounting, 
Auditing and Reporting. 1994 . London: ICAEW.
Auditing Standards Board (ASE). 1972. Due Care in the
Performance of Work. New York: AICPA. In
Professional Standards, Vol. 1, 1988. Chicago:
Commerce Clearing House.
Auditing Standards Board (ASB). 1988. Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 60, Communication of 
Internal Control Structure Related Matters Noted in
an Audit. New York:AICPA.
Bailey, C.D. 1981. Evaluation of Internal Accounting
Controls: A Laboratory Study of the Expert
Judgements of Certified Internal Auditors and
Independent Certified Public Accountants. Ph.D.
diss., Georgia State University. Dissertation
Abstracts International, 42, 2733A. University
Microfilms No. 81-24301.
517
Bailey, A.D., Jr., G.L. Duke, J. Gerlach, C. Ko, R.D.
Meservy and A.B. Whinston. 1985. TICOM and the
Analysis of Internal Controls. The Accounting
Review, 60 (April): 186-201.
Baker, Don W. 1986. Treadway Commission: Its Initial
Conclusions (Dec), Management Accounting. Quoted in
Thomas J. Philips, Jr., Barry T. Lewis, and Tom
Agee. 1987. The Treadway Commission: Implications
for Internal Auditors. Internal Auditor (Oct): 24-
28.
Basu, Progyan. 1992. The Influence of Client Control
Environment Attributes on Evaluation of Internal
Control: An Empirical Investigation of Auditor
Judgement. Ph.D. diss., The University of Nebraska.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 53, 3978A.
Berelson, Bernard and Gary A. Steiner. 1964. Human
Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
Biddle, Gary, C. 1983. Decision-Making in Auditing:
Alternative Research Strategies. In Symposium on
Auditing Research 1982: Discussion Papers, 32-59.
Glasgow : University of Glassgow Press.
Biggs, Stanley F. and Theodore J. Mock. 1983. An
Investigation of Auditor Decision Processes in the
Evaluation of Internal Controls and Audit Scope
Decisions. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 21,
No (Spring): 234-255.
Blalock, Rubert, M., Jr. 1979. Social Statistics, Revised
2nd ed. Singapore: Mc-Graw-Hill International
Editions.
Bland, Martin, J., and G. Altman Douglas. 1986.
Statistical Methods for Assessing Agreement Between
Two Methods of Clinical Measurement. The Lancet 
(Feb): 307-310.
Bodnar, G. 1975. Reliability Modelling of Internal
Control Systems. The Accounting Review (Oct): 747-
756.
Bonner, Sarah, E. 1990. Experience Effects in Auditing:
The Role of Task -Specific Knowledge. The Accounting
Review, Vol 65, No. 1: 72-92.
Briston, R.J. and Perks R. 1977. The External Auditor-
His Role and Cost to Society. Accountancy (Nov): 48-
52.
518
Britton, B.K., and A. Tesser. 1982. Effects of Prior
Knowledge on Use of Cognitive Capacity in Three
Complex Cognitive Tasks. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior 21: 421-36. Quoted in Butt, L.J.
1988. Frequency Judgments in an Auditing-Related
Task. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.20, No.2
(Autumn): 315-330.
Broeker, Milton M. 1967. Audit Problems Relating to
Review of Internal Control. The Journal of 
Accountancy  , (Feb) CXXIII: 75-78.
Brown, Gene R. 1962. Objective Internal Control
Evaluation. The Journal of Accountancy, CXII (Nov):
50-56.
Brown, Paul R. 1983. Independent Auditor Judgement in
the Evaluation of Internal Audit Functions. Journal 
of Accounting Research, Vol 21, No.2, (Autumn): 444-
455.
Brunswik, E. 1952. The Conceptual Framework of 
Psychology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Bryant, Murray John. 1983. Auditor Judgement: Simulation
and Information Search Processes. Ph.D diss.,
University of Cincinnati.
Burns, David G. and James K. Loebbecke. 1975. Internal
Control Evaluation: How the Computer Can Help.
Journal of Accountancy, Vol.140 (August): 60-70.
Carmichael, D.R. 1970. Behavioral Hypotheses of Internal
Control. The Accounting Review (April): 235-245.
Carmichael, D.R. 1972. The Auditor's Reporting
Obligation. Auditing Research Monograph No.l. New
York: AICPA.
Carroll, John S. and John W. Payne. 1976. Cognition and
Social Behavior. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers.
Chambers, A.D. 1980. Developments in Internal Auditing.
Accounting and Business Research, (Summer): 273-283.
Chambers, A.D. 1994a. The Meaning of Internal Control 
(May). Paper presented at a conference of City
University, London.
Chambers, A.D. 1994b.	 How Control is Achieved.
Unpublished paper, University of Hull.
Chambers, A.D. 1995a. Directors' Reports pn Inter al
Financial Control. Unpublished paper.
519
Chambers, A.D. 1995b. "Internal Control Reporting",
Chapter	 in	 Financial	 Reporting,	 1995-96.
(Accountancy Books,	 Institute	 of	 Chartered
Accountants).
Chambers, A.D., Georges M Selim and Gerald Vinten.
1990. Internal Auditing, 2nd ed. Great Britain:
Pitman Publishing.
Chang, Stanley Y. and Gary J. Mann. 1991. Internal and
External Auditors: Are They Different?. Internal 
Auditing (Winter): 17-23.
Chapman, L.J. 1967. Illusory Correlation in
Observational Report. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, Vol.6: 151-155.
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.
(CIPFA). 1979. Statements on Internal Audit Practice
in the Public Sector. New York: AICPA.
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA).
1992. A Framework for Internal Control  . London:
CI MA.
Choo, F. and K.E. Trotman. 1989. The Relationship
Between Knowledge Structures and Judgements for
Experienced and Inexperienced Auditors. The
Accounting Review, Vol.66, No.3 (July) : 464-485.
Church, Bryan K. and Arnold Schneider. 1992. Internal
Auditor Involvement in Internal Control System
Design: Is Objectivity Impaired?. Journal of Applied
Business research, Vol.8, No.4 (Fall): 15-24.
Churchman, C.West and Hernert B. Eisenberg. 1964.
Deliberation and Judgement. In Human Judgements and
Optimality, ed. Maynard W. Shelly and II Glenn L.
Bryan, 45-53. New York: John Wiley & Sons,Inc.
Clay, R., and D. Haskin. 1981. Can Internal Auditors
Reduce External Audit Costs?. The Internal Auditor
(April): 63-69.
Clark, M., T.E. Gibbs and R.B Schroeder. 1980. Evaluating
Internal Audit Departments Under SAS No. 9. The
Women CPA (July): 8-11 and 22.
Cochran, W.G & G.M.Cox. 1968. Experimental Designs, 2nd
ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Cohen, S.S. 1988. Practical Statistics. London: Edward
Arnold, the educational, academic and medical
publishing division of Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.
Cohen, Louis and Michael Holliday. 1982. Statistics for
Social Scientists: An Introductory Text with
Computer Programs in BASIC. London: Paul Chapman
Publishing Ltd.
520
Colbert, Janet L. 1991. The Audit Guide on Internal
Control: Implications for the Internal Auditor.
Internal Auditing, (Fall): 33-42.
Committee on Auditing Procedure. 1949. Internal 
Control: Elements of a Coordinated System and Its 
Importance to Management and the Independent Public
Accountants. New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants.
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (CFACG). 1992. Report of the Committee on
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The
Cadbury Report) (Dec). London: Gee.
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). 1987. Report of the National 
Commision on Fraudulent Reporting (The Treadway
Commission Report). New York: AICPA.
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway
Commission	 (COSO).	 1992a.	 Internal	 Control-
Integrated Framework, Executive Summary, Vol.1
(Sept). New York: AICPA.
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). 1992b. Internal Control-
Integrated Framework, Framework, Vol.2 (Sept). New
York: AICPA.
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). 1992c. Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework, Reporting to External Parties,
Vol.3 (Sept). New York: AICPA.
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). 1992d. Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework, Evaluation Tools, Vol.4
(Sept). New York: AICPA.
Conover, W.J. 1971. Practical Nonparametric Statistics.
London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Controller General of the United States. 1981.
Standards for Audit of Governmental Organisations, 
Programs, Activities and Functions. Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Coopers and Lybrand. 1984. Manual of Auditing, 4th ed.
London: Gee & Co (Publishers) Limited.
Coopers and Lybrand. 1989. Student's Manual of 
Auditing, 3rd ed. Great Britain: T.J.Press (Padstow)
Ltd.
Coopers & Lybrand. 1993. Implementing Cadbury in the
Medium-Sized Listed Company. UK: Coopers & Lybrand.
521
Corless, John C. 1972. Assessing Prior Distributions
for Applying Bayesian Statistics in Auditing.
Accounting Review, Vol. 47 (July): 556-566.
Cowe, Roger. Cadbury's Dilution Backed. The Guardian,
9 March 1994, 17.
Cowe, Roger and Lisa Buckingham. Cadbury Lobby Fighting
Rearguard Action. The Guardian, 21 February 1994,
10.
Cushing, Barry E. 1974. A Mathematical Approach to the
Analysis and Design of Internal Control Systems.
Accounting Review, 49 (Jan): 24-32.
Defliese, P.L, K.P. Johnson and R.K. MacLeod. 1975.
Montgomery's Auditing, 9th ed. New York: The Ronald
Press Company.
Dewey, J. 1910. How we think. Boston: D.C. Health & Co.
Donadio, Janette Marie. 1992. An Empirical Study of the
Joint Effects of Knowledge, Intellectual Skill, and
Task Structure of the Accuracy of Auditors'
Performance of Diagnostic Audit Tasks. Ph.D diss.,
University of Colorado.
Dungan, Christopher Wright. 1983. A Model of an Audit
Judgement in the Form of an Expert System. Ph.D.
diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Dissertation Abstratcs International 43, 3949A.
Dunn, John. 1991. Auditing:Theory and practice. New
York: Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd.
Eggleton, Ian R.C. and Choo, Freddie. 1983. An Analysis
of Individual Differences in Auditors Internal
Control Assessments. Working papers series No. 4,
(Aug). Decision Research Centre, Victoria University
of Wellington.
Einhorn, H.J. 1971. Expert Judgement: The Use of
Nonlinear, Noncompensatory Models as a Function of
Task and Amount of Information. Organisational 
Behaviour and Human Performance , Vol.6: 1-27.
Einhorn, H.J. 1974. Expert Judgement: Some Necessary
Conditions and an Example. Journal of Applied
Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 5: 562-571.
Einhorn, Hillel J., Don N. Kleinmuntz, and Benjamin
Kleinmuntz. 1979. Linear Regression and Process-
Tracing Models of Judgement. Psychological Review,
Vol. 86 (Sept): 465-485.
Erikson, B.H. and T.A, Nosanchuk. 1988. Understanding
Data. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
522
Felix, William L., Jr. and Niles, Marcia S. 1988.
Research in Internal Control Evaluation. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice and Theory (Spring), Vol. 7,
No.2: 43-60.
Felix, William L. and William R. Kinney, Jr. 1982.
Research in the Auditor's Opinion Formulation
Process: State of the Art. The Accounting Review,
Vol.LVII, No.2, (April): 245-269.
Ferris, Kenneth R. and Kirk L. Tennant. 1984. An
Investigation of the Impact of the Qualitative
Nature of Compliance Errors on Internal Control
Assessments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice &
Theory, Vol.3, No.2, (Spring): 31-43.
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). CD-ROM Publishing
Company.
Fisch, Jean, David Taylor and Johan Ureel. 1992.
Considering the Research on Internal Iudit Risk
Models and the Criticisms on the External Audit Risk
Model Suggested by Cushing & Loebbecke (1983), 
Provide an Outline for a Modified or New Arm (May).
Unpublished master's thesis.
Flint, David. 1983. Symposium on Auditing Research 1982: 
Discussion Papers. Glassgow: University of Glassgow
Press.
Frank A. Attwood and Neil D. Stein. 1989. De Paula's
Auditing, 17th ed. Singapore: Pittman publishing.
Gaumnitz, Bruce R., Thomas R. Nunamaker, John J. Surdick
and Michael F. Thomas. 1982. Auditor consensus in
Internal Control Evaluation and Audit Program
Planning. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20,
No.2, Part II (Autumn): 745-765.
Geary, Kent Michael. 1982. An Empirical Investigation of
the Relationship Between Certain Auditor Judgements
and Structure in the Audit Process. Ph.D diss.,
University of Cincinnati.
Greenberg, R.R., and D.S. Murphy. 1989. Systems
Development and the Internal Auditor: Where Are We
Now? The Internal Auditor (August): 52-57.
Gul, F.A. 1983. A Note on the Relationship Between Age,
Experience, Cognitive Styles and Accountants'
Decision Confidence. Accounting and Business 
Research, (Winter): 85-88.
Gibbins, M. and F.M. Wolf. 1979. Auditor's Perception of 
Their Decision Environment. Working paper No. 671,
University of British Columbia (July).
523
Gwilliam, D. 1987. A Survey of Auditing Research.
London: Prentice-Hall International.
Hall, Chris, Philip Yetton and Ian Zimmer. 1982. The
Assessment of Payroll Internal Control Systems and
Auditors' Experience, Tolerance of Ambiguity, and
Dogmatism. Australian Journal of Management (June):
49-60.
Hall, William D. 1988. What Does It Take to be an
Auditor?. Journal of Accountancy (Jan): 72-80.
Hamdi F. Aly and Jack I. Duboff. 1971. Statistical vs.
Judgement Sampling: An Empirical Study of Auditing
the Accounts Receivable of a Small Retail Store.
Accounting Review, Vol. 46 (Jan): 121,123.
Hamilton, Robert E. and William F. Wright. 1977. The
Evaluation of Internal Controls over Payroll.
Research paper No. 397, Stanford University,
Graduate School of Business (Dec).
Hamilon, Robert E. and William F. Wright. 1982.
Internal Control Judgements and Effects of
Experience: Replications and Extensions.  Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol.20, No.2, Part II (Autumn):
756-765.
Han, Jin-Soo. 1987. Internal Control Evaluation and
Audit Program Planning: Judgements by /ndividua/
Auditors and Audit Teams: A Study of South Korean
CPA's. Ph.D. diss., Indiana University. Dissertation
Abstracts International, 47, 3099A.
Harrison, Edwin S. 1940. Judging Dairy Cattle. New York:
John Wiley and Sons. Quoted in Donald M.Johnson.
1971. The Psychology of Thought and Judgement. New
York: Harper and Brothers.
Haskins, Mark Eugene. 1984. Client Control Environment
Evaluations. Ph.D. diss., The Pennsylvania State
University. Dissertation Abstracts International, 
45, 3169A.
Hayes, J.R. 1964. Human Data Processing Limits in
Decision-Making. In Information System Science and
Engineering. Proceedings of the First International 
Congress on the Information Systems Sciences, ed. E.
Bennett . New York: Mc-Graw-Hill.
Hays, W.L. 1973. Statistics for the Social Sciences. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hendrick, C., J. Mills and C.A. Kiesler. 1968. Decision
Time as a Function of the Number and Complexity of
Equally Attractive Alternatives. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.8: 313-318.
524
Hicks, E.L. 1974. Standards for the Attest Function.
Journal of Accountancy 138, No.2 : 34-45.
Hobgood, G. and J.A. Sciarrino. 1972. Management Looks
at Audit Services. Financial Executives, Part 1,
(April): 26-32.
Hobgood, G. and J.A. Sciarrino. 1972. Management Looks
at Audit Services. Financial Executives, Part 2,
(August): 24-25.
Hoffman, Paul J. 1960. The Paramorphic Representation of
Clinical Judgement. Psychological Bulletin , LVII
(Aug): 126. Quoted in Ashton, R.H. 1973. Judgement
Formation in the Evaluation of Internal Control: An
Application of the Brunswick Lens Model. Ph.D.
diss., University of Minnesota.
Hoffman, P.J., P. Slovic and
Analysis-of-Variance Model
Configural Cue Utilization
Psychological Bulletin, Vol
L.G. Rorer. 1968. An
for the Assesment of
in Clinical Judgement.
. 69: 338-349.
Huitema, Bradley,E. 1980. The Analysis of Covariance and
Alternatives. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Hursch, C.K., K.R. Hammond and J.L. Hursch. 1964. Some
Methodological Considerations in Multiple Cue
Probability Studies. Psychological Review, Vol.71
(Jan): 271-289.
Huskisson, E.C. 1974. Measurement of pain. Lancet,II 
1127-1131.
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales
(ICAEW). 1993. Internal Control and Financial 
Reporting (Rutteman's report/ UK Draft), (Oct).
London: ICAEW.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW). 1994a. Internal Control and Financial 
Reporting (Final Guidance) (August). London: ICAEW.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW). 1994b. Internal Control and Financial 
Reporting: Revised Exposure Draft (UK Final 
Guidance) (August). London: ICAEW.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW). 1995. Financial Reporting, 1995-96.
London: ICAEW.
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS).
1993. Auditing into the twenty-first century. 
Edinburgh: ICAS.
525
Institute of Internal Auditors (HA). 1971. Statement of
Responsibilities of the Internal Auditor , 3rd ed.
Florida: IIA Inc.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).1978. Statement on
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing. Florida: IIA.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA). 1981. Statement of 
Responsibilities of Internal Auditing. Florida: IIA.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA). 1983. Statement on
Internal Auditing Standards (SIAS) No.l. Control: 
Concepts and Responsibilities (July). Florida: IIA
Inc.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA). 1989. Codification
of Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing. Florida:IIA Inc.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA) -UK. 1993..
Contracting-Out, Market Testing and Outsourcing, 
Professional Briefing Note Three. London: IA-UK.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA)- UK. 1994. Response
to the "Rutteman" Working Party Exposure Draft on
Internal Control and Financial Reporting. Reproduced
as an Appendix to "Internal Control", Professional
Briefing Note Six, Institute of Internal Auditors-
UK.
Institute of Internal Auditors (IA) -UK. 1995.
Control Self Assessment and Internal Audit, 
Professional Briefing Note Seven. London: IA-UK.
Jacoby, J., D.E. Speller and C. Berning. 1974. Brand
, Choice Behaviour as a Function of Information Load.
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 11: 63-69.
Jenks, J.M. 1983. Non-Computer Forecasts to Use Right
Now. Business Marketing, Vol.68: 82-84. Quoted in
Fergus Bolger and George Wright. 1994. Assessing the
Quality of Expert Judgement: Issues and Analysis.
Decision Support Systems II, 1-24. North-Holland.
Johnson, Donald, M. 1971. The Psychology of Thought and
Judgement. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Johnson, Richard A., Freemont E. Kast and James E.
Rosenzweig. 1967. The Theory and Management of 
Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Jonathan B. Schiff, Jo Ann Miller and Claire B. May.
1989. Issues Paper: Guidance on Internal Control .
Montvale, N.J: National Association of Accountants
(NAA) Publication.
526
Joyce, E.J. 1976. Expert Judgment in Audit Program
Planning in Studies on Human Information Processing.
Journal of Accounting research (Supplement), Vol.
14: 29-60.
Kaplan, Martin F. and Steven Schwartz. 1975. Human
Judgement and Decision Processes. London: Academic
Press, Inc.
Kaplan, S.E. 1985. An Examination of The Effects of
Environment and Explicit Internal Control on Planned
Audit Hours. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and
Theory (Fall): 12-25.
Karan, Vijay. 1983. Objective Evidence and Auditors'
Evaluation of an Internal Accounting Control System.
Ph.D diss., University of Texas at Austin.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 44, 1134A.
Kelley, Thomas P. 1993. The COSO Report: Challenge and
Counterchallenge, (Feb): 10-18.
Kempthorne, 0. 1952. The Design and Analysis of
Experiments. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Kintzele, Marilyn R., Philip L. Kintzele and Vernon E.
Kwiatkowski. 1993. Reporting on Internal Control in
Annual Reports. Internal Auditing (Winter): 3-15.
KPMG Peat Marwick. 1988a. Audit Program Guide (May).
USA: Peat Marwick Main and Co.
KPMG Peat Marwick. 1988b. KPMG Audit Manual (August).
USA: Peat Marwick Main and Co.
Krzanowski, W.J. 1993. Principles of Multivariate
Analysis:A User's Perspective. Oxford Statistical
Science Series 3. Oxford: Clarendon press.
Landry, Raymond Maurice, Jr. 1989. An Empirical
Investigation of EDP Audit Judgements and Consensus
Between External and Internal Audit Experts. Ph.D.
diss., University of Arkansas. Dissertation
Abstracts International, 49, 1869A, University
Microfilms No.88-18289.
Libby, R. and B.L. Lewis. 1982. Human Information
Processing in Accounting: the state of the art.
Accounting, Organisations and Society, Vol.3: 231-
285.
Libby, R., J.T. Artman and J.J. Willingham. 1985. Process
Susceptibility, Control Risk and Audit Planning. The
Accounting Review (April): 212-230.
Lurie, A.G. 1976. Minimizing Audit Costs. CPA Journal 
(Dec): 31-34.
527
Lyman Ott. 1977. An Introduction to Statistical Methods 
and Data Analysis. California: Duxbury Press.
Lord, F.M. 1953. On the Statistical Treatment of Football
Numbers. American Psychologist, 8: 750-751. Quoted
in Norman H. Andersen. Scales and Statistics:
Parametric and Nonparametric. Psychological
Bulletin, Vol 58, No 4: 305-316, pg 309.
Machinery and Allied products (MAPI). 1983. MAPI Survey
on Outside Audit Fee . MAPI: 1-18.
MacLochlain, N and Aidan Punch. 1995. Auditing
Standards: A Quick Reference. Ireland: Oak Tree
Press.
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). 1988.
International Auditing Guideline (IAG) No.6,Internal 
Control. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Institute of
Accountants (MIA) and Malaysian Institute of
Certified Accountants (MACPA).
Maletta, Mario J. 1993. An Examination of Auditor's
Decisions to Use Internal Auditors as Assistants:
The Effect of Inherent Risk. Contemporary Accounting
Research, Vol.9, No.2 (Spring): 508-525.
Margheim, Loren L. 1986. Further Evidence of External
Auditors' Reliance on Internal Auditors. Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol.24, No.1, (Spring): 194-
205.
Margheim, Loren L. and W. Label. 1990. External Auditor
Reliance on Internal Auditors When Audit Risk is
High: Some Empirical Findings. Advances in
Accounting, Vol.8: 293-311.
Marrian, IFY. 1988. Audit Committees. Edinburgh: ICAS.
Quoted in Dunn, J. 1991. Auditing: Theory and
Practice. New York: Prentice-Hall International (UK)
Ltd.
Mautz, Robert K. 1964. Fundamentals of Auditing. New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Mautz, Robert K. and Donald L. Mini. 1966. Internal
Control Evaluation and Audit Program Modification.
The Accounting Review, XLI (April): 283-291.
Mautz, Robert K. and Hussein A.Sharaf. 1985. The
Philosophy of Auditing. American Accounting
Association, Monograph No.6. Florida: American
Accounting Association.
Mautz, Robert K. and Winjam James. 1981. Criteria for
Management Control Systems. New York: Financial
Executives Research Foundation.
528
Mautz, Robert K., P.Tiessen and R.H.Colson. 1984.
Internal Auditing: Directions and Opportunities.
Florida: Institute of Internal Auditors Research
Foundation.
McDermott, Nancy Ann. 1986. The Internal Accounting
Control System in a Microcomputer Environment: An
Analytic Hierarchy Process Approach. Ph.D diss., The
George Washington University. Dissertation Abstracts 
International, 47, 1393A.
Mead, Roger. 1990. The Design of Experiments:Statistical 
Principles for Practical Application. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Meixner, Wilda Furr. 1985. The Effect of the
Organisational Environment on Judgement Consensus:
the Case for Professional Government Auditors in the
State of Texas. Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 46, 1341A.
Meixner, Wilda Furr and Robert B. Welker. 1988.
Judgement Consensus and Auditor Experience: An
Examination of Organisational Relations. The
Accounting Review, Vol.LXIII, No.3, July: 505-513.
Meservy, Rayman David. 1985. Auditing Internal
Controls: A Computational Model of the Review
Process. Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota.
Meservy, Rayman D., Andrew D. Bailey, Jr. and Paul E.
Johnson. 1986. Internal Control Evaluation: A
Computational Model of The Review Process. A Journal 
of Practice and Theory, Vol.6, No.1 (Fall): 44-74.
Messier, W.F. and A.Schneider. 1988. A Hierarchical
Approach to the External Auditor's Evaluation of the
Internal Auditing Function. Contemporary Accounting
Research, (Spring): 343-353.
Mills, Tina Y. 1993. The External Auditor's Reliance
Decision on the Internal Audit Function: A Test of
Cognitive Style and its Role in the Reliance
Decision. Ph.D. diss., The University of Tennessee,
Knoxville.
Mock, T.J, J.L Turner and J.S.Willingham. 1983. An
Improved Method of Documenting and Evaluating a
System of Internal Accounting Controls. Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory, (Spring): 91-99.
Moffeit, Katherine Southerland. 1985. The Effect of
Cognitive Style on Auditor Internal Control
Evaluation. Ph.D diss., University of Northern
Texas. Dissertation Abstracts International, 46,
3409A.
529
Mohammad Abdolmohammadi and Arnold Wright. 1987. An
Examination of the Effects of Experience and Task
Complexity on Audit Judgments. The Accounting
Review, Vol. LX11, No.1 (Jan): 1-13.
Moizer, P., S. Turley and D. Walker. 1986. Reliance on
Other Auditors: A U.K. Study. Accounting and
Business Research (Autumn): 343-352.
Moore, Perry Glen. 1993. External Auditor Reliance on
Internal Auditors: An Examination of the Similarity
of Auditor Judgements. Ph.D. diss., University of
Georgia. Dissertation Abstracts International, 54,
999A. University Microfilms No. 93-20707.
Nanni, Alfred John, Jr. 1981. The Auditor's Evaluation
of Internal Accounting Control: A Systems View of
Professional Judgement. Ph.D diss., University of
Massachusetts. Dissertation Abstracts International, 
42, 1221A.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(NCFFR). 1987. Report of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission) 
(Oct). New York:AICPA.
Newell, Allen. 1968. Judgement and its Representation:
An Introduction. In Formal Representation of Human
Judgement, ed. Benjamin Kleinmuntz. New York: John
Wiley and Sons.
Normanton, E.L. 1966. The Accountability and Audit of
Governments. Manchester: Manchester University of
Press.
Norris, Daniel Milton. 1982. Minicomputer Control
Evaluation: An Empirical Study of Auditors'
Judgements of Compensating Controls. Ph.D diss.,
University of Missouri,Columbia. Dissertation
Abstracts International, 43, 3951A..
Norusis, Marija, J. 1991. SPSS Introductory Statistics 
Student Guide. Chicago: SPSS Inc.
Okopny, D. Robert. 1986. Planning An International
Audit: An Empirical Investigation of Internal
Auditor Judgement. Ph.D diss., Texas A&M University.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 46, 3084A..
Oladeinde,Brown, Vermeulen Zeger and Waterbly Patrick.
1992. A Comparison of Audit Risk in the Internal and
External Audit Profession, (May). Paper presented at
Audit Conference, City University, London.
Oppenheim, A.N. 1966. Ouestionnaire Design and Health
Measurement. London: Heinemann.
530
Oskamp,S.	 1965	 .	 Overconfidence 	 in	 Case-Study
	
Judgements.	 Journal of Consulting Psychology
Vol.29: 261-265.
Ott, Lyman. 1977. An Introduction to Statistical 
Methods and Data Analysis. California: Duxbury
Press.
Patrick,C. 1937. Creative thought in artists. Journal 
of Psychology, Vol.4: 35-73.
Philips, Thomas J., Barry T. Lewis, and Tom Agee. 1987.
The Treadway Commission: Implications for Internal
Auditors. Internal Auditor (Oct): 24-28.
Pisharodi, Ramohan. 1985. A Behavioral Process Model of
Customer Service Evaluation Based on Supplier-
Customer Differences in Perception. Ph.D. diss., The
University of Tennessee,Knoxville.
Porter, B.A. 1994. The Audit Trinity: The key to
securing corporate accountability and responsible
corporate governance (May). Paper presented at the
British Accounting Asociation Conference,
Winchester, UK.
Porter, B.A. 1990. The Audit Expectation-Performance Gap
And The Role Of External Auditors In Society. Ph.D
diss., Massey University, New Zealand.
Rabinowitz, Allan M. 1993. Internal Controls: A Basic
Concept Demanding Universal Involvement. Internal 
Auditing, Vol.8, No.4 (Spring): 80-84.
Reckers, Philip M.J. and Martin E. Taylor. 1979.
Consistency in Auditors' Evaluations of Internal
Accounting Controls. Journal of Accounting, Auditing
and Finance (Fall): 42-55.
Rittenberg, L. 1977. Audit Independence and Systems
Design. Florida: IA, Inc. Quoted in Andrew D
Chambers, Georges M Selim and Gerald Vinten.
Internal Auditing, 2nd ed, 35-37. Great Britain:
Pitman Publishing, 1990.
Rouse, R.W. 1993. The Five Assertions - A Revisit. The
CPA Journal (Mar): 54-55.
Rorer, Leonard G., Paul J. Hoffman, Harold R. Dickman and
Paul Slovic. 1967. Configural Judgements Revealed.
Proceedings of the 75th Annual Conference of the
American Psychological Association II: 95-96. Quoted
in Ashton, R.H. 1973. Judgement Formation in the
Evaluation of Internal Control: An Application of
the Brunswick Lens Model. Ph.D. diss., University of
Minnesota.
531
Sawyer, Lawrence B. 1981. The Practice of Modern Internal 
Auditing, 2nd ed., Revised and Enlarged. Florida:
IIA, Inc.
Schiff, Jonathan B., JoAnn Miller and Claire B. May.
1989. Issues Paper: Guidance on Internal Control.
New Jersey: National Association of Accountants.
Schneider, Arnold. 1984. Modelling External Auditors'
Evaluations of Internal Auditing. Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol. 22,.No.2 (Autumn): 657-
679.
Schneider, Arnold. 1985. The Reliance of External
Auditors on the Internal Audit Function. Journal of 
Accounting Research (Autumn): 911-919.
Scott, P.J., and E.0 Huskisson. 1978. Measurement of
Functional Capacity With Visual Analogue Scales.
Rheumatology and Rehabilitation, 16: 257-259.
Shelly, Maynard W. and II Glenn L. Bryan. 1964.
Judgements and the Language of Decisions. In Human
Judgements and Optimality, ed. Maynard W. Shelly and
II Glen L. Bryan, 3-36. New York: John Wiley and
Sons.
Siegel, S. 1956. Nonparametric statistics. New York:
McGraw- Hill.
Simon, H.A. 1969. The Sciences of the Artificial.
Massachussetts: MIT Press. Quoted in John S.Carroll
and John W.Payne. The Psychology of the Parole
Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution
Theory and Information-Processing Psychology. In
Cognition and Social Behaviour, ed. John S. Carroll
and John W. Payne, 13-32. New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Inc., 1976.
Slovic, P. 1971. Convergent Validation of Risk Taking
Measures. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
(July): 68-71.
Slovic, P., D. Fleissner and W.S. Bauman. 1972. Analyzing
The Use of Information in Investment Decision
Making: A Methodological Proposal. Journal of 
Business, Vol.45: 283-301.
Slovis, P. 1966. Cue-Consistency and Cue-Utilization in
Judgement. American Journal of Psychology 79: 427-
434.
Smith, Kenneth, Arthur. 1971. An examination of the
Nature and Measurement of Internal Control in Audit
Environments. Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of
Texas. Quoted in R.H. Ashton. Judgement Formation in
the Evaluation of Internal Control: An Application
of Brunswik's Lens Model. Ph.D. diss., 1973.
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
532
of Internal
Analysis of
Ph. D. diss.,
Dissertation
Smith, Wilbur Irvin. 1984. Evaluation
Accounting Control: An Empirical
Chernoff Faces and Dyadic Audit Teams.
The University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Abstracts International, 45, 222A.
Soergel, R.F. 1983. Probing the Past For the Future.
Marketing Management 130: 39-43. Quoted in Fergus
Bolger and George Wright. 1994. Assessing the
Quality of Expert Judgement: Issues and Analysis.
Decision Support Systems II, 1-24. North-Holland.
Solomon, Morton B. and Joe R. Cooper. 1990. Reporting on
Internal Control: The SEC's Proposed Rules. Journal 
of Accountancy, (June): 56-63.
Spicer & Pegler. 1985. Spicer and Pegler's Practical 
Auditing, 17th ed. London: Butterworths.
Sprague, William. 1955. Fraud, The Accountant and
Internal Control. The Journal of Accountancy, C
(Sept): 37. Quoted in R.H. Ashton. Judgement
Formation in the Evaluation of Internal Control: An
Application of Brunswik's Lens Model. Ph.D. diss.,
1973. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
Srinidhi, Bindiganavale Narayan. 1984. Probability
Modelling of Internal Control Systems in Audit
Decision Making. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 45, 873A.
Srinidhi, B.N. and M.A. Vasarhelyi. 1986. Auditor
Judgement Concerning Establishment of Substantive
Tests Based on Internal Control Reliability.
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Spring):
64-76.
Srivastava, Rajendra, P. 1982. The Reliability of
Internal Accounting Control Systems: Design and
Analysis. Ph.D. diss., The University of Oklahama.
Streiner, David L and Geoffrey R. Norman. 1991. Health
Measurement Scales: A Practical Guide to their
Development and Use. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Tabor,R. 1983. Internal Control Evaluations and Audit
Program Revisions: Some Additional Evidence. A
Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 348-354.
Tajfel, H. and Wilkes, A.L. 1963. Classification and
Quantitative	 Judgement.	 British Journal	 of 
Psychology, Vol.54: 101-114.
Tanki, Frank J. and Richard M.Steinberg. 1993. Internal
Control-Integrated Framework: A Landmark Study. The
CPA Journal (June): 16-20.
533
Taylor, R.N. 1975. Age and experience as Determinants of
Managerial Information Processing and Decision
Making Performance. Academy of Management Journal
(March): 76-81.
Tiessen, Peter and Robert H. Colson. 1990. External
Auditor Reliance on Internal Audit. Internal 
Auditing (Winter): 10-22.
Trotman, K.T and Robert Wood. A Meta-Analysis of Studies
on Internal Control Judgements. Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol.21, No.1 (Spring): 286-292.
Trotman, K.T., Philip W. Yetton and Ian R. Zimmer. 1983.
Individual and Group Judgements of Internal Control
systems. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.21,
No.1 (Spring): 286-292.
Tucker, L.A. 1964. A Suggested Alternative Formulation
in the Developments by Hursch, Hammond and Todd.
Psychological Review (Nov): 528-532.
Turley, Stuart and Malcolm Cooper,. 1991. Auditing in
the United Kingdom: A Study of Development in the
Audit Methodologies of Large Accounting Firms. Great
Britain: Prentice-Hall International (UK) Ltd.
Venables, J.S.R and Ken Impey. 1985. Internal Audit.
London: Butterworth & Co (publishers) Ltd.
Venables, J.S.R and Ken Impey. 1988. Intemnal Madit, 7A-vd,
ed. London:Butterworth & Co (publishers) Ltd.
Wafa A. Ramzy. 1988. The Determinants of Audit Fees: An
Analytical Study. Ph.D. diss., Heriot-Watt
University, Edinburgh.
Waggoner, J. 1991. Evaluating Internal Control Procedure
Effectiveness. Internal Auditing, (Winter): 38-43.
Wagonner, J.B., and D.E. Ricketts. 1989. External
Auditors vs. Internal Auditors in an Internal
Control Test. Internal Auditing (Spring): 57-65.
Wallace, W.A. 1984. A Time Series Analysis of the Effect 
of Internal Audit Activities on External Audit Fees.
Florida: Institute of Internal Auditors Research
Foundation.
Wallas, G. 1926. The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Co.
Walker, N.R. and L.Tim Pierce. 1988. The Price
Waterhouse Audit: A State of the Art Approach. A
Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.8, No.1 (Fall): 1-
22.
534
Ward, D.D and J.C. Robertson. 1980. Reliance on Internal
Auditors. Journal of Accountancy (Oct): 62-73.
Ward, D.D. 1979. A Delphi Survey of Reliance Upon
Internal Auditors and Their Work by External
Auditors During Financial Audits. Ph.D. diss.,
University of Texas.
Watson, S.R. and D.M.Buede. 1987. Decision Synthesis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Quoted in
Fergus Bolger and George Wright. 1994. Assessing the
quality of expert judgement: Issues and Analysis.
Decision Support Systems II: 1-24. North-Holland.
Weber, R. 1978. Auditor Decision Making on Overall
System Reliability: Accuracy, Consensus and the
Usefulness of Simulation Aid. Journal of Accounting
Research (Autumn): 368-388.
Whittington, R. New Study on using internal auditors
work. Journal of Accountancy, Vol.167, No.5: 123-
128.
Whittington,
of Risk,
External
Journal
(Spring)
Ray, & Loren Margheim. 1993. The Effects
Materiality, and Assertion Subjectivity on
Auditor's Reliance on Internal Auditors. A
of Practice & Theory, Vol.12, No.1,
: 50-64.
Wiggins, Casper Eldredge, Jr. 1982. Evaluating Internal
Control and Alternative Compliance Testing
Procedures: A Simulation Approach. Ph.D. diss., The
University of Tennessee.
Wilcox, E.B. 1952. CPA Handbook, ed. Robert L. Kane, Jr.
New York: The American Institute of Accountants.
Willingham, J.J and D.R. Carmichael. 1971. Auditing
Concepts and Methods. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
Winterfeldt, D.Von and W. Edwards. 1986. Decision
Analysis and Behavioral Research. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Quoted in Fergus Bolger
and George Wright. 1994. Assessing the quality of
expert judgement: Issues and Analysis. Decision
Support Systems II: 1-24 . North-Holland.
Yu, Seongjae and John Neter. 1973. A Stochastic Model of
Internal Control System. Journal of Accounting
Research II (Autumn): 273-295.
535
APPENDIX 5a:LIST OF AUDITORS
Appendix 5ai): Cover letter for "list of auditors who are
willing to participate" from supervisor
14 February 1994
Perhaps I should start by explaining my appearance on this letterhead. I have taken up an
academic appointment at Hull and it is in that context, as supervisor of a PhD research student,
that I am writing this covering letter.
You will see from Hasnah's letter that we are asking if you and some of your colleagues would
please assist us in our research. If you are willing to do so, at the moment this will involve you
in returning the enclosed enquiry pack so as to give us the necessary details of your colleagues
(and hopefully yourself as well!) who are each prepared to assist us by completing a
questionnaire which Hasnah will send directly to the people concerned.
Hasnah's research is to investigate whether external auditors and internal auditors come to similar
or different assessments about the quality of internal control within a system and, if there are
differences between their judgements, to endeavour to explore what might be the root causes for
these differences.
I feel this research is particularly important at the moment.
Post-Cadbury, directors will be reporting on the quality of their internal financial control and,
in many companies they may be relying upon internal audit (at least to a large extent) to put them
in a position to provide such a report. External auditors will be reviewing that report and it is
possible that external auditors too will wish to consider the quality of internal work in this regard.
If the two groups of auditors are likely to come to different conclusions then it is clearly of
interest to everyone to understand what those differences are likely to be. On the other hand, if
we discover that internal auditors draw broadly similar conclusions to those of external auditors,
this will also be of relevant interest. As you are aware, businesses apart from those which are
caught directly in the Cadbury net (i.e. listed U.K. companies) are also seeking to adopt the
general principles of Cadbury.
Hasnah is an exceptionally able researcher. She herself is a university academic. I do hope that
you and your colleagues will be able to assist her in this - it would both be of immense value to
her and also, I believe, of interest to auditors generally.
You will note from Hasnah's letter that we will keep you in touch with the progress of the
research. I should say that we will ensure that all responses received will be treated with
complete confidence and will not be used in any way which could be connected with the
individuals or organisations to which they belong.
With every good wish,
Andrew Chambers
(Professor of Audit and Control)
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Appendix 5aii): Cover letter for "list of EAs who are
willing to participate" from the researcher 
21 January 1994
Dear Sir,
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS: THEIR JUDGEMENTS AND
PERCEPTIONS ON INTERNAL CONTROL
I am conducting a Phd research project under the
supervision of Prof. Andrew Chambers to find out whether
there are significant differences between the perceptions
and judgements of internal and external auditors on
certain aspects of internal control.
Using the attached sheets, we would be grateful if you
could provide us with the names of auditors from your
office and/or other offices of your firm who would be
willing to participate, together with their background
data(you are only asked to tick the appropriate boxes).
A prepaid reply envelope is enclosed for your response.
If possible we would like to have at least 8 auditors
each from the "partners" and "managers" levels and at
least 12 auditors from EACH of the "seniors" and
"juniors" levels.
PLEASE DO NOT DECLINE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH IF
YOU ARE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD A SMALLER NUMBER OF NAMES
ONLY!
Other firms are assisting us in this research so it is
possible that we will not involve every auditor that you
name to us. However, we are planning to send a
questionnaire directly to most of the auditors whom you
indicate would be willing to assist us.
Thank you for your cooperation. We will let you know
about our progress and will be sending you a summary of
our results in due course.
Yours sincerely,
HASNAH HAJI HARON
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Appendix 5aiii): Cover letter for "list of IAs who are
willing to participate" from the researcher
19 January 1994
Dear Sir,
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS: THEIR JUDGEMENTS AND
PERCEPTIONS ON INTERNAL CONTROL
I am conducting a Phd research project under the
supervision of Prof. Andrew Chambers to find out whether
there are significant differences between the perceptions
and judgements of internal and external auditors on
certain aspects of internal control.
Using the attached sheets, I would be grateful if you
could provide me with the names of auditors who would be
willing to participate, together with their background
data(you are only asked to tick the appropriate boxes).
A prepaid reply envelope is enclosed for your response.
If possible we would like to have at least 3 auditors
EACH from the "Head and Deputy Head of Internal Audit"
and "Audit Manager" levels and at least 6 auditors from
EACH of the "Senior Internal Auditor" and "Internal
Auditor" levels.
PLEASE DON'T DECLINE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH IF
YOU ARE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD A SMALLER NUMBER OF NAMES.
Other firms are assisting us in this research so it is
possible that we will not involve every auditor that you
name to us. However, we are planning to send a question-
naire directly to most of the auditors whom you indicate
would be willing to assist us.
Thank you for your cooperation. We will let you know
about our progress and will be sending you a summary of
our results in due course.
Yours sincerely,
HASNAH HAJI HARON
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Appendix 5aiv): Example from a page of list of auditors
who would be willing to participate 
PARTNER/ HEAD AND DEPUTY HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT
NAME
1.
ADDRESS(if different from your own address):
Please tick( ) the appropriate boxes.
a) Possess professional accounting and/or auditing
qualifications?
1	 Yes
2	 No
b) Professional accounting and /or auditing
qualifications (have completed and passed) as at 31
December 1993.
CACA(Chart. Assoc. of Certif. Accountants)
CIMA(Chart. Inst. of Management Accountants)
CA(Chart. Accts.,English,Irish or Scottish)
CIA(Certified Internal Auditor)
MIIA(Member of the Inst. of Int. Auditors-UK)
Other
If "other", please specify
c) length of auditing experience
(in years)
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APPENDIX 5b: FOLLOW-UP LETTER FOR "LIST OF AUDITORS WHO
ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE" FROM SUPERVISOR
We enclose another copy of what we sent you a while back and also a coi
questionnaire which we will be using. The research is well advanced in the se
has now spent a year and a half working up to this point but it is in jeopardy I
128 internal auditors and a similar number of external auditors to participate. IN
our required target for internal auditors but are short of about 80 external aud
need Ernst & Young to help us with 20 or more people in the firm whom we m;
a copy of the questionnaire.
Hasnah needs to ask for the names and details to be submitted to her first as s
balanced set of external auditors (which have to correspond in seniority, et
internal auditors).
We are particularly in need of "seniors" and "assistants" and would appreciate
those as of partners and managers, please.
We don't want to make exaggerated claims for the value of this research
believe that it has considerable value. It will be of interest to know whethe
come to the same conclusions about the same system of internal control as the
internal auditors reach and, if not, whether this can be accounted for in an
these things, it will then probably lead to further research which may be Inca
more valuable.
I know this is a very significant burden we are asking of you. I can apprec
in view of the time which will be involved (about one hour for each questio:
I do believe it could be very useful.
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APPENDIX 5c: PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE
Appendix 5ci): Cover letter for primary questionnaire
from the researcher 
Dear Sir,
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS: THEIR JUDGEMENTS AND
PERCEPTIONS ON INTERNAL CONTROL
Thank you for your willingness to participate in our
research.
The enclosed questionnaire should take approximately 11/2
hours to complete and a prepaid reply envelope is
enclosed for your response.
Please note that there are no incorrect answers. If there
are more than 1 participant in your firm,please do not
discuss when filling up the questionnaire as your
individual response is very important in this research.
You can be rest assured that your answers will be kept
strictly confidential and will solely be used for
academic purposes.
It would be most appreciated if you could return the
questionnaire to us in 2 or 3 weeks time so that we could
proceed with the analysis as soon as possible.
In case you have any query regarding the questionnaire,
you could phone me at 0482-470352 or Prof Chambers at
0790-763350.
Any comments you care to make about this work is very
much appreciated.
Thank you so much for your coopertaion. We will let you
know about our progress and will be sending you a summary
of our results in due course.
Yours sincerely,
HASNAH HAJI HARON
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Appendix 5cii): Primary questionnaire 
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF EXTERNAL AUDITORS 
Please tick ( ) the appropriate choice.
[Q1] Are you an external auditor or an internal auditor?
External auditor
Internal auditor
[02] Your current position(status)
Partner
Manager
Senior
Assistant
(Q3] Your sex
1	 Male
2 Female
[04] Length of auditing experience in years
[05] Your age in years
[06] Your qualifications(excluding professional
qualifications which are covered in question 7 and
question 8 of this questionnaire). Please tick all the
qualifications that you have.
Certificate
Diploma
First degree in accounting or related
discipline
First degree in another discipline
Postgraduate
Other
542
1 Yes
2 No
1
1.
1
1
1
[Q7] If your answer to question 6 is "other", please
specify.
[08] Do you have a professional accounting and/or
auditing qualification?
[09]	 Accounting	 and/or	 auditing	 professional
qualifications(have completed and passed)
CACA(Chart. Assoc. of Certified
Accountants)
CIMA(Chart.Institute of Management
Accountants)
CA(Chart. Accountants,English, Irish or
Scottish)
CIA(Certified Internal Auditor)
MIIA(Member of the Inst. of Internal
Auditors-UK)
Other
[Q10] If your answer to question 9 is "other", please
specify.
543
[011] Name of firm/firms(public practice or
industry/commerce) that you've last worked in as
an auditor (excluding the firm you are currently
working in) if any.
Name of firms
(most recent first)
Position(external or
internal auditor).
Please circle
appropriate answer.
Number of
years	 worked
a. EA	 IA
1	 2
b.
EA	 IA
1	 2
J
c. EA	 IA
1	 2
1
1	 I1
1
d. EA	 IA
1	 2
e. EA	 IA
1	 2
[Q12] Name of firm currently
working in
Number of years
worked
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[Q13] Total number of auditors(that is total of juniors,seniors, managers
and partners) in your firm as at 31 December 1993:
At Your Location	 United Kingdom
	 Worldwide
(place of work)
	 (estimated)
	 (estimated)
1	 1 below 25	 011	 1 below 25	 011	 1 below 25
1----1	 [---I	 1---I
1021	 1 25 to 49	 021	 1 25 to 49	 021	 25 to 49
1-1	 1-I	 F---I
031
	 501 50 to 74	 031	 1 50 to 74
	 031	 I	 to 74
1-1	 1---1	 1--I
041
	 1 75 to 99
	 041
	 1 75 to 99
	
041
	 1 75 to 99
1---I	 1--I	 1--I
051	 1 100 to 124	 051	 1 100 to 124
	
051	 1 100 to 124
1---I	 1---I	 F----1
061	 1 125 to 149	 061	 1 125 to 149
	
061	 1 125 to 149
I-1	 1-1	 I-I
071	 1 150 to 174
	
071	 1 150 to 174	 071	 1 150 to 174
I-1	 1-1	 I-I
081	 1 175 to 199	 081	 1 175 to 199
	
081	 1 175 to 199
I-I	 I-I	 1---I
091	 1 200 to 224
	 091	 1 200 to 224	 091	 1 200 to 224
1-1	 1-1	 1---I
101	 1 225 to 249
	 101	 1 225 to 249	 101	 1 225 to 249
1---I	 1----1	 1---1
ill	 1 250 to 749	 111	 1 250 to 899	 111	 1 250 to 10249
1-1	 1-1	 F---I
121	 1 750 to 1249 121
	 1 900 to 1549 121	 1 10250 to 20249
1-1	 1--I	 1----1
13 1 	 I 1250 to 1749131
	
1 1550 to 2199 131 	 / 20250 to 30249
1--I	 1-1 1---I
141	 1 1750 tO 2249 141
	 1 2200 to 2849 141
	 1 30250 to 40249
1---I	 1----1	 1---1
15 1	 I 2250 to 2749 151	 1 2850 to 3499 15 1 	 1 40250 to 50249
1-1	 1-1	 I-I
161	 1 2750 to 3249 161
	 1 3500 to 4149 161
	 1 50250 to 60249
I-I	 1-1	 1-----1
171	 1 3250 to 3749 171	 1 4150 to 4799 171	 1 60250 to 70249
1-1	 1-1	 1---I
181	 1 3750 to 4249 181	 1 4800 to 5449 181
	 1 70250 to 80249
1-1	 1-1	 1---I
191	 1 4300 & above 191	 1 5500 & above 191	 1 80250 & above
1-1	 1----1	 1----1
2 I	 I don't know	 201	 1 don't know	 201	 1 don't know
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[014] Total value of net assets of firm (worldwide) as at
31 December 1993:
01 below £25 million
02 £25 to £49.99 million
03 £50 to £74.99 million
04 £75 to £99.99 million
05 £100 to £124.99 million
06 £125 to £149.99 million
07 £150 to £174.99 million
08 £175 to £199.99 million
09 £200 to £224.99 million
10 £225 to £249.99 million
11 £250 to £499.99 million
12 £500 to £749.99 million
13 £750 to £999.99 million
14 £1 to £1.99 billion
15 £2 to £2.99 billion
16 £3 to £3.99 billion
17 £4 to £4.99 billion
18 £5 and above
19 cannot disclose
20 don't know
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01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
[(:)15] Total value of turnover of firm (worldwide) as at
31 December 1993:
below £25 million
E25 to E49.99 million
£50 to £74.99 million
£75 to £99.99 million
£100 to £124.99 million
£125 to E149.99 million
£150 to £174.99 million
£175 to £199.99 million
£200 to £399.99 million
£400 to £599.99 million
E600 to £799.99 million
£800 to £999.99 million
El to £2.99 billion
E3 to E4.99 billion
£5 to E6.99 billion
£7 to £8.99 billion
£9 to £10 billion
£10 billion and above
cannot disclose
don't know
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[Q16] Annual profit of firm (worldwide) as at 31 December
1993:
01 below £25 million
02 £25 to £49.99 million
03 £50 to £74.99 million
04 £75 to £99.99 million
05 £100 to £124.99 million
06 £125 to £149.99 million
07 £150 to £174.99 million
08 £175 to £199.99 million
09 £200 to £399.99 million
10 £400 to £599.99 million
11 £600 to £799.99 million
12 £800 to £999.99 million
13 El to £1.99 billion
14 £2 to £2.99 million
15 £3 to £3.99 million
16 £4 to £4.99 million
17 £5 to £5.99 billion
18 £6 billion and above
19 cannot disclose
20 don't know
S48
12
3
4
5
6
[Q17] The number of times you have participated in
auditing the payroll systems of clients
0 time
1 to 3 times
4 to 6 times
6 to 8 times
8 to 10 times
more than 10 times
[Q18] Estimated number of clients that you've
participated in auditing
Type of Industry (most
recent first)
No. of clients
Manufacturing
Merchandising
Natural resources
W
Banking
Insurance
Tourism
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Type of Industry (most
recent first)
No. of clients
Advertising
Property
Legal
Others (Please specify)
,
Total
550
12
1
2
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF INTERNAL AUDITORS
Please tick ( ) the appropriate choice.
[Q1] Are you an external auditor or an internal auditor?
External auditor
Internal auditor
[02] Your current position(please mark the closest in
one of these four positions).
1 Head of Internal Audit
2 Audit Manager
3 Senior Internal Auditor
4 Internal Auditor
[03] Your sex
Male
Female
[4] Length of auditing experience in years
[5] Your age in years
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11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
[Q6] Your qualifications (excluding professional
qualifications which are covered in question 7 and
question 8 of this questionnaire). Please tick all
the qualifications that you have.
Certificate
Diploma
First degree in accounting or
related discipline
First degree in another discipline
Postgraduate
Other
[07] If your answer to question 6 is "other", please
specify.
[08] Do you have a professional accounting and/or
auditing qualification?
1	 Yes
2	 No
[09] Accounting and/or auditing professional
qualifications (have completed and passed)
CACA(Chart. Assoc. of Certified Accountants)
CIMA(Chart.Institute of
Management Accountants)
CA(Chart. Accountants, English,
Irish or Scottish)
CIA(Certified Internal Auditor)
MIIA(Member of the Inst. of
Internal Auditors-UK)
Other
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[010] If your answer to question 9 is "other", please
specify.
[Q11] Name of firm/firms (public practice or
industry/commerce) that you've last worked in as
an auditor (excluding the firm you are currently
working in) if any.
Name of firms
(most recent first)
Position(external or
internal auditor).
Please circle
appropriate answer.
1
Number of
years	 worked
,
a. EA
1
IA
2
1
I
1
1
I
i
b.
EA
1
IA
2
1
1
1 I
i
I
I
c. EA
1
IA
2
I
I
I
I
1	 1
I
i
d. EA
1
IA
2
1
1 I
1
1
e. EA
1
IA
2
I
1
1 J
1
I
I
i
[012] Name of firm currently
•	 working in
Number of years 
worked 
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[Q13] Total number of auditors(that is total of juniors,seniors, managers
and partners) in your firm as at 31 December 1993:
At Your Location	 United Kingdom	 Worldwide
(place of work)	 (estimated)
	
(estimated)
1 below 25
	 011	 1 below 25
	
011	 1 below 25
021	 1 25 to 49
	 021	 1 25 to 49
	
021	 1 25 to 49
031	 1 50 to 74
	 031	 1 50 to 74	 031	 1 50 to 74
041	 1 75 to 99
	 041	 1 75 to 99	 041	 1 75 to 99
051	 100 to 124
	 051 1 	1 100 to 124	 05	 1001	 to 24
051	 1 125 to 149
	 061 1 11 125 to 149	 061	 25 to 149
1----d	 1----1	 1----d
071	 1 150 to 174
	 071
	 1 150 to 174	 071	 1 150 to 174
1----d	 P---d	 I----d
081	 1 175 to 199
	 081
	 1 175 to 199	 081	 1 175 to 199
I----d	 P---d	 1----d
091	 1 200 to 224
	 091
	 1 200 to 224	 091	 1 200 to 224
1----d	 1--I	 1----d
101	 1 225 to 249
	 101	 1 225 to 249	 101	 1 225 to 249
F---d	 P---d	 F---d
1l 	 250 to 749	 111	 1 250 to 899	 111	 1 250 to 10249
121	 1 750 to 1249 121	 1 900 to 1549 121
	
1 10250 to 20249
1----d	 1----d	 1----d
131	 1 1250 to 1749 131
	 1 1550 to 2199 131 	 1 20250 to 30249
I-4	 1----1	 I-I
141	 1 1750 tO 2249 141
	 1 2200 to 2849 141
	 1 30250 to 40249
1----d	 1----d
	 1----d
151	 1 2250 to 2749 151
	
1 2850 to 3499 151
	 1 40250 to 50249
I----d	 1----d
	
1----1
161	 1 2750 to 3249 161
	
1 3500 to 4149 161
	 1 50250 to 60249
1---d	 1- ---d	 P---d
171	 1 3250 to 3749 171
	
1 4150 to 4799 171	 1 60250 to 70249
181	 1 3750 to 4249 181
	
1 4800 to 5449 181	 1 70250 to 80249
P---d	 1--I
191	 1 4300 & above 191	 1 5500 & above 191	 1 80250 & above
2 1	 1 don't know	 201	 1 don't know	 201	 I don't know
554
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
[Q14] Total value of net assets of firm(worldwide) as
at 31 December 1993:
below £25 million
£25 to £49.99 million
£50 to £74.99 million
£75 to £99.99 million
£100 to £124.99 million
£125 to £149.99 million
£150 to £174.99 million
£175 to £199.99 million
£200 to £224.99 million
£225 to £249.99 million
£250 to £499.99 million
£500 to £749.99 million
£750 to £999.99 million
£1 to £1.99 billion
£2 to £2.99 billion
£3 to £3.99 billion
£4 to £4.99 billion
E5 and above
cannot disclose
don't know
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01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
[Q15] Total value of turnover of firm(worldwide) as at
31 December 1993:
below £25 million
£25 to £49.99 million
£50 to £74.99 million
£75 to £99.99 million
£100 to £124.99 million
£125 to £149.99 million
£150 to £174.99 million
£175 to £199.99 million
£200 to £399.99 million
£400 to £599.99 million
£600 to £799.99 million
£800 to £999.99 million
£1 to £2.99 billion
£3 to £4.99 billion
£5 to £6.99 billion
£7 to £8.99 billion
£9 to £10 billion
£10 billion and above
cannot disclose
don't know
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[016] Annual profit of firm(worldwide) as at 31 December
1993:
01 below £25 million
02 £25 to £49.99 million
03 £50 to £74.99 million
04 £75 to £99.99 million
05 £100 to £124.99 million
06 £125 to £149.99 million
07 £150 to £174.99 million
08 £175 to £199.99 million
09 £200 to £399.99 million
10 £400 to £599.99 million
11 £600 to £799.99 million
12 £800 to £999.99 million
13 £1 to £1.99 billion
14 £2 to £2.99 million
15 £3 to £3.99 million
16 £4 to £4.99 million
17 £5 to £5.99 billion
18 £6 billion and above
19 cannot disclose
20 don't know
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01
02
03
04
05
[Q17] Name of audit firm that does audit for your
company
01 Arthur Andersen
02 Coopers & Lybrand
03 Ernst & Young
04 KPMG Peat Marwick
05 Price Waterhouse
06 Touche Ross
07 Other
[018] If your answer to question 17 is "other", please
specify.
[Q19] To whom is the Head of Internal Audit
accountable? (Tick more than one if appropriate).
Financial Controller or Director of Finance
Chief Executive
Board of Directors
Audit Committee
Other
[020] If your answer to question 19 is "other", please
specify.
558
1021] Are you involved with compliance testing?
1 Yes
2 No
3 Partly
[Q22] If your answer to question 21 is "Yes" or
"Partly", please elaborate if possible.
[023] Do you make recommendations for improvement in
internal control systems?
1 Yes
2 No
3 Partly
[024] If your answer to question 23 is "Yes" or
"Partly", please elaborate if possible.
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[025] Are you involved with developing detailed
proposals for the design or re-design of internal
controls?
1 Yes
2 No
3 Partly
[026] If your answer to question 25 is "Yes" or
"Partly", please specify.
[027] Are you involved with the implementation of
control changes?
1 Yes
2 No
3 Partly
[028] If your answer to question 27 is "Yes" or
"Partly", please elaborate if possible.
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[029] Are you involved in administering or operating
any internal controls?
1 Yes
2 No
3 Partly
[030] If your answer to question 29 is "Yes" or
"Partly", please elaborate if possible.
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SECTION B 
QUESTION 1: INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE MATERIAL FOR EXTERNAL
AUDITORS 
PLEASE DO NOT CONSULT EACH OTHER WHEN ANSWERING THIS
SECTION. "YOUR INDIVIDUAL JUDGEMENT" IS VERY IMPORTANT TO
THIS RESEARCH.
The introduction passage below is a description of a
payroll cycle which serves as a background information to
the cases that accompanies it. Please read the
introduction passage below before attempting to answer
the cases.
INTRODUCTION
You are the auditor in charge of the year-end statutory
audit of ABC Limited. Your firm has performed the annual
audit for the past several years, but this is the first
year that you have been assigned to be the auditor in
charge of the fieldwork. The previous work done on
payroll did not result in any material concerns.
ABC Limited produces air conditioners in an assembly-line
operation. During the year under review, net sales were
about £40 million. You have decided that your
investigation of the company's internal control system
should be undertaken before you determine further audit
procedures which should be applied.
You have assistants to review the existing internal
control system and the operation of that system in the
various areas of the company's operations; for instance,
they will investigate the internal controls pertaining to
cash receipts; the controls over accounts receivable;
the controls over payrolls, etc. In conducting these
reviews, your assistants will use internal control
questionnaires.
You will review the completed questionnaires and then
evaluate the strength of the existing controls. Based
upon your evaluation, you will then prescribe the audit
procedures to be applied in each area.
In this experiment, you are only concerned with the
internal controls over payroll. The company has about 270
factory employees. The employees are paid monthly, and
the total annual payroll is approximately £21/2 million.
Hourly wage rates are established in the union contract.
The company has not yet computerized all aspects of its
accounting system although it is thinking of doing so in
the near future. Thus, the calculation of the payroll and
the related record-keeping and other tasks are performed
manually.
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When a new employee is hired by the company, the
personnel department sends a copy of the P45, other forms
and details of voluntary deductions to the payroll
department. The personnel department also notifies the
payroll department when a worker's
employment is terminated.
A time clock is used. The cards are kept in a rack beside
the clock, and factory employees are required to punch in
and out every day. The payroll department uses the time
cards as input to the payroll computation process. Other
input, in the form of authorised wage rates and
authorized deductions, is obtained from the personnel
department. After the payroll cheques are prepared, they
are sent to the controller's office, along with any
cheques that were spoiled in the preparation process.
Spoiled cheques are properly destroyed.
The controller signs the cheques and sends them to the
treasurer's office. The treasurer prepares a cheque for
the exact amount of the total net pay to transfer funds
from the general bank account to the imprest payroll bank
account. After the treasurer signs this cheque, his
secretary makes the deposit in the imprest payroll bank
account on the day before the payroll cheques are to be
issued.
After the cheques have been distributed to the employees,
any unclaimed cheques are returned to the controller
immediately. After holding the cheques for two days, the
controller deposits them in a special bank account and
records a liability.
Reconciliation of the payroll bank account is done
monthly.
The employees directly concerned with the payroll system
have been with the company an average of 5 years with the
range being 2 to 10 years.
YOU ARE TO ASSUME THAT THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES
DESCRIBED IN THE INTRODUCTION PASSAGE ARE FULLY COMPLIED
WITH.
You are asked to evaluate the quality of the internal
control system by putting a cross("X") on the line which
has "extremely weak" and "extremely strong" written at
each end. The cross("X") which you put on the line would
represent your strength of belief regarding the quality
of internal control system that you are evaluating.
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QUESTION 1: INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE MATERIAL FOR INTERNAL
AUDITORS 
CASE MATERIAL FOR INTERNAL AUDITORS
The introduction passage below is a description of a
payroll cycle which serves as a background information to
the cases that accompanies it. Please read the
introduction passage below before attempting to answer
the cases.
INTRODUCTION
You are the leader of a group of internal auditors who
has been put in charge of the fieldwork for the audit of
a subsidiary company, ABC Limited. This subsidiary has
been a member of the group for many years and as such has
been subject to review by both internal and external
audit on many occassions. However, this is the first year
that you have been assigned to be the auditor in charge
of the fieldwork. The previous work done on payroll did
not result in any material concerns.
ABC Limited produces air conditioners in an assembly-line
operation. During the year under review, net sales were
about £40 million. You have decided that your
investigation of the company's internal control system
should be undertaken before you determine further audit
procedures which should be applied.
You have assistants who will review the existing internal
control system and the operation of that system in the
various areas of the company's operations; for instance,
they will investigate the internal controls pertaining to
cash receipts; the controls over accounts receivable;
the controls over payrolls, etc. In conducting these
reviews, your assistants will use internal control
questionnaires.
You will review the completed questionnaires and then
evaluate the strength of the existing controls. Based
upon your evaluation, you will then prescribe the audit
procedures to be applied in each area.
In this experiment, you are only concerned with the
internal controls over payroll. The company has about 270
factory employees. The employees are paid monthly, and
the total annual payroll is approximately £21/2 million.
Hourly wage rates are established in the union contract.
The company has not yet computerized all aspects of its
accounting system although it is thinking of doing so in
the near future. Thus, the calculation of the payroll and
the related record-keeping and other tasks are performed
manually.
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When a new employee is hired by the company, the
personnel department sends a copy of the P45, other forms
and details of voluntary deductions to the payroll
department. The personnel department also notifies the
payroll department when a worker's employment is
terminated.
A time clock is used. The cards are kept in a rack beside
the clock, and factory employees are required to punch in
and out every day. The payroll department uses the time
cards as input to the payroll computation process. Other
input, in the form of authorised wage rates and
authorized deductions, is obtained from the personnel
department. After the payroll cheques are prepared, they
are sent to the controller's office, along with any
cheques that were spoiled in the preparation process.
Spoiled cheques are properly destroyed.
The controller signs the cheques and sends them to the
treasurer's office. The treasurer prepares a cheque for
the exact amount of the total net pay to transfer funds
from the general bank account to the imprest payroll bank
account. After the treasurer signs this cheque, his
secretary makes the deposit in the imprest payroll bank
account on the day before the payroll cheques are to be
issued.
After the cheques have been distributed to the employees,
any unclaimed cheques are returned to the controller
immediately. After holding the cheques for two days, the
controller deposits them in a special bank account and
records a liability. Reconciliation of the payroll bank
account is done monthly.
The employees directly concerned with the payroll system
have been with the company an average of 5 years with the
range being 2 to 10 years.
YOU ARE TO ASSUME THAT THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES
DESCRIBED IN THE INTRODUCTION PASSAGE ARE FULLY COMPLIED
WITH.
You are asked to evaluate the quality of the internal
control system by putting a cross("X") on the line which
has "extremely weak" and "extremely strong" written at
each end. The cross("X") which you put on the line
would represent your strength of belief regarding the
quality of internal control system that you are
evaluating.
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QUESTIONS COMMON TO BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL AUDITORS 
You are required to make 8 evaluations, one for each of
8 sets of answers which your assistants might bring to
you.
FOR THE PURPOSE OF Ql, YOU ARE TO ASSUME THAT YOU HAVE
INSTRUCTED YOUR ASSISTANTS TO EXAMINE ONLY 8 INTERNAL
CONTROL PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO PAYROLL. EACH PROCEDURE
IS IN THE FORM OF A QUESTION WHICH YOUR ASSISTANTS HAVE
ANSWERED BY "YES" OR "NO" DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF
THEIR EXAMINATIONS.
YOU WILL THEN BASED YOUR JUDGEMENT OF THE STRENGTH OF
INTERNAL CONTROL ON THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES
DESCRIBED IN THE INTRODUCTION PASSAGE AND THE 8 INTERNAL
CONTROL PROCEDURES WHICH ARE STATED IN THE FORM OF A
QUESTIONNAIRE. INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES WITH A "YES"
ANSWER INDICATES THAT THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURE IS
"PRESENT" AND "FULLY COMPLIED WITH".
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QUESTION 1 
Question 1 consists of "8" cases. You are required to
evaluate the internal control system of each case by
marking a cross on the line provided which has "extremely
weak" and "extremely strong" marked at each end. You can
mark a cross("X") anywhere along the line according to your
strength of belief. Each case represents a separate
internal control system.
For example,assuming you are given the following internal
control questionnaire:
INTERNAL CONTROL OUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations? NZ
2. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
3. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit? y/'
4. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? t/
5. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee
file of the personnel department? 1/
6. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately
separated from the task of payroll bank
account reconciliation? N/
7. Are management reports used to monitor
the reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? t/-
Suppose after having considered the internal control
procedures described in the introduction passage AND the
internal control procedures that exist (as indicated by the
"yes's" in the internal control questionnaire), you believe
that the internal control system is "weak". You would then
mark a cross("X") closer to the lower end of the line as
shown below,for instance:
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
567
QUESTION I 
Now, please evaluate the following 8 cases.
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[01] CASE NUMBER 1
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
2. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation? V/
3. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
H
4. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated?
5. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
6. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
7.  Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? %7
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross(X) on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[01] CASE NUMBER 2
INTERNAL CONTROL OUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations? v/-
2. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
V
3. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
V
4. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? t/-
5. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
6. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
V
.
7. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
v/P
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions?
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
(01] CASE NUMBER 3
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
v/
2. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit? V
3. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
V
4. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
V
5. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions?
6. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
7. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? x/
8. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
v'
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[Q1] CASE NUMBER 4
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation? \/.
2. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
v//
3. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
V.
4. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
V.
5. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? V
6. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
7. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
v/
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? v/
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[01] CASE NUMBER 5
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
sz
2. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
3. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations?
/
4. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
v/
5. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? k/
6. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
v/
7. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? v/.
8. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
v/
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[Q1] CASE NUMBER 6
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation? v/'
2. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
‘.-
3. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
V
4. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
v/
5. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? 	
.
v/
6. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations? V
7. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
V
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? v/
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[01] CASE NUMBER 7
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department? v/
2. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit? v/
3. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations? V
4. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation? v/-
5. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions? v
6. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
7. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated? V.
8. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
v7
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
I 	 I
extremely
	
extremely
weak
	 strong
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QUESTION 1 
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
[01] CASE NUMBER 8
INTERNAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
Internal control procedures Yes No
1. Are time cards and other source documents
checked before processing by the payroll
department for casts and calculations? v/
2. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll preparation?
v/
3. Is there adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit?
4. Are the duties of those preparing the
payroll rotated?
5. Are the names on the payroll checked
periodically against the active employee file
of the personnel department?
z
6. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation
and payment of employees adequately separated
from the task of payroll bank account
reconciliation?
V
7. Are management reports used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budgets and following up of
variance reports?
/
8. Are formal procedures established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions?
v/
Based on the internal control procedures described in the
introduction passage AND the above internal control
questionnaire, please mark a cross("X") on this scale
representing your strength of belief regarding the quality
of the internal control system.
I 	 I
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 2
[02] Can you please give any insights into the factors
you were considering when you placed your crosses on
the scales for the cases in Question 1.
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/20
I	 I	 I
/20
I	 I 
/20
I	 I	 I
/20
I	 I	 I
/20
I	 I	 I
I	 i
/20
/20
Ill
QUESTION 3
[03] Now that you have completed indicating your strength
of belief regarding the quality of the internal
control systems on the "line" provided, please
allocate a number out of 20 points to each of the 
eight internal control procedures in such a
way as to indicate the relative importance of each
internal control procedure to your ratings. The
number you can choose from is 0 to 20. "0" indicates
that the internal control procedure is "not at all
important".
THE MORE IMPORTANT THE INTERNAL CONTROL
PROCEDURE IS, THE LARGER THE NUMBER THAT SHOULD
BE ASSIGNED TO IT.
PLEASE GIVE A MARKED SCORE FOR EACH CONTROL
PROCEDURE.
Internal control procedures	 Points
1. Time cards and other source documents are
checked before processing by the payroll department
for casts and calculations 	
2. The tasks of both timekeeping and payment of
employees are adequately separated from the task of
payroll preparation
	
3. There is adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information relevant
to the audit') 	
4. The duties of those preparing the payroll are
rotated 	
5. The names on the payroll are checked
periodically against the active employee file of
the personnel department 	
6. The tasks of both payroll preparation and
payment of employees are adequately separated from
the tasks of payroll bank account reconciliation.
7. Management reports are used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data through comparisons
with budget and following up of variance reports.
/20
8. Formal procedures are established for changing
names, pay rates and deductions 	
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QUESTION 4
(Q4] ASSUMING THAT ALL OF THE 8 INTERNAL CONTROL
PROCEDURES ARE PRESENT AND FULLY COMPLIED WITH IN
THE COMPANY, please rate the extent to which the
"control objectives" can be met by each of the
internal control procedures, in the matrix on
the next page of this questionnaire.
"CONTROL OBJECTIVES" ARE GOALS WHICH IF ACHIEVED
WOULD INDICATE THAT THE SYSTEM HAS FUNCTIONED
SATISFACTORILY.
You are required to write down the appropriate
number in each box of the matrix provided below,
using this numbering scale:
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
does very slightly adequately strongly very 	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
For example, if you think that the internal control
procedure relating to line 1 of the matrix, ("Time
cards and other source documents are checked before
processing by the payroll department for casts and
calculations") will "adequately achieve" the
"Completeness" control objective then you should
put a "4" in the appropriate box. Here are some
examples which have been entered on the matrix
shown below.
Extent to which control 
°AA:=:}3,132NleM	 are met
Very slightly achieves
Slightly achieves
Does not achieve
Fully achieves
Type of 	 objectives met Itings
Existence	 2
Presentation & Disclosure	 3
Rights & Obligations	 1
Valuation
Internal control procedures Complete-
ness
Exis-
tence
Presenta-
tion &
Disclosure
Rights
&
Obligations
Value-
tion
1. Time cards and other
source documents are
checked before processing
by the payroll department
for casts and calculations.
4 2 3 1 7
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and payment of
employees are adequately
separated from the task of
payroll preparation.
,
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Internal control procedures Complete-
ness
Exis-
tence
Presents-
tine 6
Disclosure
Rights
F.
Obligations
Valua-
tion
3. There is adequate
physical security over
personal files which
contain information
relevant to the audit.
4. The duties of those
preparing the payroll are
rotated.
5. The names on the payroll
are checked periodically
against the active employee
file of the personnel
department.
6.The tasks of both payroll
preparation and payment of
employees are adequately
separated from the tasks of
payroll bank account
reconciliation.
7. Management reports are
used to monitor the
reliability of payroll data
through comparisons with
budget and following up of
variance reports. .
8.	 Formal procedures are
established for changing
names, pay rates and
deductions.
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QUESTION 4 
FOR [Q4] AND 1051, PLEASE DO NOT GIVE YOUR OPINION
WHETHER THE OBJECTIVES ARE IMPORTANT IN A PAYROLL AUDIT.
WE ARE ASKING FOR YOUR OPINION ON WHETHER THE INTERNAL
CONTROL PROCEDURES ARE ABLE TO MEET THE CONTROL
OBJECTIVES.
Now, please complete this matrix with respect to the
internal control objectives.
Key:
	
COMPLETENESS. Existing payroll transactions are
properly recorded.
EXISTENCE. Recorded payroll are for work
actually performed by non-fictitious customers.
PRESENTATION AND DISCLOSURE. Payroll
transactions are properly classified.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. Payroll transactions
are properly authorized and are rightfully the
company's obligations.
VALUATION. Recorded payroll transactions are
for the amount of time actually worked and at
the proper rates, and witholdings are properly
calculated.
Internal control
procedures
Coin-
plete-
ness
Exist-
ence
Pres-
ent-
ation
&
Discl-
osure
Rights
&
Oblig-
ations
Valu-
ation
1. Time cards and
other source
documents are
checked before
processing by the
payroll department
for casts and
calculations.
,
2. The tasks of both
timekeeping and
payment of employees
are adequately
separated from the
task of payroll
preparation.
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QUEST ION 4 
Internal control
procedures
Corn-
plete-
ness
Exist-
ence
Pres-
ent-
ation
&
Discl-
osure
Rights
&
Oblig-
ation
Valu-
ation
3.	 There is
adequate physical
security over
personal files
which contain
information
relevant to the
audit.
4. The duties of
those preparing
the payroll are
rotated.
5. The names on
the payroll are
checked
periodically
against the
active employee
file of the
personnel
department.
6.The tasks of
both payroll
preparation and
payment of
employees are
adequately
separated from
the tasks of
payroll bank
account
reconciliation.
t
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Internal control
procedures
Corn-
plete-
ness
Exist-
ence
Pres-
ent-
ation
&
Discl-
osure
Rights
&
Oblig-
ation
Valu-
ation
7. Management
reports are used
to monitor the
reliability of
payroll data
through
comparisons with
budget and
following up of
variance reports. .
8. Formal
procedures are
established for
changing names,
pay rates and
deductions.
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QUESTION 5 
[45J ASSUMING THAT ALL OF THE 8 INTERNAL CONTROL
PROCEDURES ARE PRESENT AND FULLY COMPLIED WITH IN
THE COMPANY, please rate the extent to which each of
the control objectives can be met by the overall 
internal control system (combination of all the 
internal control procedures that exist),
[Q5a] How would you rate the extent to which the
"Completeness" control objective is
achieved?
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross("X").
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
does very slightly adequately strongly very 	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
[05b] How would you rate the extent to which the
"Existence" control objective is achieved?
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross ("X").
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
does very slightly adequately strongly very 	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
[05c] How would you rate the extent to which the
"Presentation and Disclosure" control
objective is achieved?
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross("X").
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
I 	 I 	
 I 	  I 	
 I 	  I 	  I
does very slightly adequately strongly very 	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
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QUESTION 5 
(Q5d] How would you rate the extent to which the
"Rights and Obligations" control objective
is achieved?
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross( "X")
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
does very slightly adequately strongly very	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
[Q5e] How would you rate the extent to which the
"Valuation" control objective is achieved?
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross( OX").
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
does very slightly adequately strongly very 	 fully
not slightly	 strongly
ach- achieves achieves achieves achieves achieve achieves
ieve
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QUESTION 6 
[46a] Do you think that the system of internal controls
which we have been working with in this
questionnaire would (if complied with) be able to
achieve the given internal control objectives?
Please tick ( ) the appropriate answer.
1	 Yes
2	 No
If "No", please explain the reasons for your answer
[06b] Bearing in mind the answer you have just given
(06a) above, now please consider again and mark
with a cross ("X") on the scale to represent your
strength of belief regarding the quality of this
internal control system.
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
I 	 I
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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QUESTION 7
C071 Based on your experience, how would you rate the
"internal control procedure risk" with respect to
each internal control procedure?
"INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURE RISK" IS THE
PROBABLE RISK THAT AN INTERNAL CONTROL
PROCEDURE WOULD FAIL TO DETECT OR CORRECT
MATERIAL ERRORS THAT OCCUR EVEN THOUGH THE
INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURE IS BEING
FOLLOWED.
Please use the following scale in completing the
matrix on the next page of this questionnaire.
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
I 	
 i 	  I 	
 I 	  I 	  1 	  I
extremely very	 low	 average high very extremely
low	 low	 high high
For example, if you think there is an "EXTREMELY
LOW" risk that the internal control procedure
relating to line 1 of the matrix (that is "Time
cards and other source documents are checked before
processing by the payroll department for casts and
calculations") would FAIL TO DETECT OR CORRECT
material errors that occur, then you would rate it
as "1".
So you would then complete the matrix on the next
page in the following manner:
Internal control procedures Rating
1. Time cards and other source documents are checked before processing by the
payroll department for casts and calculations.
1
2. The tasks of both timekeeping and payment of employees are adequately
separated from the task of payroll preparation.
3. There is adequate physical security over personal files which contain
Information relevant to the audit.
4. The duties of those preparing the payroll	 are rotated.
5. The names on the payroll are checked periodically against the active employee
file of the personnel department.
6.The tasks of both payroll preparation and payment of employees are adequately
separated from the tasks of payroll bank account reconciliation.
7. Management reports are used to monitor the reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budget and following up of variance reports.
8. Formal procedures are established for changing names, 	 pay rates and
deductions.
You will also rate the remaining lines of the
matrix, please.
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QUESTION 7
Now, please complete the following matrix.
Internal control procedures Rating
1. Time cards and other source documents
are checked before processing by the
payroll department for casts and
calculations.
2. The tasks of both timekeeping and
payment of employees are adequately
separated from the task of payroll
preparation.
3. There is adequate physical security over
personal files which contain information
relevant to the audit.
4. The duties of those preparing the
payroll are rotated.
5. The names on the payroll are checked
periodically against the active employee
file of the personnel department.
6.The tasks of both payroll preparation and
payment of employees are adequately
separated from the tasks of payroll bank
account reconciliation.
e
7. Management reports are used to monitor
the reliability of payroll data through
comparisons with budget and following up of
variance reports.
8. Formal procedures are established for
changing names, pay rates and deductions.
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QUESTION 8 
[08] ASSUMING THAT ALL OF THE 8 INTERNAL CONTROL
PROCEDURES ARE PRESENT IN THE COMPANY and based on
your experience as an auditor, how would you rate
the "internal control risk" with respect to the
overall internal control system (combination of all
internal control procedures)?
"INTERNAL CONTROL RISK" IS THE PROBABLE RISK
THAT THE OVERALL INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM
WOULD FAIL TO DETECT OR CORRECT MATERIAL
ERRORS THAT OCCUR EVEN THOUGH ALL THE
INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES WERE BEING
FOLLOWED.
Please mark the appropriate number with a
cross("X").
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
extremely very low	 average high very extremely
low	 low	 high	 high
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QUESTION 9 
[Q9a] Do you think that the system of internal controls
which we have been working with in this
questionnaire would (if complied with) be able to
detect or correct material errors that occur?
Please tick ( ) the appropriate answer.
Yes
No
If "No", please explain the reasons for your answer.
[Q9b] Bearing in mind the answer you have just given[Q9a]
above, now please consider again and mark with a
cross ("X") on the scale to represent your strength
of belief regarding the quality of the internal
control system.
PLEASE LEAVE BLANK
extremely	 extremely
weak	 strong
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APPENDIX 5d: FOLLOW-UP LETTERS FOR PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE
Appendix 5di): First follow-up letter on primary
questionnaire from the supervisor
4 May 1994
Please bear with me for sending you this letter in
connection with Hasnah's research questionnaire which we
believe you now have and is awaiting your completion.
My purpose in writing is to express my appreciation to
you for agreeing to complete this questionnaire and to
stress how important it is to Hasnah's research that she
gets back from you a completed questionnaire. The timing
of your response is less important than her need to
receive this response from you. Hasnah has selected 64
external auditors and also a set of 64 internal auditors.
The two sets match intrms of experience,
qualifications,etc. As you will realise, it was not easy
for us to find this number of people who were willing to
assist in the research and since the participants have
been carefully selected according to their profiles, it
would be almost impossible to find satisfactory
substitutes.
Hasnah's research is dependent on her receiving back
these questionnaires, completed. So I would be very
relieved, as would Hasnah, if you could find the time
within your busy schedule to answer the questionnaire,
please.
We will, of course, keep in touch with the progress of
the research-which I think is quite important in
prcatical terms.
With every good wish,
Andrew Chambers
Professor of Audit and Control
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Appendix 5dii): Second follow-up letter on primary
questionnaire from the researcher
4 May 1994
Dear Sir/ Madam,
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS: THEIR JUDGEMENTS AND
PERCEPTIONS ON INTERNAL CONTROL
I do hope you received our earlier correspondence. We
would very much like to hear from you, please, regarding
the questionnaire we sent to you earlier. We would much
appreciate your cooperation in sending the questionnaire
to us as soon as you conveniently can so that we can
carry on with the analysis.
If you have reservations about the questionnaire we still
hope that you will complete it. We piloted the
questionnaire before sending it to you and are now
confident it meets our research requirements although, as
with most questionnaires, this may not always be apparent
to those who complete them!
If you have recently returned the completed questionnaire
prior to receiving this letter,please ignore this letter.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
(HASNAH HAJI HARON)
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Appendix 5diii): Third follow-up letter on primary
questionnaire from the supervisor
13 June 1994
As you know, we badly need your completed questionnaire. I enclose another copy in case
you cannot locate the first one. It is less important when we receive your response than that
we do receive it. We realise we are burdening you greatly with this but would be most
grateful if you could help, please.
We selected you from a list of names put forward as being able to assist us in this research.
Every external auditor selected was "matched" by an internal auditor (and vice versa, of
course). Each matched pair of questionnaires is unique. A response rate of less than 100%
weakens the results very significantly and we cannot satisfactorily substitute for "nul"
responses as this might bias the data in that a substitute for a "nul" response might complete
the questionnaire in a significantly different way.
As Hasnah's supervisor, I am becoming anxious about this: Hasnah has invested so much in
her Ph.D.
If there is any way I can reciprocate for your helpfulness - please don't hesitate to ask. We
will, of course, be keeping you informed about the results of the research - which I believe
will be important and in no way threatening to anyone.
e /
Andrew Chambers
Professor of Audit & Control
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Appendix 5div): Fourth follow-up letter on primary
questionnaire from the supervisor
21 July 19972
About three months ago your name was put forward as someone who would be willing to assist
in our research (some of the names we have may have been put forward by their "bosses" without
the names' knowledge). We're now writing to ask you to help by completing the enclosed
questionnaire - which could take up to 11/2 hours. The questionnaire is unique to a particular
"matched pair" of auditors comprising one external and one internal auditor - and we need both
completed to be useful to us.
The research is exploring whether internal and external auditors reviewing the same system reach
similar conclusions - and, if not, in what ways do they differ and what might be the reasons. We
consider this research to be particularly important in view of the current emphasis upon internal
control and the need for coordination between internal and external auditors. We shall be giving
our helpers progress reports as our research progresses.
The research is being conducted by Hasnah Haron, a university accounting academic who is
engaged upon her Ph.D under my supervision. I do hope you will be able to help. We don't ask
you lightly as we realise it is a lot to ask - but your contribution will be very valuable however
you answer the questions.
Please note that there are no incorrect answers. If there are other participants in your firm, please
do not discuss the questionnaire with them as your individual response is very important to this
research. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will solely be used for academic
purposes.
Andrew Chambers
Professor of Audit & Control
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APPENDIX 5e: ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS TO FILL IN PRIMARY
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Appendix 5ei): Cover letter for additional participants
to fill in primary questionnaire from the supervisor
I have a Ph.D research student who is exploring the topical issue of whether external auditors and
internal auditors come to similar conclusions about systems of internal control. Her research
method requires that she analyses 64 matched pairs of questionnaires. She is still a few short of
the number she needs.
Accordingly, I am writing to you, being the first time we have approached your firm, to ask you
if you would be so kind as to arrange for the enclosed questionnaire to be completed by a
member of your staff who corresponds to the Profile given on the cover sheet of the
questionnaire.
I can assure you that the research analysis will divorce the identity of individuals and firms from
the data.
It would be immensely valuable to us if you could help us in this way. The questionnaire takes
about 1V2 hours to complete. If you are unable to help could you please return the questionnaire
in the envelope provided.
Thank you in advance - we shall be keeping you in touch with the results of the research.
‘")
Andrew Chambers
Professor of Audit & Control
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Appendix 5eii): Profile list of auditors attached to
questionnaire
PLEASE WRITE IN CAPITAL LETTERS. 
NAME
NAME OF FIRM/ORGANISATION
ADDRESS: 
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Please arrange for the questionnaire to be completed by a
member of your staff who fits ALL 3 criterias (as marked by
a "	 " in the appropriate boxes):
1. Current position(status)
Partner/ Head or Deputy Head of Internal Audit
Manager/ Audit Manager
Senior/ Senior Internal Auditor
Junior/ Internal Auditor
Have COMPLETED and PASSED one or more of the
following exams as at 31 December 1993:
CACA(Char. Assoc. of Certified Account.)
CIMA(Char. Institute of Management Account.)
CA(Char. Account. English,Irish or Scottish)
CIA(Certified Internal Auditor)
MIIA(passed by examination)
CIPFA(Chart. Inst. of Public Financ.Account.)
Have NOT COMPLETED and PASSED one or more of
the following exams as at 31 December 1993:
CACA(Char. Assoc. of Certified Account.)
CIMA(Char. Institute of Management Account.)
CA(Char. Account. English,Irish or Scottish)
CIA(Certified Internal Auditor)
MIIA(passed by examination)
CIPFA(Chart. Inst. of Public Financ. Account.)
3. Length of AUDITING experience:
less than or equal to 3 yrs
more than 3 yrs but less than
or equal to 6 yrs
more than 6 yrs
MESSAGE TO THE AUDITOR WHO COMPLETES THIS QUESTIONNAIRE:
PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS WITH COLLEAGUES HOW YOU COMPLETE THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE AS IT IS YOUR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE WHICH IS
NEEDED.
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Appendix 5fi): Matching up and initial selection of EAs and
IAs from the list of available auditors 
EA
Auditor No Experience Manage- Educat- Total Select
level ment
level
lanai
level
avail
inexp prtnr prof
inexp prtnr nprof
inexp mgr prof
inexp mgr nprof
10322,10417 inexp sr prof 2 2
11623,11624,11626 inexp sr nprof 3 3
10435,10437,
10436
inexp jr prof 3 1
10440,10832, inexp jr nprof 7 7
10833,10836
11629
11630,11631 
11402 modexp prtnr prof 1 1
modexp prtnr nprof
10814,10815 modexp mgr prof 4 3
11012,11011 
modexp mgr nprof
10317,10318, modexp sr prof 15 7
10319,10321,
10420,10421,
10424,10425,
10817,10819,
10821,11317
11625,11627,
11628
10428 modexp sr nprof 1 1
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10430,10432 modexp jr prof 7 6
10433,10434
10438,10439
10429 
10431 modexp jr nprof 1 1
10301,10302 veryexp prtnr prof 22 13
10401,10402
10403,10404
10406,10407
10801,10803
10806,10807
10809,
11001,11002
11301,11401
11403,11404
11405,11601
11602,10405
10408 veryexp prtnr nprof 1 1
10309,10310 veryexp mgr prof 19 12
10409,10410
10411,10412
10413,10414
10415,10416
10811,10816
11009,11010
10809,11609
11610,11611
11612
veryexp mgr nprof
10320,10418 veryexp sr prof 7 2 4
10419,10422
10423,10426
11417 
10427 veryexp sr nprof 2 2
11318 
veryexp Jr prof
veryexp jr nprof
Total
	
95
	
64
THERE ARE 15 GROUP'S
5*8
IA
Auditor No Experience
level
Management
level
Educa-
tional
level
Total
avail
Select
inexp head &
dephd
prof
inexp head &
dephd
nprof
inexp aud mgr prof
inexp aud mgr nprof
24011 inexp sria prof	 ' 6 2
24612
24808
24911
26407
25407
24810 inexp sria nprof 6 3
24909
26409,26411
25007,25511
24713 inexp ia prof 4 3
25216
23214 inexp ia nprof 8 7
24815,24816
24817
26413,25506
26711,23814
25202 modexp head &
dephd
prof 1 1
modexp head &
dephd
nprof
24104,24105 modexp aud mgr prof 3 3
26406 
23313 modexp aud mgr nprof 4 -
23913
26404,23801
599
23708 modexp sria prof 16 7
23907,23908
24010
24607,24611
24707,24709
24807
24910
25207 25211
26706,26707
26907,26908 
23207 modexp sria nprof 10 1
24012
24609
24708
24812
24908
25307,25308
25509,23816
23217 modexp ia prof 12 6
23713
24114 24115
24116,24613
24614,25214
25217,25218
26713,26725
23215 modexp ia nprof 9 1
24814
24818
26709,26710
25504,25505
25510
23813
600
23701,23702 veryexp head prof 32 13
23703,23705 &dephd
23706,23712
24001,24002
24101
24601,24602
24701
24801,24802
24901,24902
25201
25301
25401
25701
26401
26701,26712
26717,26718
26801
26901
23711,25001
25503,25501
23807
23901 veryexp head & nprof
24003 dephd
24803
25203
25901
26301
25508,23803
601
,23204 veryexp aud mgr prof 27 12
23306
23704
23714
23904
24005
24106
24604,24605
24704,24705
24805,24806
24904 24905
25204,25205
25206
25904,25905
26705,26715
26719
25512 26704
25004,23806
23206 veryexp aud mgr nprof 9 -
23905
24004
24706
24804
25304
26104
26703,23804
23211,24608 veryexp sria prof 25 4
23707
23307
23709,23710
23909
24007,24008
24009,26708
24407
24809,24811
25208,25209
25210,25212
25907,25909
25910
26714,26722
26807,23809
25408 veryexp sria nprof 3 2
25908
25507
602
24113 veryexp ía prof 10 -
24413,24414
25213,25215
25913,25915
26716,26724
23815
25118 veryexp ía nprof 1
Total
	 194	 64
THERE ARE 19 GROUPS OF IAs .
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Appendix 5f ii): Final matching up and selection of the 64
Pairs of auditors 
Firms Auditors selected Total
inexp,sria,prof 24011(10322) 2
24612(10417)
inexp,sria,nprof 25007(11624) 3
24909(11623)
26411(11626)
inexp,ia,prof 24813(10437) 3
23213(10435)
24713(10436)
inexp,ia,nprof 23214(10440) 7
24815(10832)
24816(10833)
24817(10836)
25506(11629)
26413(11630)
26711(11631)
modexp,hd&dephd, 25202(11402) 1
prof
modexp,aud mgr,prof 26406(11012) 3
24104(10814)
24105(11011)
modexp,sria,prof 26707(10421) 7
25211(10321)
23708(10317)
23907(10318)
26907(10819)
26908(11317)
24010(10319)
modexp,sria,nprof 23816(10428) 1
modexp,ia,prof 24614(10434) 6
23217(10429)
26713(10439)
25214(10438)
24114(10432)
23713(10430)
modexp,ia,nprof 26709(10431) 1
604
very,exp,hd&dephd 24601(10405) 13
prof 24901(10806)
24701(10803)
25501(11404)
25201(11002)
23711(10301)
26718(11601)
26801(11602)
25001(11001)
25301(11301)
25401(11403)
24101(10302)
25701(11405)
veryexp,hd&dephd, 23901(10408) 1
nprof
veryexp,audmgr,prof 24005(10414) 12
24604(10811)
24905(11009)
23204(10309)
24704(10816)
25512(11010)
25204(11609)
23704(10411)
23904(10413)
24106(10809)
23306(10310)
25904(11610)
veryexp,sria,prof 23307(10320) 2
23809(11417)
veryexp,sria,nprof 25408(10427) 2
25908(11318)
TOTAL
	 64
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AUDITOR NO SET NO
EA	 IA
10301	 23711	 10
10302	 24101	 15
10309
	
23204	 1
10310	 23306	 2
10317	 23708	 14
10318	 23907	 36
10319	 24010
	
20
10320
	 23307	 22
10321	 25211	 46
10322	 24011	 25
10405
	
24601	 30
10408
	
23901	 27
10411	 23714	 3
10413	 23904	 34
10414	 24005	 52
10417	 24612	 19
10421	 26707	 39
10427	 25408
	 24
10428	 23816	 48
10429	 23217	 64
i
10430	 23713	 49
606
Appendix 5f iii): Assignment of set numbers to the 64 
matched pairs of auditors at random
EA IA SET NO
10431 26709 32
10432 24114 63
10434 24614 58
10418 24407 42
10436 24713 6
10422 25909 61
10438 25214 7
10439 26713 16
10440 23214 57
10803 24701 37
10806 24901 60
10809 24106 54
10811 24604 11
10814 24104 18
10816 24704 21
10819 26907 44
10832 24815 56
10833 24816 31
10836 24817 12
11001 25001 5
11002 25201 17
11009 24905 59
11010 25512 38
607
SET NO
62
8
28
33
40
53
9
26
29
13
47
51
55
4
23
35
45
41
50
43
EA IA
11011 24105
11012 26406
11301 25301
11317 26908
11318 25908
11402	 - 25202
11403 25401
11404 25501
11405 25701
11417 23809
11601 26718
11602 26801
11609 25204
11610 25904
11623 24909
11624 25007
11626 26411
11629 25506
11630 26413
11631 26711
Source: Random numbers, pg 690, Table 8, Appendix.
Ott, Lyman. 1977. An Introduction to Statistical Methods 
and Data Analysis. California: Duxbury Press.
(First 2 digits, horizontally, starting with first
number).
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APPENDIX 5g: NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
Appendix 5gi): Results of t-tests - early versus late 
reply for respondents selected at "random"
Total no. 
GROUP 1 - EQ 1: early reply (after 15/4/94 but
	 60
before 31/5/94)
GROUP 2 - EQ 2: late reply (after 31/5/94
	 37
but before 21/7/94)
97
Ratings of the 8 cases
CASE FINDINGS
Case 1 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
.37460 1.6575 1.054 37	 1.8768	 1.349	 -.89
Case 2 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60	 .8770	 .641 37	 .7708	 .571	 .83 .411
Case 3 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60 1.5245	 .804 37	 1.8341	 1.049	 -1.64 .105
Case 4 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
4.7368	 .604	 37 4.5841	 .937	 .89	 .380
Case 5 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60 2.2127	 .970 37 2.2505
	 1.037	 -.18 .856
Case 6 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60 2.4882 1.098 37	 2.6522	 .955	 -.75 .455
Case 7 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60 1.7953	 .915 37	 2.1311	 1.220	 -1.44 .154
Case 8 Group 1 (early)
n	 mean	 sd
Group 2 (late)
n	 mean	 sd	 t val sig
60 2.8252 1.086 37 2.9024	 .920	 -.36 .720
Appendix 5gii): Results of t-tests - reply from
"randomly" versus "non-randomly" selected respondents 
Total no. 
GROUP 1 - EQ 1: random (after 15/4/94 but 	 97
before 21/7/94)
GROUP 2 - EQ 2: non-random (after 21/7/94 	 31
but before 15/12/94)
128
Ratings of the 8 cases 
CASE FINDINGS
Case 1 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97	 1.7411	 1.173	 31 1.7019	 1.189 -.16	 .872
Case 2 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97	 .8365	 .614	 31 .6416	 .476 -1.62	 .109
Case 3 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97 1.6426	 .913	 31 1.8281	 1.045 .95	 .344
Case 4 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97 4.6786	 .748	 31 4.8235	 .583 .99	 .325
Case 5 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97	 2.2271	 .991	 31 2.5984	 1.162 1.74	 .084
Case 6 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97 2.5507 1.043	 31 2.7965	 .992 1.15	 .250
Case 7 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 siK
97 1.9234 1.049	 31 1.7716	 1.004 -.71	 .480
Case 8 Group 1 (random)
n	 mean	 sd	 n
Group 2
mean	 sd
(non-random)
t val	 sig
97	 2.8547 1.021
	 31 2.8255	 1.179 -.13	 .894
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APPENDIX 6: EXAMINATION OF VARIABLES 
Appendix 6ai): Examination of variables (difference
between EAs' and IAs' ratings of the cases) to determine 
whether they are normally distributed or otherwise 
** If K-S (Lilliefors) is not significant, then it is
NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED.
EXINDCN1
Valid cases:
(DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 1)
64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing: .o
Mean .2233 Std Err .1681 Min -2.7500 Skewness .3840
Median .0950 Variance 1.8094 Max 3.5000 S E Skew .2993
5% Trim .2032 Std Dev 1.3451 Range 6.2500 Kurtosis -.0016
IQR 1.8475 S E Kurt .5905
-2.50	 .O	 2. 0	 5.:0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors) 	 .0854
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
.48
.32
.16
.00
-.16
-.32
-.48
-2.50	 . 0	 2. 0	 5. 0
Detrended Normal Plot
df	 Significance
64	 * > .2000
EXINDCN2 (DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 2)
Valid cases:	 64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing:	 .0
Mean	 -.1447 Std Err
	
.0970 Min	 -2.4000 Skewness
	 .8041
Median	 -.0600 Variance	 .6017 Max	 1.0600 S E Skew	 .2993
5% Trim	 -.1021 Std Dev	 .7757 Range	 3.4600 Kurtosis	 .3584
IQR
	 .9825 S E Kurt	 .5905
2.40
	 .75
.50
.25
.00
-.25
-.50
-.75
-2 40	 -1.20	 .0	 1. 0
Detrended Normal Plot
dl	 Significance
64	 * .0912
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
EXINDCN3 (DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 3)
Valid cases:	 64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing:	 .0
Mean	 .0300 Std Err	 .1607 Min	 -4.0300 Skewness	 -.4111
Median	 .0000 Variance	 1.6529 Max	 3.3700 S E Skew	 .2993
5$ Trim	 .0571 Std Day	1.2857 Range	 7.4000 Kurtosis	 1.6721
IQR	 1.3400 S E Kurt	 .5905
2.40	 1.20
-6.00
	 -3.00	 .0	 3.0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors) 	 .0745
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
-6.00	 -3.00	 . 0	 3. 0
Detrended Normal Plot
dl	 Significance
64	 • > .2000
EXINDCN4 (DIFFERENCE OF Kits AND 'As RATINGS OF CASE 4)
Valid cases:	 64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing:	 .0
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EXINDCN7 (DIFFERENCE OF AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 7)EAs
Valid cases:	 64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing:	 .0
Mean	 .0047	 Std Err	 .1585	 Min	 -3.2200	 Skewness	 -.1532
Median	 .0450	 Variance	 1.6073	 Max	 3.1200	 S E Skew	 .2993
5% Trim	 .0174	 Std Dev
	
1.2678	 Range	 6.3400	 Kurtosis	 -.0714
ION	 1.7850	 S	 E Kurt	 .5905
2.40
	
.48
-6.00	 -3.00	 .0	 3. 0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors)	 .0574
-6.00	 -3.00	 . 0	 3. 0
Detrended Normal Plot
di
	 Significance
64	 • > .2000
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.16
.00
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-.32
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Mean -.0175 Std Err .1270 Min -2.2200 Skewness .6983
Median -.0300 Variance 1.0325 Max 3.6900 S E Skew .2993
5% Trim -.0537 Std Dev 1.0161 Range 5.9100 Kurtosis 2.2192
ION 1.0450 S E Kurt .5905
-2.00	 .0	 2.0	 4 0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors)	 .0974
. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
-2.00	 .i0	 2.0	 4. .0
Detrended Normal Plot
di	 Significance
64	 * > .2000
EXINDCN5 (DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 5)
Valid cases: 64.0	 Missing cases: .0	 Percent missing: .0
Mean .1477 Std Err .1783 Min -3.5900 Skewness -.1429
Median .1550 Variance 2.0350 Max 3.3800 S E Skew .2993
5% Trim .1569 Std Dev 1.4265 Range 6.9700 Kurtosis -.0506
IOR 1.9325 S E Kurt .5905
2.40
1.60
.80
.00
-.80
-1.60
-2.40
..
4*
..*
fr.
ft
**
..
.48
.32
.16
.00
-.16
-.32
-.48
-6.00	 -3.00	 .0	 3. .0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors)	 .0414
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
-6.00	 -3.00	 . 0	 3. 0
Detrended Normal Plot
di	 Significance
64	 • > .2000
EXINDCN6
Valid cases:
(DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF CASE 6)
64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing: .0
Mean .0950 Std Err .1929 Min -3.2500 Skewness -.0169
Median .0800 Variance 2.3815 Max 3.6300 S E Skew .2993
5%	 Trim .0899 Std Dev 1.5432 Range 6.8800 Kurtosis -.6198
ION 2.4800 S E Kurt .5905
2.40
1.60
.80
.00
-.80
-1.60
-2.40 •
.2.
***
*ft
..
t
•
.24
.16
.08
.00
-.08
-.16
-.24
-3.00	 0	 3. .0	 6 0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors)	 .0648
* NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
-3 00	 .0	 3.0	 6. .0
Detrended Normal Plot
di	 Significance
64	 • > .2000
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
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-.8247
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Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors)	 .1033
-4.00	 -2.00	 . 0	 2.0
Detrended Normal Plot
di
	 Significance
64	 • .0868
• II"	 It.
tt
**et
.0
-.2402
.2993
-.5968
.5905
-6.00	 -3 00	 .0	 3.:0
Normal Plot
Statistic
K-S (Lilliefors) 	 .0642
.48
.32
.16
.00
-.16
-.32
-.48
-6.00	 -3.00	 . 0	 3.
Detrended Normal Plot
di
	
Significance
64	 a > .2000
2.40
1.60
.80
.00
-.80
-1.60
-2.40
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EXINDCN8
Valid cases:
(DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND lAs RATINGS OF CASE 8)
64.0	 Missing cases:	 .0	 Percent missing: .0
Mean .1243 Std Err .1691 Min -2.6600 Skewness .2779
Median .0750 Variance 1.8307 Max 3.7200 S E Skew .2993
5% Trim .0949 Std Dev 1.3530 Range 6_3800 Kurtosis .1059
IQR 1.7275 S E Kurt .5905
2.40
1.60 a	 a
.60
.40
.80 .20
.00 .00
-.80 -.20
-1.60 -.40
-2.40 -.60
K-S (Lilliefors)
0	 2. 0	 5. .0
Normal Plot
Statistic
.0536
-2.50	 .0	 2. 0	 5.0
Detrended Normal Plot
di	 Significance
64	 a	 > .2000
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
EXINDCO (DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF 'CO APPROACH)
.0	 Percent missing:
-3.9600 Skewness .
2.3400 S E Skew
6.3000 Kurtosis
1.7400 S E Kurt
Valid cases: 64.0	 Missing cases:
Mean .1252 Std Err .1832 Min
Median .2500 Variance 2.1478 Max
5% Trim .2063 Std Dev 1.4655 Range
ION
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
EXINDCR (DIFFERENCE OF EAs AND IAs RATINGS OF 'CR" APPROACH)
.0	 Percent missing:
-2.9400 Skewness
2.9100 S E Skew
5.8500 Kurtosis
2.2325 S E Kurt
Valid cases: 64.0	 Missing cases:
Mean .1959 Std Err .1847 Min
Median .2350 Variance 2.1822 Max
5% Trim .2251 Std Dev 1.4772 Range
IQR
• NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
PLOT /PLOT EXCN1 WITH INCN1 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF
CASE 1 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 1).
PLO OF XCN1 WITH INCN
5.25
a
3.5
1.75
1
2.
0	 1.6	 3.2
case number 1
64 cases plotted.
4.8
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN1 WITH MNEICN1 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS
OF CASE 1 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 1 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
LOT F EX NDCN WIT MNE CN1
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1	 1	 1
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64 cases plotted.
PLOT /PLOT EXCN2 WITH INCN2 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF
CASE 2 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 2).
PLO OF XCN2 WITH INCN
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2
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111111	 11	 1
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64 cases plotted.
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN2 WITH MNEICN2 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS
OF CASE 2 AGAINST MEAN OF RATINGS OF CASE 2 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
LOT F EX NDCN WIT MNE CN2
1.25
X
2	 -1.25
-2.5
.37	 1 12	 1.87
.75
	
1.5
MNEICN2
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Appendix 6aii): Examination of closeness of EAs' and IAs' 
ratings of the different cases by means of "plots"
64 cases plotted.
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PLOT /PLOT EXCN3 WITH INCN3 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF
CASE 3 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 3).
PLO OF XCN3 WITH INCH
a
3
0	 1.2	 2.4	 3.6
case number 3
64 cases plotted.
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN3 WITH MNEICN3 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS
OF CASE 3 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 3 BETWEEN EAs AND 'As).
PLOT OF E INDC 3 WI H MN ICN3
X
3
47	 1.42
.95
64 cases plotted.
2.37	 3.32
1.9
	
2.85
MNEICN3
3.8
PLOT /PLOT EXCN4 WITH INCN4 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF
CASE 4 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 4).
PLO OF XCN4 WITH INCN
a
4
64 cases plotted.
2.
0	 1.6	 3.2
case number 4
4.8
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN4 WITH MNEICN4 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS
OF CASE 4 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 4 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
PLO OF XIND N4 W TH M EICN
X
4
3.37	 4.12	 4.87
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64 cases plotted.
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5.25
PLOT /PLOT EXCN5 WITH /NCN5 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OP
CASE 5 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 5).
T OF EXCN WIT INC 5
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64 cases plotted.
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN5 WITH MNEICN5 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF
CASE 5 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 5 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
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X
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PLOT /PLOT EXCN6 WITH INCN6 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS
OF CASE 6 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 6).
PLO OF XCN6 WITH INCH
a
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case number 6
64 cases plotted.
4.8
64 cases plotted.
PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN6 WITH MNE/CN6 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF
CASE 6 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 6 BETWEEN HAS AND IAs).
PLOT OF E INDC 6 WI H MN ICN6
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64 cases plotted.
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PLOT /PLOT EXCN7 WITH INCN7 (PLOT OF HAS RATINGS
OF CASE 7 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 7).
PLO OF IECN7 WITH INCH
5.25
C
a
S
e
3.5
S
U
m
b
e 1.75
r
7
2.
0	 1.6	 3.2
case number 7
64 cases plotted.
4.8
PLOT /PLOT EXCN8 WITH INCN8 (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS
OF CASE 8 AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE 8).
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64 cases plotted.
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PLOT /PLOT ExINDCN8 WITH MNEICN8 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS
OF CASE 8 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 8 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
PL T OF ERIN CN8 ITH NEIC 8
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PLOT /PLOT EXINDCN7 WITH MNEICN7 (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF
CASE 7 AGAINST MEAN RATINGS OF CASE 7 BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
64 cases plotted.
64 cases plotted.
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PLOT /PLOT ECO WITH ICO (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF CASE
BY 'CO APPROACH AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE BY 'CO' APPROACH).
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PLOT /PLOT EXINDCO WITH MNCO (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF CASE BY
'CO' APPROACH AGAINST MEAN OF CASE BY "CO" APPROACH BETWEEN EAs AND lAs).
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PLOT /PLOT ECR WITH /CR (PLOT OF EAs RATINGS OF CASE
BY 'CR" APPROACH AGAINST IAs RATINGS OF CASE BY 'CR' APPROACH).
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PLOT /PLOT EXINDCR WITH MNCR (PLOT OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF CASE BY
'CR' APPROACH AGAINST MEAN OF CASE BY "CR" APPROACH BETWEEN EAs AND IAs).
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64 cases plotted.
64 cases plotted.
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Appendix 6aiii): Examination of closeness of EAs' and 
IAs' ratings of the different cases by means of an
"overlay plots"
plot symbols ='i"e'/format=overlay
/title='ezternal and internal auditors evaluations of case l'
/hsize=60/vertical='audtrno ' min(5000) max(32000)
/horizontal='evaluations in inches'min(0) max(6)
/plot=audtrno with cnl.
i:IA	 e:EA
I	
TzterTal aed infernal andltors l evalTatioes of i case l l	 i
a
30000 i i
U i iili ii1	 i	 i	 ii 1	 iiii 3. i
d
t
r
n
o
20000
i
e
i
e
Iii	 iiiil	 ii
e e
iiii	 i	 i
8	 ee
ii
e
i	 1 i
e e eeeeeeeeee eee e CI 8 e
10000 Se e eee	 ee ee en eee eeee e
1	 .A	 1	 1.A	 1	 2.A	 1	 3.;	 1	 4.i	 1	 5.A	 1
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
evaluations in inches
a:AUDTRNO WITH CN1 $:Multiple occurrence	 128 cases
plot symbols ='1"e'/format=overlay
/title='ezternal and internal auditors evaluations of case 2'
/hsize=60/vertical='audtrno ' min(5000) max(32000)
/horizontal='evaluations in inches'min(0) max(6)
/plot=audtrno with cn2.
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a:AUDTRNO WITH CK2 $:Multiple occurrence 	 128 cases
plot symbols
/title= 'external
/plot=audtrno
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Appendix 6aiv): Results t-test matched pairs (parametric
test) and wilcoxon matcheloliPAiligped-rank tests ("upon-
parametric test) - an example. 
T-test matched pairs(parametric test) 
	Paired samples t-test: ECOMPA	 complete-tcrds and 0th source doc for c
	
ICOMPA	 complete-tcrds and oth source doc for c
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPA	 63	 3.2063	 1.743	 .220
ICOMPA	 63	 3.6190	
•
	 .
(Difference) Standard 	 Standard
Mean	 Deviation	 Error	 Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
	
2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tail
-.007	 .959	 -1.43	 62	 .158-.4127	 2.290	 .289
	
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPB 	 completeness- timek & pymnt seprtd fr pa
	
ICOMPB
	
completeness- timek & pymnt seprtd fr pa
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPB	 64	 2.4531	 1.321	 .165
ICOMPB	 64	 2.6250
(Difference) Standard	 Standard
-.1719
	
2.020	 .253
Mean	 Deviation	 Error	 Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom
	
-.068	 .595	 -.68
	2-Tail	 lDegrees of 2-Tai
63	
Prob.
.499
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPC 	 complete- adeq physical security over pe
ICOMPC	 complete- adeq physical security over pe
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPC	 64	 1.9219	 1.301	 .163
ICOMPC	 64	 2.1406	 1.446	 .181
(Difference) Standard 	 Standard
	
2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tail
Mean	 Deviation	 Error
	
Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
-.2188	 2.058	 .257
	
-.121	 .342 I
	
-.85	 63	 .398
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPD	 completeness- duties preprg payroll ac r
ICOMPD
	
completeness- duties preprg Payroll ac r
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPD	 64	 2.0469	 1.147	 .143
ICOMPD	 64	 2.3594	 1.252	 .176
(Difference) Standard	 Standard	 2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tail
Mean	 Deviation	 Error	 Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
-.3125	 1.763	 .220
	
-.078	 .539	 -1.42	 63	 .161
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPE	 complete-names on payr checkd agnst acti
ICOMPE	 complete-names on payr checkd agnst acti
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases
	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPE	 63	 3.2063	 1.186	 .225
ICOMPE	 63	 3.0635
(Difference) Standard	 Standard	 2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tail
Mean	 Deviation	 Error	 Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
.1429
	
2.361	 .298	 .081	 .529	 .48	 62	 .633
	
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPF	 complete-preptn & pymnt seprtd Tr payrl
	
ICOMPF	 complete-preptn & pymnt seprtd fr payrl
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPF	 62	 2.5484	 1.554	 .197
ICOMPF	 62	 3.0323
(Difference) Standard	 Standard	 2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tail
Mean	 Deviation	 Error	 Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
-.4839
	 1.923
	 .244	 .226	 .077	 -1.98	 61	 .052
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPG 	 complete-mgmnt repts use to moult reliab
ICOMPG	 complete-mgmnt repts use to monit reliab
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPG	 62	 4.0161	 1.166	 .148
ICOMPG	 62	 3.7419
(Difference) Standard	 Standard
Mean	 Deviation	 Error
.2742	 1.821	 .231
Paired samples t-test: ECOMPH 	 complete-formal proced est for chngg nam
ICOMPH
	
complete-formal proced est for chngg nam
Variable	 Number	 Standard	 Standard
	
of Cases	 Mean	 Deviation	 Error
ECOMPH	 62	 3.0323	 1.708	 .217
ICOMPH	 62	 3.3548
(Difference) Standard	 Standard
Mean	 Deviation	 Error
-.3226	 2.387	 .303
	
2-Tail	 t	 Degrees of 2-Tall
	
Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
.003	 .984	 1.19	 61	 .240
• 2-Tail	 Degrees of 2-Tail
Corr. Prob.	 Value	 Freedom	 Prob.
-.010	 .939	 -1.06	 61	 .291
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Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test(non-parametric) 
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPA	 complete-tcrds and 0th source doc for c
with ICOMPA	 complete-tcrds and 0th source doc for c
Mean Rank	 Cases
23.09	 22 - Ranks (ICOMPA Lt ECOMPA)
28.21	 29 + Ranks (ICOMPA Gt ECOMPA)
12	 Ties (ICOMPA Eq ECOMPA)
--
63	 Total
Z =	 -1.4529	 2-tailed P =	 .1463
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPB	 completeness- timek 6 pymnt seprtd fr pa
with ICOMPB
	
completeness- timek 6, pymnt seprtd fr pa
Mean Rank	 Cases
29.30	 20 - Ranks (ICOMPB Lt ECOMPB)
23.87	 31 + Ranks (ICOMPB Gt ECOMFB)
13	 Ties (ICOMPB Eq ECOMPB )
--
64	 Total
Z =	 -.7218
	
2-tailed P =	 .4704
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPC
	
complete- adeq physical security over Pe
with ICOMPC
	 complete- adeq physical security over pe
Mean Rank
	
Cases
24.06	 18 - Ranks (ICOMPC Lt ECOMPC)
21.42	 26 • Ranks (ICOMPC Gt ECOMPC)
20	 Ties (ICOMPC Eq ECOMPC)
--
64	 Total
Z =	 -.7236	 2-tailed P = .4693
	
 Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
EEZISC	 existence-adeq physical security over pe
with IEZISC
	
existence-adeq physical security over pe
Mean Rank
	
Cases
25.50	 27 - Ranks (IEXISC Lt EEXISC)
25.50	 23 + Ranks (IEXISC Gt EEXISC)
14	 Ties (IEXISC Eq EEXISC)
--
64	 Total
Z .	 -.4923	 2-tailed P . .6225
	
 Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
	
ECOMPD	 completeness- duties preprg payroll ac r
	
with ICOMPD	 completeness- duties preprg payroll ac r
	
Mean Rank
	
Cases
	
24.16	 19 - Ranks (ICOMPD Lt ECOMPD)
	
24.72	 29 + Ranks (ICOMPD Gt ECOMPD)
	
16	 Ties (ICOMPD Eq ECOMPD)
64	 Total
Z =	 -1.3231	 2-tailed P =	 .1858
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPE	 complete-names on payr checkd agnst anti
with ICOMPE	 complete-names on payr checkd agnst anti
Mean Rank
	
Cases
24.84	 29 - Ranks (ICOMPE Lt ECOMPE)
27.52	 22 + Ranks (ICOMPE Gt ECOMPE)
12	 Ties (ICOMPE Eq ECOMPE)
--
63	 Total
Z =	 -.5390	 2-tai1.ed 4 = .5899
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
	
ECOMPF	 complete-preptn 6 pymnt seprtd fr payrl
	
with ICOMPF	 complete-preptn E. pymnt seprtd fr payrl
Mean Rank
	
Cases
27.14	 14 - Ranks (ICOMPF Lt ECOMPF)
22.67	 33 + Ranks (ICOMPF Gt ECOMPF)
15	 Ties (ICOMPF Eq ECOMPF)
--
62	 Total
Z =	 -1.9471	 2-tailed P = .0515
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPG
	
complete-mgmnt repts use to monit reliab
with ICOMPG	 complete-mgmnt repts use to monit reliab
Mean Rank	 Cases
23.45	 30 - Ranks (ICOMPG Lt ECOMPG)
26.25	 18 + Ranks (ICOMPG Gt ECOMPG)
14	 Ties (ICOMPG Eq ECOMPG)
--
62	 Total
Z =	 -1.1846	 2-tailed P =	 .2362
	  Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test
ECOMPH
	
complete-formal proced est for chngg nam
with ICOMPH	 complete-formal proced est for chngg nam
Mean Rank	 Cases
29.46	 24 - Ranks (ICOMPH Lt ECOMPH)
29.53	 34 + Ranks (ICOMPH Gt ECOMPH)
4	 Ties (ICOMPH Eq ECOMPH)
--
62	 Total
Z .	 -1.1497	 2-tailed P =	 .2503
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